Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

The Buena Vista Rancheria of Me-Wuk Indians ("Buena Vista") entered into a compact with California to engage in gaming on its tribal land and then petitioned the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") for approval of the compact. Amador County, in which Buena Vista's land was located, challenged the Secretary's "no-action" approval claiming that the land at issue failed to qualify as "Indian land." At issue was whether Amador County lacked constitutional standing to maintain the suit and whether a compact, that was deemed approved where he failed to act within the 45 day limit, was reviewable. The court held that Amador County had standing where its allegations were more than sufficient to establish concrete and particularized harm and where Amador County could easily satisfy the requirements of causation and redressability. The court also held that where, as here, a plaintiff alleged that a compact violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(8)(C), and required the Secretary to disapprove the compact, nothing in the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2), precluded judicial review of a subsection (d)(8)(C) no-action approval. Accordingly, the court remanded to give the district court the opportunity to assess the merits of the suit.

Appellant, an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, pled guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon in Indian Country in violation of 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(3) and 1153 and was sentenced to 36 months imprisonment followed by 3 years supervised release. At issue was whether the government failed to establish compliance with Articles I and V of the Fort Laramie Treaty, 15 Stat. 635, between the United States and different Tribes of Sioux Indians which deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction over his case. The court affirmed the judgment and held that even if Articles I and V of the treaty could reasonably be construed as establishing a jurisdictional requirement at the time the treaty was executed, Congress's subsequent grant of citizenship to the Indians makes them subject to all restrictions to which any citizen was subject and was evidence of clear indication to abrogate any contrary treat provisions.

Respondent filed suit in Federal District Court against federal officials who managed tribal assets held in trust by the Federal Government alleging violations of fiduciary duty and requesting equitable relief. The next day after filing the suit, respondent filed this action against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims ("CFC") alleging almost identical violations and requesting money damages. At issue was whether a common factual basis like the one apparent in respondent's suits sufficed to bar jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1500. The Court held that two suits were for or in respect to the same claim, precluding CFC jurisdiction, if they are based on substantially the same operative facts, regardless of the relief sought in each suit. The Court also held that the substantial overlap in operative facts between respondent's District Court and CFC suits precluded jurisdiction in the CFC where both actions alleged that the United States held the same assets in trust for respondent's benefit and they describe almost identical breaches of fiduciary duties.

A 1935 settlement gives the tribe specific irrigation rights in the Gila River. The government filed another water rights claim on behalf of the tribe in 1979, resulting in a 2006 Arizona Supreme Court decree that the 1935 decree resolved all of the tribe's rights under all theories and that federal court was the proper forum for interpretation and enforcement of that decree. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed a claim against the United States for failure to secure and protect the tribe's water rights. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding the claim barred by the six-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. 2501. Rejecting an argument that the tribe was not on notice of its harm until the 2006 decision, the court stated that the plain terms of the 1935 decree indicated that the tribe would have no further rights and that the government was representing multiple parties.

The defendant was convicted of being a spectator at a cockfight that occurred in Indian Country, in violation of the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 13, (assimilating Oklahoma law criminalizing cockfighting and being a spectator) as applied through the Indian Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1152. The Tenth Circuit remanded for dismissal. The prosecution failed to present any evidence that the defendant was an Indian; Indian status of the victim or perpetrator is an element of the federal criminal statute. Federal courts lack jurisdiction over a victimless crime, committed in Indian Country by a non-Indian. The court noted that the state retains jurisdiction.

One day after giving birth, the 17-year-old mother appeared in Utah state court to relinquish parental rights and consent to adoption. Although the mother's mother is a registered member of the Cherokee Nation, the court determined that the mother was not a member and that the baby was not subject to the 10-day wait for consent to adoption under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901. The federal district court held that the baby was a member of the tribe and that the Act applied, but did not vacate the adoption. The Tenth Circuit reversed. While the Cherokee Nation Citizenship Act provides that "every newborn child who is a Direct Descendant of an Original Enrollee shall be automatically admitted as a citizen of the Cherokee Nation" for 240 days after birth and there was evidence that the baby is a direct descendant, the Citizenship Act does not govern application of ICWA. ICWA defines an Indian child as having a parent who is a tribe member.