Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

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Petitioner Christopher Yancey filed an action in district court contending that Oklahoma state-court rulings terminating his parental rights over his Indian child were invalid under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The district court dismissed his action, determining that either federal abstention was mandated, or the action was barred by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. Tiffany Leatherman and Petitioner are the natural parents of Baby Boy L. Petitioner was a member of the Muscogee (Creek) Indian Nation of Oklahoma, but Leatherman was not a member of any Native American tribe. Petitioner and Leatherman were teenagers when the child was conceived, and they never married. Before the child was born, Leatherman decided to place him for adoption, and she located Timothy and Tammy Thomas who were interested in adopting him. In December 2002, Leatherman brought an action in Oklahoma state court to terminate Petitioner's parental rights and to determine the child’s eligibility for adoption without Petitioner's consent. Leatherman appeared in court, relinquished her parental rights, and consented to the adoption. Petitioner appeared in the proceedings and objected to the adoption. On May 18, 2010, the Oklahoma trial court entered an order terminating Petitioner's parental rights. The court found that the ICWA had been complied with and that the Thomases had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner's custody of Baby Boy L. would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. There was no indication in the record that Petitioner appealed that order. On the day after the Oklahoma trial court entered its order, Petitioner filed this action against the Thomases. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court did not err in dismissing Yancey’s federal-court action because it was barred by res judicata. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's decision terminating Appellant's parental rights. View "Yancey v. Thomas" on Justia Law

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The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the most recent claims brought by the Samish Indian Nation in its continuing quest for federal recognition and benefits. The claims court reasoned that some of the allegations were not premised upon any statute that was money-mandating, and that allegations reliant on money-mandating statutes were limited by other statutes, so that they fell outside the scope of the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. 1491(a)) and the Indian Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. 1505). The Federal Circuit affirmed with respect to some of the allegations because the Tribal Priority Allocation system (25 CFR 46.2) is not money-mandating. The court reversed dismissal of claims under the Revenue Sharing Act, reasoning that the court's ability to provide a monetary remedy under that law is not limited by operation of the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. 1341. View "Samish Indian Nation v. United States" on Justia Law

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This was the second appeal in litigation arising from the Secretary of Health and Human Services' (HHS) decision not to enter into a self-determination contract with the Southern Ute Indian Tribe (Tribe). In an initial order, the district court ruled that HHS's decision was unlawful, granted summary judgment to the Tribe, and directed the parties to prepare a proposed order for injunctive relief. After the parties were unable to agree on the proposed order, the district court issued an interlocutory order in which it endorsed HHS's approach to the contract’s start date and contract support costs. The Tribe appealed, and the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On remand, the district court issued a final order, directing the parties to enter a self-determination contract including HHS's proposed language regarding the contract start date and contract support costs and denying the Tribe’s request for damages. Both parties appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that HHS was required to contract with the Tribe and regarding the contract start date, but reversed the court's decision regarding contract support costs. View "Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

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The Tribe operates a Wisconsin casino and financed investment in a Natchez, Mississippi riverboat casino by issuing bonds backed by casino revenue. The bank, as trustee, alleged that the Tribe had breached a bond indenture and sought appointment of a receiver to manage the trust security on behalf of the bondholder. The district court dismissed, holding that the indenture was void, as a gaming facility management contract not approved by the National Indian Gaming Commission (25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(9), 2711(a)(1)), and that the Tribe's waiver of sovereign immunity in the indenture was consequently void. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The indenture was void so that the waiver of sovereign immunity cannot serve as a predicate for jurisdiction. The district court should have permitted the bank to file an amended complaint to the extent that it presented claims for legal and equitable relief in connection with the bond transaction on its own behalf and on behalf of the bondholder so that it could address whether the bank has standing to litigate claims on behalf of the bondholder and determine whether collateral documents, when read separately or together, waive sovereign immunity with respect to any such claims. View "Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Assn v. Lake of the Torches Econ. Dev. Corp." on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of second degree murder for the stabbing of a fourteen-year-old and assault with a dangerous weapon for the stabbing of a seventeen-year old in Indian country. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court erred in imposing mandatory minimum sentences under 18 U.S.C. 3559(f) because age was an element of the offense that must be found by the jury, and in denying her motions to suppress evidence and to sever counts of the indictment trial. The court held that the district court did not commit plain error in imposing the minimum thirty-year sentence for second degree murder of a child under the age of eighteen mandated by section 3559(f)(1) because the age provisions in section 3559(f) were sentencing factors. The court also held that, given the violent events of the night in question, the officer had probable cause to enter the parked, but highly mobile, vehicle without a warrant and to seize the weapons he observed inside. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied her motion to sever the murder and assault charges. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

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The Tenth Circuit considered whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) properly exercised its discretion to reject a gift of property by a member of the Miami Tribe of Oklahoma to the tribe. The Court noted that this appeal also raised a novel jurisdictional question regarding its review of administrative decisions following a remand from district court. James Smith wanted to transfer to the tribe a portion of his property interest in the Maria Christiana Reserve No. 35 (southwest of Kansas City) where the tribe had plans to develop gaming facilities. Federal law and restrictions on Smith’s fee interest required the BIA to approve any transfer. Citing concerns regarding fractional land interests in the Reserve as well as the long-range best interests of Reserve landowners, the BIA denied Smith’s application to transfer the land. The Tribe challenged that decision. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held the BIA properly exercised its discretion in denying the application. With regard to the jurisdictional question raised, the Court concluded that the government has not abandoned its right to challenge the district court’s remand order, even though the government substantially prevailed in the district court’s final judgment. The Court found the district court erred in its remand order reversing the BIA’s denial of Smith’s application. Therefore the Court vacated the district court’s final judgment and its order reversing the BIA, and remanded the case for further consideration of Smith’s application consistent with this opinion. View "Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of one count of arson for setting fire to his home on the Rosebud Indian Reservation. Defendant appealed the restitution order contending that the district court erred in awarding restitution to the two organizations that had provided emergency funds to the victims without reducing the amount of restitution owed to the victims personally. Defendant also contended that the district court further erred in using the replacement cost to determine the value of the homeowner's loss. The court held that the district court erred in awarding full restitution to the family for their personal property losses while also awarding restitution to the Red Cross and the Bureau of Indian Affairs for the amount of funds each provided to the family. The court also held that the district court erred in calculating Sicangu Wicoti Awanyakapi Corporation's actual loss to be the replacement cost of the destroyed home and in failing to account for its retention of defendant's Monthly Equity Payment Account. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "United States v. Frazier" on Justia Law

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In these consolidated appeals, respondents appealed the district court's order granting petitioner's, an enrolled member of the Pascua Yaqui Tribe, amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. At issue was whether the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. 1302(7), prohibited the tribal court from imposing consecutive sentences cumulatively exceeding one year for multiple criminal violations arising from a single criminal transaction. The court held that section 1302(7) unambiguously permitted tribal courts to impose up to a one-year term of imprisonment for each discrete criminal violation. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "Miranda v. Braatz, et al" on Justia Law

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The Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa (Band) sued the the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Revenue (Commissioner) to prevent taxation of the out-of-state pension income of Band members. The state taxed a Band member's pension earned in Ohio but received on a reservation. The Band argued that the taxation violated due process and was preempted by federal law. The court held that because citizenship provided a constitutional nexus, Minnesota's taxation complied with due process. The court also held that Minnesota's taxation was not preempted where the case was controlled by the general rule: "Absent express federal law to the contrary, Indians going beyond reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to non-discriminatory state law otherwise applicable to all citizens of the state." Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Fond Du Lac Band v. Frans" on Justia Law

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Blue Lake Rancheria, an Indian tribe, sought a refund of Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), 26 U.S.C. 3306(c)(7), taxes paid by Mainstay Business Solutions (Mainstay), an employee leasing company wholly owned by the Tribe. At issue was the scope of section 3306(c)(7)'s exception from "employment" and also at issue was whether Mainstay was the common law employer of its leased employees. The court held that the services performed "in the employ of an Indian tribe" were excepted from FUTA's definition of "employment" by section 3306(c)(7) only where a tribe or its instrumentality was a common law employer of the worker performing the services. The court held that because Mainstay was a common law employer of its leased employees during the years in question, it was not required to pay FUTA taxes with respect to those employees. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the Tribe. View "Blue Lake Rancheria, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law