Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Charles Medicine Blanket unsuccessfully appealed his conviction on sexual assault charges. He sought the writ of habeas corpus from the Tenth Circuit to challenge the district court’s denial of his appeal. Though he committed his crimes in Colorado, Petitioner was arrested on the Rosebud Sioux Reservation in South Dakota, and was extradited back to Colorado to stand trial. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Petitioner argued that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was arrested with an "invalid" federal warrant, and then removed from the reservation without an extradition hearing. Furthermore, Petitioner alleged that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to challenge his arrest warrant and extradition. The district court concluded that Petitioner failed to exhaust "certain due process claims" in his state post-conviction proceedings before bringing his appeal to the district court. Specifically, Petitioner failed to pursue his due process claims through "one complete round of the state’s appellate process." Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Petitioner did not exhaust his due process claims in the lower courts, and as such, the lower courts were correct in denying him the relief he sought. View "Medicine Blanket v. Brill" on Justia Law

This case arose when the Colorado River Indian Tribes ("CRIT") exercised jurisdiction over appellants, a non-Indian closely held corporation and its non-Indian owner, in an unlawful detainer action for breach of a lease of tribal lands and trespass. The tribal court entered judgment in favor of the tribe and appellants appealed. At issue was the extent of the CRIT's civil authority over appellants who were acting on tribal land within the reservation. The court held that under the circumstances presented, where there were no sufficient competing state interests at play, the tribe had regulatory jurisdiction through its inherent authority to exclude, independent from the power recognized in Montana v. United States. The court also held that adjudicative jurisdiction also existed in light of Supreme Court precedent recognizing tribes' inherent civil authority over non-Indian conduct on tribal land and congressional interest in promoting tribal self-government. The court further held that in this instance, by applying traditional personal jurisdiction principles, the tribal court had personal jurisdiction over a non-Indian agent acting on tribal land. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment as to the non-Indian corporation and reversed with respect to the non-Indian owner. View "Water Wheel Camp Recreational, et al. v. LaRance, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant, the finance officer for the Standing Rock Housing Authority of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, pleaded guilty to theft concerning programs receiving federal funds and was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 120 months imprisonment. At issue was whether the district court committed procedural error when it departed upwards from the advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range, U.S.S.G. 4A1.3, and when it considered ethnicity and other improper factors during sentencing. Also at issue was whether the sentencing was substantively unreasonable. The court held that the district court did not engage in impermissible double counting by departing upwards to criminal history category IV where the district court discussed the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of appellant, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between similar defendants, and the need to provide restitution for the victims. The court also held that the sentence was substantively reasonable where any comments regarding race or national origin were not offered as an explanation for imposing sentence but reflected the district court's disagreement with appellant's counsel that the Guidelines were "fair" and that a Guidelines sentence of 70 to 87 months imprisonment was appropriate as a matter of law; where the district court's statements expressed its frustration about its inability to order restitution for an amount closer to the total loss of money rather than a comment on appellant's socio-economic status; and where the district court did not use appellant's lack of an addiction to justify the sentence, but rather to describe his state of mind as he carried out the embezzlement scheme.

This case stems from Plaintiff Crowe & Dunlevy, P.C.'s (Crowe) legal representation of the Thlopthlocco in the Muscogee (Creek) Nation District Court in 2007. Nathan Anderson, a member of the Thlopthlocco Nation attempted a coup d'etat by declaring himself the only valid leader and purported to appoint a new government. While the "coup" proceeded through the tribal courts, the matter of paying the legal bill for Crowe's representation came up. With the "official" government in dispute, and tribal business halted from an injunction issued until the case was resolved, Mr. Anderson argued that his legal fees should be paid from the tribal treasury. The tribal district court dismissed his claim, reasoning that until the litigation was resolved, no one knew who had authority to spend Thlopthlocco funds. The court then ordered that any attorney fees paid from the tribe's treasury be refunded. Instead of complying with the order, Crowe filed suit with the federal district court, seeking to enjoin the tribal court from ordering a return of the legal fees. The federal court ruled in favor of Crowe, and the tribal judge, Defendant Judge Gregory Stidam, appealed. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Judge Stidham argued the case should have been dismissed because he was entitled to sovereign and judicial immunity. The Tenth Circuit found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in granting the injunction against Judge Stidham's order. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Appellants appealed the order of the district court denying their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the estate of their father, the decedent. At issue was whether the district court erred when it assumed subject matter jurisdiction over the probate of the estate when the decedent was an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe and all of his estate property was located within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation at the time of his death. The court overruled State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court and held that the Blackfeet Tribal Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of the decedent's estate and assumption of subject matter jurisdiction by the district court was impermissible because Montana and the Blackfeet Tribe had not taken the necessary steps for Montana to assume civil jurisdiction over the Blackfeet Reservation.

Hollywood Mobile Estates Limited ("Hollywood") filed a complaint in district court against the Seminole Tribe of Florida ("Tribe") where the Tribe and the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") approved a lease assignment between Hollywood and the Tribe. At issue was whether Hollywood alleged an injury fairly traceable to the Secretary or redressable by the district court in a complaint that alleged that the Tribe had threatened to repossess tribal property in violation of the lease. Also at issue was whether the interests of Hollywood were within the zone of interests protected by the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. 415, and its accompanying regulations. The court held that Hollywood lacked constitutional standing to maintain its complaint and therefore, vacated in part the judgment entered by the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court also held that Hollywood lacked prudential standing to sue the Secretary and therefore, affirmed the denial of the motion for leave to amend the complaint as futile.

Plaintiff sued defendant seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that defendant's liens were not valid, in whole or in part, where plaintiff received a substantial settlement from her insurer when she suffered serious injuries in a car accident and received extensive health care services from defendant. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant because it had a right to recover the money spent on plaintiff's medical care under 25 U.S.C. 1621e. The court reversed and held that section 1621e, which allowed healthcare providers to recover expenses from third-party tortfeasors, relevant insureres, or other third parties, did not apply to the action where defendant sought to enforce a right of recovery against plaintiff to whom it provided services.

A member of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community was convicted of destroying trees on the Ontonagon Reservation (18 U.S.C. 1853) and stealing tribal property for his own use (18 U.S.C. 1163). The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the defendant had a right to use the land as chief of the Ontonagon Band and that his sentence was improper because he did not receive an acceptance of responsibility reduction. Federal law does not recognize a separate Ontonagon Band; the land is held by the government in trust for the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community. Merely expressing regret for the consequences of criminal conduct, without admitting wrongful intent, does not constitute acceptance of responsibility within the meaning of the Guidelines. The court acted within its discretion in imposing a restitution requirement of $47,200.

Pursuant to the Indian Self-determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), the United States enters into contracts with Indian tribes and tribal organizations for âthe planning, conduct and administration of programs or services which are otherwise provided to Indian tribes and their members pursuant to Federal law.â These agreements (Contract Support Cost contracts, or CSCs) include costs which are used for the running of essential tribal services, such as law enforcement, economic development and natural resource management. Congress mandated all CSCs be provided with full funding, but then failed to appropriate funds sufficient to pay all CSCs. Instead Congress capped appropriations at a level well below the sum total of CSCs. Several tribes sued seeking to collect the promised-but-unappropriated CSC money. The government argued that the phrase âsubject to the availability of appropriationsâ relieves it of the obligation to pay if the Congress doesnât appropriate the funds. The tribes argued that only Congressional funding decisionsânot the discretionary allocation decisions made by the Department of the Interiorâcan render an appropriation âunavailable.â The Tenth Circuit concluded that Plaintiffsâ interpretation is âreasonable,â and it reversed the district courtâs grant of summary judgment in favor of the government. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

The Seneca Nation of Indians ("Seneca Nation"), Unkechauge Indian Nation ("Unkechauge Nation"), St. Regis Mohawk Tribe ("Mohawk Tribe"), Cayuga Indian Nation of New York ("Cayuga Nation"), and Oneida Nation of New York ("Oneida Nation") (collectively, "plaintiffs") sought to enjoin amendments to New York's tax law which were designed to tax on-reservation cigarette sales to non-member purchasers. At issue was whether New York's amended tax law interfered with plaintiffs' tribal sovereignty and violated their immunity from state taxation. The court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the precollection scheme impermissibly imposed a direct tax on tribal retailers, or alternatively, imposed an undue and unnecessary economic burden on tribal retailers; and that the coupon and prior approval systems interfered with their rights of self-government and rights to purchase cigarettes free from state taxation. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in granting the Oneida Nation's motion for preliminary injunction and correctly rejected the Seneca Nation's, Cayuga Nation's, Unkechauge Nation's, and Mohawk Tribe's motions for preliminary injunctions.