Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Michael McCrary sued Ivanof Bay Village (Ivanof Bay) and its president, Edgar Shangin, under two contracts, alleging breaches of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. The superior court dismissed the suit based on sovereign immunity. McCrary appealed the sovereign immunity ruling, arguing that even though the United States Department of Interior lists Ivanof Bay as a federally recognized Indian tribe, Ivanof Bay has not been formally designated as a federally recognized tribe. The Supreme Court previously concluded Alaska Native tribes recognized by Congress or the Executive Branch are sovereign under federal law, and McCrary did not demonstrate that conclusion should be overturned. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's dismissal of McCrary's suit.View "McCrary v. Ivanof Bay Village" on Justia Law

The primary issue presented by this case was whether the State had jurisdiction over members of Indian tribes who sold unstamped cigarettes without a license at a store that located on trust allotment land outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation. In 2007 and 2008, agents of the Washington State Liquor Control Board purchased cigarettes from the "Indian Country Store" in Puyallup. The cigarette cartons and packs that were purchased did not contain Washington or tribal tax stamps. Consequently, in July 2008 agents went to the store again with a warrant and seized 37,000 cartons of unstamped cigarettes. The owner of the Indian Country Store at the time was Defendant Edward Comenout, an enrolled member of the Quinault Indian Nation. His brother, Robert Comenout Sr., and his nephew, Robert Comenout Jr., were engaged in running the store on a daily basis. Robert Sr. is an enrolled member of the Tulalip Tribes and Robert Jr. is an enrolled member of the Yakama Nation. The Indian Country Store, despite its name, was not on an Indian reservation, but on two trust allotments outside the boundary of any reservation. The State charged all three Comenouts in Pierce County Superior Court with (1) engaging in the business of purchasing, selling, consigning, or distributing cigarettes without a license; (2) unlawful possession or transportation of unstamped cigarettes; and (3) first degree theft. Edward, who was the alleged principal, moved to dismiss on grounds that the State lacked jurisdiction, joined by Robert Sr. and Robert Jr. The superior court denied the motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Comenouts were not exempt from Washington’s cigarette tax. Because RCW 82.24.110 and .500 criminalize the possession of unstamped cigarettes and the unlicensed sale of cigarettes, the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss the charges. View "Washington v. Comenout" on Justia Law

After parental rights to an Indian child were involuntarily terminated in district court, the White Earth Band of Ojibwe (the Band) petitioned for transfer of the ensuing preadoptive placement proceedings to its tribal court. The district court granted the Band's motion even though the child did not reside and was not domiciled within the tribe's reservation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that with respect to an Indian child not residing or domiciled on the child's tribe's reservation, (1) the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) permits transfer to tribal court of only foster care placement and termination of parental rights proceedings; and (2) Rule 48 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure, providing for transfer of the juvenile protection matter to an Indian child's tribe, is limited to foster care placement and termination of parental rights proceedings. View "In re R.S." on Justia Law

Petitioners-Appellees, Teryl Pearson and Robert Pearson (Pearsons) petitioned to adopt Teryl Pearson's (Pearson) grandson, G.D.J. The natural mother, Respondent-Appellant Tessia Bre Stubbs (Stubbs) contested the adoption. The trial court entered two orders on August 11, 2010, in favor of the Pearsons on their Application to Adjudicate Minor Eligible for Adoption Without Consent of the Natural Mother and in its Order Adjudicating Minor Eligible for Adoption Without Consent of the Natural Mother. Stubbs raised multiple issues in her attempt to block the adoption. Among them, she argued that the trial court erred in finding that she failed to contribute to the support of G.D.J., and failed to maintain a meaningful relationship with G.D.J. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the evidence presented was sufficient to support the trial court's decision to allow the adoption to proceed.View "In re Adoption of G.D.J." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court considered whether a tribal police officer who observed Defendant Loretta Lynn Eriksen commit a traffic infraction on the Lummi Reservation could validly stop her outside the reservation and detain her until county police arrived. The Court concluded that the tribe’s inherent sovereign powers did not authorize this extraterritorial stop and detention. "While the territorial limits on the Lummi Nation’s sovereignty create serious policy problems, such as the incentive for intoxicated drivers to race for the reservation border, the solution does not lie in judicial distortion of the doctrine of inherent sovereignty. Instead, these issues must be addressed by use of political and legislative tools, such as cross-deputization or mutual aid pacts, to ensure that all law enforcement officers have adequate authority to protect citizens’ health and safety in border areas. We urge the Lummi Nation and Whatcom County to work together to solve the problems made evident by this case; but if they can or will not do so, we will not manipulate the law to achieve a desirable policy result." Accordingly, the Court concluded the stop and detention of Defendant were invalid. The Court reversed the superior court’s decision and remand to the district court for further proceedings.View "Washington v. Eriksen" on Justia Law

Defendant Linus Poitra appealed a default judgment entered by the district court regarding a lease between Plaintiff Darrel Gustafson as lessee and Leon and Linus Poitra as lessors. Linus Poitra argued the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enter the default judgment because the Poitras were members of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, and the land subject to the lease is Indian-owned fee land located within the boundaries of the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. Linus Poitra argued the default judgment infringed upon tribal sovereignty because of cases pending in the Turtle Mountain Tribal Court. Upon review of the applicable legal authority and the evidence presented at trial, the Supreme Court vacated the default judgment finding that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the lease.View "Gustafson v. Poitra" on Justia Law

Siblings Michael and Desiree Mendoza attended a wedding reception at the Santa Ana Star Casino operated by Petitioner, Tamaya Enterprises, Inc. (the Casino), where they were served alcoholic beverages and became intoxicated.  Casino employees continued to serve Michael and Desiree alcohol despite their apparent intoxication.  Michael and Desiree left the Casino and were killed when their vehicle left the roadway and rolled over.  Suit was filed in state court against the Casino claiming that the Casino's delivery of alcohol to Michael and Desiree while they were obviously intoxicated was in violation of state law and proximately caused their deaths. The Casino sought to dismiss the suit, claiming the state court lacked jurisdiction over a dram shop action where the tavernkeeper's duty not to serve alcohol to an intoxicated person is imposed by tribal law, not state law, and where the tribal law contains a provision reserving exclusive jurisdiction to the tribal courts. The Court of Appeals issued an opinion reversing the district court's dismissal of the complaint and remanded for further proceedings. In this appeal, the Supreme Court addressed a question of state court jurisdiction in a dram shop action brought under the Tribal-State Class III Gaming Compact (the Compact), negotiated between the State of New Mexico and the Pueblo of Santa Ana pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988. There was a conflict between Section 8 of the Compact which provides for state court jurisdiction where a casino visitor has been injured by the conduct of a casino, and Section 191 of the Pueblo of Santa Ana Liquor Ordinance, which reserves exclusive jurisdiction to tribal courts.  Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that New Mexico state courts properly exercise jurisdiction over casino visitors' personal injury claims pursuant to the Compact.  The second issue concerns the two types of common law dram shop claims:  claims brought by third parties injured by the conduct of the intoxicated patron against a tavernkeeper (third-party claims) and claims brought by the intoxicated patron against the tavernkeeper to recover for his own injuries (patron claims).  The Court considered the status of such common law claims following the codification of dram shop liability in the Liquor Control Act.  Due to the explicit language contained in the act that limits its application to taverns licensed under New Mexico law, the Court held that the Act was not intended to preempt all common law  claims.  Accordingly, because the Act does not preempt all common law claims, the common law recognizes an action by a third party against a tavernkeeper for over service of alcohol.  Therefore, the Court affirmed the result reached by the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "Mendoza v. Tamaya Enters, Inc." on Justia Law

Two tribal members (Appellants) were committed as sexually dangerous persons under Minn. Stat. 253B.02, 18c and committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program. Appellants moved to dismiss their commitments for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on their status as enrolled tribal members. The district court denied both motions to dismiss. Appellants appealed the district court's orders, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding that even though federal law did not affirmatively grant the State jurisdiction to commit appellants, federal law did not preempt appellants' commitments. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) based on the terms of the state's civil commitment statute, appellants' commitments were civil causes of action subject to Congress' express grant of civil jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1360(a); (2) in light of the strong State interests presented, the fact that Congress has not pervasively regulated this area of the law, and the minimal intrusion on tribal sovereignty, Minnesota's enforcement of chapter 253B was not preempted; and (3) the state had jurisdiction to civilly commit Appellants.View "In re Civil Commitment of Johnson" on Justia Law

Twenty three former tribal employees sued the Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma for breach of employment contracts. The contracts contained a limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Tribal law requires that waiver of sovereign immunity must be consented to by the Business Committee of the Tribe by resolution. The trial judge, on motion for reconsideration, granted the Tribe's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissed the case. On appeal, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the Tribe expressly and unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiffs' employment contracts. Upon review of the contracts and the applicable tribal resolutions and legal standards, the Supreme Court held that waiver of sovereign immunity was neither expressed nor consented to in the Business Committee's resolutions that authorized the Chief to sign the employment contracts. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.View "Dilliner v. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma " on Justia Law

The State of Michigan entered into a compact with the Bay Mills Indian Community pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(C). The compact authorizes Bay Mills to conduct class III gaming activities (a casino) on Indian lands within the state, but prohibits it from doing so outside that territory. Bay Mills opened a second casino on land it had purchased through a congressionally established land trust. The Tribe claimed it could operate a casino there because the property qualified as Indian land. Michigan sued under section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), which allows a state to enjoin gaming activity conducted in violation of any tribal-state compact. The district court granted the injunction, but the Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit unless Congress provided otherwise; section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) only authorized suits to enjoin gaming activity located “on Indian lands,” while the complaint alleged the casino was outside such territory. The Supreme Court affirmed. As “domestic dependent nations,” Indian tribes exercise “inherent sovereign authority” that is subject to plenary control by Congress; unless Congress acts, the tribes retain their historic sovereign authority. Among the core aspects of that sovereignty is “common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers,” which applies whether a suit is brought by a state or arises from a tribe’s commercial activities off Indian lands. IGRA’s plain terms do not authorize this suit. Section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) partially abrogates tribal immunity with respect to class III gaming located “on Indian lands,” but the premise of Michigan’s suit is that Bay Mills’ casino is unlawful because it is outside Indian lands. Michigan argues that the casino is licensed and operated from within the reservation and that such administrative action constitutes “class III gaming activity.” IGRA’s provisions and history indicate that “class III gaming activity” refers to the gambling that goes on in a casino, not the offsite licensing of such games. View "Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty" on Justia Law