Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.View "In re J.L. Gordon, Minor" on Justia Law

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.View "In re C.I. Morris, Minor" on Justia Law

Mother, a non-Indian, gave birth to Child and decided to place Child for adoption. Father was a member of Cherokee Nation. Mother chose a non-Indian family to adopt Child. Adoption Agency filed a pleaded seeking to deviate from the Indian Child Welfare Act's (ICWA) placement preferences. The district court decided to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences based on Mother's preference that Child be placed with a non-Indian family. Intervenor Cherokee Nation challenged the district court's decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, absent a request for anonymity by a biological parent with respect to a child's placement, a parent's placement preference cannot override ICWA's placement factors.View "In re T.S.W." on Justia Law

Upon adjudication of parental neglect, the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) took custody of L.O., a child and an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation, and placed L.O. with a foster family. After L.O.'s natural parents relinquished parental rights, L.O.'s foster family filed a petition for adoption. The Nation filed an objection to the adoption because DCFS failed to abide by the placement preferences contained in the Indian Child Welfare Act and moved the juvenile court to transfer jurisdiction to the Nation. The juvenile court denied the transfer motion. The Nation appealed, and the court of appeals dismissed the case. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two procedural questions raised by the Nation, the juvenile court granted the foster family's petition to adopt L.O. Filed with the adoption order was a document titled "Navajo Nation's Consent to Adoption." The Supreme Court declined to address the issues raised on certiorari and dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that the Nation's consent to L.O.'s adoption placement rendered the procedural questions moot.View "Navajo Nation v. State " on Justia Law

After a hearing, the circuit court terminated Mother's parental rights to Child. Mother was Native American and eligible to be enrolled in the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, but because she was not actually enrolled, an Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) specialist for the Tribe concluded that Child was not eligible for enrollment. Since Child was not enrolled or eligible for enrollment, the court found ICWA inapplicable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err (1) in finding ICWA inapplicable, as Mother failed to show that Child was an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA; and (2) in finding that termination of Mother's parental rights was the least restrictive alternative available.View "In re L.S." on Justia Law

Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to her two children in the district court. The district court ordered that the tribal social services have custody over the children. The tribal court then ordered the adoption of the children. Mother subsequently asked the state district court to set aside her relinquishment under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The district court denied Mother's petition. At issue on appeal was whether, under section 1919 of the ICWA, a tribal-state agreement respecting child custody proceedings may vest a Nevada district court with subject matter jurisdiction to take a relinquishment of parental rights under circumstances where section 1911(a) of the ICWA would otherwise lay exclusive jurisdiction with the tribal court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ICWA, in keeping with the fundamental principles of tribal autonomy, allows for tribal-state agreements for concurrent jurisdiction even when the tribe would have exclusive jurisdiction absent an agreement.View "In re S.M.M.D." on Justia Law

David S. appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter Hannah, who is an Indian child. Hannah was taken into the custody by the Office of Children's Services (OCS) while David was incarcerated. David remained in jail for the first 20 months of Hannah's life. David was released from prison and was on parole for five months, during which time he had regular visits with Hannah. David then became a fugitive for nine months, before being recaptured and reincarcerated. While David was a fugitive, OCS petitioned for termination of his parental rights, and two months after David was returned to prison, the superior court held a termination trial. The superior court found that Hannah was a child in need of aid due to David’s abandonment, incarceration, and substance abuse. The superior court also concluded that OCS had engaged in active efforts to help David's rehabilitation, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act, and that it was in Hannah's best interests for David's parental rights to be terminated. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's ruling because OCS established all requirements necessary for termination.View "David S. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs" on Justia Law

Six tribal councils, joined by two other associations, filed an action against the State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in the superior court seeking a declaratory judgment that the 2005 Bristol Bay Area Plan (BBAP, the Plan) was unlawful. DNR’s motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) was denied and the superior court held that: (1) the BBAP is a regulation that must be promulgated under the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and (2) Alaska Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) does not bar the Tribes’ claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) did not bar the Tribe's claims and the that BBAP is not a regulation.View "Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources v. Nondalton Tribal Council" on Justia Law

Maternal grandparents petitioned for permanent guardianship of a minor Indian child in the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe tribal court. After receiving the guardianship, they sought to have it recognized in a South Dakota circuit court, which had been exercising jurisdiction over the child and his deceased mother since 2007. The circuit court concluded that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction and, consequently, denied the grandparents' motion to recognize the tribal court order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the minor child did not reside on the Mille Lacs Reservation for purposes of exclusive jurisdiction under the Indian Child Welfare Act; and (2) because the tribal court did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the grandparents' guardianship petition, the circuit court did not err in denying the grandparents' petition to recognize the tribal court order. View "Merrill v. Altman" on Justia Law

Mother and Father's parental rights to their children were terminated by the district court. Before the district court's judgment, Mother had moved to transfer to the case to a tribal court as allowed under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). However, the case was never transferred. The district court maintained jurisdiction and denied Mother's request to continue the termination hearing and appoint counsel for the children. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not comply with the jurisdictional ICWA transfer requirements where the court misinterpreted the ICWA requirement to require an affirmative acceptance of the transfer by the tribe; and (2) because there was an apparent conflict between the children's wishes and what the guardian ad litem concluded to be in the children's best interests, counsel for children should be appointed on remand. Remanded. View "In re J.W.C." on Justia Law