Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

The Tribe filed a complaint regarding the government's management of the Central and Southern Florida Project for Flood Control in the Everglades. The gist of the four-count complaint the Tribe filed was that the project diverted excessive flood waters over tribal lands. The district court dismissed three of the complaint's counts for failure to state a claim for relief and the fourth on summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed Count I because the complaint contained nothing to support Count I's allegation that the Corps had an obligation to protect and not interfere with the Tribe's rights; the district court properly dismissed Count II because it contained no allegation of the process the Tribe claimed was due, much less that it was inadequate; the district court properly dismissed Count III because it failed for the same reasons the court found Count I insufficient to state a claim; and the district court properly dismissed Count IV because its allegations were vague and ambiguous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of FL v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

The Tribe sought to set aside a decision of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) directing the Tribe to place the names of certain disenrolled individuals back on its membership roll. The BIA issued its decision pursuant to regulations providing for administrative review of adverse tribal enrollment actions where, as the BIA believed in this case, a tribe had authorized such review. The court concluded that the Tribe's governing documents did not grant the authority to the BIA to review appeals from disenrollment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Cahto Tribe v. Dutschke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant, the Northern Arapaho Tribe, sued various state and county officials in Wyoming, seeking an injunction against the state’s imposition of certain vehicle and excise taxes in an area that Appellant contended was Indian country. Appellant claimed that the state may not tax its members in Indian country, and that the Indian country status of the land was conclusively established by an earlier decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court. The district court dismissed the action with prejudice for failure to join a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) after determining, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), that two absent entities (the Eastern Shoshone Tribe and the United States) were necessary parties who could not feasibly be joined, and in whose absence the action could not proceed. The district court also concluded that the Indian country status of the land had not been conclusively determined by the earlier state litigation. Appellant appealed both determinations. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the lower court that the dismissal of the action was proper because the Eastern Shoshone was necessary party that could not feasibly be joined, but vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. View "Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Harnsberger, et al" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Commissioner issued four summonses to third-party financial institutions to determine whether the Miccosukee Tribe had complied with its federal withholding requirements during the period from 2006-2009. The Tribe petitioned to quash the summonses on the grounds of sovereign immunity, improper purpose, relevance, bad faith, and overbreadth. The district court denied those petitions. Because the court concluded that tribal sovereign immunity did not bar the issuance of these third-party summonses, the district court did not clearly err when it found that the summonses were issued for a proper purpose, and the Tribe lacked standing to challenge the summonses for overbreadth, the court affirmed the judgment.View "Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States" on Justia Law

The district court granted temporary custody of three Native American children to the department of social services. Citing the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe (Tribe) contested the custody order by challenging the oldest child's temporary placement and questioning the lack of adherence to relative placement preferences under the ICWA. The court advised that ICWA placement preferences were not yet applicable. The Tribe filed an application for a writ of mandamus or prohibition from the Supreme Court to compel a new temporary custody hearing. The Supreme Court dismissed the Tribe's application for an extraordinary writ, holding that the trial court was not obligated to follow ICWA at temporary or emergency custody proceedings under state law, and therefore, the trial court appropriately rejected the Tribe's invocation of ICWA and requests for a new temporary custody hearing conducted in full accord with ICWA.View "Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. Judicial Court (Davis)" on Justia Law

The State petitioned for permanent legal custody and termination of Father's parental rights to his two children after the court held that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied and approved treatment plans for Father prepared by the State. The district court subsequently terminated Father's parental rights to the children. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Father's argument that the district court improperly concluded that Father's treatment plans were appropriate was not preserved for appellate review; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to terminate Father's parental rights under the ICWA where (i) a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the State made "active efforts" to provide services and programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts were unsuccessful, and (ii) the State proved that the children would likely suffer serious emotional or physical harm if Father was to retain custody. View "In re D.S.B." on Justia Law

Agreeing with the Board, the district court ruled that Quantum's 1996 Management Agreement with the Pueblo was null and void for lack of approval by the Secretary as required by 25 U.S.C. 81, and that it was incapable of being validated by the 2000 amendment to section 81, the application of which would be impermissibly retroactive. Applying Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the court concluded that Congress made no clear statement that it intended the 2000 amendment to apply retroactively. The court also concluded that, because the 1996 Agreement required Secretarial approval that was never obtained and the parties agreed that the Agreement would be valid without Secretarial approval under section 81 as amended, the application of the new law would give life to a null and void agreement, thereby attaching new legal consequences to it. Although the Pueblo may have voluntarily undertaken the stated duties and liabilities under the Agreement, such an agreement was null and void without Secretarial approval before 2000. Since the Secretary never approved the Agreement, any legislative validation of the duties or liabilities attached to it was impermissibly retroactive. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Quantum Entertainment Ltd. v. Dept. of the Interior" on Justia Law

This dispute involved a revenue-sharing agreement between GCSD and SNW to build the Skywalk over the Grand Canyon on remote tribal land. GCSD filed suit against SNW seeking declaratory judgment that the Hualapai Tribe lacked the authority to condemn its intangible property rights and injunctive relief. After multiple hearings, the district court denied GCSD's temporary restraining order to enjoin SNW based on the principles of comity and ordered GCSD to exhaust tribal court remedies prior to review in federal court. The court affirmed and held that where, as here, a tribal court has asserted jurisdiction and was entertaining a suit, the tribal court must have acted in bad faith for exhaustion to be excused. The facts of this case did not support a finding of bad faith on the part of the tribal court. The submitted evidence supported the district court's finding that the tribal court operated independently from the tribal council and the evidence presented did not meet the narrow futility exception. The tribal court did not plainly lack jurisdiction because Montana v. United States's main rule was unlikely to apply to the facts of this case. Furthermore, the district court correctly relied on Water Wheel Camp Recreation Area, Inc. v. LaRance, which provided for tribal jurisdiction without even reaching the application of Montana. Even if the tribal consensual relationship with SNW or the financial implications of the agreement likely placed it squarely within one of Montana's exceptions and allowed for tribal jurisdiction. View "Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev. v. 'Sa' Nyu Wa Inc." on Justia Law

On December 14, 2012, the district court issued an alternative writ of mandate directing several irrigation districts to comply with Mont. Code Ann. 85-7-1956 and -1957 before executing a water use agreement with the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Nation and the United States. On February 15, 2013, the district court issued another writ of mandate that rescinded and superseded the alternative writ of mandate. The writ of mandate enjoined the irrigation districts from entering into the proposed agreement. The Supreme Court vacated both the district court's writ of mandate and injunction and the court's alternative writ of mandate, holding that the district court (1) issued an appealable order, making the appeal from the district court's writ of mandate and injunction as well as the issue of whether the statutes apply to the water use agreement properly before the Court; (2) improperly granted the writ of mandate and injunction; and (3) incorrectly compelled the irrigation districts to comply with sections 85-7-1956 and -1957 before they executed the water use agreement. View "W. Mont. Water Users Ass'n, LLC v. Mission Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

Tribal authorities of the Tohono O'odham nation charged LKAV, age 17, with murder in May 2009. In November 2011, the United States moved to commit LKAV pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4241 to an adult medical facility for psychiatric treatment. The court held that when the United States charges a juvenile with an act of juvenile delinquency under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. 5031-42, the district court must follow 18 U.S.C. 5037(e) if it committed the juvenile for a study of the juvenile's competency to stand trial. Because the district court in this case instead committed LKAV under 18 U.S.C. 4241(d), the court reversed the judgment. View "United States V. LKAV, Juvenile Male" on Justia Law