Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Leisnoi, Inc. retained the law firm of Merdes & Merdes to represent it in litigation against Omar Stratman over its certification of and title to certain lands Leisnoi claimed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Leisnoi and Merdes entered a contingency fee agreement under which, if Leisnoi was successful, Merdes would receive an interest in the lands Leisnoi obtained or retained. The case was resolved in 1992 in favor of Leisnoi, although Stratman appealed and the related litigation continued for another decade. In October 2008, the Stratman litigation finally concluded in Leisnoi's favor. The following year, Merdes moved the superior court to issue a writ of execution. Leisnoi opposed the motion, arguing among other things that the judgment was void under 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s restrictions on contingency fee contracts involving Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act lands. In January 2010, the Superior Court issued an order denying Leisnoi's motion and granting Merdes's motion to execute. Six months later, Leisnoi paid Merdes the remaining balance. Leisnoi then appealed the superior court's ruling. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned questions of waiver and whether the superior court's judgment was void or voidable. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded: (1) Leisnoi did not waive its right to appeal by paying Merdes the balance due on the judgment; (2) an Arbitration Panel's fee award and the superior court's 1995 entry of judgment violated 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s prohibition against attorney contingency fee contracts based on the value of Native lands that were subject to the Act; (3) the superior court's 2010 order granting Merdes's motion to execute on the 1995 judgment separately violated the Act's prohibition against executing on judgments arising from prohibited attorney contingency fee contracts; (4) notwithstanding the illegality of the Arbitration Panel fee award and the 1995 judgment, Leisnoi was not entitled to relief pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b) (the 1995 order was voidable rather than void for purposes of Civil Rule 60(b), and therefore not subject to attack under Civil Rule 60(b)(4)); and (5) Leisnoi was not entitled to relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6). Accordingly, Merdes was ordered to return Leisnoi's payment of the balance on the judgment, but Leisnoi was not entitled to recover payments made prior to the issuance of the writ of execution. View "Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner Michael Clark's conviction for theft on tribal trust land over which the State had jurisdiction. The Court noted that while the State lacked explicit statutory authorization to issue search warrants on tribal lands, federal law had not preempted the State's ability to do so. Further, the tribe had not used its inherent sovereignty to regulate the procedure by which state law enforcement could execute search warrants on the reservation. Petitioner moved to suppress evidence gathered on tribal land without a tribal warrant. View "Washington v. Clark" on Justia Law

Appellant, an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, was civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). Appellant appealed, challenging his indeterminate civil commitment by asserting three substantive claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to indeterminately civilly commit an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe; (2) the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata did not preclude the State from presenting in the civil commitment proceeding evidence of conduct alleged in earlier criminal cases that ended in acquittals; and (3) Appellant waived his to right appellate review of his claim that the State violated the Minnesota Constitution when it committed him without a trial by jury.View "Beaulieu v. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1153, which provided for federal jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. The court held that the Tribal Enrollment Certificate was insufficient to establish that defendant was an Indian for the purposes of federal jurisdiction under section 1153 because the government introduced no evidence that defendant's bloodline was derived from a federally recognized tribe. Because the court held that the government introduced insufficient evidence under the first prong of the United States v. Bruce test, the court need not consider whether the Tribal Enrollment Certificate alone was sufficient to carry the government's burden as to the second prong. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's convictions under section 1153 in counts 2 through 9 of the indictment. Defendant's conviction for conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 was unaffected by the court's disposition.View "United States v. Zepeda" on Justia Law

In 1967, Raymond and Margaret Becker's eight child inherited an undivided one-eighth interest in patented fee land located within the boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation. None of the Beckers were Indians. In 2006, one of the Becker children sold her interest to Patrick and Carletta Aberle. Patrick was a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, and Carletta was a non-Indian. Due to certain conveyances, Patrick and Carletta each owned an undivided one-sixteenth interest in the property. The Becker children later commenced this action seeking a sale of the entire property. The Aberles counterclaimed for partition. Patrick also contended that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute because he was a member of the Tribe, which had jurisdiction. The circuit court ordered a sale of the entire property, concluding that state jurisdiction did not infringe upon tribal sovereignty. In considering the state-tribal jurisdiction issue, the Supreme Court noted that a determination of the disputed land's alienability was necessary. The Court then remanded the matter to the circuit court to reconsider the jurisdiction question after further development of a factual record and consideration of land alienation cases.View "McGuire v. Aberle" on Justia Law

The district court terminated Mother's parental rights to her two daughters (collectively, Children). Mother appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Department of Health and Human Services (Department) undertook sufficient active efforts to reunify Mother and Children as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA); (2) the Department provided sufficient evidence that reunification of Children with Mother would cause serious physical or emotional damage to Children; (3) the district court correctly determined that Mother had stipulated to the terms of the treatment plan; and (4) all stipulations in ICWA involuntary termination proceedings need not be reduced to writing. View "In re D.A." on Justia Law

The Town and the State appealed from the district court's adverse summary judgment ruling in a suit where the Tribe challenged the Town's imposition of the State's personal property tax on the lessors of slot machines used by the Tribe at Foxwoods Casino. The court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction; the Tribe had standing; neither the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., nor the Indian Trader Statutes, 25 U.S.C. 261-64, expressly barred the tax; and, under the White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker test, federal law did not implicitly bar the tax because the State and Town interests in the integrity and uniform application of their tax system outweighed the federal and tribal interests reflected in IGRA. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Tribe and in denying summary judgment for the Town and State. View "Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard" on Justia Law

After the National Indian Gaming Commission decided that a 1994 consent decree involving the City of Duluth and the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa was incompatible with federal law, the Band moved for dissolution of the consent decree. The City opposed the motion and the district court granted it in part and denied it in part. Both parties appealed. The Commission's change in the law governing Indian gaming made illegal what the earlier consent decree was designed to enforce. The 2011 decision by the Commission, the agency authorized by Congress to interpret and enforce the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., ruled that the 1994 arrangement between the City and the Band violated the Act. That determination provided ample support for the district court's decision to grant prospective relief from continued enforcement of the 1994 consent decree into the 2011 to 2036 period since continued execution of the agreement would be "no longer equitable." It was unclear what conclusion the district court would have reached without its mistaken belief that Rule 60(b)(6) was not available for consideration of potential retrospective relief. The district court abused its discretion by not examining all the relevant factors and therefore the court reversed the district court's decision denying retrospective relief to the Band for its obligations to pay rent withheld from 2009 to 2011 and remanded that question for further consideration.View "City of Duluth v. Fond Du Lac Band of Chippewa" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit bribery of an Indian tribal official, and aiding and abetting a bribery involving an agent of an Indian tribal government. Defendant raised evidentiary challenges on appeal. The court held that the district court did not plainly err in determining that evidence relating to uncharged bribery activity was "intrinsic" to the charged conspiracy and therefore admissible notwithstanding the government's failure to give defendant pretrial notice of its intent to use this evidence. Given the substantial evidence of defendant's guilt, and defendant's failure to object and his decision to rehash the same testimony on cross-examination, the court concluded that defendant was not sufficiently prejudiced by the admission of the testimony at issue for the court to exercise its discretion to recognize plain error, if any existed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "United States v. Duane Dale Big Eagle" on Justia Law

Defendant, the Bureau of Indian Affairs Superintendent at the Fort Peck Indian Reservation, was convicted of charges stemming from her involvement in a scheme to obtain money from a tribal credit program. The court reversed defendant's convictions on Counts I and II (conspiracy, theft and conversion of Indian Tribal Organization property) because the alleged object of the conspiracy - the loan modification - was not itself criminal and, therefore, there could be no conspiracy; affirmed defendant's conviction on Count III (bribery) where a rational jury could easily infer a quid pro quo from the facts; reversed defendant's conviction on Count IV (falsification, concealment, or covering up of a material fact) because the government did not show that defendant violated a specific duty to report Credit Program fraud; reversed defendant's conviction on Count V (public acts affecting a personal financial interest) because defendant's financial interest in this matter was insufficient under 18 U.S.C. 208(a); and affirmed defendant's conviction on Count VI (misprision of a felony) where a jury could conclude that payment of the loans at issue made the discovery of the fraud less likely and, therefore, that defendant took an affirmative step to conceal the felony. The court also concluded that there was no Fifth Amendment violation arising out of defendant's convictions on Count V and VI. Finally, the court remanded for resentencing where the district court erred in adjusting the sentence. View "United States v. White Eagle" on Justia Law