Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

South Dakota Native American inmates filed suit against defendants claiming that a tobacco ban substantially burdened the exercise of their religious beliefs in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a). The court concluded that the record amply showed that the inmates have satisfied their burden. That some Native Americans practicing the Lakota religion would consider red willow bark a sufficient alternative to tobacco did not undermine the decision of the district court. Even assuming that defendants' ban on tobacco furthered compelling government interests in security and order, the ban was not the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. The court concluded that the scope of the district court's remedial orders extended no further than necessary to remedy the violation of inmates' rights under RLUIPA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of injunctive relief in all respects. View "Native American Council, etc., et al. v. Weber, et al." on Justia Law

Members of Healy Lake Village Tribe who claimed to constitute the newly elected tribal council brought suit in superior court against Mt. McKinley Bank after the Bank refused to change the signatory authority on the Tribe’s accounts to reflect the alleged leadership change. A second group of tribal members, who also claimed to represent the Tribe based on a competing election, was granted intervention in order to contest the superior court’s jurisdiction. The superior court determined that the fundamental issue in the case was the determination of the legitimate governing body of the Tribe, which was an internal self-governance matter within the Tribe’s retained inherent sovereignty. The superior court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the group that brought the initial action appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. Because determining the real party in interest would have required the superior court to decide matters solely within the Tribe’s retained inherent sovereignty, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Healy Lake Village v. Mt. McKinley Bank" on Justia Law

This case involved numerous claims concerning environmental hazards at three sites on Navajo land in Arizona. El Paso, the successor-in-interest to the corporation that mined uranium at the Mill, filed suit against the United States and others, raising claims under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. 7901-7942, and the Solid Waste Disposal Act, commonly referred to as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901-6992k. The Tribe intervened and asserted parallel claims under these acts, as well as additional claims against the Government. The court reversed the dismissal "with prejudice" of El Paso's RCRA claims that related to the Dump; remanded with instructions to the district court to enter judgment against El Paso "without prejudice;" vacated the district court's dismissal of El Passo's RCRA claims as to the Highway 160 Site; remanded the case so that these claims could be considered on the merits; and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all other respects. View "El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

After receiving an adverse ruling from the Rosebud tribal courts regarding a casino management contract, plaintiff filed suit in federal court seeking to vacate the tribal court ruling and to enjoin the Tribe from continuing a second action in the Rosebud tribal courts. The court reversed the district court's denial of the Tribe's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust tribal court remedies pertaining to BBC's challenge of the tribal courts' jurisdiction; remanded this part of the claim to the district court with instructions to enter an order dismissing plaintiff's complaint; and affirmed the district court's orders in all other respects. View "Colombe v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, et al." on Justia Law

The Catawba Indian Nation brought a declaratory judgment action against the State (and Mark Keel) to determine the effect of the Gambling Cruise Act on its gambling rights. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the State, finding: (1) the Tribe's action was precluded by collateral estoppel and/or res judicata, and (2) the Gambling Cruise Act does not confer upon the Tribe the right to offer video poker and similar electronic play devices on its Reservation as the Act does not alter the statewide ban on video poker. The Tribe appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part: the circuit court's determination that the Gambling Cruise Act did not authorize the Tribe to offer video poker on its Reservation in contravention of the existing statewide ban on video gambling devices was affirmed; the Tribe's action was not precluded by collateral estoppel or res judicata, reversing this finding by the circuit court. View "Catawba Indian Nation v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

J.S., born in 1998, was an “Indian child” under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). In 2002, J.S. was adjudicated a youth in need of care, and temporary custody was granted to the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department). In 2012, the Department filed a petition for legal guardianship. Ultimately, the district court granted guardianship over J.S. to J.S.’s foster family. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State’s failure to provide notice to Father and his tribe at the outset of these proceedings did not provide a basis to overturn the district court’s ultimate guardianship order; (2) 25 U.S.C. 1912(d) did not provide a basis to overturn the district court’s award of guardianship to the foster family based on the State’s alleged failure to make “active efforts” to provide services and promote the relationship between Father and J.S.; and (3) contrary to Father’s contention, 25 U.S.C. 1912(e) did not apply to this case and did not serve to invalidate the district court’s award of guardianship. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

In 1986, the City of Duluth and the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa (the Band) entered into several agreements establishing a joint venture to operate gaming activities in Duluth. The agreements required that the Band seek approval before creating any additional Indian Country. In 1994, the Band and the City created a series of new agreements and amendments to the 1986 agreements. In 2010, the Band acquired a plot of land. The Band sought to have the plot placed in trust but did not seek the City’s approval to do so, as required by the 1986 agreements. The City commenced this action in state district court seeking a court order requiring the Band to withdraw its trust application. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Band had only consented to suit in federal court in the 1994 agreements. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision and reinstated the district court’s judgment for the Band, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the issue of whether the Band breached the 1986 agreements because it required interpretation of the 1994 agreements, which was a matter vested in the federal courts. View "City of Duluth v. Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa" on Justia Law

In 2012, a grand jury in the District of Rhode Island served the Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Preservation Office (NITHPO) with a subpoena duces tecum directing NITHPO to appear before the grand jury with a series of documents. NITHPO refused to produce the subpoenaed records. The sitting grand jury was subsequently discharged, and in 2013, a new grand jury was empanelled. Thereafter, the government filed a motion to compel NITHPO’s compliance with the 2012 subpoena. The district court granted the government’s motion to compel and ordered NITHPO to comply with the 2012 grand jury subpoena. After NITHPO failed to appear on the agreed-upon date, the district court adjudged NITHPO in civil contempt and imposed a fine for noncompliance. On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated the district court’s order holding NITHPO in civil contempt, holding that a subpoena duces tecum compelling the production of documents to a now-defunct grand jury cannot be enforced by civil contempt sanctions before a successor grand jury; and (2) rejected NITHPO’s contentions that tribal sovereign immunity shielded it from subpoena and that the subpoena was unreasonably broad in scope. View "In re Grand Jury Proceedings" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Robert Bonnet is a petroleum landman who conducted business through Bobby Bonnet Land Services. In 2008, Plaintiffs entered into a written contract with the Energy and Minerals Department of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation to serve collectively as an independent contractor and consultant. When the Tribe terminated this contract in 2009, Plaintiffs sued various companies and individuals (but not the Tribe) in federal court, alleging these defendants caused the Tribe to terminate this contract prematurely. Plaintiffs served the Tribe with a non-party subpoena duces tecum requesting documents relevant to their suit. The Tribe moved to quash the subpoena based on the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. The district court denied the Tribe's motion, but modified the subpoena to limit or strike requests it deemed overbroad. The Tribe appealed. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether a subpoena duces tecum served on a non-party Tribe seeking documents relevant to a civil suit in federal court is itself a "suit" against the Tribe triggering tribal sovereign immunity. Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, the Court concluded, yes, it is a "suit" against the Tribe. Therefore the Court reversed the district court's denial of the Tribe's motion to quash based on tribal immunity. View "Bonnet v. Ute Indian Tribe" on Justia Law

The State entered into an agreement allowing Big Lagoon to operate a casino on a certain parcel of land. On appeal, the State challenged the district court's order requiring the State to negotiate with Big Lagoon under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701-2721. Under Carcieri v. Salazar, the BIA lacked authority to acquire land in trust for tribes that were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. The court concluded that the only reasonable construction of section 2710(d)(3)(A) is that a tribe's right to request negotiations depends on its having jurisdiction over Indian lands on which it proposes to conduct class III gaming; the State did not waive the "Indian lands" requirement; the land at issue was not "Indian lands" because there was no family or other group on what is now the Big Lagoon in 1934; and, therefore, pursuant to Carcieri, Big Lagoon was not such a tribe. Accordingly, Big Lagoon cannot demand negotiations to conduct gaming on the land and cannot sue to compel negotiations if the State fails to negotiate in good faith. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Big Lagoon Rancheria v. State of California" on Justia Law