Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether Washington State courts have jurisdiction over a civil case arising out of a contract in which the tribal corporation waived its sovereign immunity and consented to jurisdiction in Washington State courts. The Washington Supreme Court held that it did not infringe on the sovereignty of the tribe to honor its own corporation's decision to enter into a contract providing for jurisdiction in Washington State courts. View "Outsource Servs. Mgmt. v. Nooksack Bus. Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a proceeding brought by the Klallam under the continuing jurisdiction of a 1974 decree issued by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, and it involved a dispute over the geographic scope of the Lummi's "usual and accustomed fishing grounds." The court held that the law of the case doctrine applies only when the issue was decided explicitly or by necessary implication in the previous disposition. In this case, the court held that no prior decision has yet explicitly or by necessary implication determined whether the waters immediately west of northern Whidbey Island are a part of the Lummi's usual and accustomed fishing grounds. Therefore, the district court erred in concluding that the issue was controlled by law of the case and the court reversed the grant of Klallam's motion for summary judgment, remanding for further proceedings. View "Lower Elwha Klallam Indian Tribe v. Lummi Nation" on Justia Law

A 17-month-old Indian child was removed from the custody of her mother, who has a lengthy substance abuse problem and has lost custody of at least six other children, and her father, who has an extensive criminal history and has lost custody of one other child. This case involves the placement preferences set forth in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. The court concluded that the trial court correctly required that the foster parents demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that there was good cause to depart from the ICWA's placement preferences. However, the trial court's application of the good cause exception to the facts before it was legally erroneous and the error was prejudicial to the foster parents. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "In re Alexandria P." on Justia Law

The County appealed the district court's order preliminarily enjoining it from foreclosing upon certain real property owned by the Cayuga Nation in order to recover uncollected ad valorem property taxes. The court affirmed the district court's injunction where the court declined, as has the Supreme Court, to read a "commercial activity" exception into the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit. In the absence of a waiver of immunity by the tribe, unless Congress has authorized the suit, precedents demand that the court affirm the district court's injunction of the County's foreclosure proceedings against the Cayuga Nation's property. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca County, New York" on Justia Law

The Ho-Chunk Nation, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, operates casinos in Wisconsin and nets more than $200 million annually from its gambling operations. Cash Systems, one of three businesses involved in this case, engaged in issuing cash to casino customers via automated teller machines and kiosks, check-cashing, and credit- and debit-card advances. Whiteagle, a member of the Nation, held himself out as an insider and offered vendors an entrée into the tribe’s governance and gaming operations. Cash Systems engaged Whiteagle in 2002 as a confidential consultant. Cash Systems served as the Nation’s cash-access services vendor for the next six years, earning more than seven million dollars, while it paid Whiteagle just under two million dollars. Whiteagles’s “in” was his relationship with Pettibone, who had been serving in the Ho-Chunk legislature since 1995. Ultimately, Whiteagle, Pettibone, and another were charged with conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371) to commit bribery in connection with the contracts with the Ho-Chunk Nation and substantive bribery (18 U.S.C. 666). Whiteagle was also charged with tax evasion and witness tampering. Pettibone pleaded guilty to corruptly accepting a car with the intent to be influenced in connection with a contract. Whiteagle admitted that he had solicited money and other things of value for Pettibone from three companies, but denied actually paying bribes to Pettibone and insisted that he and Pettibone had advocated for Whiteagle’s clients based on what they believed to be the genuine merits of those clients. Convicted on all counts, Whiteagle was sentenced, below-guidelines, to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on the bribery charges, the loss calculation, and admission of certain evidence.View "United States v. Whiteagle" on Justia Law

The Minto Tribal Court terminated the parental rights of Edward Parks and Bessie Stearman to their daughter S.P. At the termination hearing, the attorney for Parks and Stearman was not permitted to present oral argument to the tribal court. Parks did not file an appeal with the Minto Court of Appeals and instead brought suit against S.P.'s foster parents, the Simmondses, in the state superior court in an attempt to regain custody of S.P. The Simmondses moved to dismiss Parks's state lawsuit on the basis that the tribal court judgment terminating parental rights was entitled to full faith and credit under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that full faith and credit should not be afforded because the tribal court had denied Parks minimum due process by prohibiting his attorney from presenting oral argument on his objections to tribal court jurisdiction based on his status as a non-tribal member. Although the superior court recognized that oral argument is not a per se requirement of minimum due process, the superior court concluded that the denial of oral argument in this case deprived Parks of a meaningful opportunity to be heard because Parks did not receive sufficient notice that his attorney would not be allowed to present oral argument to the tribal court. The Simmondses appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court for further findings. On remand, the superior court reiterated its prior conclusion of a violation of minimum due process and further concluded that the due process error was not harmless because Parks's objections to the Minto Tribal Court's jurisdiction might have had merit. The Simmondses appealed again to the Supreme Court. Because Parks failed to exhaust his remedies in the Minto Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that his state court suit should have been dismissed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded for dismissal of Parks's suit. View "Simmonds v. Parks" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed suit against the United States and others alleging, inter alia, violations of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and federal common law. The Tribe claimed that the Government breached its fiduciary duties under federal law to protect the land and natural resources subject to the aboriginal title of the Tribe. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the Tribe failed to allege "agency action" sufficient to meet the requirements of the sovereign immunity waiver in section 702, which is necessary to maintain its claims against the federal government and its agencies. View "Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of TX v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

Stockbridge, a recognized Indian tribe, appealed from the district court's dismissal of its claims asserting title of a tract of land in upstate New York. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that it was well-settled that claims by an Indian tribe alleging that it was unlawfully dispossessed of land early in America's history were barred by the equitable principles of laches, acquiescence, and impossibility. View "Stockbridge-Munsee v. State of New York, et al." on Justia Law

The Attorney General (AG) brought suit against Native Wholesale Supply alleging violations of the Oklahoma Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act. In 1998, four of the largest tobacco product manufacturers and forty-six states entered into a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) to settle litigation brought by the states to recoup health care expenses resulting from cigarette smoking. In 1999, the Legislature required tobacco product manufacturers who do not join the MSA and whose cigarettes were sold in Oklahoma to make annual payments into escrow accounts to cover health care expenses resulting from cigarette smoking. In August of 2006, the AG removed both Seneca brand cigarettes and their manufacturer, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., from the AG's directory. In 2007 and 2008, Native Wholesale Supply (NWS) caused Seneca cigarettes to be brought into Oklahoma knowing that the tobacco product manufacturer did not comply with the Escrow Statute or the Complementary Act and that the Seneca cigarette manufacturer and Seneca cigarettes were not on the AG's directory. In May of 2008, Oklahoma Attorney General Drew Edmondson, sought disgorgement and payment to the State of all gross proceeds realized by NWS from the sale of contraband Seneca cigarettes in violation of the Complementary Act. NWS removed the case to federal court asserting complete federal preemption of this state-law suit because NWS "is chartered by the Sac and Fox Nation, is wholly owned by a member of the Seneca Nation, and conducts business on Indian land with Native Americans." The federal court concluded the case was improperly removed and remanded it to the state court. The state district court then granted NWS' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied NWS' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The AG appealed the subject matter jurisdiction dismissal and NWS counter-appealed the personal jurisdiction ruling. The Supreme Court held that the State has personal jurisdiction over NWS based on the Company's purposeful availment of the Oklahoma cigarette marketplace and had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this suit. NWS filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and listed three states in the proceeding as having claims similar to Oklahoma's lodged against it. The three states jointly moved to lift the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court lifted the stay and directed that "information produced by [NWS] during discovery in the bankruptcy case shall be treated by the States as satisfying any request for such information in the State Litigation." The information NWS turned over to Oklahoma included documents showing the cigarette sales and shipping transactions between NWS and Muscogee Creek Nation Tobacco Wholesale and Bowen Wholesale from 2006 to 2010. The state district court case proceeded; and the AG moved for summary judgment. The district court sustained the AG's motion for summary judgment, denied NWS' cross-motion for summary judgment, and entered judgment in favor of Oklahoma. The district court denied NWS' motion for new trial. NWS appealed the summary judgment and denial of a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Oklahoma v. Native Wholesale Supply" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed suit contending that a Florida tax on motor and diesel fuel purchased off tribal lands violated the Indian Commerce Clause, the Indian sovereignty doctrine, and the Equal Protection Clause. The court concluded that Florida has not waived its sovereign immunity from this federal suit. Without a valid abrogation by Congress, Florida was immune from suit regardless of the nature of the relief sought. Further, the Tribe could not circumvent the sovereign immunity of Florida by suing the Director of the Department based on the decision in Ex parte Young where the Department, not the Director, is the real, substantial party in interest in this suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. View "Seminole Tribe of Florida v. State of FL Dept. of Revenue, et al." on Justia Law