Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

In 2011 the Roy home on the Red Lake Indian Reservation was engulfed in flames and collapsed before fire crews could extinguish the fire. The next morning the bodies of Roy and Beaulieu were retrieved from the rubble. Autopsies indicated that Roy and Beaulieu had been stabbed multiple times before the fire and that their death was caused by exsanguination. A jury convicted defendants, including Martin and Robinson, under 18 U.S.C. 1153, which allows the federal government to prosecute certain "offenses committed within Indian country," including murder or robbery. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of improper ex parte contact by the district court with the jury venire; that the government failed to prove Martin’s Indian status under section 1153 even though he stipulated to that fact; that the court erred by denying Robinson’s motions to sever and allowing the prosecutor to comment on his failure to testify; and that the court erred by declining to give Martin lesser included instruction on theft and by enhancing his sentence by six levels under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(3)(C) for infliction of permanent bodily injury. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

Archambault, a Native American, has many prior convictions for child neglect and substance abuse in the Tribal Court and a history of mental health problems. Archambault's 13-year-old son told a healthcare worker that his mother began forcing him to smoke marijuana when he was six years old and that he had been prescribed Ritalin, but his mother took it from him. His mother would crush the pills and either inhale or inject them. Archambault sold pills that she did not use. Her son stated that he would get in trouble if he took the Ritalin himself. The Bureau of Indian Affairs interviewed Archambault. She admitted using and selling Ritalin and giving her son marijuana. Indicted for distribution of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), she violated the terms of her release by testing positive for alcohol and marijuana and by disorderly conduct. She pled guilty. The court calculated a guideline range of four to 10 months, heard arguments, discussed the section 3553(a) factors, and concluded that Archambault posed a risk to her child, had an extensive tribal criminal history not reflected in her guideline category, and had performed poorly on pretrial release, then sentenced her to 18 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the the sentence. View "United States v. Archambault" on Justia Law

Brooks, a member of the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, is incarcerated for Minnesota convictions of first-degree DWI and assaulting an officer. The Minnesota Department of Corrections (MDOC) requires a chemical-dependency assessment. Brooks was ordered to complete treatment in order to be transferred to a lower-security prison, qualify for work release, and avoid disciplinary sanctions. Brooks began treatment in 2011, but, in 2012, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc; the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. 1996; and the Minnesota Constitution. He claimed that his required chemical-dependency program deprived him of his right to the free exercise of his religion. The district court dismissed some claims and granted summary judgment for the defendants on all others. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, because, based on the complaint, the court and the defendants could not discern what beliefs he has or what faith he professes. View "Brooks v. Roy" on Justia Law

Jane Doe appealed an order terminating her parental rights to her son, TSD. Because TSD was an "Indian child" as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act, the magistrate court was required to make findings in addition to those required by Idaho law. Among other findings, the Department of Health and Welfare (DHW) was required to satisfy the court that it made "active efforts" to "prevent the breakup of the Indian family." On appeal, Doe argued that the magistrate court erred in finding that DHW made such efforts and erred in failing to make that finding by clear and convincing evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court's decision terminating Doe's parental rights. View "In re Termination of Parental Rights of Jane (2014-23) Doe" on Justia Law

The Tribe asked the Department to take into trust a parcel of land the Tribe recently required for the construction and operation of a new gambling casino. The Secretary denied the request. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2719, generally bans gaming on lands that tribes acquire after its enactment in 1988, but creates an exception for tribes with restored lands. The district court granted summary judgment for the government because the Tribe was seeking to operate multiple casinos, something the applicable regulations unquestionably and reasonably are intended to prevent. While the application was pending before the agency, the Tribe advised the agency that it was willing to close down its original casinos once the new one was in operation. The court concluded that the Secretary reasonably implemented the restored lands exception, to limit the extent to which a restored tribe may operate gaming facilities on restored land, in order to ensure parity between restored and established tribes; the Indian canon, recently articulated in Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, does not apply here; there has been no unexplained change in the agency policy; but the agency should have considered the Tribe's alternative offer to move all gaming to the new casino. Therefore, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "Redding Rancheria v. Jewell" on Justia Law

S.B.C. was a Naive American child whose biological parents were enrolled members of the Blackfeet Tribe (Tribe). When S.B.C. was approximately four months old he was removed from Mother’s care and placed with Foster Mother. The district court later terminated both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and granted legal custody to Child Services with the right to consent to the adoption of S.B.C. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by denying the Tribe’s motion to transfer jurisdiction to the Blackfeet Tribal Court; (2) did not abuse its discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights; and (3) did not abuse its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights. View "Matter of S.B.C." on Justia Law

Sometime in early 2007, "Connie" approached Holly and William Ebert, a married couple she knew from church, about adopting her child. Connie wanted the Eberts to adopt her child because she thought they would be loving parents and because they shared her religious values. The Eberts agreed to the adoption. "Bruce" and Connie began a relationship in August 2006. At some point, Connie told Bruce that she was pregnant and was considering giving up the child for adoption. Bruce objected to the adoption. After a final attempt to repair their relationship, Bruce and Connie separated permanently in January 2007 and that was when Connie contacted the Eberts about her child. Before the child was born, the Eberts met with Bruce "to discuss a consent to adopt." In late December 2007, Bruce filed a complaint for custody of the child, "Timothy." In July 2008 the Eberts filed an adoption petition and intervened in Bruce's custody case. The superior court ordered paternity testing, and Bruce obtained a positive result. The court appointed counsel for Bruce and consolidated the adoption and custody cases. The superior court ordered an interim custody arrangement after a hearing in December 2008. The court granted physical custody to the Eberts and semiweekly visitation to Bruce. The court also ordered Bruce to pay $50 per month in child support, retroactive to 2007; over the next four months, Bruce paid a total of $200 in support. It was undisputed that Bruce paid no child support before being ordered to do so at a December 2008 hearing. He later testified that he did not realize he had a child support obligation and that the Eberts never applied to the Child Support Services Division for child support. Bruce claimed he was under the impression that the Eberts were wealthy and did not need his financial assistance. In May 2009 the superior court held a trial on the adoption petition and the custody dispute. In post-trial briefing, Bruce argued that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) compelled the court to grant Bruce custody of Timothy and prevented the Eberts from adopting Timothy without Bruce's consent. The Eberts argued that Bruce could not invoke ICWA to prevent the adoption because he was not a "parent" for purposes of the statute until he established paternity in late 2008. They also argued that ICWA section 1912(d)'s "active efforts" provision did not apply in a private adoption, particularly when the parent seeking to invoke ICWA had no meaningful connection to any tribe. And they maintained that, even if ICWA applied, the supervised visitation provided to Bruce was adequate to fulfill the active efforts requirement. Finally, they argued that Bruce's consent to the adoption was not required under state law because Bruce could not show that his failure to communicate with or support Timothy during the child's first year of life was justifiable. Connie, who continued to support the adoption, made arguments similar to the Eberts'. The Eberts and Connie appealed the superior court's denial of the adoption, claiming that Bruce's consent to the adoption was unnecessary. The Supreme Court found that under AS 25.23.050(a)(2)(B), the consent of a noncustodial parent was not required for adoption if that parent unjustifiably fails to support the child. But the superior court did not clearly err by concluding that Bruce had justifiable cause for his failure to support the child. View "Ebert v. Bruce L." on Justia Law

In 2006, the Secretary of the Interior approved amendments to Title 8 of the Omaha Tribal Code, which modified the tribe's Beverage Control Ordinance and allowed the tribal government to impose a 10 percent sales tax on the purchase of alcohol from any licensee on tribal land. The Omaha Tribe attempted to enforce this alcohol tax on establishments in or near Pender engaged in the sale of alcoholic beverages. Those establishments and the village claimed that they were not located within the boundaries of the Reservation and not subject to the tax. The district court denied declaratory and injunctive relief. The Omaha Tribal Court as well and the district court determined that Pender and the areas at issue are located on Omaha tribal land. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Congress did not intend to "diminish" the boundaries of the Omaha Indian Reservation in Nebraska when it enacted an 1882 Act that ratified an agreement for the sale of Omaha tribal lands to non-Indian settlers. View "Smith v. Parker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), claiming that tribal officers employed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) acted negligently when pursuing a drunk driver and that such negligence resulted in plaintiff and his wife's injuries. Congress extended the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity to claims resulting from the performance of functions authorized by the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, commonly referred to as section 314, 25 U.S.C. 450f. Under the two-part test of section 314, courts must first determine whether the alleged activity is, in fact, encompassed by the relevant federal contract or agreement. The scope of the agreement defines the relevant "employment" for purposes of the scope of employment analysis at step two. Second, courts must decide whether the allegedly tortious action falls within the scope of the tortfeasor's employment under state law. If both these prongs are met, the employee's actions are covered by the FTCA. The court vacated the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court should conduct a new analysis of its subject matter jurisdiction using the two-step framework the court discussed. View "Shirk v. United States" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Lewiston Golf Course Corporation, an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of the Seneca Nation of Indians, a federal recognized Indian tribe, was protected from suit by the Seneca Nation’s sovereign immunity. Supreme Court ruled that Lewiston Golf did not qualify as an “arm” of the Seneca Nation and denied Lewiston Golf’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s foreclosure action with respect to its mechanic’s liens. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the most significant factors set forth in Matter of Ranson v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Cmty. Fund counted against sovereign immunity on the part of Lewiston Golf. View "Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving, Inc. v. Corporation" on Justia Law