Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

The Tribe filed suit against the government seeking damages to cover the cost of providing safe drinking water on the northeastern Arizona Hopi Reservation. The reservation’s public water systems rely on groundwater drawn from subsurface layers of water-bearing rock. The Tribe alleges that the systems serving five communities on the eastern portion of the reservation contain unsafe levels of arsenic that exceed the federally allowed maximum. The Tribe alleges the United States funded and provided technical assistance for the construction of many of those wells. The Tribe owns and operates the public water systems serving four of the communities; the Bureau of Indian Affairs owns and operates the system serving the fifth. To invoke the court’s jurisdiction under the Indian Tucker Act, the Tribe must identify a statute or regulation imposing a specific obligation on the government to provide adequate drinking water that would give rise to a claim for money damages. The Court of Federal Claims concluded that the Tribe failed to do so. The Federal Circuit affirmed. The sources of law relied on by the Tribe do not establish a specific fiduciary obligation on the United States to ensure adequate water quality on the Reservation. View "Hopi Tribe v. United States" on Justia Law

Since 1998, Crow Tribal Housing Authority (“Crow Housing”) has received Indian housing block grants made under the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”). In 2001, HUD discovered that it had overpaid Crow Housing and sought to recover the overpayments through deductions from future grants. The district court concluded that HUD acted under 25 U.S.C. 4161 and 4165 when it sought to recover the overage and that HUD violated the notice and hearing requirements under those sections because it did not provide Crow Housing with a hearing at which these deductions could be contested. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) HUD did not act under section 4161, but its actions did trigger the opportunity for a hearing under section 4165; and (2) because Crow Housing did not request a hearing, HUD did not violate its statutory obligation under section 4165 and did not improperly deprive Crow Housing of a hearing. View "Crow Tribal Housing Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev." on Justia Law

Two parents disputed the legal custody and visitation rights for their daughter; the mother resided in Alaska and the father resided on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation in Montana. The superior court awarded sole legal custody to the mother because it concluded that the parties could not communicate effectively to co-parent their daughter. The court ordered unsupervised visitation between the father and the daughter in Alaska, but prohibited visitation on the reservation until the daughter turned eight. The father appealed. Although the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it decided legal custody, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court failed to fully justify its decision when creating its restrictive visitation schedule and allocating visitation expenses. Consequently the Supreme Court remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Red Elk v. McBride" on Justia Law

Based on an incident between Fire Cloud, an Indian, and his friend’s girlfriend, that occurred in his home on Indian land, Fire Cloud was charged with aggravated sexual abuse by force (Count I) and attempted aggravated sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. 2241(a). He requested the district court instruct the jury regarding a lesser-included offense, abusive sexual contact, with respect to Count I, 18 U.S.C. 2244(a)(1). On Count I, the jury found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of abusive sexual contact. On Count II, the jury found him guilty of attempted aggravated sexual abuse. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the verdict and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence demonstrate that a reasonable jury could have found Fire Cloud guilty for both offense. View "United States v. Fire Cloud" on Justia Law

Before he died, the Decedent transferred two quarter sections of Indian trust land located in Tripp County, South Dakota, to his son. The Decedent’s estate (the Estate) filed this action arguing that the Decedent lacked the requisite mental capacity or was unduly influenced by his son when he transferred the land. Specifically, the Estate requested that the court compel the Decedent’s son to make application to the Secretary of the Interior for the transfer of the Indian trust property to the Estate. The circuit court denied the Estate’s request and dismissed the action, determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the parcels held in trust by the United States. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. View "Ducheneaux v. Ducheneaux" on Justia Law

At the start of the dependency proceedings, the juvenile court and Ventura County Human Services Agency believed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901, did not apply to Eskimo families. Father and mother appealed from the order terminating parental rights to their two minor children and selecting adoption as the permanent plan, Welf. & Inst. Code 366.26. The court of appeal reversed. Evidence submitted for the first time on appeal established that the children are Indian children under ICWA. The federal definition of "Indian" includes "Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska." The Noorvik Native Community, a federally-recognized Alaskan Indian tribe confirmed that the minors are tribe members. Before terminating parental rights to an Indian child, the juvenile court must satisfy ICWA requirements, including finding that "active efforts" were made to provide services designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and that parents' continued custody of minors "is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage." Having found ICWA inapplicable, the juvenile court did not consider these requirements before terminating parental rights; NNC was not afforded an opportunity to intervene. View "In re H.G." on Justia Law

Misquadace pleaded guilty to failure to pay child support, 18 U.S.C. 228(a)(3). He was sentenced to five years’ probation and $54,613.12 in restitution. In 2013, he admitted failing to assign his tribal gaming per capita payment to the South Dakota Department of Social Services in violation of his probation conditions. Misquadace remained on probation and was ordered to pay $200 per month toward his outstanding child-support balance. The condition that he assign his per capita payment was eliminated. Weeks later, a second petition alleged failure to report a change of residence. At his revocation hearing, Misquadace admitted the violation. His probation was revoked. He explained that he had been homeless because of his alcohol addiction but had joined a new church, obtained housing, and was attempting to get his life back in order for the benefit of his children. Misquadace’s violation was a Grade C offense, and his advisory sentencing range was 8 to 14 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed the statutory maximum of 24 months’ imprisonment and 1 year of supervised release, and reduced the amount of restitution owed to $53,716. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the court properly weighed the sentencing factors. View "United States v. Misquadace" on Justia Law

The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services filed a petition for emergency protective services for seven-year-old H.T., alleging drug use by Mother and domestic violence between Mother and her boyfriend. The petition stated that H.T. “may be an Indian Child for the purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).” The district court granted the motion for emergency protective services. The district court subsequently held a hearing that adjudicated H.T. a youth in need of care. The Department then filed a petition for permanent legal custody and termination of parental rights. The district court held a termination hearing and adopted and approved the termination petition. Mother appealed, asserting that the district court failed to comply with state and federal statutory requirements for terminating parental rights to an Indian child. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Mother received fundamentally fair procedures prior to the termination of her parental rights; but (2) because the district court applied the wrong statutory standards in its final order, its judgment is vacated. Remanded for entry of a new order on the issue of whether Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. View "In re H.T." on Justia Law

Brown, Reyes, Lyons, and Tibbetts were indicted under the Lacey Act which makes it unlawful to "sell . . . any fish . . . taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of . . . any Indian tribal law." 16 U.S.C. 3372(a)(1). The indictments alleged that they had netted fish for commercial purposes within the boundaries of the Leech Lake Reservation in violation of the Leech Lake Conservation Code, then sold the fish. The four are Chippewa Indians, and they moved to dismiss the indictments on the ground that their prosecution violates fishing rights reserved under the 1837 Treaty between the United States and the Chippewa. The district court granted the motions. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the historic fishing rights of the Chippewa Indians bar the prosecution for taking fish within the Leech Lake Reservation. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Appellant Linda Vista Village San Diego Homeowners Association, Inc. appealed the dismissal of their request for a declaratory judgment and other relief. Appellant's complaint was filed in 2012 against defendants-respondents the City of San Diego and the predecessors of Tecolote Investors, LLC. Members of the HOA are sublessees of mobile home park lots subject to a 1979 master lease between the City and Tecolote Investors. Appellant argued that the park site was located on and should have been properly characterized as "Pueblo Lands" within the meaning of the San Diego City Charter (section 219). Section 219 and its predecessors since 1909 have been applied to certain Pueblo lands north of the San Diego River to require approval by City Council ordinance and City voters for any sale or lease of them for more than 15 years. Since no voter approval was sought or obtained for this transaction, Appellant alleged the City was without power to enter into the existing 55-year master lease of the park site with the Landlord Defendants (or their predecessors). As a consequence, Appellant sought decrees to invalidate the master lease and consequently its subleases, specifically attacking the 1983 City-approved provisions allowing periodic rent increases. Appellant also claims entitlement to various other types of relief, such as damages. In light of the applicable authorities, the recorded title documents for the parcels demonstrate as a matter of law that on this record, the restrictions of section 219 did not apply, the face of the pleading failed to state its causes of action, and the Landlord Defendants' demurrer was correctly sustained without leave to amend. Based on de novo analysis (akin to judgment on the pleadings),the Court of Appeal concluded the record fully supported the dismissal of all causes of action as to the City too. View "Linda Vista Village San Diego HOA v. Tecolote Investors" on Justia Law