Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Fort Yates School District operates within the Standing Rock Indian Reservation. The North Dakota Constitution requires that the District provide education to children who are Indians or reside on reservations. In 2003, the District and the Tribe entered into an Agreement, providing that both the Standing Rock and the Fort Yates School Boards would govern the school system; that all property or equipment purchased under the Agreement would generally be joint property; and that it "neither diminishes nor expands rights or protections afforded … under tribal, state or federal law." After a fight between two students, A. was suspended and C. obtained a restraining order against A. A. allegedly violated the restraining order by verbally harassing C. at school. The school suspended A. for 10 additional days. Murphy sued on behalf of her daughter, C., a Tribe member, in the Tribal Court, which held that it had jurisdiction. The District did not appeal to the Standing Rock Supreme Court, but filed suit in federal court against Murphy and the Tribal Court. The district court dismissed and remanded to the Tribal Court. The Eighth Circuit reversed with respect to Tribal Court jurisdiction, but affirmed dismissal of the Tribal Court on sovereign immunity grounds. View "Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Derrick Jim of aggravated sexual abuse occurring in the Navajo Nation. Jim initially pled guilty to this offense, but later withdrew his plea and went to trial. On appeal, Jim claimed that the trial court erred when it let the Government present evidence of the admissions he made in his plea agreement and during his plea colloquy to the jury, despite Jim waiving his Rule 410 protections as part of the plea agreement underlying his (withdrawn) guilty plea. In its cross-appeal, the Government challenged Jim’s 360-month prison sentence, arguing that the district court erred in calculating Jim’s offense level under the sentencing guidelines. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in enforcing Jim’s Rule 410 waiver by allowing the Government to present to the jury Jim’s prior admissions of guilt. The Court agreed with the Government that the district court erred when it held that, in determining whether a two-offense-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2A3.1(b)(4)(B) for causing the victim serious bodily injury applied in Jim’s case, the court could not consider any injuries directly resulting from the sexual abuse for which Jim was convicted. Thus, the case was remanded for resentencing so the district court could determine, in the first instance, whether that enhancement was warranted in this case and, if so, the impact of that enhancement on Jim’s sentence. View "United States v. Jim" on Justia Law

Officer Glen Gutierrez, on duty as a full-time salaried police officer of the Pueblo of Pojoaque and also commissioned as a Santa Fe County deputy sheriff, was patrolling a portion of U.S. Highway 84/285 located within the exterior boundary of the Pojoaque Pueblo. Officer Gutierrez observed Jose Loya making a dangerous lane change and pulled Loya over. Once stopped, Officer Gutierrez asked Loya to step out of his vehicle and informed Loya that he was under arrest for reckless driving in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-113 (1987), a state law. Officer Gutierrez placed Loya in the back of his patrol vehicle and transported Loya to the Pojoaque Tribal Police Department for processing. Loya, a non-Indian, was not subject to prosecution for violation of tribal law, so he was transported from the Pueblo to the Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center where he was incarcerated. Ultimately, Officer Gutierrez prosecuted Loya for reckless driving in Santa Fe County Magistrate Court. The issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on a a county’s legal obligation when a non-Indian, arrested by a tribal officer and prosecuted in state court for state traffic offenses, sues the arresting tribal officer for federal civil rights violations. Specifically, the issue the Court identified in this case was when the county has an obligation under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, to provide that tribal police officer with a legal defense in the federal civil rights action. The district court as well as the Court of Appeals found no such legal duty, in part because it concluded that the tribal officer was not a state public employee as defined in the NMTCA. The Supreme Court held the opposite, finding clear evidence in the text and purpose of the NMTCA requiring the county to defend the tribal officer, duly commissioned to act as a deputy county sheriff, under these circumstances. View "Loya v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The Fond du Luth Casino in Duluth opened in 1986 as a joint venture between the city and the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa and is operated by the Band. The 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act led to restructuring of agreements between the Band and the city under a 1994 consent decree, under which the Band paid the city $75 million 1994-2009, 19 percent of gross revenues. The Band stopped making payments in 2009, believing that they violated IGRA as interpreted by the National Indian Gaming Commission. In 2011, the Gaming Commission issued a Notice of Violation, determining that the payments violated IGRA requirements that tribes have the sole proprietary interest in casinos and are their primary beneficiaries. The Commission ordered the Band not to resume payments. The Band sought relief under FRCP 60(b)(6) from payments in 2009-2011. The district court denied relief. The Eighth Circuit remanded and again reversed and remanded, finding that the district court failed to consider all of the factors identified in its 2013 order. The court must give proper weight to the congressional intent that tribes be the primary beneficiaries of Indian gaming and the fact that the city was on notice in 2009 of Gaming Commission policies. View "Duluth v. Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa" on Justia Law

The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), 25 U.S.C. 450, authorizes self-determination (Title I) contracts. The Bureau of Indian Affairs reviews proposals for the Secretary of the Interior. A proposal not declined within 90 days is deemed approved. In October 2011, the Tribe wrote to the Bureau’s Office of Self Governance (OSG) requesting several million dollars for public safety, attaching a Resolution authorizing submission of a “Title I Compact Request.” OSG replied that it did not have authority to manage a Title I agreement, copying the Bureau’s Office of Justice Services (OJS), as the appropriate contact. OJS asked the Tribe to clarify whether it was seeking a Title I contract or funding under Title IV. The Tribe emailed OJS, regarding availability to meet "regarding the Title 1 request" and sent two follow-up emails, referencing its “Title 1 request.” On February 1, 2012 the Tribe wrote to OJS, stating that “the contract is deemed approved.” OJS responded that the intent of the October letter was unclear and did not meet self-determination contract proposal requirements. The Tribe again asserted deemed approval. A year later, OJS received a letter titled “Claim for performance of Title I justice services contract pursuant to Contract Disputes Act.” OJS again denied receiving a complete proposal. The Civilian Board of Contracting Appeals dismissed a claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Tribe has not been awarded a contract, noting a parallel appeal with the Interior Board of Indian Appeals. View "Yurok Tribe v. Dep't of the Interior" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the United States, Attorney Kandis Martine, and Budget Rent-A-Car after plaintiffs were injured in a car accident caused by Martine. Martine, while driving a rental car to an adoption hearing, drove down the wrong direction on a one-way street and caused the accident. On appeal, the United States challenged the district court's partial summary judgment ruling that, under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346 et seq., and under a self-determination contract entered into between the Department of Interior, BIA, and the Navajo Nation Tribe, Martine was "deemed" an employee of the BIA and afforded the full protection and coverage of the FTCA. The court concluded that the district court's decision concerning subject matter jurisdiction is consistent with the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. 450 et seq., statutory scheme; the terms of the self-determination contract; and the record evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Colbert v. United States" on Justia Law

Wisconsin’s Governor has entered into gaming compacts with all of the state’s tribes (Wis. Stat. 14.035). The HoChunk Nation adopted an ordinance, authorizing Class I and Class II gaming on its lands. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2703(6), (7), (8), defines Class I gaming as social games and traditional Indian gaming, regulated exclusively by tribes; Class II gaming includes bingo and certain nonbanked card games (players compete against one another rather than against the house) that are authorized by state laws. Class III gaming is a residual category, regulated under tribal-state compacts. A 2008 agreement between the state and the Nation does not restrict Class II gaming. Since 2010, the Nation has offered nonbanked electronic poker at Ho-Chunk Madison. Wisconsin sought an injunction to stop the poker, which, if classified as Class III would violate the Nation’s compact with the state. The district court ruled that the poker was a Class III game. The Seventh Circuit reversed. States may not prohibit a tribe from offering gaming that is roughly equivalent to what the state allows for its residents. A state must criminalize a gambling activity in order to prohibit the tribe from engaging in it. Wisconsin decriminalized nonbanked poker in 1999. IGRA does not permit interference with Class II poker on tribal land. View "Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation" on Justia Law

Schlemm, a member of the Navajo Tribe, and a prisoner, sought an order requiring the prison to accommodate his religious practices under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. Members of the Tribe honor the dead through dancing, praying, and eating traditional foods. Wisconsin concedes that this celebration is religious and that Schlemm sincerely believes that “traditional foods” should include game meat. The prison rejected his request for game meat or ground beef and his offer to secure a sealed platter from an outside vendor. The prison permits Jewish inmates to have outside vendors supply sealed Seder platters. Defendants maintain that serving venison would be too expensive, would exceed the capacity of institutional kitchens, and would violate a rule limiting prison foods to those certified by the USDA. The district court granted summary judgment, ruling that the denial does not impose a “substantial burden” on Schlemm’s religious exercise; the state has a “compelling governmental interest” in costs and using USDA-inspected meats; and that the denial is the “least restrictive means” of furthering those interests. The Seventh Circuit remanded, holding that the state was not entitled to summary judgment and ordering a preliminary injunction allowing Schlemm to order venison and to wear a multicolored headband while praying in his cell and during group ceremonies. View "Schlemm v. Frank" on Justia Law

In 1991, the Tulalip Tribes of Washington and the State of Washington signed a tribal-state gaming compact (the Tulalip Compact), which has since been amended numerous times. The Spokane Tribe did not participate in the collective negotiation process that led to the Tulalip Compact. In 2007, a compact between the Spokane Tribe and the State (the Spokane Compact) became effective. In 2010, Tulalip requested negotiations with the State to amend its compact to enable Tulalip to acquire additional licenses to video player terminals licenses to video player terminals for Class III gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. When negotiations broke down, Tulalip initiated suit, asserting that the “most-favored tribe” clause in the Tulalip Compact entitled it to the amendment because the mechanism was available to the Spokane Tribe but unavailable to Tulalip. The district court granted summary judgment to the State and denied Tulalip’s cross-motion for summary judgment. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the most-favored tribe clause did not require the State to adopt Tulalip’s proposed amendment because the amendment did not mirror the restrictions set forth the Spokane compact. View "Tulalip Tribes of Washington v. State of Washington" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Shinnecock Indian Nation filed suit to vindicate its rights to land in the Town of Southampton, claiming that 1859 New York legislation allowed thousands of acres of the Nation’s land to be wrongfully conveyed to the town. The district court dismissed, holding that laches barred the claims. An appeal to the Second Circuit remains pending. In 2012, the Nation filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking $1,105,000,000, alleging that the United States, “acting through the federal court system . . . denied any and all judicial means of effective redress for the unlawful taking of lands” in violation of trust obligations arising under the Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. 177, and the “federal common law.” The Claims Court dismissed on alternative grounds: that the claims were not ripe because they were predicated upon the district court’s judgment in the prior suit, which was on appeal, or that, even if the claims were ripe, it had no jurisdiction because they did not fall within the Indian Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The court refused to allow amendment to allege a judicial takings claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the breach of trust claims are not ripe for review, vacated the jurisdiction ruling, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the breach of trust claims without prejudice. View "Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States" on Justia Law