Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Cascadia challenged the BIA's approval of the Kokwel Project, a plan by the Coquille Indian Tribe to harvest 268 acres of timber in the Coquille Forest in southwest Oregon. The district court granted summary judgment to the BIA and Tribe. The court concluded that the BIA and the Tribe did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., by aggregating the Alder/Rasler Project, which had been approved, but not yet completed, as part of the environmental baseline against which the incremental impact of the Kokwel Project was considered. Further, the court concluded that the Coquille Restoration Act (CRA), 25 U.S.C. 715 et seq., does not require compliance with the Recovery Plan for the northern spotted owl. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Cascadia Wildlands v. Bureau of Indian Affairs" on Justia Law

Alabama filed suit against PCI under state and federal law to enjoin gaming at casinos owned by the Poarch Band of Creek Indians and located on Indian lands within the state’s borders. The district court rejected Alabama's claims of public nuisance and dismissed the action based on defendant's tribal immunity or failure to state a claim for relief. The court affirmed, concluding that PCI was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity on all claims; the Individual defendants were entitled to tribal sovereign immunity as to Alabama’s state law claim but not its claim under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 18 U.S.C. 1166-68; and Alabama failed to state a claim for relief under the IGRA because 18 U.S.C. 1166 gives states no right of action to sue. View "Alabama v. PCI Gaming Auth." on Justia Law

Jennifer and Adam were the parents of three minor children: a daughter, Andrea, and two younger boys. The children were Indian children as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The State's Office of Children's Services (OCS) took three minor children into emergency custody, then sought a court order granting OCS temporary custody, asserting there was probable cause to find the children in need of aid. A standing master determined that no probable cause existed and recommended that the three children be returned to their mother's custody. The State objected to the master's recommendation, and the superior court reviewed and rejected it, finding that there was probable cause. The mother filed this appeal, asking the Supreme Court to hold that masters have the authority to return children to their homes without judicial review. Before the State filed its brief, the superior court dismissed the underlying case, making this appeal moot. After its review, the Supreme Court applied the "public interest" exception to the mootness doctrine and affirmed the superior court's ruling. View "Jennifer L. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a non-Indian, filed a complaint in state district court against Defendants, enrolled members of the Northern Arapaho Tribe, for injuries sustained in a vehicle accident that occurred on a state highway within the boundaries of the Wind River Indian Reservation. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting (1) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) the two-year statute of limitations dictated by the Shoshone and Arapaho Law and Order Code should apply to bar Plaintiff’s action. The district court denied the motion, concluding (1) the court’s exercise of jurisdiction would not infringe on tribal sovereignty, and (2) the court had at a minimum concurrent jurisdiction over the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) had subject matter jurisdiction over this action, and (2) properly concluded that Plaintiff’s action was timely filed under Wyoming’s four-year statute of limitations. View "C'hair v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Several Indian tribes successfully challenged the imposition of state fuel taxes on tribal retailers. Since then, the State and various tribes signed agreements under which the tribes agreed to buy taxed fuel, and the State agreed to refund a portion of the fuel tax receipts to the tribes. An industry group unsuccessfully challenged the lawfulness of these agreements. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court's review reduced to whether those agreements violated article II, section 40 of the State Constitution. "Without passing judgment on whether the legislature successfully moved the legal incidence of the tax away from tribal retailers," the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the industry group's challenge. View "Auto. United Trades Org. v. Washington" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the court considered whether Florida’s Rental Tax and Florida’s Utility Tax, as applied to matters occurring on Seminole Tribe lands, violate the tenets of federal Indian law. The court held that Florida’s Rental Tax is expressly precluded by 25 U.S.C. 465, and, in the alternative, is preempted by the comprehensive federal regulation of Indian land leasing. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order as to this issue. The court concluded, however, that the district court erred in placing the legal incidence of the Utility Tax on the Tribe and find that, on this record, the Tribe has not demonstrated that the Utility Tax is generally preempted by federal law. Therefore, the court reversed as to this issue and remanded for further proceedings. View "Seminole Tribe v. Stranburg" on Justia Law

The dependency petition alleged that mother "K.B." had beat X.B., her youngest son, with a belt causing welts and bruises to his chest, shoulder, arms, and legs, and that she pushed X.B.’s head into a pillow to muffle his screams, causing him to feel as if he were suffocating. The petition alleged that mother had a history of using inappropriate discipline techniques on her sons, such as beating them with belts, humiliating K.B. in public, and forcing K.B. to complete strenuous exercise routines as punishment. The petition also alleged that mother allowed her live-in boyfriend to inappropriately punish K.B. and to smoke marijuana in the children’s presence. K.B. appealed the trial court’s order placing X.B. with his nonoffending and noncustodial biological father, K.D. (father), who lived out of state. She argued that the court erred by failing to find under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (a), that it would be detrimental to X.B.’s emotional well-being to be separated from his maternal family. Mother requested that X.B. be placed with his older sibling in the home of his maternal grandmother. She also argued that the court failed to give proper notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "In re K.B." on Justia Law

Michael C. appeals a juvenile court judgment terminating his parental rights to his minor daughter A.C., and selecting adoption as her permanent plan. Father mainly argued that no sufficient evidence supported the court's underlying findings that: (1) the Agency's adoption assessment report was adequate and up to date on the child's mental and emotional status; and (2) there was no applicable exception to adoption preference. In addition, the Father sought review, by way of designating his appeal to be a writ proceeding, of certain of the juvenile court's earlier orders from the 12-month review and referral hearing, claiming he did not forfeit such claims, even though his previously appointed appellate attorney declined to file such a writ petition after the 12-month orders were made (to that end, Father argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel). Accordingly, Father now asked the Court of Appeal to consider whether the 12-month referral hearing orders were still reviewable because they failed to meet the standards of the Indian Child Welfare Act regarding sufficient evidence: (1) of "ICWA detriment" to return the child to his custody; and (2) whether "active reunification efforts" were made that allowed the juvenile court to rule that his reunification services were adequate and could properly be terminated at the 12-month review and referral hearing. After careful consideration of these arguments in light of the trial court's record, the Court of Appeal determined there was no adequate showing in support of Father's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and further, he has forfeited the substantive arguments he raised about the orders made at the 12-month review hearing. "Even if we were to consider those claims on a writ basis, we would find them meritless." Regarding the judgment that terminated his parental rights and selected adoption as the permanent plan for the child, the Court found no prejudicial error or abuse of discretion occurred, and that the judgment was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

Long, a member of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, operated the “OC Store,” a novelty store, on the reservation. The store had few exterior windows. BIA Officer Spargur encountered juveniles, carrying fireworks. One juvenile stated that he just bought them at the OC Store. Spargur went to the Store, was unsure whether it was closed, but concluded the store was open because of lights, music, unlocked doors, and the juveniles’ report that they had “just” purchased fireworks. Spargur entered through two unlocked doors, stopped at a third door, and “knock[ed] and announce[d] police.” Receiving no response, Spargur opened the main door, and, seeing Long’s son, entered the store. Another of Long’s sons acknowledged the juveniles had been in the store. Spargur noticed a small package on one of the concession tables that, based on his experience and training, he “recognized . . . as a package normally holding synthetic marijuana.” Once Long emerged, Spargur reminded him not to sell fireworks after Independence Day, left the store, and prepared an affidavit for a search warrant. A judge, 60 miles away, approved the warrant by telephone. Spargur and others searched the store, seizing 80 grams of synthetic marijuana. Long conditionally pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss, finding that the officers’ actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Long" on Justia Law

In April 2013, plaintiffs filed a complaint in Utah state court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint sought a declaration as to the authority of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (the "Tribe") over non-Indian businesses operating on certain categories of land. It also alleged that Dino Cesspooch, Jackie LaRose, and Sheila Wopsock (individuals affiliated with the Ute Tribal Employment Rights Office ("UTERO")), had harassed and extorted plaintiffs in violation of state law. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss in state court by way of a special appearance, arguing that service of process had been insufficient, that the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of a valid waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, that the Tribe and its officers were immune from suit but were necessary and indispensable parties, and that plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies in tribal court. Cesspooch and LaRose were properly served. Two attorneys for the defendants moved for pro hac vice admissions. The motions were granted. Following a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the state court ordered further briefing on whether defendants' motion constituted a general appearance and authorized substituted service on the Tribe and Wopsock. The court then granted plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint adding additional defendants. The Tribe, Cesspooch, LaRose, and Wopsock were served the amended complaint. The Tribe filed a notice of removal in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. In its notice, the Tribe stated that Cesspooch, LaRose, and Wopsock consented to removal, and that the remaining defendants would consent. The remaining defendants (save one) filed consent and joinders to removal. Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that the initial defendants waived their right to removal (or to consent to removal) by litigating in state court, removal was untimely, the defendants had not unanimously consented to removal, and that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion to remand. The Tribe appealed the remand order. The Tenth Circuit dismissed this appeal, finding that under 28 U.S.C. 1447(d), a district court order remanding a case to state court was "not reviewable on appeal or otherwise." Further, the Court held that a district court order remanding because the defendants did not unanimously join or consent to removal was patently "not reviewable." In addition, the Court concluded that the remand order in this case was colorably characterized as being based on lack of unanimity. View "Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe" on Justia Law