Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

The Nation and the State executed a gaming compact in 2002 pursuant to the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701-2721. After the Compact was approved by the Secretary of the Interior and became effective in 2003, the Nation purchased an unincorporated parcel of land within the outer boundaries of Glendale, Arizona, pursuant to the federal Gila Bend Indian Reservation Lands Replacement Act (LRA). Plaintiffs filed suit against the Nation seeking to enjoin the Nation's plan to conduct Class III gaming on Parcel 2. The district court granted summary judgment to the Nation. The court concluded that, under the ordinary meaning of the words used in the statutory text, the Nation plainly had “land claims” for damage to its reservation lands; were the court to find the term “land claim” to be ambiguous, and proceeded under Chevron to apply the DOI’s definition of the term, then the court would find that the Nation also had a claim concerning the impairment of title or other real property interest or loss of possession of its reservation land; and the district court did not err in determining that the LRA was a “settlement” of the Nation’s land claims. The court also concluded that the district court properly rejected plaintiffs' claims of judicial estoppel and waiver; the duly-executed Compact negotiated at length by sophisticated parties expressly authorizes the Nation to conduct gaming on its “Indian Lands,” subject to the requirements of section 2719 of IGRA; because Parcel 2 complies with the requirements of section 2719, and the Compact expressly allows the Nation to conduct Class III gaming there, the district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the Nation on plaintiffs’ breach of Compact claim; the Nation's choice to conduct Class III gaming in accordance with the express terms of the Compact does not deviate from the agreed common purpose of the Compact, and therefore does not breach the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and the district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ non-Compact claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Tohono O'odham Nation" on Justia Law

A federally recognized Alaska Native tribe adopted a process for adjudicating the child support obligations of parents whose children are members of the tribe or are eligible for membership, and it operated a federally funded child support enforcement agency. The Tribe sued the State and won a declaratory judgment that its tribal court system had subject matter jurisdiction over child support matters and an injunction requiring the State’s child support enforcement agency to recognize the tribal courts’ child support orders in the same way it recognized such orders from other states. Because the Supreme Court agreed that tribal courts had inherent subject matter jurisdiction to decide the child support obligations owed to children who are tribal members or were eligible for membership, and that state law thus required the State’s child support enforcement agency to recognize and enforce a tribal court’s child support orders, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alaska v. Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska" on Justia Law

In 1854, the Omaha Tribe entered into a treaty with the United States to establish a 300,000-acre reservation and to “cede” and “forever relinquish all right and title to” its remaining land in present-day Nebraska for a fixed price. In 1865, the Tribe entered into another treaty, agreeing to sell land to the government for a fixed sum. In 1872, the Tribe sought to sell more land. Instead of a fixed-sum purchase, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to survey, appraise, and sell tracts of reservation land to settlers and to deposit proceeds with the Treasury for the Tribe’s benefit. Congress took the same approach in 1882 with respect to roughly 50,000 acres of reservation land (22 Stat. 341). Peebles purchased land under the terms of the 1882 Act and established the village of Pender. In 2006, the Tribe sought to subject Pender retailers to tits amended beverage control ordinance pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1161 (permitting tribes to regulate liquor sales on reservation land and in “Indian country”). Concluding that the 1882 Act did not diminish the Reservation, the district court ruled in favor of the Tribe. The Eighth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. Only Congress may diminish the boundaries of an Indian reservation, and its intent to do so must be clear. The 1882 Act had none of the common textual indications that express clear intent, but falls into a category of surplus land acts that “merely opened reservation land to settlement.” Although the Tribe has been absent from the disputed territory for more than 120 years, the Court stated that subsequent demographic history is the “least compelling” evidence; the justifiable expectations of non-Indians living on the land cannot alone diminish reservation boundaries. View "Nebraska v. Parker" on Justia Law

In 1854, the Omaha Tribe entered into a treaty with the United States to establish a 300,000-acre reservation and to “cede” and “forever relinquish all right and title to” its remaining land in present-day Nebraska for a fixed price. In 1865, the Tribe entered into another treaty, agreeing to sell land to the government for a fixed sum. In 1872, the Tribe sought to sell more land. Instead of a fixed-sum purchase, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to survey, appraise, and sell tracts of reservation land to settlers and to deposit proceeds with the Treasury for the Tribe’s benefit. Congress took the same approach in 1882 with respect to roughly 50,000 acres of reservation land (22 Stat. 341). Peebles purchased land under the terms of the 1882 Act and established the village of Pender. In 2006, the Tribe sought to subject Pender retailers to tits amended beverage control ordinance pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1161 (permitting tribes to regulate liquor sales on reservation land and in “Indian country”). Concluding that the 1882 Act did not diminish the Reservation, the district court ruled in favor of the Tribe. The Eighth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. Only Congress may diminish the boundaries of an Indian reservation, and its intent to do so must be clear. The 1882 Act had none of the common textual indications that express clear intent, but falls into a category of surplus land acts that “merely opened reservation land to settlement.” Although the Tribe has been absent from the disputed territory for more than 120 years, the Court stated that subsequent demographic history is the “least compelling” evidence; the justifiable expectations of non-Indians living on the land cannot alone diminish reservation boundaries. View "Nebraska v. Parker" on Justia Law

Goldenstein, obtained a $1,000 online loan from a company owned by Chippewa Indians, incorporated under Chippewa tribal law, and authorized to issue loans secured by vehicles at interest rates greater than permitted under Pennsylvania law. Goldenstein pledged his car and was charged 250 percent interest. The company, after deducting a $50 transfer fee and wiring $950 to Goldenstein, withdrew installments of $207.90 from Goldenstein’s bank account in June and July. Goldenstein removed funds from the account because he did not recognize the activity on his bank statements. When the company attempted to collect the August installment, it was rejected for insufficient funds. Repossessors took Goldenstein’s car. Goldenstein was told that his payment would not be accepted, nor his car returned unless he signed releases. Goldenstein paid $2,393 ($2,143 for the loan and $250 in repossession fees), signed the releases, then filed suit, claiming violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692–1692p; Pennsylvania’s Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act and Uniform Commercial Code; and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). The Third Circuit vacated summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the RICO and state law claims, but affirmed as to the FDCPA claim. Forfeiture of collateral can amount to “collection of unlawful debt” under RICO, but defendants had a right to possession and did not violate the FDCPA by repossessing the car. View "Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant, a non-Indian, appealed his conviction under the federal murder statute, 18 U.S.C. 111, for the murder of the victim on the Tohono O’odham Indian reservation in Arizona. The court concluded that section 1111 was applicable to defendant under the Indian General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1152, which makes federal criminal law applicable in federal enclaves when the defendant is a non-Indian and the victim is an Indian, because the government adduced sufficient evidence to establish that the victim in this case was an Indian. The court held that the evidence introduced at trial, taken in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to establish that defendant acted with premeditation and, therefore, the court affirmed defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. Because the district court erred in defining the term “burglary” in section 1111 by reference to Arizona’s third-degree burglary statute, and this error was not harmless, the court vacated defendant's conviction for felony murder. View "United States v. Reza-Ramos" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendant alleging that they sustained injuries as a result of Defendant’s negligence. The accident underlying Plaintiffs’ claims occurred while Defendant was acting within the scope of his employment with the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity on Plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiffs sought money damages from Defendant personally, not from the Authority. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity extended to Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant because Defendant was an employee of the Mohegan Tribe and was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. View "Lewis v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Casino, alleging unlawful gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and Florida law. The Seminole Tribe of Florida owns and operates the Casino under the name “Seminole Indian Casino-Immokalee.” The district court dismissed the suit because the Tribe is a federally recognized tribe entitled to sovereign immunity. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the Tribe is indeed a federally recognized Indian tribe entitled to sovereign immunity. View "Longo v. Seminole Indian Casino-Immokalee" on Justia Law

Defendants Christopher and Jordan were found guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, both in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2, 113, and 1153. The court concluded that the admission of the certificates of the degree of Indian blood did not violate Christopher’s and Jordan’s Sixth Amendment rights because they were admissible as non-testimonial business records. In this case, the enrollment clerk here did not complete forensic testing on evidence seized during a police investigation, but instead performed the ministerial duty of preparing certificates based on information that was kept in the ordinary course of business. Moreover, in addition to the certificates, the government elicited testimony from the deputy superintendent for trust services that Christopher and Jordan were enrolled in the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the lesser-included-offense instruction; there was no error in the district court’s questioning of the emergency room doctor; and the evidence was sufficient to convict Jordan of assault with a dangerous weapon or assault resulting in serious bodily injuries. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rainbow" on Justia Law

The juvenile court found Tavian B. to be a child who lacks proper parental care by reason of the fault or habits of his parents and to be in a situation dangerous to life or limb or injurious to his health or morals. The State subsequently filed a motion to terminate the parental rights of both parents. Father filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction to the Oglala Sioux Tribal Juvenile Court pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Before the juvenile court ruled on Father’s motion to transfer, the State withdrew its motion to terminate parental rights. Thereafter, the juvenile court concluded that good cause existed to overrule Father’s motion to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court because the proceedings were in “an advanced stage.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State did not meet its burden of establishing good cause to deny transfer to tribal court, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to transfer. View "In re Interest of Tavian B." on Justia Law