Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

M.H.C. (child) was born in September of 2013. The Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) placed the child in protective custody on November 5, 2013. In the initial petition filed on November 18, 2013, the State declared the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) were applicable. On November 21, 2013, the Cherokee Nation appeared at the initial appearance, and the natural mother informed the court that she had a Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood but was not currently a tribal member. Thereafter, the Cherokee Nation received official notice from the State that it planned to adjudicate the child as deprived. The Cherokee Nation sent DHS a response notifying DHS that the child was eligible for enrollment in the tribe and enclosing a tribal-enrollment application for DHS to complete. After the Cherokee Nation's initial attempt to have DHS complete the enrollment application, the Cherokee Nation sent DHS three additional enrollment applications. The district court ruled the ICWA inapplicable because the mother was not a registered tribal member, the child was not a member either. The natural mother was also told if ICWA applied, the child would likely have to leave foster mother's care because foster mother was a non-ICWA compliant placement. No party informed the natural mother of ICWA's benefits and protections. The natural mother declined to enroll at the time. The district court subsequently found the State broke confidentiality by allowing the Cherokee Nation to attend a family team meeting in a non-ICWA case. The district court granted the Cherokee Nation's motion to transfer the case to tribal court, finding the State failed to provide clear-and-convincing evidence of good cause to deny the transfer. The State and foster mother (together Appellants) appealed. The Oklahoma Supreme Court retained the appeal for disposition. Neither DHS, nor the natural mother, nor the child through her attorney objected to the transfer to tribal court jurisdiction. Only the State and the foster mother objected. After review, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in finding ICWA applicable upon the natural mother's enrollment in the Cherokee Nation. ICWA applied to the proceedings prospectively from the date the record supports its application. Appellants failed to present clear-and-convincing evidence of "good cause" for the case to remain with the district court. Because the district court did not err in granting the motion to transfer to tribal court, the Court affirmed the order granting the motion to transfer. View "In the Matter of M.H.C." on Justia Law

Mother appeals the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to Alissa and K.C., and identifying adoption as the permanent plan for her two daughters. The court concluded that the Department did not adequately investigate Mother's claim of Indian ancestry pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. Therefore, the court remanded for the juvenile court to direct the Department to conduct a meaningful investigation into Mother's claim of Indian ancestry, including making genuine efforts to locate other family members who might have information bearing on the children's possible Indian ancestry. The court conditionally affirmed the order and remanded for compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of the ICWA. View "In re Michael V." on Justia Law

Meyers used his credit card to make purchases at the Green Bay are Oneida Travel Center and Oneida One Stop retail locations, owned and operated by the federally‐recognized Oneida Indian tribe. He received electronically printed receipts that included more than the last five digits of his credit card and the card’s expiration date. He alleged, in a putative class action, that the Tribe issued these receipts in violation of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act, which states: [n]o person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or transaction, 15 U.S.C. 1681c(g)(1). FACTA defines a person as “any individual, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or other entity.” The district court concluded that the Tribe was immune from suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that whether a tribe is subject to a statute and whether the tribe may be sued for violating the statute are two different questions. Any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of immunity; “government or governmental subdivision or agency” does not unambiguously refer to tribes. View "Meyers v. Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wis." on Justia Law

While responding to an early-morning 911 call, Officer Blaine Parnell of the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, attempted to arrest Jakota Wolfname on two outstanding tribal warrants. Parnell ordered Wolfname to put his hands behind his back; instead, Wolfname ran away. As the result of his flight from Parnell and the ensuing scuffle, a grand jury indicted Wolfname for “knowingly and forcibly assault[ing], resist[ing], and interfer[ing] with” Parnell while Parnell “was engaged in the performance of his official duties, which resulted in bodily injury to . . . Parnell.” The jury found Wolfname guilty of resisting and interfering with Parnell in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 111(a)(1). It also found that Wolfname made physical contact with Parnell. But the jury wrote, “No,” next to the assault option on the verdict form. And despite testimony from Parnell and his orthopedic surgeon indicating that Parnell suffered damage to a ligament in his thumb during the struggle, the jury also declined to find that Wolfname inflicted bodily injury on Parnell. The district court imposed a 24-month prison sentence. Wolfname appealed. In this case, the parties asked the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to decide whether assault was an element of every conviction under 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1). The Tenth Circuit found that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury it had to find Wolfname assaulted Parnell. This error was plain error, and warranted reversal. View "United States v. Wolfname" on Justia Law

Thirty years ago, the Tenth Circuit decided all boundary disputes between the Ute Indian Tribe, the State of Utah, and its subdivisions. The only thing that remained was for the district court to memorialize that mandate in a permanent injunction. Twenty years ago, the Court modified its mandate in one respect, but stressed that in all others, the Court's earlier decision remained in place. The matter came before the Tenth Circuit again: the State of Utah, one of its cities, and several of its counties sought to relitigate the same boundaries. "Over the last forty years the questions haven’t changed - and neither have our answers." This case and all related matters were reassigned to a different district judge. The court and parties were directed to proceed to a final disposition both promptly and consistently with the Tenth Circuit's mandates in "Ute V," "Ute VI," and this case. View "Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah v. Myton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a member of the Tribe, filed suit against the Tribe in California state court for employment-related claims. The Tribe timely removed to district court and then moved to dismiss based on tribal immunity. The district court denied the motion based on the ground that the Tribe unequivocally waived its immunity by removing the action to federal court. The court followed the Eleventh Circuit and held that the act of removal does not express the clear and unequivocal waiver that is required for a tribe to relinquish its immunity from suit. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bodi v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians" on Justia Law

The Cowlitz gained legal status as a tribe in the eyes of the government in 2002 and then successfully petitioned the Department of the Interior to take into trust and declare as their “initial reservation” a parcel of land. The Cowlitz wish to use this parcel for tribal government facilities, elder housing, a cultural center, as well as a casino. Two groups of plaintiffs, Clark County and Grande Ronde, filed suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., challenging the Interior Secretary’s decision to take the land into trust and to allow casino-style gaming. The district court consolidated the actions and subsequently ruled in favor of the Secretary and Cowlitz. The court concluded that the Secretary reasonably interpreted and applied the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. 461 et seq., to conclude that the Cowlitz are a recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction; the Secretary reasonably determined that the Cowlitz meet the “initial-reservation” exception to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.; and the court rejected plaintiffs' remaining claims of error under the IRA, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and 25 C.F.R. 83.12(b), based on the Secretary’s alleged failure independently to verify the Tribe’s business plan and membership figures. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde v. Jewell" on Justia Law

The Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians and Findleton entered into the Construction Agreement for a gaming facility. In 2008 (10 months later), the Tribe suspended construction because the financial meltdown had adversely affected its ability to secure financing. In 2012, Findleton sought to compel ADR under the Agreement The Tribe asserted that it had not waived its sovereign immunity or consented to suit in the state court and that Findleton’s failure to exhaust his tribal administrative remedies deprived the court of jurisdiction. Findleton cited resolutions by the Tribal Council, waiving immunity. The Tribe has a General Council, consisting of all tribal members 18 years or older, and the Tribal Council, an elective body consisting of seven members of the General Council whose powers are more narrowly circumscribed. The Tribe’s constitution does not permit the Tribal Council to waive sovereign immunity without the General Council’s “consent” and “prior approval.” The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the action, finding that the Council was authorized to waive the Tribe’s immunity and did so in resolutions adopted in 2008 and on June 2, 2007, “in order to attract other individuals and entities to do business with the Tribe.” View "Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians" on Justia Law

The Mackinac Tribe filed suit to compel the Secretary of the Interior to convene an election allowing the Tribe to organize under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. 476(a). Although the Mackinac Tribe does not appear on the Secretary’s list of federally acknowledged tribes and has not been acknowledged through the Secretary’s Part 83 process, see 25 C.F.R. pt. 83, the group alleges it is federally recognized for IRA purposes because it is the historical successor to a tribe the federal government previously recognized via treaty. The district court found that the Mackinac Tribe failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by first seeking acknowledgment through the Part 83 process. As the district court did, the court reserved the question whether a group must be recognized to be eligible to organize under the IRA and whether that recognition must be marked by the group’s appearance on the Secretary’s list of federally recognized tribes. The court read the Tribe's complaint as seeking a writ of mandamus. The court declined the requested mandamus because review will be possible after the Mackinac Tribe has completed the Part 83 procedure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Mackinac Tribe v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 702, 705, challenging the authority of the Department of the Interior to take title to a particular tract of land under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. 465. The land (the Bradley Property) had been put into trust for the use of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians in Michigan, otherwise known as the Gun Lake Band or the Gun Lake Tribe. After the Supreme Court determined that plaintiff had prudential standing to bring this suit, Congress passed the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (the Gun Lake Act), Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913, a stand-alone statute reaffirming the Department’s decision to take the land in question into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe, and removing jurisdiction from the federal courts over any actions relating to that property. The court affirmed the district court's determination that the Gun Lake Act is constitutionally sound and thus plaintiff's suit must be dismissed. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion to strike a supplement to the administrative record. View "Patchak v. Jewell" on Justia Law