Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs challenged the Governor’s authority to concur in the decision of the Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (18 U.S.C. 1166-1167; 25 U.S.C. 2701, to take 305 acres in Madera County into trust for the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians for the purpose of operating a class III gaming casino. The Governor’s concurrence was necessary under federal law for the granting of permission to operate the casino. While the case was pending, the legislature ratified a compact previously negotiated and executed with North Fork by the Governor concerning the terms and conditions for gambling. Plaintiffs then initiated Proposition 48, a referendum by which, at the 2014 general election, the voters disapproved the ratification statute. North Fork alleged that the ratification statute was not subject to referendum. The complaint and cross-complaint were dismissed, so that the land remained in trust for North Fork, but the compact was not ratified, so gaming on the land was not approved. Subsequently, after federal litigation between North Fork and the state, a set of procedures designed to function as an alternative to a state-approved compact was approved by the Secretary of the Interior. The court of appeal concluded that the Governor’s concurrence is invalid in this situation. View "Stand up for California v. State of California" on Justia Law

The maternal grandparents and guardians of Child (together, Grandparents) filed a petition to adopt Child, alleging that Mother had consented to the adoption, that Father had abandoned Child, and that terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in Child’s best interests. Father, a non-Indian, answered, alleging that Child was an “Indian child” under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act (NICWA). Neither party disputed that Child met the definition of “Indian child” under those acts. The county court applied both acts, which provide heightened protection to the rights of parents and tribes in proceedings involving adoption of Indian children. Following a hearing, the county court denied the petition because it was unable to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Father had abandoned Child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) although the ICWA and NICWA apply to this adoption proceeding, not every provision of ICWA and NICWA applies to a non-Indian parent; (2) the county court erred in applying a higher standard of proof to the abandonment element of the NICWA; and (3) the county court erred in finding that Grandparents were not required to show “active efforts” had been made to unite Father and Child. View "In re Adoption of Micah H." on Justia Law

Mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights over her daughter, Charlotte V., on the ground the juvenile court failed to comply with the strict notice requirements specified in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. A juvenile dependency petition alleged that Mother repeatedly rammed her car into Father's while Charlotte was sitting in the back seat of Mother's car; Mother also brandished a loaded handgun at Father; the handgun was within Charlotte's reach inside the car; Mother and Father wrestled for the handgun; and Father was arrested for concealing a firearm and Mother was arrested for child endangerment. The court concluded that the record contains substantial evidence of proper notice to the Blackfeet Nation where DCFS provided two notices by certified mail to the tribe containing information about Mother, Father, and Charlotte's grandmother and uncle; the Blackfeet Nation was given a copy of Mother's tribal identification card and number as well as information about Mother's time at the reservation and Charlotte's health care at a health clinic on the reservation; and, because Charlotte claims Indian ancestry from Mother, that information would be sufficient for meaningful review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Charlotte V." on Justia Law

The children, ages two and four, were detained after their parents‘ residence was raided by the Mendocino Major Crimes Task Force. Both parents allegedly had substance abuse problems. Father was in Mendocino County jail. Months later, the court ordered the children to be returned to Mother under a family maintenance plan. Weeks later, Mother was arrested in another raid; drug paraphernalia and honey oil were found within the children‘s reach. The children were detained. Father‘s reunification services were later terminated for lack of compliance. Mother’s services were terminated for lack of compliance and inability to have the children returned to her by the 12-month review. Over mother‘s objection, visitation was later terminated, due to distance. The court eventually terminated parental rights. The parents appealed, arguing failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901. The minors‘ possible Wailaki Native American ancestry was first noted in the initial petition. Father‘s attorney informed the court that Father had provided to the social worker a completed ICWA-020 form indicating he had both Wailaki and Pomo heritage. The court of appeal reversed the termination of parental rights. Not all of the Pomo Indian Bands were noticed. View "In re: O.C." on Justia Law

Robert Crawford was pulled over by Flathead Tribal Police Officer Casey Couture on the Flathead Reservation. Crawford was allowed to leave but was then informed that he was in violation of his parole because he did not have permission to be traveling in that area. Crawford was arrested upon a warrant issued for parole violations and then charged with criminal possession of dangerous drugs. A jury found him guilty. Thereafter, Crawford filed this action in state court against Couture, the Flathead Tribal Police Department, and the Confederated Salish Kootenai Tribal Government alleging numerous claims due to inappropriate conduct by Couture. The district court dismissed Crawford’s claims based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the sovereign immunity of the Tribe. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly dismissed Crawford’s claims based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and sovereign immunity. View "Crawford v. Couture" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed these lawsuits challenging the federal government's decision in 2008 to give the Oneida Indian Nation of New York over approximately 13,000 acres of land in central New York. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, rejecting plaintiffs' claims that the land‐into‐trust procedures are unconstitutional and that certain provisions of the Indian Land Consolidation Act (ILCA), 25 U.S.C. 2201 et seq., bar the United States from taking land into trust for the Tribe. The court agreed with the district court that the entrustment procedure generally, and this entrustment in particular, lie within the federal government’s long‐recognized “plenary” power over Indian tribes: Neither principles of state sovereignty nor the Constitution’s Enclave Clause—which requires state consent for the broadest federal assertions of jurisdiction over land within a state—prevents the federal government from conferring on the Tribe jurisdiction over these trust lands. The court further held that the Oneida Nation of New York is eligible as a “tribe” within the meaning of 25 U.S.C. 465 and 2201(1) for land to be taken into trust on its behalf. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgments. View "Upstate Citizens for Equality v. United States" on Justia Law

Mustang Run Wind Project, LLC, (Mustang) filed an application with the Osage County Board of Adjustment for a conditional use permit involving approximately 9,500 acres of land. Mustang proposed to use the land for placing sixty-eight wind turbines on less than 150 acres and generating electricity. Public meetings on the proposed wind energy facility were held in April and May 2014. The proposed facility was close to another "wind farm" which had obtained a permit three years previously. Mustang's application included land zoned for agricultural use and was then being used for agriculture and ranching. The County Board of Adjustment denied the application. A trial de novo was held and the trial court ordered the County Board of Adjustment to issue a conditional use permit. The Osage County Board of Adjustment and the Osage Nation appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court held that the Osage County Board of Adjustment possessed authority to grant conditional use permits, but the trial judge's findings were not against the clear weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment requiring the Board of Adjustment to issue a conditional use permit with any additional reasonable conditions. View "Mustang Run Wind Project, LLC v. Osage City Bd of Adjustment" on Justia Law

In June 2013, C.B.(mother) married R.B. (stepfather). C.B. and R.B. filed a petition for termination of parental rights as to C.W. (biological father) and adoption later that month of T.A.W., C.B.'s biological child and an "Indian child" under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), and the Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). C.W. was non-Indian, but C.B. was, and an enrolled member of the Shoalwater Bay Tribe. C.W. had been incarcerated at the time of the termination petition on charges relating to drug abuse and domestic violence. C.W.'s parental rights were ultimately terminated. In reaching its decision, the trial court found that ICWA applied to the termination proceedings and that ICWA's requirements were met beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court did not require C.B. and R.B. to prove that active efforts were undertaken to remedy C.W.'s parental deficiencies prior to terminating his parental rights and made no finding to that effect. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding: (1) ICWA and WICWA protected non-Indian and Indian parents alike; (2) the trial court erred by not making an active efforts finding; (3) the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl," (133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013)), was factually distinguishable; and (4) WICWA had no abandonment exception. C.B. and R.B. appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded this case to the trial court so that it could reconsider the termination petition in light of those holdings. View "In re Adoption of T.A.W." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, alleging that she was terminated from her job because of her age pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-634. The district court adopted the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation to grant the Poarch Band's motion to dismiss the suit based on the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. In this case, there is no evidence that the Poarch Band waived its immunity, either generally or in the present suit. The court rejected plaintiff's comparison of the definitions of the term "employer" found in the ADEA and Title VII, in conjunction with the Supreme Court's opinion in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer; plaintiff's argument that the ADEA is a statute of general applicability is foreclosed by the court's precedent; and other circuits that have considered the issue raised by this appeal also have determined that federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over an ADEA claim asserted against a federally-recognized Indian tribe. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision to grant the Poarch Band’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians" on Justia Law

In 2002 the Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians of California (Enterprise Tribe) submitted a request to the United States Department of the Interior (Department) to acquire a site in Yuba County for the purpose of establishing a casino/hotel resort complex. Pursuant to statute, the Secretary was authorized to acquire land, within or without an existing reservation, for the purpose of providing land for Indians. Land so acquired after October 17, 1988, could not, with some exceptions, be used for gaming. The exception at issue here was where the Secretary “after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary’s determination.” The Governor indicated his official concurrence with the Assistant Secretary’s determination. Plaintiff Auburn Tribe owned and operated the Thunder Valley Resort and Casino, approximately 20 miles from the Yuba County site. The Auburn Tribe filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief, alleging: (1) the Governor was required to comply with California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) before concurring in the Secretary’s decision to take lands into trust for the Enterprise Tribe; and (2) the Governor performed a legislative act when he concurred with the Secretary and when he negotiated and executed the compact with the Enterprise Tribe, in violation of the constitutional mandate of separation of powers. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded the CEQA did not apply here, and that the Governor’s concurrence did not violate the separation of powers clause. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Brown" on Justia Law