Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

The Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians and Findleton entered into the Construction Agreement for a gaming facility. In 2008 (10 months later), the Tribe suspended construction because the financial meltdown had adversely affected its ability to secure financing. In 2012, Findleton sought to compel ADR under the Agreement The Tribe asserted that it had not waived its sovereign immunity or consented to suit in the state court and that Findleton’s failure to exhaust his tribal administrative remedies deprived the court of jurisdiction. Findleton cited resolutions by the Tribal Council, waiving immunity. The Tribe has a General Council, consisting of all tribal members 18 years or older, and the Tribal Council, an elective body consisting of seven members of the General Council whose powers are more narrowly circumscribed. The Tribe’s constitution does not permit the Tribal Council to waive sovereign immunity without the General Council’s “consent” and “prior approval.” The court of appeal reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the action, finding that the Council was authorized to waive the Tribe’s immunity and did so in resolutions adopted in 2008 and on June 2, 2007, “in order to attract other individuals and entities to do business with the Tribe.” View "Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians" on Justia Law

The Mackinac Tribe filed suit to compel the Secretary of the Interior to convene an election allowing the Tribe to organize under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. 476(a). Although the Mackinac Tribe does not appear on the Secretary’s list of federally acknowledged tribes and has not been acknowledged through the Secretary’s Part 83 process, see 25 C.F.R. pt. 83, the group alleges it is federally recognized for IRA purposes because it is the historical successor to a tribe the federal government previously recognized via treaty. The district court found that the Mackinac Tribe failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by first seeking acknowledgment through the Part 83 process. As the district court did, the court reserved the question whether a group must be recognized to be eligible to organize under the IRA and whether that recognition must be marked by the group’s appearance on the Secretary’s list of federally recognized tribes. The court read the Tribe's complaint as seeking a writ of mandamus. The court declined the requested mandamus because review will be possible after the Mackinac Tribe has completed the Part 83 procedure. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Mackinac Tribe v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 702, 705, challenging the authority of the Department of the Interior to take title to a particular tract of land under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. 465. The land (the Bradley Property) had been put into trust for the use of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians in Michigan, otherwise known as the Gun Lake Band or the Gun Lake Tribe. After the Supreme Court determined that plaintiff had prudential standing to bring this suit, Congress passed the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (the Gun Lake Act), Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913, a stand-alone statute reaffirming the Department’s decision to take the land in question into trust for the Gun Lake Tribe, and removing jurisdiction from the federal courts over any actions relating to that property. The court affirmed the district court's determination that the Gun Lake Act is constitutionally sound and thus plaintiff's suit must be dismissed. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiff's motion to strike a supplement to the administrative record. View "Patchak v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for four counts of sexual abuse of a minor and one count of assault to his girlfriend resulting in serious bodily injury, all occurring in Indian country. Defendant's girlfriend died from her injuries twenty-one months after the assault. The minor is a relative of the girlfriend who was living with the couple. The court concluded that the minor's testimony was sufficient to support the sexual abuse convictions; the district court erred in admitting the hearsay statement of the girlfriend's former husband where the girlfriend had stated that defendant was the person who committed the assault, but the erroneous evidentiary ruling did not affect defendant’s substantial rights where the record as a whole, excluding the testimony, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for the assault; the evidence amply supported the verdict; and, in regard to defendant's sentence of 293 months in prison, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying an upward departure under USSG 4A1.3 for inadequacy of criminal history category, and USSG 5K2.1 for conduct resulting in death. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Stoney End of Horn" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a child dependency proceeding involving two minors. The children were eligible for tribal membership but were not Indian children as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Rule 5.482(c) of the California Rules of Court requires a juvenile court in this scenario to “proceed as if the child is an Indian child” and to take steps “to secure tribal membership for the child.” The juvenile court in this case directed the Department of Health and Human Services to make efforts to secure tribal membership for the children. While the applications were pending, the court proceeded as if ICWA applied, held a hearing, and adjudged the children to be dependents of the court and ordered them placed with their maternal grandmother. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that Rule 5.482(c) conflicted with state law. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal to the extent it held that related Rule 5.484(c)(2) was invalid and affirmed in all other respects, holding (1) Rule 5.482(c) is invalid because it conflicts with the Legislature’s intent to enforce ICWA by codifying its provisions, including the federal definition of Indian child; and (2) Rule 5.484(c)(2) is consistent with state law and valid. View "In re Abbigail A." on Justia Law

Jason Merida, the former executive director of construction for the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma (the Nation), was convicted after a fifteen-day jury trial on six counts of a seven-count indictment. The indictment alleged Merida conspired to receive cash and other remuneration from subcontractors performing work on construction projects for the Nation, embezzled in excess of $500,000 by submitting and approving false subcontractor invoices, and willfully failed to report income on his 2009 and 2010 federal tax returns. Merida testified in his own defense at trial and, on cross-examination, prosecutors impeached his testimony using the transcript of an interview the Nation’s attorneys had conducted with him as part of a separate civil lawsuit, before the initiation of these criminal proceedings. Merida objected to the use of the transcript and moved for mistrial, arguing the transcript was protected by the attorney-client privilege and its use prejudicially damaged his credibility with the jury. The district court denied his motion for a mistrial and the jury convicted Merida on all but one count. Merida timely appealed the trial judge’s denial of his motion for mistrial. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Merida" on Justia Law

Defendant Roger Barnett served as Second Chief of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation in 2013 and 2014. He pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma to embezzling funds from the Tribe by appropriating to his own use money withdrawn from ATM machines. The sole issue on this appeal was whether the district court properly determined the amount of money embezzled for purposes of calculating Defendant’s offense level and the amount he owed the Tribe in restitution. Defendant argued that the court’s reliance on the presentence report (PSR) and Addendum was improper because the government failed to present at sentencing any evidence of the amount of loss. The Tenth Circuit disagreed: the district court could properly rely on the PSR and Addendum because Defendant did not adequately challenge their recitations of the evidence concerning his defalcations. The only issue that he preserved for appeal was whether the recited evidence sufficed to support the court’s determination of the amount of loss, and the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient. View "United States v. Barnett" on Justia Law

Alexandria P., an Indian child, was placed with her extended family in Utah, after the dependency court concluded that Alexandria's foster parents, de facto parents, failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was good cause to depart from the adoptive placement preferences set forth in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. The court remanded the matter twice because the lower court used an incorrect standard in assessing good cause. The dependency court has now correctly applied the law governing good cause, considering the bond Alexandria has developed over time with the foster parents as well as a number of other factors related to her best interests. The court affirmed the judgment because substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that the foster parents did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was good cause to depart from the ICWA’s placement preferences. View "In re Alexandria P." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are descendants of Margarita Britten (Margarita), a Pala Band of Mission Indian who was born in 1856. After the Executive committee disenrolled more than 150 of Margarita's descendants, the Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs (AS-IA) affirmed. Plaintiffs filed suit invoking 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), alleging that the AS-IA’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. Determining that the court has jurisdiction to review the agency's decision, the court concluded that the AS-IA’s decision articulated a rational interpretation of the facts before him, and reasonably concluded that the 1997 Constitution was valid, notwithstanding the absence of a formal election, based on the language of the governing documents, and the past practice of the Band. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the BIA has an independent trust duty to protect them from unjust disenrollment. Because the Executive Committee now has ultimate authority over enrollment decisions under the 1997 Constitution and 2009 Ordinance, the AS-IA reasonably concluded that any questions of the surviving preclusive effect of the 1989 decision are properly directed to the Band, not the BIA. Finally, the AS-IA acted reasonably in declining to join two disenrolled minors to the agency appeal, because the minors had not challenged their disenrollment before the Regional Director. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment upholding the AS-IA; granted defendants' motion to supplement the record on appeal; and denied plaintiffs' motion for judicial notice. View "Aguayo v. Jewell" on Justia Law

The juvenile court removed Isaiah W., a newborn, from the care of his parents and placed him in foster care. The court found the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) inapplicable and did not order the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services to notify any tribe or the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Mother did not appeal from the order placing Isaiah in foster care. More than one year later, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed from the second order, arguing that the juvenile court erred by failing to order the Department to comply with ICWA’s notice requirements. The Court of Appeal denied relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a parent may challenge a finding of ICWA’s inapplicability in the course of appealing from a subsequent order terminating parental rights, even if the parent did not raise such a challenge in an appeal from the initial order; and (2) in this case, the fact that Mother did not allege ICWA notice error in an appeal from the original dispositional order did not preclude her from raising the claim in this appeal. View "In re Isaiah W." on Justia Law