Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile courts order terminating her parental rights to R.H., an Indian child, and selecting adoption as his permanent plan. The court held that the juvenile court could implicitly conclude that the Tribe had no present interest in participating in the determination of R.H.'s permanent plan; R.H. has never had any contact with the Tribe and was bonded to his prospective adoptive parents, with whom he has lived since he was four months old; and there was good cause to depart from the Indian Child Welfare Act's, 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., placement preferences. Furthermore, the court declined to consider Mother's proffered additional evidence. View "In re R.H." on Justia Law

Father appealed from the order terminating his parental rights to his daughters under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The Court of Appeal agreed with Father that there was an inadequate investigation of Mother's claim of Indian ancestry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. In this case, although the name of the tribe Mother identified did not directly correspond to that of a federally recognized Indian tribe, the Department failed to satisfy is affirmative obligation to interview family members and others who could be expected to have relevant information concerning the children's status, and the juvenile court failed to ensure an appropriate inquiry had been conducted before concluding ICWA did not apply to these proceedings. Accordingly, the court remanded to allow the Department and the juvenile court to remedy that violation. The court otherwise affirmed the order. View "In re Elizabeth M." on Justia Law

Father appealed from the order terminating his parental rights to his daughters under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The Court of Appeal agreed with Father that there was an inadequate investigation of Mother's claim of Indian ancestry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. In this case, although the name of the tribe Mother identified did not directly correspond to that of a federally recognized Indian tribe, the Department failed to satisfy is affirmative obligation to interview family members and others who could be expected to have relevant information concerning the children's status, and the juvenile court failed to ensure an appropriate inquiry had been conducted before concluding ICWA did not apply to these proceedings. Accordingly, the court remanded to allow the Department and the juvenile court to remedy that violation. The court otherwise affirmed the order. View "In re Elizabeth M." on Justia Law

The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Department in an action challenging the Department's decision to take a tract of land into trust for the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians and authorized it to operate a casino there. The court held that the North Fork was an Indian tribe for which the Department had authority to acquire trust land under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that the Department's trust decision violated the IRA, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The court viewed the same extensive record and afforded the appropriate measure of deference to the Department's supportable judgments and concluded that its decisions were reasonable and consistent with applicable law. View "Stand Up For California! v. DOI" on Justia Law

An Indian child in the custody of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and depression. The child’s psychiatrist recommended treating him with an antidepressant, with the addition of a mood stabilizer if it later became necessary. When the mother rejected the recommendation, OCS asked the superior court for authority to consent to the medications over the mother’s objection. The court granted OCS’s request. The mother appealed, arguing that the superior court failed to apply the correct standard for determining whether her fundamental constitutional rights as a parent could be overridden. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed with her in part, holding that the constitutional framework laid out in Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute, 138 P.3d 238 (Alaska 2006), applied to a court’s decision whether to authorize medication of a child in OCS custody over the parent’s objection. The Supreme Court concluded that the superior court’s findings in this case regarding the antidepressant satisfied the “Myers” standard but that its findings regarding the optional mood stabilizer did not. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part the superior court’s order authorizing OCS to consent to the recommended medications. View "Kiva O. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

In a previous appeal, the court concluded that the minors’ mother revoked maternal uncle Rafael’s Indian custodian status under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901, shortly after the children were detained. The court determined that compelling evidence supported the refusal to place the minors with Rafael as an extended family member—an ICWA "preferred placement"—given their special needs and Rafael’s cognitive deficits. The court rejected Rafael’s challenge to permanent plan orders continuing long-term foster care, concluding that Rafael was no longer a party to the dependency proceedings. While those appeals were pending, Rafael filed a new action, attacking a permanent plan order continuing the minors in foster care. Rafael argued that active efforts have not been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, specifically with regards to visitation; and that foster care was neither necessary nor appropriate, as he is willing and able to take custody. The court of appeal dismissed, finding that Rafael lacked standing. The minors have been in permanent plans for several years, so services should be tailored to support their compelling need for stability and permanency. Rafael can continue to appear in juvenile court and request visitation as an interested relative and the Tribe remains involved, arguing for increased contact among the minors, Rafael, and the grandmother. Rafael only lacks standing to challenge the minors’ permanent plans. View "In re E.R." on Justia Law

T.C. appealed the juvenile court's dispositional order placing her minor daughter, A.F., in the care of her paternal grandmother, Donna F. T.C. contended the court erred by failing to comply with the placement preferences required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) and argued the juvenile court should have continued A.F.'s placement with T.C.'s maternal cousin. The Court of Appeal agreed with the Agency that the juvenile court's dispositional order complied with the applicable placement preferences and affirm the order. View "In re A.F." on Justia Law

In 2015, Wichita and affiliated tribes made plans to build a History Center on a plot of land held by the federal government in trust for the Wichita Tribe, Delaware Nation, and Caddo Nation jointly. One of those neighbors, the Caddo Nation, claimed the land may contain remains of ancestral relatives. Before the Wichita Tribe began construction, Caddo Nation sued the Wichita Tribe for allegedly violating the procedures required by the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) throughout the planning process. Caddo Nation sought an emergency temporary restraining order preventing Wichita Tribe from continuing construction until it complied with those procedures. When the district court denied that request, Caddo Nation appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals without seeking further preliminary relief. In the intervening year while the case was on appeal with the Tenth Circuit, Wichita Tribe completed construction of the History Center. The Tenth Circuit concluded it had no jurisdiction over this appeal because the relief Caddo Nation requested from the district court was moot. View "Caddo Nation of Oklahoma v. Wichita & Affiliated Tribes" on Justia Law

R.W.D. appealed a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to his two children, K.S.D. and J.S.D. After a review of the juvenile court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded clear and convincing evidence established that the children were deprived, the deprivation was likely to continue, and the children had been in foster care at least 450 of 660 nights. The Court also concluded active efforts to prevent the breakup of this Indian family were made and those efforts have been unsuccessful. However, the Court found nothing in the record to satisfy the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) requirement of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of a qualified expert witness, that continued custody by the parents would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children. Accordingly, though the Court retained jurisdiction over this case, it remanded for testimony from an ICWA qualified expert witness. View "Interest of K.S.D." on Justia Law

The broad waiver of sovereign immunity found in section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) waived sovereign immunity for all non-monetary claims, and section 704 of the APA's final agency action requirement constrained only actions brought under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 702, 704. The Navajo Nation filed suit challenging Interior's published guidelines clarifying how it would make surplus and shortage determinations for delivery to Western states of the waters of the Colorado River. The panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Nation's claims under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., based on lack of standing where the challenged guidelines did not present a reasonable probability of threat to either the Nation's adjudicated water rights or its practical water needs. The panel also held that the Nation's breach of trust claim sought relief other than money damages, and the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 702 applied squarely to the claim. Therefore, the panel reversed and remanded as to this issue. Finally, the district court acted within its discretion in refusing post-judgment leave to amend. View "Navajo Nation v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law