Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

A consumer lender, GreatPlains Finance, LLC, owned by the Fort Belknap Indian Community, a federally recognized tribe, was sued by Rashonna Ransom for allegedly violating New Jersey consumer-protection laws. Ransom had taken out two high-interest loans from GreatPlains and claimed the lender broke several laws. GreatPlains argued it was protected by tribal sovereign immunity, as it was created by the tribe to generate revenue and was managed by a tribally owned corporation, Island Mountain Development Group.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied GreatPlains' motion to dismiss, ruling that the lender was not an arm of the tribe and thus not entitled to sovereign immunity. The court based its decision partly on the control exerted by a non-tribal private-equity fund, Newport Funding, which had significant influence over GreatPlains' operations due to a loan agreement. GreatPlains' subsequent motion to reconsider was also denied, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and applied a multi-factor test to determine whether GreatPlains was an arm of the tribe. The court considered factors such as the method of incorporation, the entity's purpose, tribal control, the tribe's intent to confer immunity, and the financial relationship between the tribe and the entity. The court found that while GreatPlains was created under tribal law and intended to benefit the tribe, the financial relationship was crucial. GreatPlains had not shown that a judgment against it would impact the tribe's finances, as it had not returned profits to the tribe. Consequently, the Third Circuit held that GreatPlains was not an arm of the tribe and lacked sovereign immunity, affirming the District Court's decision and remanding for further proceedings. View "Ransom v. GreatPlains Finance, LLC" on Justia Law

In October 2021, five children were removed from their home under a protective custody warrant and placed into the temporary custody of San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the Department). Dependency petitions were filed for all five children. At the detention hearing, the mother denied Indian ancestry, and the father of two of the children also denied Indian ancestry but indicated potential Indian heritage on an ICWA form. The juvenile court found ICWA did not apply and took jurisdiction over the children, removing them from parental custody and ordering reunification services for the mother.The mother appealed, arguing the Department failed to fulfill its duty to inquire about the children's potential Indian ancestry from extended family members, as required by former section 224.2, subdivision (b). The Court of Appeal held that the extended-family inquiry duty did not apply because the children were placed into temporary custody pursuant to a warrant under section 340, not section 306, and thus rejected the mother's argument.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to resolve the conflict regarding the scope of the initial inquiry duty under former section 224.2. The court concluded that the county welfare department has an extended-family inquiry duty in all cases where a child is placed into temporary custody, regardless of whether the child was removed from the home with or without a warrant. The court held that Assembly Bill 81, which clarified this duty, applies retroactively as it merely clarified existing law.The Supreme Court of California reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the matter to the juvenile court for compliance with the inquiry requirements of section 224.2. If the juvenile court finds the inquiry duty has been satisfied and ICWA does not apply, it shall reinstate the jurisdiction and disposition order. If ICWA applies, the court shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and California implementing provisions. View "In re Ja. O." on Justia Law

The Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, a federally recognized tribe, operates several substance-abuse health programs funded by the federal government. To support these programs, the Tribe built the Obaashiing Chemical Health Treatment Center, costing $5.8 million, financed through a $4.95 million loan from the Department of Agriculture and $850,000 of the Tribe's own funds. The Tribe sought compensation from the Indian Health Service (IHS) for both the facility's depreciation and the loan payments under a § 105(l) lease.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the case. The Government had compensated the Tribe for depreciation in 2020 and 2021 and for loan payments in 2022 but refused to compensate for both costs each year, citing 25 C.F.R. § 900.70, which prohibits duplicative compensation. The district court upheld the Government's decision, agreeing that compensating for both depreciation and loan payments would be duplicative.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Government correctly declined to compensate the Tribe for both depreciation and loan payments, as doing so would result in duplicative compensation. The court affirmed the district court's judgment regarding the 2022 decision but reversed the judgment for 2020 and 2021. The court instructed the district court to vacate the Government's decision for those years and remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings, allowing the Government to apply its anti-duplication rationale consistently across all years. View "Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. HHS" on Justia Law

In January 2023, Chase Lane Rocha, living in a camper in Boswell, Oklahoma, with his pregnant girlfriend, was involved in a series of events leading to the death of his mother, Riki Amix. After consuming alcohol, Rocha returned home and got into a physical altercation with his stepfather, Dakota Amix. Rocha, intoxicated and distraught, armed himself with a pistol and, during a confrontation with family members, accidentally discharged the weapon, fatally wounding his mother. Rocha fled the scene, discarded the weapon, and later surrendered to law enforcement, admitting to the shooting but claiming it was accidental.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma conducted a jury trial where Rocha was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter in Indian Country. The court denied Rocha’s request for a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, reasoning that Rocha did not admit to the mens rea of involuntary manslaughter. The court sentenced Rocha to 60 months in prison, an upward variance from the Guidelines range of 27 to 33 months, citing the need for just punishment and deterrence, and the reckless nature of Rocha’s conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the denial of the acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment was not clearly erroneous given Rocha’s conduct before and during the trial. The appellate court also found that the district court did not err in considering societal expectations as part of its analysis of permissible sentencing factors. Finally, the appellate court concluded that the district court’s explanation for the upward variance was adequate and that the sentence was substantively reasonable given the totality of the circumstances. View "United States v. Rocha" on Justia Law

The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) removed two Indian children from their home after finding their parents intoxicated and unable to care for them. The superior court adjudicated the children as being in need of aid, and the children’s tribe intervened. The children’s father moved to another state and, after initially failing to engage with OCS, eventually completed all case plan requirements. OCS then sought to place the children with their father through the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC), but the other state denied approval. Despite this, OCS sought permission from the superior court to release custody to the father while he was temporarily in Alaska.The superior court found that the ICPC was inapplicable to a release of custody to a parent under AS 47.14.100(p) and granted OCS’s request, dismissing the case. OCS released custody to the father before he left Alaska. The Native Village of Saint Michael appealed, arguing that the ICPC should apply and that the superior court failed to make adequate best interest findings.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that when OCS properly releases custody of a child to a parent under AS 47.14.100(p), the requirements of the ICPC do not apply, even if the parent plans to subsequently transport the child to another state. The court affirmed the superior court’s decision that the ICPC was inapplicable under the circumstances and that the other state’s approval was not required for placement with the father. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the case. View "Native Village of Saint Michael v. State" on Justia Law

The Gila River Indian Community (GRIC) sued two landowners, the Schoubroek and Sexton families, alleging that their farms were pumping groundwater originating from the Gila River, infringing on GRIC’s water rights. GRIC sought to stop the pumping and have the wells sealed. The San Carlos Apache Tribe intervened in support of GRIC.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona found that it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 and § 1331, rejecting the defendants' argument that the Arizona state court's Gila River Adjudication had exclusive jurisdiction. The district court granted summary judgment for GRIC, concluding that the defendants' wells were pumping subflow from the Gila River and ordered the wells to be shut down. The court also denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on claim preclusion grounds, despite a 2007 dismissal with prejudice of a similar complaint by GRIC.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the district court had jurisdiction but not exclusive jurisdiction. It held that the Decree did not provide the district court with prior exclusive jurisdiction over non-parties to the Decree. The court also found that the Arizona state court did not have prior exclusive jurisdiction over the claims.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment on claim preclusion, recognizing that the 2007 dismissal did not preclude GRIC’s current claims due to the specific context of the settlement agreement. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for GRIC, finding that GRIC had not provided clear and convincing evidence that the wells were pumping subflow or were within the subflow zone. The court vacated the district court's remedy of shutting down the wells and remanded for further proceedings. View "Gila River Indian Community v. Schoubroek" on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile court’s orders denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating her parental rights to her daughter, C.R., born in December 2020. The father was not a party to the appeal. Mother did not challenge the merits of the court’s rulings but argued that the order terminating her parental rights should be conditionally reversed due to deficiencies in the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services’ (DCFS) initial inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California statutes.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Juvenile Court Referee Juan M. Valles, had previously reviewed the case. The court detained C.R. from her parents in January 2021, sustained a section 300 petition, declared C.R. a dependent, and removed her from her parents’ custody. Mother was granted reunification services, which were later terminated in September 2023. The court denied mother’s section 388 petition in September 2024 and terminated her parental rights. Mother filed separate notices of appeal, which were consolidated for purposes of briefing, argument, and decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply was supported by substantial evidence. The court noted that both the Department and the court had previously inquired about the family’s potential Indian ancestry during mother’s dependency case, and maternal grandmother had denied any Indian ancestry. The court concluded that the Department’s inquiry was adequate and that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that ICWA did not apply. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s orders. View "In re C.R." on Justia Law

In January 2023, law enforcement officers from the Rosebud Sioux Tribe responded to a report of a man brandishing a firearm at Benjamin Fool Bull's home. Witnesses identified Tyson Quigley as the man with the firearm and Erwin White Lance as the man with a baseball bat. Both men were later found in a gold Chrysler sedan, which contained a firearm, ammunition, and other items. Quigley declined to speak with investigators, but White Lance admitted to being invited into the residence and claimed responsibility for the firearm before invoking his right to remain silent.Quigley and White Lance were charged with first-degree burglary and using a firearm during a crime of violence. Quigley was also charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. White Lance died during the proceedings, and the charges against him were dismissed. The district court granted the Government's motion to exclude White Lance's statements as hearsay, ruling that they were not admissible under Rule 804 or Rule 807. At trial, Quigley was found guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm but acquitted of the other charges. He was sentenced to 90 months in prison and three years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that White Lance's statement about taking responsibility for the firearm was not sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under Rule 804(b)(3) or Rule 807. The court noted that the statement was made under circumstances that suggested a motive to protect Quigley and was contradicted by eyewitness testimony. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the statement. View "United States v. Quigley" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the July 2024 orders of the Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, which awarded guardianship of her children, I.R.S. and M.W.A.H., to non-kinship, non-Native American foster parents. The children were removed from the mother's home due to her illicit drug use and associated safety concerns. I.R.S. is a member of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe, triggering the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Department initially placed I.R.S. with the mother's sister (Aunt), but later removed him due to allegations of physical abuse. The mother did not object to the new placement at the time. M.W.A.H. was born in September 2022 and was also removed from the mother's custody due to her continued issues. Both children were placed with a non-kinship, non-Native American foster family.The District Court adjudicated both children as youths in need of care and extended temporary custody to the Department. The mother did not contest these adjudications. The Department later petitioned for guardianship, which the mother initially contested but later approved of the placement. However, she changed her mind multiple times during the proceedings. The Aunt filed a motion to intervene, asserting her right under ICWA, but later withdrew her motion and was deemed an "interested person."The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decisions. The court held that the mother was not denied her right to counsel, as she had stipulated to the adjudication and did not pursue a transfer to tribal court. The court also found that the District Court did not err in failing to treat the mother's questions about transferring her case to tribal court as a motion to transfer. Additionally, the court concluded that the District Court did not erroneously deny the Aunt's motion to intervene, as she withdrew her motion. Finally, the court held that the District Court correctly concluded that good cause existed to deviate from ICWA placement preferences, as the Department had made diligent efforts to find a suitable ICWA-preferred placement but found none. View "In re I.R.S. & M.W.A.H." on Justia Law

Gary Perez and Matilde Torres, members of the Lipan-Apache Native American Church, believe that certain religious services must be conducted at a specific site within Brackenridge Park in San Antonio, Texas. The City of San Antonio planned improvements to the park, including tree removal and bird deterrence, which Perez and Torres argued would destroy their sacred worship space. They sued the City, claiming violations of their religious rights under the First Amendment, the Texas Constitution, the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and a new clause in the Texas Constitution that prohibits limiting religious services.The federal district court granted limited relief, allowing the Church access for certain ceremonies but did not enjoin the City's improvement plans. Perez appealed, and the Fifth Circuit initially affirmed the district court's decision but later withdrew its opinion and certified a question to the Supreme Court of Texas regarding the scope and force of the new Texas Religious Services Clause.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the Texas Religious Services Clause imposes a categorical bar on governmental limitations of religious services, regardless of the government's interest in the limitation. However, the Court also concluded that the scope of the clause is not unlimited and does not extend to the government's preservation and management of publicly owned lands. The Court emphasized that the clause does not require the government to provide or maintain natural elements necessary for religious services on public property. The case was remanded to the federal courts for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "PEREZ v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO" on Justia Law