Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Between 2017 and 2021, a man sexually abused a minor, the daughter of his girlfriend, in various locations within Indian country in Oklahoma. The abuse came to light after the victim reported it to a school counselor, triggering investigations by state, tribal, and federal authorities. The locations of the abuse included areas within the Cherokee and Muscogee (Creek) Reservations.Initially, the State of Oklahoma charged the defendant in state court as a non-Indian, and the Cherokee Nation filed charges against him in tribal court as an Indian for the same conduct. The defendant sought dismissal of the state prosecution, claiming Indian status, and, in the tribal prosecution, claimed he was not an Indian. Subsequently, a federal grand jury indicted him on four counts: two under 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (as a non-Indian defendant with an Indian victim), and two under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (as an Indian defendant). The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment as multiplicitous or to require the government to elect the theory of prosecution. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma denied these motions and allowed the case to proceed to trial, instructing the jury to convict under only one statutory regime, not both.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was an Indian and that the defendant was a non-Indian at the time of the offenses. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting alternative charges to go to the jury, so long as the instructions prevented multiplicitous convictions. The court affirmed the defendant’s convictions. View "United States v. King" on Justia Law

A group of environmental organizations, Native tribes, and individual plaintiffs sought to prevent a land exchange in Southeast Arizona’s Tonto National Forest, mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act. This exchange would transfer nearly 2,500 acres of federal land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—and a large copper deposit to Resolution Copper Mining LLC. In return, the company would provide over 5,000 acres of equally appraised land to the federal government. Plaintiffs raised concerns under several statutes, including the Land Exchange Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive flaws in the exchange.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied motions for preliminary injunctions, finding that plaintiffs failed to show likely success or serious questions on the merits of their claims relating to appraisal, NEPA compliance, tribal consultation, and religious liberty. In a related case, Apache Stronghold v. United States, the district court’s denial of an injunction on religious liberty grounds was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit and not disturbed by the Supreme Court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that plaintiffs had Article III standing and that their NEPA claims were justiciable as “final agency action.” However, it concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their appraisal, NEPA, consultation, or religious liberty claims. The court further determined that existing precedent foreclosed the RFRA and Free Exercise arguments. The court did not address other injunction factors and dissolved the administrative stay. View "BROWN LOPEZ V. USA" on Justia Law

Two Illinois residents obtained online loans of $600 each from a lender operating under the laws of the Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians, with interest rates approaching 500% per year. The loan agreements included an arbitration clause, which delegated to the arbitrator all questions including the enforceability and formation of the agreement, specifying that such issues would be determined under “tribal law and applicable federal law.” At the time the loans were issued, the referenced tribal law did not exist.After receiving the loans, the borrowers filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, alleging violations of Illinois consumer-protection statutes and federal laws. The defendants moved to compel arbitration under the terms of the loan agreements. The district court denied the motion, finding that the arbitration and delegation provisions were unenforceable because they effectively forced the plaintiffs to waive their substantive rights under Illinois law, applying the “prospective waiver” doctrine.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial de novo. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no mutual assent to the arbitration and delegation provisions. The court determined that, at the time of contracting, the specified tribal law did not exist, and federal law does not supply substantive contract-formation rules. Because the contract’s governing law provision referred to a body of law that was nonexistent and subject to unilateral creation by the defendants’ affiliate, there was no meeting of the minds as to an essential term. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the absence of mutual assent rendered the arbitration and delegation provisions unenforceable and affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. View "Harris v W6LS, Inc." on Justia Law

A federal land exchange was mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act, requiring the United States Forest Service to transfer approximately 2,500 acres of National Forest land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—to Resolution Copper Mining, LLC, in exchange for over 5,000 acres of private land. The legislation included requirements for tribal consultation, land appraisal, and the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). Following the issuance of a revised Final EIS in 2025, several environmental and tribal groups, as well as individual Apache plaintiffs, challenged the exchange. Their claims spanned the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive deficiencies.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied the plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction, finding that they had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on any claims relating to the appraisal process, NEPA, consultation, or the National Forest Management Act. A separate group of Apache plaintiffs brought similar claims, including religious liberty challenges, which were also denied—particularly in light of circuit precedent established in Apache Stronghold v. United States. All plaintiff groups appealed and sought further injunctive relief pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and affirmed. The court held that plaintiffs had standing and their claims were justiciable, but that none of their arguments were likely to succeed on the merits or raised serious questions. The court specifically found the appraisals and environmental review sufficient, the agency’s tribal consultation adequate, and the religious liberty claims foreclosed by circuit precedent. The denial of a preliminary injunction was affirmed, and all related motions for injunctive relief were denied as moot. View "ARIZONA MINING REFORM COALITION V. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE" on Justia Law

An individual was convicted by a jury in Charles Mix County, South Dakota, for failing to appear at a pretrial conference in a pending felony case. In a separate incident, he pleaded guilty to simple assault following an altercation with another inmate at the county jail. He appealed both convictions, raising jurisdictional arguments based on his status as an enrolled member of the Yankton Sioux Tribe. He contended that both the courthouse and the jail are located in Indian country, thus depriving the state court of jurisdiction. He also challenged the denial of his motion to dismiss under the 180-day rule, the admission of certain evidence, and the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal in the failure to appear case.The First Judicial Circuit Court denied his motions to dismiss, finding that neither the courthouse nor the jail was located in Indian country as defined by federal law. The court attributed most of the pretrial delay to the defendant’s own actions, such as refusing to participate in proceedings and to communicate with counsel, and determined the 180-day period for trial had not expired. The court also admitted evidence over his objections, including a bond form and testimony by his prior attorney, and allowed a jury to decide the failure to appear charge.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed both appeals together. It held that the land in question does not qualify as Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)-(c), reaffirming precedent that previously allotted lands that have passed into non-Indian ownership are not Indian country. The court declined to overrule its earlier decision in Bruguier v. Class. It further held that the 180-day rule was not violated, the challenged evidence was properly admitted, and sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed both convictions. View "State v. Winckler" on Justia Law

Twin infants who are eligible for tribal membership were placed in emergency foster care with licensed, non-tribal foster parents after being born with serious medical issues. The county obtained temporary legal custody of the children through a Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) proceeding, and the children were eventually moved from the foster parents’ home to the home of maternal relatives who are members of the same tribe as the children. The foster parents, after learning of the planned move, sought to intervene permissively in the CHIPS case, filed a third-party custody petition, and moved to stay the placement change, arguing in part that tribal placement preference statutes were unconstitutional.The Minnesota District Court denied the foster parents’ motions to intervene and for a stay, and dismissed the third-party custody petition without considering their constitutional arguments. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. It directed the district court to reconsider intervention and third-party custody, and addressed the constitutionality of the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA), finding it constitutional. On remand, the district court again denied intervention and dismissed the third-party custody petition, concluding the foster parents were not proper parties and could not file such petitions in the ongoing CHIPS proceeding.The Minnesota Supreme Court consolidated the appeals. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention, as such intervention was not in the children’s best interests. The court also held that a third-party custody petition is not available in juvenile court CHIPS proceedings and may only be brought as a petition to transfer custody by a party to the action. Because the foster parents were not parties, the court declined to address their constitutional challenges to ICWA and MIFPA, and vacated the Court of Appeals’ discussion of those constitutional issues. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: L.K." on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in Oklahoma state court of several serious crimes, including first-degree rape of a child under fourteen, forcible sodomy, lewd or indecent acts to a minor, rape by instrumentation, and commission of a lewd act in front of a minor. He asserted membership in the Kickapoo Tribe and claimed the crimes occurred in Indian country, which would affect the state court’s jurisdiction. The specific area in question was formerly part of the Citizen Potawatomi reservation.After conviction, the petitioner challenged the state court’s jurisdiction in the Oklahoma state courts, raising various arguments about the land’s status. He also brought claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of due process, and violations of federal law. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected his jurisdictional arguments and other claims. He then sought habeas relief in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that Congress had clearly disestablished the Citizen Potawatomi reservation in 1891, citing statutory language and Supreme Court precedent. The court found that the petitioner had waived arguments regarding the land as a dependent Indian community or an Indian allotment by failing to properly preserve those claims. Additionally, the court determined that the petitioner’s other claims (including those alleging violations of the Indian Child Welfare Act, ineffective assistance, improper questioning, and due process violations) were procedurally barred as they had not been properly exhausted in state court and did not meet the requirements for overcoming an anticipatory procedural bar. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "Wahpekeche v. Pettigrew" on Justia Law

A commercial air tour operator, who had previously conducted flights over Bandelier National Monument under interim authority, challenged a final order issued by the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Park Service. This order established an Air Tour Management Plan (ATMP) for Bandelier National Monument, prohibiting all commercial air tours over the site. The agencies’ process included public comment, environmental assessment, and extensive consultation with Native American tribes, who strongly objected to air tours due to cultural and privacy concerns. The operator argued that his flights were minimally intrusive, carefully routed, and brief, and that banning them would negatively impact safety and his business.The agencies initially considered various alternatives, including allowing limited air tours or maintaining previous operations, but ultimately concluded that any commercial air tour flights would create unacceptable impacts to Bandelier’s natural and cultural resources and visitor experience. The agencies’ environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) found no significant impacts for NEPA purposes, but their record of decision emphasized significant adverse impacts to tribal cultural resources under the National Parks Air Tour Management Act (NPATMA).Upon petition for review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard and de novo for statutory interpretation, as required by recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held that NPATMA and NEPA use different significance standards, and that the agency’s path to finding significant adverse impacts under NPATMA was reasonably discernible in the record. The court also rejected the petitioner’s additional statutory and constitutional challenges, finding them either unexhausted or inadequately briefed. The Tenth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "Adams v. FAA" on Justia Law

Three individuals were involved in a conspiracy to rob a marijuana dealer at his home on the Big Cypress Seminole Indian Reservation. During the attempted robbery, a bystander was shot and killed, and the perpetrators fled without obtaining money or drugs. One of the defendants later discussed the crime with a third party, who reported the information to law enforcement and recorded a conversation, further implicating the participants. Additional evidence, including surveillance footage, cell site records, and ballistics, corroborated the involvement of the defendants.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida heard the case. One defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that because both he and the victim were enrolled members of Indian tribes and the offense occurred in Indian country, and since the charged crimes were not listed in the Major Crimes Act, the court lacked jurisdiction. The district court disagreed and denied the motion, allowing the prosecution to proceed. During trial, another defendant objected to the admission of prior convictions without an explicit balancing of probative value and prejudicial effect. The court admitted the evidence without making such a finding. The jury ultimately found the defendants guilty on various counts, and the defendants appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that federal courts possess jurisdiction over generally applicable federal crimes, such as Hobbs Act robbery, even when committed by an Indian against another Indian in Indian country. The court also found that the district court erred by not conducting an on-the-record balancing before admitting evidence of prior convictions, but deemed this error harmless given the strength of the government’s case. The convictions of all three defendants were affirmed. View "USA v. Brice" on Justia Law

Two children were removed from their parents’ home in June 2020 and subsequently found by the Juvenile Court of Williams County, North Dakota, to be children in need of protection. The children remained in the custody of North Star Human Service Zone. In 2022, the State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of both parents, but those petitions were denied. On April 1, 2025, the State filed new petitions to terminate parental rights. Following a hearing, the juvenile court found that termination was in the children’s best interests and ordered that the parental rights of G.G. (the father) and S.F. (the mother) be terminated. The court issued oral and written findings supporting its decision, but neither addressed whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied. G.G. appealed the termination of his parental rights, contending that the juvenile court’s findings were inadequate because they failed to determine whether ICWA applied. The State responded that ICWA was not applicable. The Supreme Court of North Dakota noted that in termination proceedings, a juvenile court must make a threshold inquiry and finding as to whether ICWA applies whenever there is reason to know the child may be an Indian child. The Supreme Court further explained that this inquiry is required for each new petition, and the absence of such a finding constitutes clear error. The Supreme Court of North Dakota held that the juvenile court’s failure to make a threshold finding on ICWA applicability was clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the juvenile court with instructions to make a finding on whether ICWA applies, based on the existing record or with additional evidence if necessary. The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction during the remand. View "Interest of D.G." on Justia Law