Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Kyle and Jill Welsh, members of the Colorado River Indian Tribes (CRIT) and owners of WW Young Money, LLC, leased tribal land to operate a smoke shop. After renewing their lease in 2020, tribal officials notified the Welshes in 2021 that their lease was terminated, alleging violations of the CRIT property code, including untimely rent payments, continued occupancy after a demand to vacate, and property damage. The Welshes responded by filing a civil RICO action in federal court, alleging that the tribal officials engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity that included illegal lease termination, conversion of inventory, extortion, and providing false information to law enforcement.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the complaint. It held that the tribal officials were entitled to sovereign immunity because their alleged conduct occurred within the scope of their authority and in their representative capacities. The court also ruled that CRIT was a required party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, as it had a legally protected interest in the lease, and that the action could not continue without the tribe, whose joinder was barred by sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the tribal officials were not entitled to sovereign immunity because they were sued in their individual capacities for money damages, and any recovery would come from them personally, not from CRIT. The appellate court also determined that CRIT was not a required party because the outcome would not affect its real property or contractual rights, as the plaintiffs did not seek to reinstate the lease. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(7) and remanded for consideration of whether the complaint states a valid claim and if leave to amend should be granted. View "WELSH V. LOUDBEAR" on Justia Law

This case concerns a mother’s appeal from an order terminating her parental rights to three children, following state intervention and child protection proceedings. The Department of Public Health and Human Services initiated proceedings by filing petitions asserting the children were in need of care, identifying the children’s parents, and considering whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) might apply. The Department investigated possible tribal connections, particularly with the Blackfeet Tribe, by gathering family history, sending verification requests, and notifying the Tribe of hearings. The Blackfeet Tribe responded that none of the children were enrolled or eligible for enrollment. The Department completed ICWA checklists, and the district court, after multiple hearings, consistently found no reason to know the children were Indian children under ICWA.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, terminated the mother’s parental rights, finding that the Department made diligent efforts to determine the applicability of ICWA. At no point during the proceedings did the mother object to, or challenge, the Department’s efforts or the court’s determination that ICWA did not apply. It was only on appeal that she argued the Department’s efforts were insufficient, citing potential errors in information provided to the Blackfeet Tribe.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the district court correctly found that the Department made diligent efforts regarding ICWA. The Supreme Court held that the district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous: the Department fulfilled its duty to investigate and notify the Tribe, and no evidence supported a contrary result. The Court further held that the mother waived her right to challenge the Department’s ICWA efforts by not objecting during the lower court proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re L.C." on Justia Law

A child, K.L., was removed from his mother’s custody after allegations of substance abuse and child endangerment. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition on K.L.’s behalf, and he was placed with his half-siblings at their maternal aunt’s home. The mother’s whereabouts were frequently unknown, and she made only limited appearances during the proceedings. The father, J.A., was not initially involved but later established his biological relationship to K.L. and participated in reunification efforts, which ultimately were terminated after the court found his progress insufficient. The juvenile court then terminated both parents’ rights after determining K.L. was likely to be adopted, and no exception to adoption applied.After the termination of his parental rights, the father appealed, arguing that DCFS failed to conduct an adequate initial inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and corresponding California law. Specifically, he asserted that DCFS should have made greater efforts to contact the maternal grandmother to determine whether K.L. might have Indian ancestry. The father contended that the failure to interview the maternal grandmother rendered the inquiry insufficient and warranted conditional reversal of the termination order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the record and determined that DCFS fulfilled its initial inquiry obligations by contacting all reasonably available relatives, including the parents, paternal grandmother, maternal aunt, and others. The court found that maternal grandmother was not reasonably available, as her contact information could not be obtained and the maternal aunt declined to provide it without her consent. The court held that DCFS was not required to take additional investigative steps. The order terminating parental rights was affirmed. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law

A mother gave birth to a child who was eligible for enrollment in an Indian tribe as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The mother admitted to using methamphetamine during pregnancy, which led to an initial report to state authorities, though the child remained in her care as he did not test positive for drugs. Several months later, the child was found unattended in a hotel room under the care of an adult suspected of being under the influence, prompting the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) to take emergency custody. The father, who was incarcerated at the time, was identified and participated in early proceedings by telephone. Following his release, he attempted to engage in the case plan and visited his son, but over the next two and a half years, OCS assigned five different caseworkers to the family. The father experienced periods of incarceration, lapses in contact, and personal challenges, but he also took parenting classes, sought substance abuse assessment, and maintained some visitation.The Superior Court for the Third Judicial District, Anchorage, adjudicated the child as being in need of aid and later terminated the father’s parental rights on grounds of abandonment and substance abuse. At trial, the court found that OCS had made active efforts to reunify the family, relying on the preparation of a case plan, some referrals for substance abuse testing, and attempts to contact the father, even though it recognized that OCS’s efforts were not perfect, especially during periods of the father’s incarceration.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether OCS’s actions satisfied ICWA’s requirement that “active efforts” be made to prevent the breakup of an Indian family. The court held that OCS’s efforts were passive rather than active because it failed to make necessary referrals, provide adequate support services, and consistently engage with the father. The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the termination of parental rights and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jace B. v. State" on Justia Law

A member of the Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians allegedly sold fentanyl to a non-tribal member while on tribal land within Nevada. After the transaction, the buyer left tribal territory and subsequently died in nontribal state territory from an overdose of the fentanyl, combined with methamphetamine. The State charged the tribal member with second-degree murder caused by a controlled substance, based on the sale leading to the buyer’s death.The Fourth Judicial District Court, Elko County, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge, agreeing with his argument that the federal Major Crimes Act preempted Nevada’s jurisdiction. The district court reasoned that the only alleged criminal act—the drug sale—occurred entirely within tribal land, and thus Nevada could not prosecute the offense.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered whether the State had jurisdiction to prosecute a crime that began in Indian country but was completed in nontribal state territory. The Supreme Court held that Nevada has jurisdiction over crimes consummated within its boundaries, pursuant to NRS 171.015. The court determined that the charged offense was not complete until the victim died, and because death occurred in nontribal state territory, the crime was interterritorial and consummated within Nevada. The court further held that the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a), does not preempt Nevada’s jurisdiction over crimes that occur partially in Indian country and partially in nontribal territory. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "STATE VS SALAZAR" on Justia Law

The case concerns an agreement between the City of Tulsa and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, made in connection with ongoing federal litigation over whether Tulsa has criminal jurisdiction over Native Americans for conduct within the Nation's reservation. Through a settlement, Tulsa agreed not to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Native Americans on the reservation, to dismiss pending prosecutions in municipal court, and to refrain from future prosecutions of Native Americans for acts occurring there. The State of Oklahoma, through its Governor, challenged the validity of this settlement, arguing it was entered into without necessary state approvals.Following the settlement, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma declined to rule on the agreement’s validity, finding that whether the agreement was lawful was a matter of state law. The federal court also denied the State’s motion to intervene and ultimately dismissed the federal litigation after the parties stipulated to dismissal in light of their settlement.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma assumed original jurisdiction to decide whether Tulsa’s agreement with the Nation was valid under state law. The court concluded that although cities may enter into cooperative agreements with tribal governments, state law requires such agreements to be approved by both the Governor and the Joint Committee on State-Tribal Relations. The court held that Tulsa’s settlement was a new and independent agreement—not merely an extension of a prior cross-deputization agreement—and lacked the mandatory statutory approvals. The court issued a writ of mandamus compelling Tulsa to secure those approvals if it wishes to proceed and declared the settlement unenforceable as a matter of law until such approvals are obtained. View "STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. STITT v. CITY OF TULSA" on Justia Law

The case concerns the reconstruction of a bridge on Interstate 95 in Providence, Rhode Island, a project that received federal funding from the Federal Highway Administration. Because the project would affect the Providence Covelands Archaeological District, a site of historic and religious importance to the Narragansett Indian Tribe, federal law required that the agency consult with the Tribe and consider mitigation measures. Initially, a 2011 programmatic agreement provided for the transfer of certain parcels of land to the Tribe, but this transfer stalled when the State of Rhode Island demanded the Tribe waive its sovereign immunity as a condition. The Tribe refused, negotiations failed, and the agreement was terminated. Subsequently, the Highway Administration developed a new programmatic agreement, which did not include land transfers but instead provided for preservation covenants and educational initiatives. The Tribe objected to both the process and substance of the new agreement.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the Tribe’s claims regarding the first agreement for lack of standing but found standing as to claims concerning the second agreement. The district court granted summary judgment to the Highway Administration, ruling that the agency had adequately consulted with the Tribe, was not required to include the Tribe as a signatory, and had reasonably explained changes between agreements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Tribe had standing to challenge the adequacy of consultation and the process by which the second agreement was adopted. The court further held that the Highway Administration was not required to make the Tribe a signatory since the affected land was not tribal land, that consultation with the Tribe was adequate under the law, and that the agency’s change of position was reasonably explained and not arbitrary or capricious. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Narragansett Indian Tribe v. McMaster" on Justia Law

A federally recognized tribe in Oklahoma has experienced ongoing leadership disputes for nearly two decades, with multiple factions vying for control. Since 2007, the tribe has failed to hold valid elections, instead appointing interim leaders, which has led to repeated litigation in tribal, federal, and now state courts. Recently, rival claimants conducted separate elections, resulting in competing assertions of authority and control over tribal assets, with the Bureau of Indian Affairs declining to recognize any leader due to the unresolved internal conflict.The Okfuskee County District Court became involved after one faction, supported by its purported Business Committee, filed for a temporary restraining order against another group for trespass and sought declaratory relief as to the legitimate tribal leadership. The court issued an emergency restraining order and denied a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the Business Committee recognized by tribal courts was the proper authority and that the dispute concerned civil trespass, not internal governance.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma was asked to assume original jurisdiction and issue a writ of prohibition against the district court’s proceedings. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the dispute in the district court was, in fact, an unresolved intratribal leadership conflict that would require the state court to interpret tribal law and governance structures. The court determined that such intratribal disputes are nonjusticiable in state courts due to principles of tribal sovereignty and self-government, and that the purported waiver of sovereign immunity by one faction could not confer jurisdiction when the authority of that faction itself was contested. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma granted the writ of prohibition, assumed original jurisdiction, and ordered the district court to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "ANDERSON v. PARRISH" on Justia Law

Bailey Belt and Theodora Belt were charged under the Major Crimes Act for assaulting and murdering Elijah Morrison on the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation. On the night in question, an argument between the parties escalated into violence, culminating in Elijah being beaten and run over by a car. Surveillance footage from a nearby residence captured portions of the incident, but the video contained gaps. Key physical evidence included Elijah’s blood on Theodora’s car and a DNA mixture on the car’s windshield.The case was tried before the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. At trial, the government introduced the surveillance footage despite defense objections regarding its authenticity, particularly because the camera owner was deceased and could not testify about the gaps in the video. The jury convicted both Bailey and Theodora. At sentencing, the district court applied a “vulnerable victim” enhancement, finding Elijah was especially susceptible to harm at the time he was run over.Bailey and Theodora appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, challenging the admission of the surveillance footage and, in Bailey’s case, the application of the vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement. The Eighth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the surveillance footage, concluding that the government met the low bar for authentication based on the totality of the circumstances and corroborating evidence. The court further held that the vulnerable victim enhancement was properly applied, as Elijah became unusually vulnerable during the course of the offense, and this vulnerability was not a factor already incorporated in the relevant sentencing guideline. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Belt" on Justia Law

Two children from the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska were forcibly taken from their homes in the late 1800s and placed in a federal Indian boarding school on a United States Army base. Both died at the school, allegedly because of abusive conditions, and were buried on the grounds without the consent of their families or the tribe, contrary to their tribal and religious customs. Decades later, the Army relocated the remains, along with others, to the Carlisle Barracks Post Cemetery, again without consent. The Winnebago Tribe sought the return of the boys’ remains for proper reburial, invoking the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the Tribe’s action for failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that NAGPRA’s repatriation requirement only applies to Native American remains that are part of a federal agency’s or museum’s “holdings or collections,” and concluded that remains interred in a cemetery do not qualify. The court found that the relevant statutory and regulatory language, as well as the legislative history, supported this interpretation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s interpretation. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the ordinary meaning of “holdings or collections,” as well as the applicable statutory context and regulatory definitions, the remains of the two boys, purposefully accumulated and held by the Army in the cemetery, are covered by NAGPRA’s repatriation requirement. The court emphasized that its holding does not extend to consensually buried remains or require agencies to inventory unknown remains. The judgment of the district court was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. United States Department of the Army" on Justia Law