Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns a fatal car accident that occurred in February 2017 on a state highway within the Chickasaw Nation Reservation in Oklahoma. Lloyd Ray Hatley, while driving slightly above the speed limit, glanced at a vehicle parked on the shoulder. When he looked back, he saw another car, driven by Gay Ott and carrying Mary Nappa, had swerved into his lane and was braking. Hatley was unable to stop in time and collided with the car, resulting in Nappa’s death. Emergency responders extricated the passengers, but Nappa was pronounced dead at the scene. Hatley was not injured. Data from the vehicles indicated the Pontiac attempted an illegal left turn and Hatley was accelerating before braking sharply to avoid the collision.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma indicted Hatley on four counts related to the accident, including involuntary manslaughter in Indian country. The government sought to prove Hatley’s Indian status—an essential element for federal jurisdiction—using a tribal verification letter and testimony from Derrick Vann, a Cherokee Nation records custodian. Hatley objected to the admissibility of this evidence, arguing lack of foundation and hearsay. The district court admitted the evidence, and the jury convicted Hatley of involuntary manslaughter under Count 4, acquitting him on other counts. Hatley was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the government was required to prove Hatley’s Indian status at the time of the offense. The court found that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the tribal verification letter and Vann’s testimony, as neither was properly authenticated nor admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. Because no other competent evidence established Hatley’s Indian status at the relevant time, the error was not harmless. The Tenth Circuit reversed Hatley’s conviction and remanded with instructions to vacate the conviction and conduct further proceedings. View "United States v. Hatley" on Justia Law

A Canadian mining company operated a lead-zinc smelter in British Columbia, discharging millions of tons of slag and contaminated effluent containing hazardous substances into the Upper Columbia River over several decades. This pollution injured fish and benthic organisms in the river, which holds significant cultural and practical importance for a federally recognized Native American tribe whose reservation borders the river. The tribe sought damages for the interim lost use of these injured natural resources, including losses with a cultural dimension, such as reduced fishing and diminished ability to use the river for traditional purposes.Litigation began in 2004, with individual tribal members, later joined by the tribe and the State of Washington, bringing claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) against the company. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington found the company liable for response costs and, after a trial, awarded the tribe investigative expenses and attorney’s fees. The case then proceeded to a third phase to determine liability for natural resource damages. The district court granted summary judgment to the company on the tribe’s claims for interim lost use damages, reasoning that CERCLA does not authorize recovery for injuries to “cultural resources” or for damages with a cultural component.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that CERCLA authorizes recovery for interim lost use of injured natural resources, even when those lost uses have a cultural dimension, provided the damages are for injury to natural resources as defined by the statute. The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for trial to determine whether the tribe sustained damages from lost uses of injured natural resources. View "CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COLVILLE RESERVATION V. TECK COMINCO METALS LTD" on Justia Law

Nine inmates at a Connecticut correctional facility challenged their confinement in a unit known as Q-Pod, which is used to transition inmates from more restrictive housing back to the general population. The plaintiffs alleged that Q-Pod imposed harsher conditions than the general population, including extended periods of isolation, unsanitary conditions due to toilet restrictions, lack of access to medical care and counseling, limited vocational and educational opportunities, and restricted religious services. Two plaintiffs specifically claimed they were denied access to Native American religious practices, such as sweat lodge ceremonies and smudging, which are congregate religious activities.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment to the prison officials on the basis of qualified immunity for all federal claims, finding that the conditions in Q-Pod did not rise to the level of constitutional violations under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, and that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment free exercise claims. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and denied injunctive relief as moot. Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment as to the Eighth Amendment, procedural due process, and the free exercise claims of seven plaintiffs, holding that the conditions and restrictions in Q-Pod did not violate clearly established law. However, the Second Circuit reversed as to the free exercise claims of two plaintiffs who were denied participation in Native American congregate religious services, finding that the denial, without any penological justification, violated clearly established law. The court remanded with instructions to deny summary judgment on these claims and vacated the dismissal of the related state-law claims. View "Baltas v. Chapdelaine" on Justia Law

Three children were removed from their mother’s care after reports of neglect, substance abuse, and domestic violence. Two of the children, C.V.I. and C.J.J.I., are considered “Indian children” under federal and state law due to their tribal affiliations, while the third, R.A.R., is not. The Department of Children, Youth, and Families sought and obtained orders for out-of-home placement and later filed dependency petitions. The children spent several months in foster care while the court process unfolded, with the Department offering various services to the mother and involving the relevant tribe.The Spokane County Superior Court (juvenile court) held a fact-finding hearing and found the children dependent but ruled that whether the Department made “active efforts” to prevent the breakup of the Indian family was a dispositional issue, not required at the dependency stage. The court ordered the children to remain in out-of-home care until disposition. At the subsequent disposition hearing, the court found that the Department had made active efforts and continued the children’s out-of-home placement. The mother appealed, arguing that the Department was required to prove “active efforts” at the dependency hearing. The Washington Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the juvenile court erred by not making an “active efforts” finding at the dependency hearing, and remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that when a child is placed outside the home, the juvenile court must find that the Department made “active efforts” to prevent the breakup of the Indian family before entering an order of dependency. If such findings are not made, the dependency and dispositional orders must be vacated, and the children must be returned to their parent unless doing so would subject them to substantial and immediate danger or threat of such danger. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "In re Dependency of C.J.J.I." on Justia Law

A child, B.M., was born to Cheryl Melius and Lakota Songer, who were no longer in a relationship at the time of birth. Cheryl initially had sole custody and did not inform Lakota of the birth immediately. After B.M. was diagnosed with failure to thrive, Cheryl voluntarily placed the child with her brother, Miles, and his wife, Tori (the Meliuses), who were later granted guardianship. Lakota established paternity and sought custody, but the Meliuses initiated a third-party custody action, leading to a combined proceeding. During the litigation, the Meliuses were granted temporary custody, and Lakota was given stepped-up visitation. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was found to apply after Lakota disclosed his tribal status.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Gregory County, South Dakota, held a trial and found that while the Meliuses had a significant relationship with B.M., they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that extraordinary circumstances existed to rebut Lakota’s presumptive right to custody under SDCL 25-5-30. The court awarded Lakota sole custody but granted the Meliuses ongoing visitation and ordered Lakota to use a specific daycare provider. The court also assessed attorney fees against Lakota for his late disclosure of tribal status and for contempt related to violating court orders.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court’s finding that the Meliuses did not establish extraordinary circumstances to overcome Lakota’s parental rights and affirmed the denial of non-parent custody. The Supreme Court reversed the award of permanent visitation to the Meliuses, holding that such visitation cannot be granted absent a finding of extraordinary circumstances rebutting the parent’s rights. The Court also reversed the attorney fees related to the tribal status delay, finding the lower court erred in assigning responsibility to Lakota. The issue regarding the daycare provider was deemed moot. The case was remanded to determine attorney fees solely attributable to contempt. View "Melius v. Songer" on Justia Law

A 17-year-old defendant was charged with ten serious offenses, including murder and assault, after a violent confrontation at the home of his rivals. The incident stemmed from a feud with a classmate and escalated when the defendant, accompanied by his family, armed himself and attacked the victims’ home. The attack resulted in the death of one individual and severe injuries to others. The defendant, an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation, was charged under federal law for crimes committed within the Cherokee Nation Indian Reservation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma first reviewed the case. The government moved to transfer the defendant from juvenile to adult criminal proceedings under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge recommended granting the transfer, and the district court adopted this recommendation after conducting a de novo review. The district court weighed the statutory factors, including the defendant’s age, social background, psychological maturity, prior delinquency record, past treatment efforts, and the availability of rehabilitative programs, and found that most factors favored transfer to adult status.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the statutory transfer factors and found no clear error in its factual findings. The court also rejected the defendant’s Eighth Amendment argument that transfer was unconstitutional due to the potential punishments, holding that the challenge was unripe under circuit precedent. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order transferring the defendant to adult criminal proceedings. View "United States v. J.D.V., Jr." on Justia Law

The case concerns a land exchange between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the J.R. Simplot Company, involving land that was formerly part of the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes had ceded this land to the United States under an 1898 agreement, which Congress ratified in 1900. The 1900 Act specified that the ceded lands could only be disposed of under certain federal laws: homestead, townsite, stone and timber, and mining laws. In 2020, BLM approved an exchange of some of these lands with Simplot, who sought to expand a waste facility adjacent to the reservation. The Tribes objected, arguing that the exchange violated the restrictions set by the 1900 Act.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho reviewed the Tribes’ challenge and granted summary judgment in their favor. The court found that the BLM’s approval of the exchange violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it did not comply with the 1900 Act’s restrictions. The court also held, in the alternative, that the exchange failed to meet requirements under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court certified the case for interlocutory appeal to resolve the legal question regarding the interplay between the 1900 Act and FLPMA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the 1900 Act’s list of permissible land disposal methods is exclusive and that the BLM’s exchange under FLPMA was not authorized because FLPMA is not among the listed laws. The court further held that FLPMA does not repeal or supersede the 1900 Act’s restrictions, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Tribes under established Indian law canons. The court concluded that BLM’s authorization of the exchange was not in accordance with law. View "SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES OF THE FORT HALL RESERVATI V. USDOI" on Justia Law

The case concerns the Estate of Jack Halverson, which sought to compel the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), to partition a parcel of land on the Crow Reservation in Montana. Jack Halverson had owned a significant fractional interest in Allotment 1809 and, in 2015, applied for a partition under federal law. After Halverson’s death, his estate and the BIA entered into a settlement agreement that purported to resolve the partition. The BIA executed deeds to effectuate the partition, but the Estate contended that the BIA failed to assign the ownership interests as required by the agreement, resulting in the Estate receiving a smaller share of land than anticipated.After the BIA recorded the deeds, the Estate moved before an Administrative Law Judge to compel the BIA to comply with the settlement agreement, but the motion was denied. The Estate then filed a mandamus action in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, seeking to compel the BIA to partition the land as agreed. The district court granted summary judgment for the BIA, finding that the agency had fully performed its obligations under the settlement agreement. The Estate appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the action was barred by sovereign immunity. The court held that a mandamus suit seeking to enforce contract rights against a federal official is, in effect, a suit against the United States, and such suits are barred unless there is a clear waiver of sovereign immunity. The court found no statute waiving immunity for this type of claim. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "HALVERSON v. BURGUM" on Justia Law

Rural residents of Alaska, including Alaska Natives, have long relied on subsistence fishing in navigable waters such as the Kuskokwim River, which runs through the Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuge. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) was enacted to protect this way of life by establishing a rural subsistence priority for fishing and hunting on “public lands.” For decades, the federal government and the State of Alaska have disagreed over whether “public lands” under Title VIII of ANILCA includes navigable waters where the United States holds reserved water rights, especially after Alaska’s own subsistence laws were found unconstitutional for not providing a rural preference.After the federal government assumed management of the rural subsistence priority, a series of Ninth Circuit decisions known as the Katie John Trilogy held that “public lands” in Title VIII does include such navigable waters. The United States implemented this interpretation, managing subsistence fishing on the Kuskokwim River within the Refuge. However, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sturgeon v. Frost, which interpreted “public lands” differently in another section of ANILCA, Alaska asserted renewed authority over the river, issuing conflicting fishing orders that did not prioritize rural subsistence users.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction in favor of the United States and intervenors, holding that the Katie John Trilogy remained binding and that Alaska could not interfere with federal management of the rural subsistence priority.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Katie John Trilogy is not clearly irreconcilable with Sturgeon v. Frost, as the statutory context and purpose of Title VIII support a broader interpretation of “public lands” that includes navigable waters for subsistence purposes. The court also found that subsequent congressional actions ratified this interpretation. The judgment and injunction were affirmed. View "United States v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Members of the Crow Tribe who own trust allotments on the Crow Reservation challenged the loss of their historic water rights following the ratification of the Crow Tribe-Montana Compact and the Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act. The Settlement Act, passed by Congress in 2010, codified a negotiated agreement among the Crow Tribe, the state of Montana, and the United States, which defined tribal water rights and provided substantial federal funding for water infrastructure. In exchange, the Tribe and allottees agreed to waive all other water rights claims. The Act required the Secretary of the Interior to publish a Statement of Findings certifying that certain conditions were met, which would trigger the waiver of prior water rights.After the Secretary published the Statement of Findings in June 2016—following a deadline extension agreed to by the Tribal Chairman and the Secretary—several allottees filed suit nearly six years later. They argued that the extension was invalid because, under the Crow Constitution, only the Tribal General Council or Legislature could authorize such an agreement. They also alleged that the Secretary’s action exceeded statutory authority, breached trust obligations, and violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the Secretary’s publication of the Statement of Findings constituted final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, but found the Secretary reasonably relied on the Tribal Chairman’s authority to extend the deadline. The court further held that the Settlement Act created specific trust duties, but the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege any breach. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims for takings, due process, and equal protection failed as a matter of law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Hill v. DOI" on Justia Law