Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns the reconstruction of a bridge on Interstate 95 in Providence, Rhode Island, a project that received federal funding from the Federal Highway Administration. Because the project would affect the Providence Covelands Archaeological District, a site of historic and religious importance to the Narragansett Indian Tribe, federal law required that the agency consult with the Tribe and consider mitigation measures. Initially, a 2011 programmatic agreement provided for the transfer of certain parcels of land to the Tribe, but this transfer stalled when the State of Rhode Island demanded the Tribe waive its sovereign immunity as a condition. The Tribe refused, negotiations failed, and the agreement was terminated. Subsequently, the Highway Administration developed a new programmatic agreement, which did not include land transfers but instead provided for preservation covenants and educational initiatives. The Tribe objected to both the process and substance of the new agreement.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the Tribe’s claims regarding the first agreement for lack of standing but found standing as to claims concerning the second agreement. The district court granted summary judgment to the Highway Administration, ruling that the agency had adequately consulted with the Tribe, was not required to include the Tribe as a signatory, and had reasonably explained changes between agreements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Tribe had standing to challenge the adequacy of consultation and the process by which the second agreement was adopted. The court further held that the Highway Administration was not required to make the Tribe a signatory since the affected land was not tribal land, that consultation with the Tribe was adequate under the law, and that the agency’s change of position was reasonably explained and not arbitrary or capricious. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Narragansett Indian Tribe v. McMaster" on Justia Law

A federally recognized tribe in Oklahoma has experienced ongoing leadership disputes for nearly two decades, with multiple factions vying for control. Since 2007, the tribe has failed to hold valid elections, instead appointing interim leaders, which has led to repeated litigation in tribal, federal, and now state courts. Recently, rival claimants conducted separate elections, resulting in competing assertions of authority and control over tribal assets, with the Bureau of Indian Affairs declining to recognize any leader due to the unresolved internal conflict.The Okfuskee County District Court became involved after one faction, supported by its purported Business Committee, filed for a temporary restraining order against another group for trespass and sought declaratory relief as to the legitimate tribal leadership. The court issued an emergency restraining order and denied a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the Business Committee recognized by tribal courts was the proper authority and that the dispute concerned civil trespass, not internal governance.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma was asked to assume original jurisdiction and issue a writ of prohibition against the district court’s proceedings. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the dispute in the district court was, in fact, an unresolved intratribal leadership conflict that would require the state court to interpret tribal law and governance structures. The court determined that such intratribal disputes are nonjusticiable in state courts due to principles of tribal sovereignty and self-government, and that the purported waiver of sovereign immunity by one faction could not confer jurisdiction when the authority of that faction itself was contested. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma granted the writ of prohibition, assumed original jurisdiction, and ordered the district court to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "ANDERSON v. PARRISH" on Justia Law

Bailey Belt and Theodora Belt were charged under the Major Crimes Act for assaulting and murdering Elijah Morrison on the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation. On the night in question, an argument between the parties escalated into violence, culminating in Elijah being beaten and run over by a car. Surveillance footage from a nearby residence captured portions of the incident, but the video contained gaps. Key physical evidence included Elijah’s blood on Theodora’s car and a DNA mixture on the car’s windshield.The case was tried before the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota. At trial, the government introduced the surveillance footage despite defense objections regarding its authenticity, particularly because the camera owner was deceased and could not testify about the gaps in the video. The jury convicted both Bailey and Theodora. At sentencing, the district court applied a “vulnerable victim” enhancement, finding Elijah was especially susceptible to harm at the time he was run over.Bailey and Theodora appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, challenging the admission of the surveillance footage and, in Bailey’s case, the application of the vulnerable victim sentencing enhancement. The Eighth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the surveillance footage, concluding that the government met the low bar for authentication based on the totality of the circumstances and corroborating evidence. The court further held that the vulnerable victim enhancement was properly applied, as Elijah became unusually vulnerable during the course of the offense, and this vulnerability was not a factor already incorporated in the relevant sentencing guideline. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Belt" on Justia Law

Two children from the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska were forcibly taken from their homes in the late 1800s and placed in a federal Indian boarding school on a United States Army base. Both died at the school, allegedly because of abusive conditions, and were buried on the grounds without the consent of their families or the tribe, contrary to their tribal and religious customs. Decades later, the Army relocated the remains, along with others, to the Carlisle Barracks Post Cemetery, again without consent. The Winnebago Tribe sought the return of the boys’ remains for proper reburial, invoking the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the Tribe’s action for failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that NAGPRA’s repatriation requirement only applies to Native American remains that are part of a federal agency’s or museum’s “holdings or collections,” and concluded that remains interred in a cemetery do not qualify. The court found that the relevant statutory and regulatory language, as well as the legislative history, supported this interpretation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed with the district court’s interpretation. The Fourth Circuit held that, under the ordinary meaning of “holdings or collections,” as well as the applicable statutory context and regulatory definitions, the remains of the two boys, purposefully accumulated and held by the Army in the cemetery, are covered by NAGPRA’s repatriation requirement. The court emphasized that its holding does not extend to consensually buried remains or require agencies to inventory unknown remains. The judgment of the district court was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. United States Department of the Army" on Justia Law

A federally recognized tribe in southern California operated a wholesale tobacco distribution business, selling cigarettes exclusively to other California tribes. These tribal businesses, in turn, sold the cigarettes to individual consumers on their respective reservations. Neither the distributing tribe nor its customers held state licenses to distribute or sell cigarettes, and no state cigarette taxes were collected at any point in the distribution chain. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) placed the tribe on the Prevent All Cigarette Trafficking (PACT) Act’s noncompliant list, which restricts delivery of cigarettes by common carriers, due to violations of California’s cigarette tax and licensing laws.After the California Department of Justice notified the tribe of noncompliance, the state asked ATF to add the tribe to the noncompliant list. The tribe responded by arguing the PACT Act did not apply to its sales, but continued to make sales without appropriate licenses or tax payments. ATF issued notices of violations and, after considering the tribe’s responses, confirmed its decision to list the tribe. The tribe then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, challenging ATF’s actions as contrary to law and procedurally deficient. The district court granted summary judgment to ATF, finding that the agency’s decision was adequately reasoned and procedurally proper.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the tribe’s remote cigarette sales to other tribes constituted “off-reservation” activity subject to California’s licensing and tax laws. The court found that the tribe’s customers were “consumers” under the PACT Act, rendering the tribe a “delivery seller” required to comply with state law. The court also held that ATF did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act’s procedural requirements. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "TWENTY-NINE PALMS BAND OF MISSION INDIANS V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who, as a member of the Osage Nation, was previously convicted in Oklahoma state courts of several offenses, all committed in areas recognized as Indian country. In 2013, she was convicted of driving under the influence in Washington County. She was subsequently convicted in Mayes County in 2016 for possessing methamphetamine and a firearm, and again in Tulsa County in 2016 for possession of controlled substances and paraphernalia, as well as impersonation. In each proceeding, she was represented by counsel. Later, she was indicted in federal court for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances after a DEA investigation, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma calculated her advisory Sentencing Guidelines range by including her three prior state convictions in her Criminal History Category. The defendant objected, arguing that the state courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her because she is Native American and the offenses occurred in Indian country. The district court overruled her objection, noting the convictions had not been vacated or reversed by any Oklahoma court and were not obtained in violation of her right to counsel. The district court ultimately sentenced her after applying a downward variance.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed whether the district court erred in including the prior state convictions in the Criminal History calculation. The Tenth Circuit held that, under federal law and United States Sentencing Guidelines, prior state convictions must be counted unless they have been vacated, reversed, or were obtained in violation of the right to counsel. The court found no exception for convictions alleged to be void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, absent their invalidation by the convicting court. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Oscar Hudspeth, a member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, was convicted by a jury of two sex abuse offenses involving his young stepdaughter, D.J., which occurred when she was between five and seven years old and living in his home. The prosecution’s evidence included D.J.’s testimony about the abuse and statements Hudspeth made during a post-polygraph interview with an FBI agent, where he admitted to inappropriate touching. Prior to trial, both parties agreed to exclude any reference to the polygraph test from evidence, and the district court admitted a redacted version of the interview transcript omitting mention of the polygraph.In the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, Hudspeth moved to either exclude the entire interview or, alternatively, to ensure all polygraph references were redacted. When it became clear that a redacted version would be admitted, Hudspeth changed his position, seeking to admit the entire interview, including polygraph references, to provide context for his admissions. The district court admitted the redacted interview and excluded polygraph references, noting that Hudspeth had earlier agreed to the exclusion. Hudspeth was ultimately found guilty and sentenced to the mandatory minimum term.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed whether excluding polygraph references violated Hudspeth’s constitutional right to present a complete defense. The court held that the exclusion did not violate his constitutional rights or constitute an abuse of discretion. It found that polygraph evidence is generally unreliable and disfavored, and that the exclusion was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate. The court concluded that even if there was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the strength of the prosecution’s case. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Hudspeth" on Justia Law

A child and her sister, both recognized as Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), were removed from their parents due to concerns about their welfare. After an unsuccessful initial foster placement, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) placed the children with their mother’s cousin, Petra, in Seattle. Petra is a member of the children’s tribe. Upon arrival, the children had dental and nutritional issues. Although Petra arranged dental surgery for one child, she did not obtain follow-up care for the other child, Ax adée, whose dental problems persisted untreated during two years in Petra’s care. Petra also imposed dietary restrictions on Ax adée, resulting in significant stagnation in the child’s growth.After Petra requested that the other child be moved due to behavioral concerns, OCS placed both children with Chastity, a licensed therapeutic foster parent and tribal member in Alaska. Following this transfer, Ax adée received extensive dental treatment and began gaining weight after dietary restrictions were lifted. Petra challenged OCS’s decision in the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, First Judicial District, Ketchikan, arguing she was a suitable foster parent and that OCS had not justified the placement change.After a six-day evidentiary hearing, the superior court found that Petra had failed to address Ax adée’s dental and nutritional needs, leading to significant health concerns. The court concluded that Petra was not a suitable foster parent and upheld OCS’s decision to place the child in a lower-preference ICWA foster home.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s order. The main holding is that clear and convincing evidence supported the finding that Petra was not a suitable foster parent due to her failure to meet the child’s basic dental and nutritional needs, justifying placement in a lower-preference home under ICWA. View "Petra J. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

State officials in Florida constructed an immigration detention facility at the Dade-Collier Training and Transition Airport, located in the Florida Everglades, using state funds and employees. The facility was built on state property and managed by state law enforcement, although federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials inspected the site and occasionally coordinated the transport and detention of individuals there. The state planned to seek federal reimbursement but had not received any federal funding at the time of the events in question. Several state agencies operated under agreements with the federal government, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), allowing them to assist with immigration enforcement, but Florida retained control over the facility’s management and construction.The Friends of the Everglades, the Center for Biological Diversity, and the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. They alleged violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), claiming that officials failed to conduct a required environmental review before constructing and operating the facility. The district court issued a preliminary injunction halting further construction, requiring removal of certain structures, and prohibiting detention of additional individuals at the site. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, concluding that the construction was a final agency action and a major federal action under NEPA, and that federal officials exercised substantial control over the project.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate either a final agency action under the APA or substantial federal control necessary to trigger NEPA, given that Florida constructed and controlled the facility without federal funding or operational authority. The court also found that the district court’s injunction violated a statutory prohibition against enjoining immigration enforcement. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

The dispute arose after the Fort Sill Apache Tribe opened the Warm Springs Casino near Lawton, Oklahoma, in 2022. The Comanche Nation, which operates casinos in the same region, experienced increased competition and claimed that the Warm Springs Casino was opened in violation of federal law. The Comanche Nation sought injunctive relief to halt the casino’s operations and monetary damages against several officials of the Fort Sill Apache Tribe, both in their individual and official capacities.The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma heard the officials’ motion to dismiss, in which the officials argued that tribal sovereign immunity barred the claims against them. The district court denied the officials' motion to dismiss, finding that the officials were not protected by tribal immunity on the claims at issue and that the Tribe was not a required party for the purposes of the lawsuit. The district court’s order also explicitly denied tribal immunity as a defense to the official-capacity Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, and implicitly rejected tribal immunity for the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of tribal immunity under the collateral-order doctrine. The Tenth Circuit held that IGRA abrogates tribal sovereign immunity for claims brought by an Indian tribe to enjoin class III gaming conducted in violation of a tribal-state compact on Indian lands, allowing the Comanche Nation’s official-capacity IGRA claim to proceed. However, the Tenth Circuit concluded that tribal immunity barred the official-capacity RICO claims because the requirements of the Ex Parte Young exception were not met. The court further held that the officials were not entitled to tribal immunity on the individual-capacity RICO claims. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Comanche Nation v. Ware" on Justia Law