Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant Edmond Warrington was charged in Oklahoma state court after he engaged in sexual activity with his mentally disabled, 18-year-old adopted niece. When the U.S. Supreme Court decided McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), the federal government took over prosecution for the alleged sexual abuse. The district court denied a motion to suppress inculpatory statements Warrington made to federal agents during transport from state to federal custody. Warrington proceeded to trial, where he was convicted by a jury of three counts of sexual abuse in Indian Country and sentenced to 144 months’ imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. The court also imposed a $15,000 special assessment under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015 (“JVTA”), a penalty of $5,000 for each count of conviction. On appeal, Warrington argued: (1) the district court erred in denying his suppression motion because the agents questioned him in violation of the Sixth Amendment; and (2) the court plainly erred in imposing the JVTA assessment on a per count basis instead of imposing one $5,000 penalty in the case. The Tenth Circuit concluded the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached in the federal proceeding and, in any event, Warrington voluntarily waived his right to counsel after receiving a Miranda warning, therefore, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. Warrington’s second issue raised was an issue of first impression for the Tenth Circuit, and the Court concluded the trial court did not commit plain error. View "United States v. Warrington" on Justia Law

Defendant Jeriah Budder, an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation, killed David Jumper in Indian Country. He was charged by the State of Oklahoma with first-degree manslaughter. THe charges were dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the wake of McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020). A federal grand jury then indicted Defendant on three charges: (1) first-degree murder in Indian country; (2) carrying, using, brandishing and discharging a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence; and (3) causing the death of another in the course of (2). On appeal, defendant argued he was denied the due process of law guaranteed by the federal constitution because the retroactive application of McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S.Ct. 2452 (2020) deprived him of Oklahoma’s law of self-defense, which he argued was broader than the defense available to him under federal law. The Tenth Circuit held that the application of McGirt did not constitute an impermissible retroactive application of a judicial decision. Further, the Court rejected defendant’s argument that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Budder" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Shannon Kepler appealed his conviction for causing death by discharging a firearm during a crime of violence. Kepler and his wife Gina Kepler both worked as officers for the Tulsa Police Department. During the summer of 2014, the Keplers began to experience conflict with their 18-year-old adopted daughter, Lisa. Kepler gained access to Lisa’s Facebook account to monitor her activity. Eventually, the Keplers kicked Lisa out of their home and dropped her off at a homeless shelter. Kepler continued to monitor Lisa’s Facebook account and discovered she was dating a man named Jeremey Lake. Using police department resources, Kepler obtained Lake’s address, phone number, and physical description. On the same day he obtained this information, Kepler armed himself with his personal revolver and drove his SUV to Lake’s address. He spotted Lisa and Lake walking together near the residence. Kepler stopped the SUV in the middle of the road, rolled down the window, and called out to Lisa. Lisa refused to talk to him and walked away. Kepler exited the vehicle to follow her. At that point, Lake approached Kepler to introduce himself and shake his hand. Kepler drew his revolver. Lake tried to run away. Kepler shot him, once in the chest and once in the neck. Kepler then turned and fired shots in the direction of Lisa and Lake’s half-brother, M.H., who was 13 years old. Kepler then fled. Witnesses called 911. Paramedics arrived and declared Lake dead. Later that night, Kepler turned himself in to the Tulsa Police Department. At trial, Kepler admitted he shot Lake. He did not contend that he acted out of anger, provocation, or passion. Instead, he said he responded in self-defense to Lake’s threatening him with a chrome pistol. He entered into evidence the pistol discovered in a nearby trashcan and suggested that one of the witnesses took the pistol from Lake’s body and smuggled it into the police station. The jury rejected Kepler’s self-defense argument, leading to the conviction at issue here. Though Kepler argued second-degree murder was not a "crime of violence" and not a predicate offense for his conviction, the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed Kepler's convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Kepler" on Justia Law

Craig Morrison and Amanda Walker brought Walker’s three-year-old son, R.T., to the emergency room and told doctors that R.T. had jumped off his bed and hit his head on his scooter. After examining R.T., doctors discovered bruising across most of R.T.’s body - injuries the doctors determined did not line up with Morrison’s and Walker’s story. The doctors contacted the police, who initiated a child abuse investigation, ultimately leading to a grand jury indictment of Morrison for two counts of child abuse, under the Assimilated Crimes Act, and of Walker for two counts of enabling child abuse, under the Assimilated Crimes Act. They were tried in a joint trial and the jury returned guilty verdicts on all four counts. In separate sentencing proceedings, the district court granted the Government’s motions for upward variances from United States Sentencing Guidelines sentences for both Morrison and Walker. Morrison and Walker filed separate appeals, collectively raising ten challenges to their convictions and sentences. Because Morrison and Walker were tried in one trial, and each joined several of the other’s arguments on appeal. Determining none of their arguments were meritorious, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Morrison’s and Walker’s convictions and sentences. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

In 1992, the Crow Tribe brought a declaratory action against Wyoming Game and Fish officials to determine whether the 1868 Treaty with the Crows afforded it an unrestricted right to hunt in the Bighorn National Forest. Relying on a line of prior Supreme Court cases interpreting Indian treaties, the federal district court in Wyoming held in Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis (Repsis I), 866 F. Supp. 520 (D. Wyo. 1994), that Wyoming’s admission as a state extinguished the Tribe’s treaty hunting rights (the “Statehood Holding”). In Crow Tribe of Indians v. Repsis (Repsis II), 73 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1995), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s Statehood Holding. Alternatively, the Tenth Circuit held that the Bighorn National Forest was “occupied,” so the Tribe’s treaty hunting rights would not have applied to the area in question (the “Occupation Rationale”), and also reasoned that Wyoming could have justified its restrictions on hunting due to its interest in conservation (the “Conservation Necessity Rationale”). In 2019, the Supreme Court decided Herrera v. Wyoming, 139 S. Ct. 1686 (2019), in response to Wyoming’s attempts to prosecute a Tribe member for hunting in Bighorn National Forest. Critically, the Court held that the Tribe’s treaty rights had not been extinguished by Wyoming’s admittance as a state and that Bighorn National Forest was not categorically “occupied.” On remand, Wyoming continued its efforts to prosecute the Tribe’s member, arguing in part that the defendant could not assert a treaty right to hunt in Bighorn National Forest because Repsis II continued to bind the Tribe and its members through the doctrine of issue preclusion. The Tribe moved for relief from Repsis II under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). But the district court denied the Tribe’s motion, holding that it lacked the power to grant relief because the Tenth Circuit relied on alternative grounds for affirmance (the Occupation and Conservation Necessity Rationales) that the district court had not considered in Repsis I. The Tribe appealed, arguing that the district court legally erred when it held that it lacked the power to review the Tribe’s Rule 60(b) motion. The Tenth Circuit concluded the district court abused its discretion when it held that it lacked the authority to review the Tribe’s motion for post-judgment relief. The matter was remanded again for further proceedings. View "Crow Tribe of Indians, et al. v. Repsis, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Kyle Sago appealed murder convictions committed in Indian country and causing death by use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (namely, first- or second-degree murder). The jury was instructed on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and self-defense. On appeal Sago argued the district court plainly erred in providing model jury instructions on first- and second-degree murder that inadequately defined the required element of malice. Specifically, he argued the instructions omitted the mitigation defense referred to as “imperfect self-defense:” the instructions were defective in that they failed to inform the jury that it could not find that Sago acted with malice unless it found that he was not acting in the sincere belief (even if the belief was unreasonable) that the use of deadly force was necessary. The Tenth Circuit affirmed: a mitigating circumstance instruction negates the malice element of first- and second-degree murder and must be accompanied by a lesser-included-offense instruction to inform the jury of the offense on which it could convict the defendant in light of the mitigating circumstance. And here, Sago did not request a relevant lesser-included-offense instruction for involuntary manslaughter. Therefore, the trial court did not err in declining to instruct on the mitigating circumstance. View "United States v. Sago" on Justia Law

This case concerns a social worker’s duty to inquire whether a child involved in a dependency proceeding “is or may be an Indian child” under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), a duty commonly referred to as the “initial inquiry.” At issue in this appeal was whether the initial inquiry encompassed available extended family members in every proceeding where a child is removed from home or in only those cases where the social worker takes temporary custody of the child without a warrant under exigent circumstances. Here, the child was initially taken into the custody of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) by protective custody warrant before being detained by the juvenile court and later removed at disposition. Reunification efforts failed, and the juvenile court ultimately terminated parental rights and freed the child for adoption. Relying on In re Robert F., 90 Cal.App.5th 492 (2023) the department argued that because the child wasn’t initially removed from home without a warrant, the duty to interview available to extended family members never arose. The Court of Appeal concluded there was only one duty of initial inquiry, and that duty encompasses available extended family members no matter how the child is initially removed from home. Applying a narrower initial inquiry to the subset of dependencies that begin with a temporary removal by warrant frustrates the purpose of the initial inquiry and “den[ies] tribes the benefit of the statutory promise” of Assembly Bill No. 3176 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.). Because the department in this case failed to ask the child’s available extended family members whether the child had any Native American ancestry, the Court conditionally reversed the order terminating parental rights and remanded for the juvenile court to direct the department to complete its investigation. View "In re Delila D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Greenville Rancheria (Greenville) was a sovereign Indian tribe that owned administrative and medical offices (property) in the City of Red Bluff. Following a contested election, defendant Angela Martin was elected as Greenville’s chairperson, which included the authority to act as Greenville’s chief executive officer. After her election, Martin, along with approximately 20 people, including defendants Andrea Cazares-Diego, Andrew Gonzales, Hallie Hugo, Elijah Martin, and Adrian Hugo, entered the property and refused to leave despite the remaining members of the tribal council ordering them to leave and removing Martin’s authority as chairperson under Greenville’s constitution. Because of defendants’ failure to vacate the property, Greenville filed a verified emergency complaint for trespass and injunctive relief. The trial court granted Greenville a temporary restraining order, but later granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Greenville appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed: defendants did not point to any authority demonstrating the federal government’s intent to preempt state law or deprive state courts of subject matter jurisdiction in property disputes between tribal members occurring on lands outside tribal trust lands. "To conclude we lack jurisdiction over property disputes between tribal members on nontribal lands would limit tribal members’ access to state court, especially considering California courts have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280 over property disputes between tribal members on tribal trust lands. (Section 1360.) Consequently, the state court has jurisdiction to hear Greenville’s dispute against defendants regarding land it owns in fee simple that is not held in trust by the federal government." View "Rancheria v. Martin" on Justia Law

The lawsuit giving rise to this appeal was brought by Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Corrales, on behalf of himself, against the California Gambling Control Commission (the Commission) and the two competing factions of the California Valley Miwok Tribe (the Tribe), including his former client, the "Burley faction." In the Court of Appeals' preceding opinion, CVMT 2020, the Court affirmed, on res judicata grounds, the dismissal of a lawsuit filed by attorney Corrales against the Commission on behalf of the Burley faction. Through this lawsuit, Corrales sought to ensure that he received payment from the Tribe for the attorney fees that he claims he was due under a fee agreement he entered into with the Burley faction in 2007. Specifically, even though the Tribe’s leadership dispute was still not resolved, Corrales sought either (1) an order requiring the Commission to make immediate payment to him from the Tribe’s RSTF money, or (2) an order that when the Commission eventually decides to release the Indian Gaming Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF) money to the Tribe, his attorney fees had to be paid directly to him by the Commission before the remainder of the funds were released to the Tribe. The trial court dismissed Corrales’s lawsuit because the question of whether Burley represented the Tribe in 2007 for the purpose of entering into a binding fee agreement with Corrales on behalf of the Tribe required the resolution of an internal tribal leadership and membership dispute, over which the courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction. After judgment was entered, Corrales brought a motion for a new trial and a motion for relief from default. Among other things, Corrales argued that the trial court should have stayed his lawsuit rather than dismissing it. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's dismissal, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Corrales v. Cal. Gambling Control Com." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Isaiah Redbird, a member of the Kiowa Nation, was convicted by jury of first-degree murder and assault resulting in serious bodily injury. On appeal. he argued the district court improperly admitted character evidence about his propensity for violence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2)(B). The Tenth Circuit found Redbird did not raise that specific objection at trial. Because Redbird did not argue plain error on appeal, the Tenth Circuit concluded he waived his evidentiary challenge and therefore affirm his convictions. View "United States v. Redbird" on Justia Law