Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

The case stemmed from a dispute over property subject to the terms of a will executed by a now-deceased member of the Tonawanda Seneca Nation (the Nation). Judge Robert Noonan, a county court and surrogate’s court judge, presided over the proceedings seeking to probate the will in the surrogate’s court. The Nation commenced a N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding in the Appellate Division seeking to prohibit the judge or any future surrogate in the estate proceeding from exercising jurisdiction over the case. The Appellate Division dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that the proceeding must originate in Supreme Court. At issue on appeal was whether the proceeding must originate in Supreme Court because Judge Noonan’s position as Surrogate was not one listed in N.Y. C.P.L.R. 506(b)(1), which limits article 78 proceedings that may be commenced in the Appellate Division to those against County Court Judges and Supreme Court Justices, or whether Judge Noonan’s position as a county court judge required that the proceeding be commenced in the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, where Judge Noonan was acting as Surrogate with respect to the probate of the will, the Nation’s suit challenging those actions should have been brought in Supreme Court. View "Tonawanda Seneca Nation v. Noonan" on Justia Law

The Pueblo of San Felipe (Pueblo) appealed a Court of Appeals decision declining to extend the Pueblo immunity from suit. Hamaatsa, Inc. (Hamaatsa) owned land in Sandoval County. Adjacent to Hamaatsa’s property was land owned in fee by the Pueblo. The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) conveyed to the Pueblo, in fee simple, the land at issue on December 13, 2001. The property, adjacent and contiguous with reservation land, was not then held in trust by the federal government as part of the Pueblo’s reservation. In its 2001 conveyance to the Pueblo, the BLM reserved an easement and right-of-way over, across the parcel at issue here ( “932 Roads” or “R.S. 2477 Roads,”). The BLM purported to quitclaim its interest in one particular R.S. 2477 to the Pueblo. Hamaatsa used Northern R.S. 2477 on the Pueblo’s property to access its land. In August 2009, Hamaatsa received a letter from the then Governor of the Pueblo stating that Hamaatsa had no legal right of access across the Pueblo’s property and that Hamaatsa’s use of Northern R.S. 2477 was a trespass. Hamaatsa continued to use the road and filed suit requesting that the district court declare that the Pueblo cannot restrict use of the road. The Pueblo moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing its immunity deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear Hamaatsa's case. The Supreme Court agreed the district court lacked jurisdiction and remanded the case for dismissal. View "Hamaatsa, Inc. v. Pueblo of San Felipe" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a class action claiming the right to title and possession of twelve square miles of land in southern Minnesota. Appellants allege that they are lineal descendants of the Mdewakanton band of the Sioux tribe who were loyal to the United States during the 1862 uprising, and that the Secretary of the Interior set apart the twelve square miles for the loyal Mdewakanton and their descendants. The court concluded that the district court correctly held that appellants failed to state a claim under federal common law as set forth in the progeny of Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida; the district court properly granted defendants' motions to dismiss on the ground that Section 9 of the Act of February 16, 1863, Act of Feb. 16, 1863, ch. 37, 9, 12 Stat. 652, 654, does not provide a private remedy to the loyal Mdewakanton; the district court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions, and the claims regarding the appellate-cost bond are moot; and, because the district court made no findings regarding the propriety of the Municipal Appelllees' motion for costs, the motion was moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of appellees' motion to dismiss; vacated the order imposing sanctions and requiring an appellate-cost bond; and remanded for limited consideration of Municipal Appellees’ motion for costs Under Rule 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. 1920. View "Wolfchild v. Redwood County" on Justia Law

In 1854, the Omaha Tribe entered into a treaty with the United States to establish a 300,000-acre reservation and to “cede” and “forever relinquish all right and title to” its remaining land in present-day Nebraska for a fixed price. In 1865, the Tribe entered into another treaty, agreeing to sell land to the government for a fixed sum. In 1872, the Tribe sought to sell more land. Instead of a fixed-sum purchase, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to survey, appraise, and sell tracts of reservation land to settlers and to deposit proceeds with the Treasury for the Tribe’s benefit. Congress took the same approach in 1882 with respect to roughly 50,000 acres of reservation land (22 Stat. 341). Peebles purchased land under the terms of the 1882 Act and established the village of Pender. In 2006, the Tribe sought to subject Pender retailers to tits amended beverage control ordinance pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1161 (permitting tribes to regulate liquor sales on reservation land and in “Indian country”). Concluding that the 1882 Act did not diminish the Reservation, the district court ruled in favor of the Tribe. The Eighth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. Only Congress may diminish the boundaries of an Indian reservation, and its intent to do so must be clear. The 1882 Act had none of the common textual indications that express clear intent, but falls into a category of surplus land acts that “merely opened reservation land to settlement.” Although the Tribe has been absent from the disputed territory for more than 120 years, the Court stated that subsequent demographic history is the “least compelling” evidence; the justifiable expectations of non-Indians living on the land cannot alone diminish reservation boundaries. View "Nebraska v. Parker" on Justia Law

In 1854, the Omaha Tribe entered into a treaty with the United States to establish a 300,000-acre reservation and to “cede” and “forever relinquish all right and title to” its remaining land in present-day Nebraska for a fixed price. In 1865, the Tribe entered into another treaty, agreeing to sell land to the government for a fixed sum. In 1872, the Tribe sought to sell more land. Instead of a fixed-sum purchase, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to survey, appraise, and sell tracts of reservation land to settlers and to deposit proceeds with the Treasury for the Tribe’s benefit. Congress took the same approach in 1882 with respect to roughly 50,000 acres of reservation land (22 Stat. 341). Peebles purchased land under the terms of the 1882 Act and established the village of Pender. In 2006, the Tribe sought to subject Pender retailers to tits amended beverage control ordinance pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1161 (permitting tribes to regulate liquor sales on reservation land and in “Indian country”). Concluding that the 1882 Act did not diminish the Reservation, the district court ruled in favor of the Tribe. The Eighth Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. Only Congress may diminish the boundaries of an Indian reservation, and its intent to do so must be clear. The 1882 Act had none of the common textual indications that express clear intent, but falls into a category of surplus land acts that “merely opened reservation land to settlement.” Although the Tribe has been absent from the disputed territory for more than 120 years, the Court stated that subsequent demographic history is the “least compelling” evidence; the justifiable expectations of non-Indians living on the land cannot alone diminish reservation boundaries. View "Nebraska v. Parker" on Justia Law

Arrow Midstream Holdings, LLC and Arrow Pipeline, LLC (collectively "Arrow") appealed, and Tesla Enterprises, LLC ("Tesla") cross-appealed, a judgment dismissing without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction its action against 3 Bears Construction, LLC and Tesla for breach of contract and a declaration that Tesla's pipeline construction lien was invalid. In 2013, Arrow hired 3 Bears to be the general contractor for the construction of a pipeline located on a right-of-way easement acquired by Arrow from the Bureau of Indian Affairs over Indian trust land on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. 3 Bears entered into a subcontract with Tesla to supply materials and labor for the construction. 3 Bears was owned by two members of the Three Affiliated Tribes ("Tribe") and was certified under the Tribal Employment Rights Ordinance ("TERO"). 3 Bears claimed Arrow was a covered employer who was required to comply with TERO rules. After the pipeline was completed, a dispute arose between 3 Bears and Tesla concerning amounts Tesla claimed it was owed by 3 Bears for work Tesla performed. In mid-2014, Tesla sent Arrow a notice of right to file a pipeline lien under N.D.C.C. ch. 35-24. Tesla recorded the pipeline lien against Arrow in the Dunn County recorder's office in June 2014. In July 2014, Arrow commenced this action in state district court challenging the validity of the pipeline lien, seeking indemnification, and claiming 3 Bears breached the parties' contract. In August 2014, 3 Bears moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In November 2014, 3 Bears filed a complaint against Tesla and Arrow in Fort Berthold Tribal Court. 3 Bears sought a declaration that the pipeline lien was invalid, alleged Arrow had breached the master service contract, and requested an award of damages. In December 2014, the state district court agreed with 3 Bears' argument that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. The court concluded "exercising jurisdiction over this action under the circumstances presented here would infringe upon Tribal sovereignty." The court further concluded, "at the very least, Arrow and Tesla, as a matter of comity, should be required to exhaust their tribal court remedies before this Court exercises jurisdiction." The court dismissed the action "without prejudice to allow any of the parties to re-open the case without payment of another filing fee should it become necessary for purposes of enforcing the Tribal Court action or for any other reason." After review of the matter, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding the district court had jurisdiction over this lawsuit. View "Arrow Midstream Holdings, LLC v. 3 Bears Construction, LLC" on Justia Law

At dispute in this case was the Crow Water Compact - an agreement among the United States, the Crow Tribe, and the State - which recognizes a Tribal Water Right of the Crow Tribe and its members in a number of sources of water that abut or cross the Crow Indian Reservation in Montana. Here, a group of Crow tribal member Allottees - persons who hold interests in parcels of former Tribal land mostly created by the General Allotment Act - objected to the Compact in the Water Court, claiming that the United States breached its fiduciary duties to the Allottees by failing to protect their water rights in the Compact and failing to adequately represent them in Compact proceedings. The Water Court dismissed the Allottees’ objections. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Water Court (1) applied the proper legal standard of review in dismissing the Allottees’ objections; (2) did not exceed its jurisdiction by dismissing the Allottees’ action rather than staying consideration of the Compact pending resolution of the Allottees’ action in federal district court; and (3) did not err in determining that the Allottees have rights to a share of the Crow Tribal Water Right and that the United States adequately represented the Allottees during the Compact negotiations. View "In re Crow Water Compact" on Justia Law

The Pueblo of Jemez brought suit against the United States under the federal common law and the Quiet Title Act (QTA), seeking to quiet its allegedly unextinguished and continuing aboriginal title to the lands of what was known as Valles Caldera National Preserve. The government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court held it lacked subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of law and dismissed the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). It reasoned that sovereign immunity barred the action based on its conclusion that the Jemez Pueblo’s title claim against the United States accrued in 1860 when the United States granted the lands in question to the heirs of Luis Maria Cabeza de Baca (the Baca heirs). The claim thus fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian Claims Commission Act (ICCA), which waived sovereign immunity and provided a cause of action to all Indian claims against the government that accrued before 1946 so long as they were filed within a five year statute of limitations period. Because the claim was not so filed, it became barred by sovereign immunity. The Pueblo appealed, arguing that its aboriginal title was not extinguished by the 1860 grant to the Baca heirs and that its claim for interference with its Indian title did not accrue until 2000, after the United States acquired an interest in the Valles Caldera and began interfering with the Jemez Pueblo’s access to the land. Upon careful consideration of the arguments made on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings: "This appeal is not about whether the Jemez Pueblo holds aboriginal title. On remand, the Jemez Pueblo will have to prove that it had, and still has, aboriginal title to the land at issue in the case. This appeal concerns whether the 1860 Baca grant extinguished the Jemez Pueblo’s alleged aboriginal title to the lands which are the subject of this action. We hold it did not and the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, the 1860 Baca grant itself provided a pre-1946 claim against the United States the Jemez Pueblo could have brought under the ICCA." View "Pueblo of Jemez v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Shinnecock Indian Nation filed suit to vindicate its rights to land in the Town of Southampton, claiming that 1859 New York legislation allowed thousands of acres of the Nation’s land to be wrongfully conveyed to the town. The district court dismissed, holding that laches barred the claims. An appeal to the Second Circuit remains pending. In 2012, the Nation filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking $1,105,000,000, alleging that the United States, “acting through the federal court system . . . denied any and all judicial means of effective redress for the unlawful taking of lands” in violation of trust obligations arising under the Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. 177, and the “federal common law.” The Claims Court dismissed on alternative grounds: that the claims were not ripe because they were predicated upon the district court’s judgment in the prior suit, which was on appeal, or that, even if the claims were ripe, it had no jurisdiction because they did not fall within the Indian Tucker Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The court refused to allow amendment to allege a judicial takings claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed that the breach of trust claims are not ripe for review, vacated the jurisdiction ruling, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the breach of trust claims without prejudice. View "Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant Linda Vista Village San Diego Homeowners Association, Inc. appealed the dismissal of their request for a declaratory judgment and other relief. Appellant's complaint was filed in 2012 against defendants-respondents the City of San Diego and the predecessors of Tecolote Investors, LLC. Members of the HOA are sublessees of mobile home park lots subject to a 1979 master lease between the City and Tecolote Investors. Appellant argued that the park site was located on and should have been properly characterized as "Pueblo Lands" within the meaning of the San Diego City Charter (section 219). Section 219 and its predecessors since 1909 have been applied to certain Pueblo lands north of the San Diego River to require approval by City Council ordinance and City voters for any sale or lease of them for more than 15 years. Since no voter approval was sought or obtained for this transaction, Appellant alleged the City was without power to enter into the existing 55-year master lease of the park site with the Landlord Defendants (or their predecessors). As a consequence, Appellant sought decrees to invalidate the master lease and consequently its subleases, specifically attacking the 1983 City-approved provisions allowing periodic rent increases. Appellant also claims entitlement to various other types of relief, such as damages. In light of the applicable authorities, the recorded title documents for the parcels demonstrate as a matter of law that on this record, the restrictions of section 219 did not apply, the face of the pleading failed to state its causes of action, and the Landlord Defendants' demurrer was correctly sustained without leave to amend. Based on de novo analysis (akin to judgment on the pleadings),the Court of Appeal concluded the record fully supported the dismissal of all causes of action as to the City too. View "Linda Vista Village San Diego HOA v. Tecolote Investors" on Justia Law