Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

The Town and the State appealed from the district court's adverse summary judgment ruling in a suit where the Tribe challenged the Town's imposition of the State's personal property tax on the lessors of slot machines used by the Tribe at Foxwoods Casino. The court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction; the Tribe had standing; neither the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., nor the Indian Trader Statutes, 25 U.S.C. 261-64, expressly barred the tax; and, under the White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker test, federal law did not implicitly bar the tax because the State and Town interests in the integrity and uniform application of their tax system outweighed the federal and tribal interests reflected in IGRA. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Tribe and in denying summary judgment for the Town and State. View "Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard" on Justia Law

After the National Indian Gaming Commission decided that a 1994 consent decree involving the City of Duluth and the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa was incompatible with federal law, the Band moved for dissolution of the consent decree. The City opposed the motion and the district court granted it in part and denied it in part. Both parties appealed. The Commission's change in the law governing Indian gaming made illegal what the earlier consent decree was designed to enforce. The 2011 decision by the Commission, the agency authorized by Congress to interpret and enforce the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., ruled that the 1994 arrangement between the City and the Band violated the Act. That determination provided ample support for the district court's decision to grant prospective relief from continued enforcement of the 1994 consent decree into the 2011 to 2036 period since continued execution of the agreement would be "no longer equitable." It was unclear what conclusion the district court would have reached without its mistaken belief that Rule 60(b)(6) was not available for consideration of potential retrospective relief. The district court abused its discretion by not examining all the relevant factors and therefore the court reversed the district court's decision denying retrospective relief to the Band for its obligations to pay rent withheld from 2009 to 2011 and remanded that question for further consideration.View "City of Duluth v. Fond Du Lac Band of Chippewa" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit bribery of an Indian tribal official, and aiding and abetting a bribery involving an agent of an Indian tribal government. Defendant raised evidentiary challenges on appeal. The court held that the district court did not plainly err in determining that evidence relating to uncharged bribery activity was "intrinsic" to the charged conspiracy and therefore admissible notwithstanding the government's failure to give defendant pretrial notice of its intent to use this evidence. Given the substantial evidence of defendant's guilt, and defendant's failure to object and his decision to rehash the same testimony on cross-examination, the court concluded that defendant was not sufficiently prejudiced by the admission of the testimony at issue for the court to exercise its discretion to recognize plain error, if any existed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "United States v. Duane Dale Big Eagle" on Justia Law

Defendant, the Bureau of Indian Affairs Superintendent at the Fort Peck Indian Reservation, was convicted of charges stemming from her involvement in a scheme to obtain money from a tribal credit program. The court reversed defendant's convictions on Counts I and II (conspiracy, theft and conversion of Indian Tribal Organization property) because the alleged object of the conspiracy - the loan modification - was not itself criminal and, therefore, there could be no conspiracy; affirmed defendant's conviction on Count III (bribery) where a rational jury could easily infer a quid pro quo from the facts; reversed defendant's conviction on Count IV (falsification, concealment, or covering up of a material fact) because the government did not show that defendant violated a specific duty to report Credit Program fraud; reversed defendant's conviction on Count V (public acts affecting a personal financial interest) because defendant's financial interest in this matter was insufficient under 18 U.S.C. 208(a); and affirmed defendant's conviction on Count VI (misprision of a felony) where a jury could conclude that payment of the loans at issue made the discovery of the fraud less likely and, therefore, that defendant took an affirmative step to conceal the felony. The court also concluded that there was no Fifth Amendment violation arising out of defendant's convictions on Count V and VI. Finally, the court remanded for resentencing where the district court erred in adjusting the sentence. View "United States v. White Eagle" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to hold the city liable for injuries caused by the negligence of a tribal police officer based on the theory that the city had a "non-delegable" duty to provide law enforcement services to the community. Plaintiffs were ordered by the officer to ride on the back of a four-wheeler after he found plaintiffs violating a curfew ordinance. Plaintiffs alleged that they were thrown off the four-wheeler and injured when the officer lost control. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the city because the officer was immune from individual liability for plaintiffs' tort claims, both under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), and the tribe's sovereign immunity. Because the officer was immune, plaintiffs' claims against the city for his negligence failed since those claims were based on the city's vicarious liability for the officer's negligence. View "M.J. v. United States" on Justia Law

Christopher C. and Therese C.'s parental rights were terminated as to the couple's four children. The trial court relied primarily on evidence that neither parent had acquired the basic skills necessary to parent their children despite more than a year of training by the Department of Health & Social Services' Office of Children's Services. The Supreme Court after its review concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by sufficient evidence. Therefore the Court affirmed the termination of the parties' parental rights. View "Christopher C. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

A group of Freedmen, former Cherokee slaves and their descendants, sued in district court claiming that the Cherokee Nation had violated the 1866 Treaty that guaranteed the Freedmen all the rights of native Cherokees. To avoid the sovereign immunity bar, the Freedmen sued not only the Cherokee Nation itself but also the relevant executive official, the Principal Chief, in his official capacity. Applying the precedents that permitted suits against government officials in their official capacities, the court concluded that this suit could proceed against the Principal Chief in his official capacity, without the Cherokee Nation itself as a party. The Cherokee Nation and the Principal Chief in his official capacity were one and the same in the Ex Parte Young suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. As a result, the Principal Chief could adequately represent the Cherokee Nation in this suit, meaning that the Cherokee Nation itself was not a required party for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.View "Vann, et al v. DOI, et al" on Justia Law

Mother's two Indian children, both minors, were placed in foster care by a separate juvenile court. After the State filed a motion to terminate parental rights, the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska sought to transfer the proceedings to the Omaha Tribal Court pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act. The juvenile court denied the request, finding that the motions were filed at an "advanced stage" of the juvenile proceedings. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no basis for a determination that the motions to transfer these cases to tribal court were filed at an advanced stage of the proceedings to terminate parental rights, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in affirming the separate juvenile court's denial of the motions on this ground. Remanded with directions to sustain the motions to transfer the cases to the Omaha Tribal Court.View "In re Zylena R." on Justia Law

The Office of Children's Services (OCS) placed a Native child in a non-Native foster home while working with the other towards reunification. Over two years later, the superior court terminated the parents' parental rights. The child's maternal grandmother and the tribe sought to enforce the Indian Child Welfare Act's (ICWA) placement preferences. The foster parents petitioned for adoption. The superior court found good cause to deviate from the ICWA preference, and that the grandmother was not a suitable placement for the child. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the tribe argued the superior court erred by applying the wrong standard of proof for the good cause determination; that the court's findings were not supported by sufficient evidence; and that the findings were not sufficient to support the good cause determination. The Supreme Court found that the ICWA implicitly mandated that good cause to deviate from ICWA's adoptive placement preferences be proved by clear and convincing evidence. To the extent prior cases held otherwise, they were overruled. Therefore the superior court was vacated here and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Native Village of Tununak v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Magnan pled guilty to three county of murder in the first degree and one count of shooting with intent to kill. He was sentenced to death for each murder conviction, and to life for the shooting. In his application for habeas relief to the district court, Petitioner argued that his crimes took place in "Indian country," and that as a result, the state trial court lacked jurisdiction over the crimes. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found that a 1970 conveyance of property from the Seminole Nation to the federal Housing Authority extinguished any "Indian Country" designation; even assuming that the Seminole Nation retained some rights to the property in question, those rights were insufficient to deprive the State of criminal jurisdiction. The district court denied the writ application but granted a certificate of appealability. After its review of the case, the Tenth Circuit concluded that conveyance of the surface estate to the land in which the crimes took place were insufficient to extinguish Seminole Nation control over it. Therefore, the land in question was indeed "Indian Country" and therefore the state trial court lacked jurisdiction over the crimes. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case with instructions to grant Petitioner habeas relief. View "Magnan v. Workman, et al" on Justia Law