Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Native American Law
Fort Belknap v. Office of Pub. & Indian Hous.
This case involves a federal rent-subsidy program for Indian Tribes and Tribally Designated Housing Entities (TDHE) that lease housing to Indians. Fort Belknap, a TDHE, petitioned for review of HUD's decision to withhold overpayments from future program payments. The court held that 25 U.S.C. 4161(d) allows an appeal only when HUD takes action pursuant to section 4161(a). In this instance, because HUD has taken no action pursuant to section 4161(a), the court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Fort Belknap v. Office of Pub. & Indian Hous." on Justia Law
United States v. Livingston
Defendant was convicted of mail fraud and theft by an officer or employee of a gaming establishment on Indian lands. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction. The court concluded that the location of the gaming establishment was not an element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. 1168(b) and that the indictment adequately alleged mail fraud and theft by an officer or employee of a gaming establishment on Indian lands; there was no error in the jury instructions where the instructions correctly defined "intent to defraud;" and there was no error in the admission of prior acts evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Livingston" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Native American Law
DISH Network Service L.L.C. v. Laducer, et al.
Defendant, an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of the Chippewa Indians, entered into a satellite television contract with DISH but used his daughter's credit card to open his account. After defendant stopped making payments, DISH charged the daughter's credit card. The daughter sued DISH in state court but DISH removed to federal court where it filed a third party complaint against defendant. Defendant then filed an abuse of process claim against DISH in tribal court. At issue on appeal was DISH's challenge to the district court's denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the tribal court from conducting a trial on defendant's abuse of process claim. The court affirmed the district court's judgment because it was not "plain" that the tribal courts lacked jurisdiction over defendant's abuse of process complaint. View "DISH Network Service L.L.C. v. Laducer, et al." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Native American Law
Chehalis Tribes v. Thurston Cnty.
The Tribe and CTGW brought suit against the County for imposing property taxes on the Great Wolf Lodge located on the Grand Mound Property, which was tribal land held in trust by the government. At issue was whether state and local governments have the power to tax permanent improvements built on non-reservation land owned by the United States and held in trust for an Indian tribe. The court concluded that Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones made it clear that where the United States owns land covered by 21 U.S.C. 465, and holds it in trust for the use of a tribe, section 465 exempts permanent improvements on that land from state and local taxation. Accordingly, under Mescalero, the County was barred from taxing the Great Wolf Lodge during the time in which the Grand Mound Property was owned by the United States and held in trust under section 465. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the County. View "Chehalis Tribes v. Thurston Cnty." on Justia Law
Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C.
Leisnoi, Inc. retained the law firm of Merdes & Merdes to represent it in litigation against Omar Stratman over its certification of and title to certain lands Leisnoi claimed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Leisnoi and Merdes entered a contingency fee agreement under which, if Leisnoi was successful, Merdes would receive an interest in the lands Leisnoi obtained or retained. The case was resolved in 1992 in favor of Leisnoi, although Stratman appealed and the related litigation continued for another decade. In October 2008, the Stratman litigation finally concluded in Leisnoi's favor. The following year, Merdes moved the superior court to issue a writ of execution. Leisnoi opposed the motion, arguing among other things that the judgment was void under 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s restrictions on contingency fee contracts involving Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act lands. In January 2010, the Superior Court issued an order denying Leisnoi's motion and granting Merdes's motion to execute. Six months later, Leisnoi paid Merdes the remaining balance. Leisnoi then appealed the superior court's ruling. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned questions of waiver and whether the superior court's judgment was void or voidable. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded: (1) Leisnoi did not waive its right to appeal by paying Merdes the balance due on the judgment; (2) an Arbitration Panel's fee award and the superior court's 1995 entry of judgment violated 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s prohibition against attorney contingency fee contracts based on the value of Native lands that were subject to the Act; (3) the superior court's 2010 order granting Merdes's motion to execute on the 1995 judgment separately violated the Act's prohibition against executing on judgments arising from prohibited attorney contingency fee contracts; (4) notwithstanding the illegality of the Arbitration Panel fee award and the 1995 judgment, Leisnoi was not entitled to relief pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b) (the 1995 order was voidable rather than void for purposes of Civil Rule 60(b), and therefore not subject to attack under Civil Rule 60(b)(4)); and (5) Leisnoi was not entitled to relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6). Accordingly, Merdes was ordered to return Leisnoi's payment of the balance on the judgment, but Leisnoi was not entitled to recover payments made prior to the issuance of the writ of execution.
View "Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C." on Justia Law
Washington v. Clark
The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner Michael Clark's conviction for theft on tribal trust land over which the State had jurisdiction. The Court noted that while the State lacked explicit statutory authorization to issue search warrants on tribal lands, federal law had not preempted the State's ability to do so. Further, the tribe had not used its inherent sovereignty to regulate the procedure by which state law enforcement could execute search warrants on the reservation. Petitioner moved to suppress evidence gathered on tribal land without a tribal warrant. View "Washington v. Clark" on Justia Law
Beaulieu v. Dep’t of Human Servs.
Appellant, an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe, was civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). Appellant appealed, challenging his indeterminate civil commitment by asserting three substantive claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to indeterminately civilly commit an enrolled member of the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe; (2) the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata did not preclude the State from presenting in the civil commitment proceeding evidence of conduct alleged in earlier criminal cases that ended in acquittals; and (3) Appellant waived his to right appellate review of his claim that the State violated the Minnesota Constitution when it committed him without a trial by jury.View "Beaulieu v. Dep't of Human Servs." on Justia Law
United States v. Zepeda
Defendant was convicted under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1153, which provided for federal jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. The court held that the Tribal Enrollment Certificate was insufficient to establish that defendant was an Indian for the purposes of federal jurisdiction under section 1153 because the government introduced no evidence that defendant's bloodline was derived from a federally recognized tribe. Because the court held that the government introduced insufficient evidence under the first prong of the United States v. Bruce test, the court need not consider whether the Tribal Enrollment Certificate alone was sufficient to carry the government's burden as to the second prong. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's convictions under section 1153 in counts 2 through 9 of the indictment. Defendant's conviction for conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 was unaffected by the court's disposition.View "United States v. Zepeda" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Native American Law
McGuire v. Aberle
In 1967, Raymond and Margaret Becker's eight child inherited an undivided one-eighth interest in patented fee land located within the boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Reservation. None of the Beckers were Indians. In 2006, one of the Becker children sold her interest to Patrick and Carletta Aberle. Patrick was a member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, and Carletta was a non-Indian. Due to certain conveyances, Patrick and Carletta each owned an undivided one-sixteenth interest in the property. The Becker children later commenced this action seeking a sale of the entire property. The Aberles counterclaimed for partition. Patrick also contended that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute because he was a member of the Tribe, which had jurisdiction. The circuit court ordered a sale of the entire property, concluding that state jurisdiction did not infringe upon tribal sovereignty. In considering the state-tribal jurisdiction issue, the Supreme Court noted that a determination of the disputed land's alienability was necessary. The Court then remanded the matter to the circuit court to reconsider the jurisdiction question after further development of a factual record and consideration of land alienation cases.View "McGuire v. Aberle" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Native American Law, Real Estate Law
In re D.A.
The district court terminated Mother's parental rights to her two daughters (collectively, Children). Mother appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Department of Health and Human Services (Department) undertook sufficient active efforts to reunify Mother and Children as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA); (2) the Department provided sufficient evidence that reunification of Children with Mother would cause serious physical or emotional damage to Children; (3) the district court correctly determined that Mother had stipulated to the terms of the treatment plan; and (4) all stipulations in ICWA involuntary termination proceedings need not be reduced to writing. View "In re D.A." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law, Native American Law