Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

In 2012, a grand jury in the District of Rhode Island served the Narragansett Indian Tribal Historic Preservation Office (NITHPO) with a subpoena duces tecum directing NITHPO to appear before the grand jury with a series of documents. NITHPO refused to produce the subpoenaed records. The sitting grand jury was subsequently discharged, and in 2013, a new grand jury was empanelled. Thereafter, the government filed a motion to compel NITHPO’s compliance with the 2012 subpoena. The district court granted the government’s motion to compel and ordered NITHPO to comply with the 2012 grand jury subpoena. After NITHPO failed to appear on the agreed-upon date, the district court adjudged NITHPO in civil contempt and imposed a fine for noncompliance. On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) vacated the district court’s order holding NITHPO in civil contempt, holding that a subpoena duces tecum compelling the production of documents to a now-defunct grand jury cannot be enforced by civil contempt sanctions before a successor grand jury; and (2) rejected NITHPO’s contentions that tribal sovereign immunity shielded it from subpoena and that the subpoena was unreasonably broad in scope. View "In re Grand Jury Proceedings" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Robert Bonnet is a petroleum landman who conducted business through Bobby Bonnet Land Services. In 2008, Plaintiffs entered into a written contract with the Energy and Minerals Department of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation to serve collectively as an independent contractor and consultant. When the Tribe terminated this contract in 2009, Plaintiffs sued various companies and individuals (but not the Tribe) in federal court, alleging these defendants caused the Tribe to terminate this contract prematurely. Plaintiffs served the Tribe with a non-party subpoena duces tecum requesting documents relevant to their suit. The Tribe moved to quash the subpoena based on the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. The district court denied the Tribe's motion, but modified the subpoena to limit or strike requests it deemed overbroad. The Tribe appealed. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether a subpoena duces tecum served on a non-party Tribe seeking documents relevant to a civil suit in federal court is itself a "suit" against the Tribe triggering tribal sovereign immunity. Pursuant to the collateral order doctrine, the Court concluded, yes, it is a "suit" against the Tribe. Therefore the Court reversed the district court's denial of the Tribe's motion to quash based on tribal immunity. View "Bonnet v. Ute Indian Tribe" on Justia Law

The State entered into an agreement allowing Big Lagoon to operate a casino on a certain parcel of land. On appeal, the State challenged the district court's order requiring the State to negotiate with Big Lagoon under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701-2721. Under Carcieri v. Salazar, the BIA lacked authority to acquire land in trust for tribes that were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. The court concluded that the only reasonable construction of section 2710(d)(3)(A) is that a tribe's right to request negotiations depends on its having jurisdiction over Indian lands on which it proposes to conduct class III gaming; the State did not waive the "Indian lands" requirement; the land at issue was not "Indian lands" because there was no family or other group on what is now the Big Lagoon in 1934; and, therefore, pursuant to Carcieri, Big Lagoon was not such a tribe. Accordingly, Big Lagoon cannot demand negotiations to conduct gaming on the land and cannot sue to compel negotiations if the State fails to negotiate in good faith. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Big Lagoon Rancheria v. State of California" on Justia Law

Oklahoma petitioned for review of the EPA's final rule establishing a federal implementation plan for the attainment of national air quality standards in "Indian country." The court held that a state has regulatory jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., over all land within its territory and outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation except insofar as an Indian tribe or the EPA has demonstrated a tribe has jurisdiction. In this instance, the EPA was without authority to displace Oklahoma's state implementation plan on non-reservation Indian country where the agency requires a tribe to show it has jurisdiction before regulating Indian country outside a reservation, yet made no demonstration of tribal jurisdiction before itself regulating those areas. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the Rule with respect to non-reservation lands. View "OK Dept. Environmetal Quality v. EPA" on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute regarding plaintiffs' membership in an Indian tribe. At issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction to enjoin preliminarily the enforcement of a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) order upholding the Band's decision to disenroll descendants of plaintiffs from the San Pasqual Band of Mission Indians and whether such injunctive relief could issue in the Band's absence. The court held that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper, and that the Band was not a required party for the adjudication of the claims underlying the preliminary injunction because they concerned solely the propriety of final agency action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the Band's motions to dismiss the claims on which the injunction rests and its consequent refusal to dissolve the preliminary injunction; remanded to allow the district court to formally clarify its order in compliance with the court's understanding of it; and concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to review on interlocutory appeal the Band's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' other claims, on which the district court expressly deferred ruling. View "Alto, et al. v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law

B.B. appealed a trial court judgment establishing him as the father of the child, J.Z.T., and ordering him to reimburse the State for past support paid on behalf of the child and to pay future child support. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the state court's exercise of jurisdiction did not infringe on the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe's right of self-government, as claimed by B.B. View "North Dakota v. B.B." on Justia Law

The Tribe bought land from the City of Lansing to build a class III gaming facility, using funds appropriated by Congress for the benefit of certain Michigan tribes. The Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act provides that land acquired with the income on these funds shall be held in trust by the federal government. Michigan obtained an injunction to prevent the Tribe from applying to have land taken into trust by the Secretary of the Interior, on the ground that the submission would violate a compact between the state and the Tribe. That compact requires that a tribe seeking to have land taken into trust for gaming purposes under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2703(4)(B), secure a revenue-sharing agreement with other tribes. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The state did not seek to enjoin a class III gaming activity, but instead a trust submission under MILCSA, so IGRA does not abrogate the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, and the district court lacked jurisdiction. The issue of whether class III gaming on the property at issue will violate IGRA if the Tribe’s MILCSA trust submission is successful is not ripe. View "Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe" on Justia Law

The Tribes filed suit in Tribal Court against plaintiff and his builders alleging that they violated the Tribes' land use policies by building a residence on Tribal land. Plaintiff filed suit in federal court against the Tribes seeking a declaration that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction and an injunction barring further tribal court proceedings against him. The Tribes moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff was required to exhaust tribal remedies before bringing suit in federal court. The district court granted the Tribes' motion to dismiss and denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Because plaintiff was an owner of non-Indian fee land, the Tribes' efforts to regulate him were "presumptively invalid." The Tribes failed to show that at least one of two limited exceptions described in Montana v. United States applied. Because the Tribes plainly lacked the authority to regulate plaintiff's construction of a single-family house on on-Indian fee land, the district court erred in concluding that exhaustion was required. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Evans v. Shoshone-Bannock LUPC" on Justia Law

Defendant Philbert Rentz fired a single gunshot that wounded one victim and killed another. He was charged with two separate counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence. Defendant moved to dismiss the second count. The district court granted his motion, holding that the applicable statute under which defendant was charged could not support multiple charges arising from a single use of a firearm. The Government appealed the pre-trial dismissal of the second count. Finding that the trial court erred in dismissing the second count, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Rentz" on Justia Law

In 2007 Hobart, Wisconsin passed an ordinance assessing stormwater management fees on all parcels in the village, including land owned by the Oneida Nation of Wisconsin, an Indian tribe, to finance construction and operation of a stormwater management system. Title to 148 parcels in Hobart, about 1400 acres or 6.6 percent of the village’s total land, is held by the United States in trust for the Oneida tribe (25 U.S.C. 465). Tribal land is interspersed with non-tribal land in a “checkerboard” pattern. The tribe sought a declaratory judgment that the assessment could not lawfully be imposed on it. Hobart argued that if that were true, the federal government must pay the fees; it filed a third‐party complaint against the United States. The district court entered summary judgment for the tribe and dismissed the third‐party claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the federal Clean Water Act did not submit the land to state taxing jurisdiction and that the government’s status as trustee rather than merely donor of tribal lands is designed to preserve tribal sovereignty, not to make the federal government pay tribal debts. View "Oneida Tribe of Indians of WI v. Village of Hobart, WI" on Justia Law