Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

A 1991 judgment, not appealed, upheld a state statute prohibiting members of the Indian tribes from hunting deer at night outside the tribes’ reservations. Wisconsin Indians had hunted deer at night since before they had electricity. Tribe members sought relief from the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) on the ground that its continued enforcement would be “no longer equitable” and asserting that “tribal members need to hunt for subsistence purposes. Between 25% and 93% of Tribal members are unemployed. They also claimed that “tribal members need to hunt at night for cultural and religious reasons.” The district court denied the motion, precipitating this appeal. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that neighboring states allow night hunting; that the state has stringent regulations; and concerns about Indian cultural and dietary practices relating to deer hunting, poverty, and unemployment. Evidence presented by the tribes indicated that night hunting for deer in the identified territory is unlikely to create a serious safety problem. View "Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. WI" on Justia Law

The Mendocino County Health and Human Services Agency filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 on behalf of Minors, ages 3, 7, and 8, alleging that Mother had a substance abuse problem that inhibited her ability to parent her children and that the parents were not providing adequate food or shelter. Deputies found the children in the care of men at a home with drugs and dangerous objects. There was no refrigerator; the toilet would not flush. There was no running water, and there were dead mice in the house. An open power panel posed a significant fire danger. The children had been wearing the same clothes since Mother had left them four nights earlier. Mother appeared to be “extremely high.” She provided a urine sample, saying it would be “dirty.” The Minors were subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901. For several months, Mother did not engage in services, despite repeated efforts to contact her. The juvenile court found that Mother had partially complied with her case plan, that there was no substantial probability Minors would be returned to her custody within 18 months of their removal, that reasonable services had been offered, and that active efforts had been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. The court terminated reunification services and set a hearing under section 366.26 to determine a permanent plan for the children. The appeals court affirmed. View "C.F. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Stop the Casino 101 Coalition sought to invalidate a compact between the state and the Federated Indians of the Graton Rancheria authorizing the operation of a gaming casino on a 254-acre parcel in and adjacent to the City of Rohnert Park. The coalition claimed that because the state failed to explicitly cede to the Graton Tribe jurisdiction over the property, which was formerly held by private parties, federal law does not authorize the assumption of tribal jurisdiction over the property, so that the state’s entry into the compact violates the California constitutional provision authorizing such gaming compacts. The state countered that the coalition’s claim is essentially an attack on the validity of action taken by the federal government that cannot be challenged in these state court proceedings, and that in all events there has been no violation of either federal or state law. The appeals court affirmed dismissal of the challenge, citing federal approval of the plan under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2701) and declining to “pass judgment on the contentious policy issues underlying the creation of Indian reservations for the purpose of constructing gaming casinos.”View "Stop the Casino 101 Coal. v. Brown" on Justia Law

King Mountain and the Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation filed suit against the Attorney General for declaratory and injunctive relief from Washington's escrow statute, Wash. Rev. Code 70.157.005-70.157.030, which requires King Mountain to place money into escrow to reimburse the State for health care costs related to the use of tobacco products. The district court granted summary judgment for the state. The court affirmed, concluding that Washington's escrow statute is a nondiscriminatory law and King Mountain's activities are largely off-reservation; the plain text of the Yakama Treaty does not create a federal exemption from Washington's escrow statute; and the district court did not err by declining to make findings regarding the Treaty's meaning to the Yakama people at the time of its signing because the meaning of the Yakama people cannot overcome the clear words of the Treaty. View "King Mountain Tobacco Co. v. McKenna" on Justia Law

Peabody mines coal on the Hopi and Navajo reservations in Arizona under leases with the tribes. The EEOC filed suit alleging, among other things, that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-8(c), prohibits the tribal hiring preference contained in the Peabody leases. The district court granted summary judgment against the EEOC on the merits. The court affirmed, concluding that the Navajo hiring preference in the leases at issue is a political classification, rather than a classification based on national origin, and therefore does not violate Title VII. Further, the EEOC waived on appeal its record-keeping claim and the district court acted within its discretion in denying the EEOC's motion to supplement the record. View "EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians owned and operated a resort and casino on its rancheria lands in Madera County. In 2005, another tribe, the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians, submitted a request to the United States Department of the Interior asking the department to acquire approximately 305 acres of land in Madera County adjacent to State Route 99 so the North Fork Tribe could develop its own resort and casino there. The land on which the North Fork Tribe wanted to build was approximately 40 miles away from the North Fork Tribe's rancheria lands and approximately 30 miles away from the Picayune Tribe's casino. Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, casino gaming on lands acquired for a tribe by the Secretary of the Interior after October 17, 1988, was generally prohibited, subject to certain exceptions. One of those exceptions was if "the Secretary, after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary's determination." The United States Department of the Interior conducted an environmental review of the project proposed by the North Fork Tribe under federal law and issued a final environmental impact statement in 2009. In September 2011, the Secretary of the Interior's delegate notified the Governor of California that the delegate had made the "'two-part determination'" that a gaming establishment on the newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the North Fork Tribe and its members and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, and asked Governor Brown to concur in that determination. Despite requests by the Picayune Tribe and others that he prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) before acting, Governor Brown issued his concurrence in the two-part determination without preparing or considering the preparation of an EIR. The following day, the Governor executed a tribal-state gaming compact with the North Fork Tribe. The Picayune Tribe filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for injunctive relief against the Governor and others, asserting that the Governor's concurrence in the two-part determination constituted an "'approval'" of a "'project'" under state law that "must be the subject of the CEQA environmental review process." All of the defendants and the real party in interest demurred. Among other things, the Governor and the real party in interest argued that as a matter of law the Governor is not a "public agency" for CEQA purposes and therefore his concurrence in the two-part determination was not subject to CEQA. The trial court agreed. Accordingly, the court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court was correct in concluding the Governor was not a public agency for CEQA purposes, and therefore did not err in sustaining the demurrers. View "Picayune Rancheria v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed suit alleging that the Secretary, acting through the BIA, violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 702, 706, by determining that the Secretary was not authorized to approve the Tribe's assignments of land to certain of its members. The district court granted summary judgment to the Secretary. At issue are the interpretation of two federal statutes: 25 U.S.C. 81 and 25 U.S.C. 77. Section 177 acknowledges and guarantees the Indian tribes' right of possession and imposes on the federal government a fiduciary duty to protect the lands covered by the Indian Nonintercourse Act. Section 81 provides that Indian tribes enjoyed the right to possess and occupy lands but not alienate these lands without the federal government's approval. The court concluded that Congressional intent is clear. Section 177 prohibits the grant, lease, or conveyance of lands, or any title thereto from an Indian tribe unless approved by Congress. In this case, Congress has not approved the transactions at issue. Thus, the Secretary properly denied approval of the deeds under Section 81 where such conveyances would violate federal law. The court concluded that the Fifth Circuit's decision in Tonkawa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Richards was not binding. The plain language of Section 81 does not support the Tribe's reading that the deeds may nevertheless be approved by the Secretary under Section 81. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Jewell" on Justia Law

This case began in July 2008 when the Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) assumed custody of four-month-old "Dawn" from her parents. Dawn was found to be a child in need of aid (CINA). Dawn's parents were Native Alaskans and thus the protections and requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied. Native Village of Tununak (the Tribe) intervened in Dawn's CINA case and submitted a list of potential placement options for Dawn, including Dawn's maternal grandmother, Elise, who lived in the village. Throughout much of the case, the parents and Tribe agreed there was good cause not to place Dawn with an ICWA preferred placement, and Dawn was eventually placed with the Smiths, non-Native foster parents who live in Anchorage. The superior court terminated Dawn's parents' parental rights at a September 2011 trial, making Dawn eligible for adoption. The Tribe asserted that, given the termination of parental rights, there was no longer good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences and objected to Dawn's continued placement in Anchorage. In November the Smiths filed a petition to adopt Dawn. At no point in the case did Elise file an adoption petition in the superior court. The superior court conducted a placement hearing following the Tribe's objection to placement with the Smiths. Following testimony by a number of witnesses, including Elise, the court found that there was continued good cause to deviate from ICWA's adoptive placement preferences and again approved Dawn's placement with the Smiths. The court then granted the Smiths' adoption petition in March 2012. Dawn was almost four years old, and had lived with the Smiths for almost two and a half years. In separate appeals, the Tribe appealed both the superior court's order finding that there was good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences and the adoption order. The Supreme Court then issued an order staying the adoption appeal while it considered the adoptive placement appeal. In 2013, the Court issued a decision in the first appeal that examined Dawn's adoptive placement with the Smiths. The Court reversed the superior court's finding of good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences. Four days after the Alaska Court issued its opinion in the adoptive placement appeal ("Tununak I"), the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl" (Baby Girl). There, the Supreme Court held that ICWA "section 1915(a)'s [placement] preferences are inapplicable in cases where no alternative party has formally sought to adopt the child. This is because there simply is no 'preference' to apply if no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under section 1915(a) has come forward." The Alaska Court concluded that the decision in "Baby Girl" applied directly to the adoptive placement case on remand and to this adoption appeal. "We discern no material factual differences between the Baby Girl case and this case, so we are unable to distinguish the holding in Baby Girl. Because the Supreme Court's holding in Baby Girl is clear and not qualified in any material way, and because it is undisputed that Elise did not 'formally [seek] to adopt' Dawn in the superior court, we conclude that, as in Baby Girl, 'there simply is no 'preference' to apply[,] [as] no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward[,]' and therefore ICWA . . .preferences are inapplicable." The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's order granting the Smiths' petition to adopt Dawn and vacated its remand order in "Tununak I" requiring the superior court to conduct further adoptive placement proceedings. View "Native Village of Tununak v. Alaska, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

J.S. was born in January 2012. Mother and Father were developmentally delayed. Later that year, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services received a referral reflecting Mother and Father were neglecting J.S. Both Mother and Father denied having Indian ancestry. The Department took J.S. into protective custody; J.S. was subsequently placed in foster care with his paternal great-grandparents, who notified the Department that J.S. may have Cherokee ancestry (the great-grandfather provided the Department with documentation that J.S.'s great-great-grandfather was Cherokee). The Cherokee Nation verified J.S.'s eligibility to affiliate with the Nation. The Department then filed a petition alleging Mother and Father failed to protect J.S. Specifically: (1) Mother and Father suffered from mental health issues and cognitive delays; and (2) they engaged in domestic violence.The juvenile court terminated the parents' rights. On appeal of that decision, Father contended the juvenile court erred by finding ICWA was inapplicable in this case. Father also argued errors were made in relation to the ICWA inquiry and notice requirements. Mother joined and expanded upon Father’s ICWA arguments. Mother also requested a different judicial officer preside over the case upon remand. Finding no reversible error, however, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

An election dispute arose about which individuals were properly elected or appointed to govern the Thlopthlocco people. The Tribal Town filed suit in the tribal court of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and, accordingly, voluntarily submitted to that court's jurisdiction. The Tribal Town subsequently concluded it did not want to maintain its suit in tribal court and dismissed its claims. But the defendant in that suit had, by that time, filed cross-claims. Arguing that the Tribal Town's sovereign immunity waiver did not cover proceedings on the cross-claims, the Tribal Town attempted to escape Muscogee court jurisdiction, but, in various decisions, several judges and justices of the Muscogee courts held that they may exercise jurisdiction over the Tribal Town without its consent. The Tribal Town then filed a federal action in the Northern District of Oklahoma against those Muscogee judicial officers, seeking to enjoin the Muscogee courts' exercise of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction, defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity, the Tribal Town had failed to join indispensable parties, and the Tribal Town had failed to exhaust its remedies in tribal court. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded, however, that the Tribal Town presented a federal question and that the other claims do not require dismissal. But the Court agreed the Tribal Town should have exhausted its remedies in tribal court while its federal court action was abated. View "Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham, et al" on Justia Law