Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

In 2006, the Secretary of the Interior approved amendments to Title 8 of the Omaha Tribal Code, which modified the tribe's Beverage Control Ordinance and allowed the tribal government to impose a 10 percent sales tax on the purchase of alcohol from any licensee on tribal land. The Omaha Tribe attempted to enforce this alcohol tax on establishments in or near Pender engaged in the sale of alcoholic beverages. Those establishments and the village claimed that they were not located within the boundaries of the Reservation and not subject to the tax. The district court denied declaratory and injunctive relief. The Omaha Tribal Court as well and the district court determined that Pender and the areas at issue are located on Omaha tribal land. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that Congress did not intend to "diminish" the boundaries of the Omaha Indian Reservation in Nebraska when it enacted an 1882 Act that ratified an agreement for the sale of Omaha tribal lands to non-Indian settlers. View "Smith v. Parker" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and his wife filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), claiming that tribal officers employed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) acted negligently when pursuing a drunk driver and that such negligence resulted in plaintiff and his wife's injuries. Congress extended the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity to claims resulting from the performance of functions authorized by the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, commonly referred to as section 314, 25 U.S.C. 450f. Under the two-part test of section 314, courts must first determine whether the alleged activity is, in fact, encompassed by the relevant federal contract or agreement. The scope of the agreement defines the relevant "employment" for purposes of the scope of employment analysis at step two. Second, courts must decide whether the allegedly tortious action falls within the scope of the tortfeasor's employment under state law. If both these prongs are met, the employee's actions are covered by the FTCA. The court vacated the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court should conduct a new analysis of its subject matter jurisdiction using the two-step framework the court discussed. View "Shirk v. United States" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Lewiston Golf Course Corporation, an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of the Seneca Nation of Indians, a federal recognized Indian tribe, was protected from suit by the Seneca Nation’s sovereign immunity. Supreme Court ruled that Lewiston Golf did not qualify as an “arm” of the Seneca Nation and denied Lewiston Golf’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s foreclosure action with respect to its mechanic’s liens. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the most significant factors set forth in Matter of Ranson v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. & Cmty. Fund counted against sovereign immunity on the part of Lewiston Golf. View "Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving, Inc. v. Corporation" on Justia Law

This matter came before the Court of Appeal for a third time; this matter stemmed from the California Valley Miwok Tribe's dispute with the Gambling Control Commission over money collected and held as a "non-compact tribe" under the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF). The Commission began withholding the distribution of RSTF funds to the Tribe when it became aware of a dispute over the tribe's membership and leadership as evidenced by ongoing proceedings and litigation involving the BIA's relationship with the Tribe. In its last opinion, the Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to lift a stay and to allow the parties to file dispositive motions. The parties filed their motions, and the trial court resolved them, entering judgment in favor of the Commission on its motion for summary judgment, which the Tribe then appealed. Finding that the Commission was properly withholding RSTF funds because it could not identify an undisputed tribal representative to receive them, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Commission's decision. View "CA Valley Miwok Tribe v. CA Gambling Control Com." on Justia Law

Father had custody of his three minor children that were “Indian children” within the meaning of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act (NICWA). The children were adjudicated as being within Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) because they lacked proper parental care. The juvenile court determined that it was in the children’s best interests for Father to have only physical custody and awarded legal custody of the children to the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The court of appeals reversed, holding that the juvenile court erred by not addressing at the dispositional hearing whether the State made “active efforts,” as required by ICWA/NICWA, to return the children’s legal custody to Father. The State appealed, arguing that the “active efforts” standard did not apply to the disposition in this case, but rather, the “reasonable efforts” standard applicable in cases involving non-Indian children applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that at any point in an involuntary juvenile proceeding involving Indian children at which a party is required to demonstrate its efforts to reunify or prevent the breakup of the family, the “active efforts” standard of ICWA/NICWA applies. View "In re Interest of Shayla H." on Justia Law

Thirteen-year-old M.S. was placed into emergency protective custody in 2011. After M.S. was adjudicated a youth in need of care, the Department of Public Health and Human Services filed a petition for termination of Father's rights. Because Father was an enrolled member of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe (Tribe), M.S. was eligible for enrollment with the Tribe and, under Indian Child Welfare Act, M.S. was an Indian child. After a hearing in 2013, the district court ordered Father’s parental rights terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the termination proceedings complied with statutory requirements for proceedings involving an Indian child. View "In re M.S." on Justia Law

The State of Oklahoma filed suit against defendants, officials of the Kialegee Tribal Town claiming that they, along with a federally-chartered corporation related to the tribe and a related Oklahoma limited liability company, were attempting to construct and ultimately operate a class III gaming facility on non-Indian lands in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma, in violation of both IGRA and a state-tribal gaming compact. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, but the district court denied the motion. The district court subsequently granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the State that prohibited defendants from constructing or operating the gaming facility on the property at issue. Defendants appealed. The Tenth Circuit concluded the State failed to state a valid claim for relief. View "Oklahoma v. Hobia" on Justia Law

Mother and Father (“Parents”) were the parents of twin girls. Mother was a member of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation (“Tribe”), Father was not a member of any tribe, and the children were either members of, or eligible to be members of, the Tribe. The Dinwiddie Department of Social Services (DDSS) filed petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (“J&DR court”) denied the petitions. The DDSS appealed. The Tribe and Parents sought to transfer the case to tribal court. The trial court held that good cause existed not to transfer the proceeding to tribal court and denied the motion to transfer. The court then terminated Parents’ parental rights. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision on the motion to transfer, vacated the award terminating Parents' parental rights, and remanded. In so doing, the court rejected the traditional “best interests of the child” test in favor of a more limited test involving a substantial risk of harm to a child arising from the transfer to a tribal court. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded in light of the standards articulated by the court of appeals in Thompson v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Family Servs. View "Dinwiddie Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Nunnally" on Justia Law

Multi-sport Olympic gold medalist Jim Thorpe died in California in 1953 without a will. His estate was assigned to his third wife, who, over the objections of children from his previous marriages, buried him in Jim Thorpe, Pennsylvania, a new borough that was created by merging the boroughs of Mauch Chunk and East Mauch Chunk. Thorpe was a Native American of Sauk heritage and a member of the Sac and Fox Nation of Oklahoma. Some of Thorpe’s children want him reburied on Sac and Fox tribal land. In 1990 Congress enacted the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, which requires museums and federal agencies possessing or controlling holdings or collections of Native American human remains to inventory those remains, notify the affected tribe, and, upon the request of a known lineal descendant of the deceased Native American or of the tribe, return such remains, 25 U.S.C. 3005. In 2010, Thorpe’s son sued the Borough for violation of NAGPRA. The district court held that the Borough was a “museum,” required to disinter Thorpe’s remains and give them to the tribe. The Third Circuit reversed. Congress could not have intended the “patently absurd result” of a court resolving a family dispute by applying NAGPRA to Thorpe’s burial. . View "Thorpe v. Borough of Jim Thorpe" on Justia Law

Lynn Becker contracted with the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (Tribe) to provide services related to the Tribe's development of its energy and mineral resources. Following a dispute concerning Becker's compensation under the contract, Becker brought breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and accounting claims against the Tribe in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. All of Becker's claims were state law claims. Nevertheless, Becker's complaint asserted that the district court had federal question jurisdiction because the case raised substantial issues of federal law. Becker appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah" on Justia Law