Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Doe and C.C.’s mother (Mother) are the biological parents of C.C., who was born in 2008. Doe, Mother, and C.C. are all members of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation (Tribes). Doe and Mother were never married, but lived together sporadically during the initial portion of C.C.’s life until Mother ended the relationship in 2010. In July of 2010, Doe shot Mother in front of C.C. Doe pleaded guilty to Attempted First Degree Murder and was sentenced to serve fifteen years, with nine years fixed. He was not eligible for parole until July of 2019. Mother married C.C.’s stepfather on October 15, 2010. Stepfather was also a member of the Tribes. The issue in this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a magistrate court’s judgment terminating John Doe’s parental rights and allowing C.C. to be adopted. Doe argued that the magistrate court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Termination of Parental Rights of John Doe (2014-25)" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Benedict Cosentino appealed an order that dismissed his claims against defendants-respondents Stella Fuller, John R. Magee, Jason P. Maldonado, William R. Ramos, and Robert B. Vargas based on the sovereign immunity afforded to Indian tribes and their officials. Cosentino was a table games dealer at an Indian tribal casino and Defendants were the five members of the tribe’s gaming commission responsible for licensing individuals involved in the tribe’s gaming activities and overseeing those activities. Shortly after he began working at the casino, Cosentino observed ongoing criminal activity on the casino floor. Based on his observations, Cosentino became a informant for the California Department of Justice and the information he provided lead to several criminal convictions. Defendants later sought to learn what information Cosentino provided the Department of Justice, but he followed the Department’s instructions and declined to divulge the information. Defendants thereafter revoked his gaming license and the casino terminated his employment because he could not work at the casino without a valid license. Cosentino filed suit claiming Defendants revoked his gaming license without cause and in retaliation for acting as an informant. Defendants specially appeared to make a motion to quash and dismiss, arguing sovereign immunity deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction because Cosentino based all of his claims on Defendants’ official actions as members of the tribe’s gaming commission. The trial court agreed and granted the motion. The Court of Appeal reversed: "[a]n official’s actions that exceed the scope of his or her authority are not protected. [. . .]Cosentino, however, presented evidence supporting his claim Defendants exceeded the scope of their authority by revoking his license without cause in retaliation against him. Sovereign immunity prevents us from inquiring into the reliability of information Defendants may have relied upon in revoking Cosentino’s license or any other errors they may have made, but it does not prevent inquiry into whether Defendants exceeded their authority by using their official position to intentionally harm Cosentino." View "Cosentino v. Fuller" on Justia Law

The Belcourt School District operates within the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation. The North Dakota Constitution requires that the District provide education to children who are Indians or reside on Indian reservations. The Tribe and School District have agreed to share responsibility for educating students, both Indian and non-Indian, residing on the Reservation, and entered into agreements in 2006 and 2009 that provided the District with exclusive authority to administer "day-to-day operations" at Turtle Mountain Community High School, including supervision and employment of staff. Tribe members sued, alleging defamation, excessive use of force, and multiple employment-related claims. The Tribal Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the District and its employees for claims related to the employees' performance of their official duties. The Tribal Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the District signed the agreements, subjecting itself to Tribal jurisdiction. The federal trial court concluded that the Tribal Court had jurisdiction, based on the agreements. The Eighth Circuit reversed and held that the Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction, reasoning that the District was clearly acting in its official capacity, in furtherance of its obligations under the state constitution, when it entered into the agreements, View "Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis" on Justia Law

Fort Yates School District operates within the Standing Rock Indian Reservation. The North Dakota Constitution requires that the District provide education to children who are Indians or reside on reservations. In 2003, the District and the Tribe entered into an Agreement, providing that both the Standing Rock and the Fort Yates School Boards would govern the school system; that all property or equipment purchased under the Agreement would generally be joint property; and that it "neither diminishes nor expands rights or protections afforded … under tribal, state or federal law." After a fight between two students, A. was suspended and C. obtained a restraining order against A. A. allegedly violated the restraining order by verbally harassing C. at school. The school suspended A. for 10 additional days. Murphy sued on behalf of her daughter, C., a Tribe member, in the Tribal Court, which held that it had jurisdiction. The District did not appeal to the Standing Rock Supreme Court, but filed suit in federal court against Murphy and the Tribal Court. The district court dismissed and remanded to the Tribal Court. The Eighth Circuit reversed with respect to Tribal Court jurisdiction, but affirmed dismissal of the Tribal Court on sovereign immunity grounds. View "Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Derrick Jim of aggravated sexual abuse occurring in the Navajo Nation. Jim initially pled guilty to this offense, but later withdrew his plea and went to trial. On appeal, Jim claimed that the trial court erred when it let the Government present evidence of the admissions he made in his plea agreement and during his plea colloquy to the jury, despite Jim waiving his Rule 410 protections as part of the plea agreement underlying his (withdrawn) guilty plea. In its cross-appeal, the Government challenged Jim’s 360-month prison sentence, arguing that the district court erred in calculating Jim’s offense level under the sentencing guidelines. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in enforcing Jim’s Rule 410 waiver by allowing the Government to present to the jury Jim’s prior admissions of guilt. The Court agreed with the Government that the district court erred when it held that, in determining whether a two-offense-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2A3.1(b)(4)(B) for causing the victim serious bodily injury applied in Jim’s case, the court could not consider any injuries directly resulting from the sexual abuse for which Jim was convicted. Thus, the case was remanded for resentencing so the district court could determine, in the first instance, whether that enhancement was warranted in this case and, if so, the impact of that enhancement on Jim’s sentence. View "United States v. Jim" on Justia Law

Officer Glen Gutierrez, on duty as a full-time salaried police officer of the Pueblo of Pojoaque and also commissioned as a Santa Fe County deputy sheriff, was patrolling a portion of U.S. Highway 84/285 located within the exterior boundary of the Pojoaque Pueblo. Officer Gutierrez observed Jose Loya making a dangerous lane change and pulled Loya over. Once stopped, Officer Gutierrez asked Loya to step out of his vehicle and informed Loya that he was under arrest for reckless driving in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-113 (1987), a state law. Officer Gutierrez placed Loya in the back of his patrol vehicle and transported Loya to the Pojoaque Tribal Police Department for processing. Loya, a non-Indian, was not subject to prosecution for violation of tribal law, so he was transported from the Pueblo to the Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center where he was incarcerated. Ultimately, Officer Gutierrez prosecuted Loya for reckless driving in Santa Fe County Magistrate Court. The issue this case presented for the New Mexico Supreme Court's review centered on a a county’s legal obligation when a non-Indian, arrested by a tribal officer and prosecuted in state court for state traffic offenses, sues the arresting tribal officer for federal civil rights violations. Specifically, the issue the Court identified in this case was when the county has an obligation under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, to provide that tribal police officer with a legal defense in the federal civil rights action. The district court as well as the Court of Appeals found no such legal duty, in part because it concluded that the tribal officer was not a state public employee as defined in the NMTCA. The Supreme Court held the opposite, finding clear evidence in the text and purpose of the NMTCA requiring the county to defend the tribal officer, duly commissioned to act as a deputy county sheriff, under these circumstances. View "Loya v. Gutierrez" on Justia Law

The Fond du Luth Casino in Duluth opened in 1986 as a joint venture between the city and the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa and is operated by the Band. The 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act led to restructuring of agreements between the Band and the city under a 1994 consent decree, under which the Band paid the city $75 million 1994-2009, 19 percent of gross revenues. The Band stopped making payments in 2009, believing that they violated IGRA as interpreted by the National Indian Gaming Commission. In 2011, the Gaming Commission issued a Notice of Violation, determining that the payments violated IGRA requirements that tribes have the sole proprietary interest in casinos and are their primary beneficiaries. The Commission ordered the Band not to resume payments. The Band sought relief under FRCP 60(b)(6) from payments in 2009-2011. The district court denied relief. The Eighth Circuit remanded and again reversed and remanded, finding that the district court failed to consider all of the factors identified in its 2013 order. The court must give proper weight to the congressional intent that tribes be the primary beneficiaries of Indian gaming and the fact that the city was on notice in 2009 of Gaming Commission policies. View "Duluth v. Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa" on Justia Law

The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDA), 25 U.S.C. 450, authorizes self-determination (Title I) contracts. The Bureau of Indian Affairs reviews proposals for the Secretary of the Interior. A proposal not declined within 90 days is deemed approved. In October 2011, the Tribe wrote to the Bureau’s Office of Self Governance (OSG) requesting several million dollars for public safety, attaching a Resolution authorizing submission of a “Title I Compact Request.” OSG replied that it did not have authority to manage a Title I agreement, copying the Bureau’s Office of Justice Services (OJS), as the appropriate contact. OJS asked the Tribe to clarify whether it was seeking a Title I contract or funding under Title IV. The Tribe emailed OJS, regarding availability to meet "regarding the Title 1 request" and sent two follow-up emails, referencing its “Title 1 request.” On February 1, 2012 the Tribe wrote to OJS, stating that “the contract is deemed approved.” OJS responded that the intent of the October letter was unclear and did not meet self-determination contract proposal requirements. The Tribe again asserted deemed approval. A year later, OJS received a letter titled “Claim for performance of Title I justice services contract pursuant to Contract Disputes Act.” OJS again denied receiving a complete proposal. The Civilian Board of Contracting Appeals dismissed a claim. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the Tribe has not been awarded a contract, noting a parallel appeal with the Interior Board of Indian Appeals. View "Yurok Tribe v. Dep't of the Interior" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the United States, Attorney Kandis Martine, and Budget Rent-A-Car after plaintiffs were injured in a car accident caused by Martine. Martine, while driving a rental car to an adoption hearing, drove down the wrong direction on a one-way street and caused the accident. On appeal, the United States challenged the district court's partial summary judgment ruling that, under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346 et seq., and under a self-determination contract entered into between the Department of Interior, BIA, and the Navajo Nation Tribe, Martine was "deemed" an employee of the BIA and afforded the full protection and coverage of the FTCA. The court concluded that the district court's decision concerning subject matter jurisdiction is consistent with the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. 450 et seq., statutory scheme; the terms of the self-determination contract; and the record evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Colbert v. United States" on Justia Law

Wisconsin’s Governor has entered into gaming compacts with all of the state’s tribes (Wis. Stat. 14.035). The HoChunk Nation adopted an ordinance, authorizing Class I and Class II gaming on its lands. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2703(6), (7), (8), defines Class I gaming as social games and traditional Indian gaming, regulated exclusively by tribes; Class II gaming includes bingo and certain nonbanked card games (players compete against one another rather than against the house) that are authorized by state laws. Class III gaming is a residual category, regulated under tribal-state compacts. A 2008 agreement between the state and the Nation does not restrict Class II gaming. Since 2010, the Nation has offered nonbanked electronic poker at Ho-Chunk Madison. Wisconsin sought an injunction to stop the poker, which, if classified as Class III would violate the Nation’s compact with the state. The district court ruled that the poker was a Class III game. The Seventh Circuit reversed. States may not prohibit a tribe from offering gaming that is roughly equivalent to what the state allows for its residents. A state must criminalize a gambling activity in order to prohibit the tribe from engaging in it. Wisconsin decriminalized nonbanked poker in 1999. IGRA does not permit interference with Class II poker on tribal land. View "Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation" on Justia Law