Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Sitka Tribe of Alaska challenged the State of Alaska's management of a commercial fishery, arguing that it harmed a subsistence fishery. The tribe argued that the state violated the subsistence priority statute and the common use and sustained yield clauses in the Alaska Constitution. The tribe also claimed that the state was misinterpreting a regulation controlling the fishery and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the state from managing the fishery according to that interpretation during the upcoming season. The superior court denied the preliminary injunction.The tribe eventually won on its statutory and regulatory claim, but the superior court denied its constitutional claim and its request for attorney’s fees. The tribe appealed to the Supreme Court of Alaska.The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s decisions. It held that the hard look doctrine, requiring agencies to consider all relevant information, already existed and there was no need to create a constitutional requirement not in the plain language of Article VIII, Section 4 of the Alaska Constitution. The court also declined to review the tribe’s motion for a preliminary injunction under the public interest exception, as the issue was moot and did not justify application of the public interest exception. Lastly, the court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award attorney’s fees as the tribe had not shown that the superior court's decision was arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or stemmed from an improper motive. View "Sitka Tribe of Alaska v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska dealt with an appeal against the termination of parental rights of two parents, Elena F. and Ronan F., by the State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services, Office of Children’s Services. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) had removed the two Indian children from their parents' home due to reported domestic violence and later terminated both parents' rights after two years. The parents appealed, arguing that OCS failed to make active efforts to reunify the family.The court found that the OCS made active efforts to reunify Elena with her children even in light of her serious mental illness, substance abuse, and her increasingly violent threats and behavior. As such, the court affirmed the termination of Elena's parental rights.However, the court found that the OCS did not make active efforts to reunify Ronan with his children. The court noted that there was no evidence that two out of three caseworkers assigned to Ronan made any efforts toward his reunification with his children. Therefore, the court reversed the termination of Ronan's parental rights. View "Ronan F. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

In this case involving the State of Alaska, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS), the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska ruled on an appeal regarding the termination of parental rights of parents Allie P. and Jimmy E. The crux of the case revolved around the application of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), which provides specific protections for Indian children and their tribes in child custody proceedings.Allie P. and Jimmy E. had two children together and Allie had two older children from a previous relationship. All four children were removed from Allie’s custody due to her history of substance abuse. Jimmy E. claimed Alaska Native heritage and argued that his children should be considered Indian children under ICWA.The Supreme Court held that Jimmy did provide a sufficient reason to know that the two youngest children are Indian children and that OCS did not conduct a sufficient inquiry. Thus, the court vacated the termination of Jimmy’s and Allie’s parental rights as to the two youngest children and remanded for further proceedings.However, the court rejected Allie's additional challenges and affirmed the termination of her parental rights with respect to her two older children. The court found that Allie had not remedied the behavior causing her children to be in need of aid, OCS made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, and termination was in the children's best interests. View "Jimmy E. v. State of Alaska, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

In a case involving the State of Alaska's Office of Children’s Services (OCS), an adult relative, Taryn M., appealed the denial of her request to have custody of an Indian child, Marcy P., who was in the custody of OCS. Marcy P. had a severe congenital disease and required a bone marrow transplant. The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the decision of the lower court, finding that OCS had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Taryn M. was an unsuitable caretaker for Marcy P. The court established that the burden of proof was on OCS to show that a preferred placement under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was unsuitable. The evidence presented showed that Taryn M. was unwilling to abide by Marcy’s treatment plans, with instances including not following medical advice for treating fevers and not returning Marcy after a visit as planned. The court concluded that Taryn M.'s actions demonstrated clear and convincing evidence that she was an unsuitable caretaker. View "Taryn M. v. State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the Arkansas Division of Corrections (ADC), alleging its policies violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). After a bench trial, the district court dismissed the complaint. It found that their religious beliefs were not sincerely held; that even if they were sincerely held, the policies did not substantially burden those beliefs; and that even if there was a substantial burden, the policies were the least restrictive means to further ADC’s compelling interests. Plaintiffs appealed.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. The court explained that the district court found that ADC lacks the staff and space for separate Jumu’ah services. But Plaintiffs proposed alternatives, including utilizing other available spaces, partitioning the same space, and scheduling two Jumu’ah services in the same space at different times. The district court neither addressed these proposed alternatives to determine whether they were available or would effectively address ADC’s compelling security interests nor addressed whether the prison’s reasons for refusing to offer an accommodation were persuasive in light of the evidence that other prisons are able to do so. Correctly applying the governing law to Plaintiffs’ challenge requires that the court do so. Further, the court wrote that the district court also found that ADC’s religious headdress policy did not substantially burden Plaintiffs’ beliefs because ADC informally allows them to wear kufis in violation of the policy. But even if ADC does not enforce it consistently, the policy expressly prohibits Plaintiffs from wearing their kufis except during religious services. View "Gregory Holt v. Dexter Payne" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to take two parcels of land in Massachusetts into trust for the Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe, holding that the BIA's application of its legal interpretation to the facts was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.Appellants brought this action challenging the Interior's 2021 record of decision reaffirming its 2015 decision to take the land into trust for the Tribe, arguing that the Tribe did not qualify as a "tribe" within the meaning of the Indian Reorganization Act, that the Tribe was not "under Federal jurisdiction," and that the parcel of land was not eligible activities under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the Interior and the Tribe. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellants were not entitled to relief on any of their allegations of error. View "Littlefield v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Kenneth Walker appealed his conviction and sentence for assault resulting in serious bodily injury within Indian country. Walker lived "off and on" with his adult niece, Victoria Dirickson. Walker asked Dirickson for a set of house keys. She declined because “[i]t was [her] only day off, and [she] really didn’t feel like getting out and making a copy” of the keys. Walker became “[r]eally aggravated,” and an argument ensued in the living room, which lead to the assault charges at issue in this case. A grand jury indicted Walker on one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury within Indian country. The indictment alleged Walker was a non-Indian and Dirickson was Indian. A jury found Walker guilty as charged. On appeal, Walker: (1) challenged the district court's jurisdiction because it erred in admitting Dirickson's Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood (“CDIB”) and tribal registration cards; (2) the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of a medical expert; (3) the district court abused its discretion in failing to give a unanimity-of-means jury instruction; (4) abused its discretion in failing to consider sentencing disparities arising from a possible sentence in a state case; and (5) Plainly erred in imposing an anger management condition of supervised release due to insufficient notice, and improper delegation of authority to the Probation Office. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Walker's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court in favor of Baldwin, Crocker & Rudd, P.C. and Kelly Rudd (collectively, BCR) in this action brought by the Northern Arapaho Tribe and the Wind River Hotel & Casino (collectively, the Tribe), holding that the district court's order imposing sanctions on the Tribe was erroneous.The Tribe brought this action seeking injunctions for the return of tribal funds and documents, an accounting, and damages for conversion and civil theft. The district court granted summary judgment for BCR on the accounting and injunctions claims and, after a jury trial, entered final judgment on the conversion and civil theft claim. The Tribe appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred by awarding sanctions under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 11. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that (1) the district court erred in imposing sanctions because BCR failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 11; (2) the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment for BCR on the Tribe's accounting claim; and (3) the Tribe failed to show the verdict would have been more favorable if racially charged evidence had not been admitted. View "Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Baldwin, Crocker & Rudd, P.C." on Justia Law

The Northwestern Band of the Shoshone Nation filed a complaint against Idaho state officials concerning the interpretation of the 1868 Treaty of Fort Bridger between the United States and several bands of the Shoshone and Bannock Tribes, including the Shoshone’s Northwestern Band. Under the Treaty, the affiliated Shoshone and Bannock Tribes ceded most of their territory to the United States. At the same time, the Tribes expressly reserved their right to hunt on unoccupied lands of the United States. Idaho officials contend that the Treaty conditions the reserved hunting right on permanent residence on a designated reservation and that Northwestern Band members may not exercise the Tribes’ treaty-reserved hunting right because the Northwest Band does not reside on a designated reservation. The district court agreed with Defendants’ treaty interpretation. The only issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in concluding that the Treaty makes the reserved hunting right contingent on permanent residence on the Fort Hall or Wind River Reservations.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The panel held that the Treaty’s terms, which must be read in context and construed as they would naturally be understood by the Tribes, plainly do not condition the exercise of the reserved hunting right on the Northwestern Band relocating to a reservation. Because the district court did not reach the Idaho officials’ alternative arguments regarding political cohesion and necessary joinder, the panel remanded the case for the district court to address those issues in the first instance. View "NORTHWESTERN BAND OF THE SHOSHONE NATION V. GREG WOOTEN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Appellant R.L., presumed father (father) of minor C.L. (the minor), appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating father’s parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption. The minor was removed from his parents through a protective custody warrant under Welfare and Institutions Code section 340. Father contended the Amador County Department of Social Services (the department) failed to comply with the initial inquiry requirements of California law implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) because the department did not inquire of extended family members as to the minor’s Indian ancestry when he was removed. The Court of Appeal agreed with father and held that the duty to inquire of extended family members applied when removal is made via a section 340 protective custody warrant. Because the department failed to comply with this duty, remand was required. Remand was also required because father stated that his great-grandmother was full-blooded Cherokee at the detention hearing, triggering a duty of further inquiry into the minor’s Indian ancestry. This further inquiry duty was not satisfied. The Court therefore conditionally reversed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re C.L." on Justia Law