Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Nine inmates at a Connecticut correctional facility challenged their confinement in a unit known as Q-Pod, which is used to transition inmates from more restrictive housing back to the general population. The plaintiffs alleged that Q-Pod imposed harsher conditions than the general population, including extended periods of isolation, unsanitary conditions due to toilet restrictions, lack of access to medical care and counseling, limited vocational and educational opportunities, and restricted religious services. Two plaintiffs specifically claimed they were denied access to Native American religious practices, such as sweat lodge ceremonies and smudging, which are congregate religious activities.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment to the prison officials on the basis of qualified immunity for all federal claims, finding that the conditions in Q-Pod did not rise to the level of constitutional violations under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, and that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment free exercise claims. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims and denied injunctive relief as moot. Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration was denied, and they appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment as to the Eighth Amendment, procedural due process, and the free exercise claims of seven plaintiffs, holding that the conditions and restrictions in Q-Pod did not violate clearly established law. However, the Second Circuit reversed as to the free exercise claims of two plaintiffs who were denied participation in Native American congregate religious services, finding that the denial, without any penological justification, violated clearly established law. The court remanded with instructions to deny summary judgment on these claims and vacated the dismissal of the related state-law claims. View "Baltas v. Chapdelaine" on Justia Law

Three children were removed from their mother’s care after reports of neglect, substance abuse, and domestic violence. Two of the children, C.V.I. and C.J.J.I., are considered “Indian children” under federal and state law due to their tribal affiliations, while the third, R.A.R., is not. The Department of Children, Youth, and Families sought and obtained orders for out-of-home placement and later filed dependency petitions. The children spent several months in foster care while the court process unfolded, with the Department offering various services to the mother and involving the relevant tribe.The Spokane County Superior Court (juvenile court) held a fact-finding hearing and found the children dependent but ruled that whether the Department made “active efforts” to prevent the breakup of the Indian family was a dispositional issue, not required at the dependency stage. The court ordered the children to remain in out-of-home care until disposition. At the subsequent disposition hearing, the court found that the Department had made active efforts and continued the children’s out-of-home placement. The mother appealed, arguing that the Department was required to prove “active efforts” at the dependency hearing. The Washington Court of Appeals agreed, holding that the juvenile court erred by not making an “active efforts” finding at the dependency hearing, and remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that when a child is placed outside the home, the juvenile court must find that the Department made “active efforts” to prevent the breakup of the Indian family before entering an order of dependency. If such findings are not made, the dependency and dispositional orders must be vacated, and the children must be returned to their parent unless doing so would subject them to substantial and immediate danger or threat of such danger. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "In re Dependency of C.J.J.I." on Justia Law

A child, B.M., was born to Cheryl Melius and Lakota Songer, who were no longer in a relationship at the time of birth. Cheryl initially had sole custody and did not inform Lakota of the birth immediately. After B.M. was diagnosed with failure to thrive, Cheryl voluntarily placed the child with her brother, Miles, and his wife, Tori (the Meliuses), who were later granted guardianship. Lakota established paternity and sought custody, but the Meliuses initiated a third-party custody action, leading to a combined proceeding. During the litigation, the Meliuses were granted temporary custody, and Lakota was given stepped-up visitation. The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was found to apply after Lakota disclosed his tribal status.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Gregory County, South Dakota, held a trial and found that while the Meliuses had a significant relationship with B.M., they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that extraordinary circumstances existed to rebut Lakota’s presumptive right to custody under SDCL 25-5-30. The court awarded Lakota sole custody but granted the Meliuses ongoing visitation and ordered Lakota to use a specific daycare provider. The court also assessed attorney fees against Lakota for his late disclosure of tribal status and for contempt related to violating court orders.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the lower court’s finding that the Meliuses did not establish extraordinary circumstances to overcome Lakota’s parental rights and affirmed the denial of non-parent custody. The Supreme Court reversed the award of permanent visitation to the Meliuses, holding that such visitation cannot be granted absent a finding of extraordinary circumstances rebutting the parent’s rights. The Court also reversed the attorney fees related to the tribal status delay, finding the lower court erred in assigning responsibility to Lakota. The issue regarding the daycare provider was deemed moot. The case was remanded to determine attorney fees solely attributable to contempt. View "Melius v. Songer" on Justia Law

A 17-year-old defendant was charged with ten serious offenses, including murder and assault, after a violent confrontation at the home of his rivals. The incident stemmed from a feud with a classmate and escalated when the defendant, accompanied by his family, armed himself and attacked the victims’ home. The attack resulted in the death of one individual and severe injuries to others. The defendant, an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation, was charged under federal law for crimes committed within the Cherokee Nation Indian Reservation.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma first reviewed the case. The government moved to transfer the defendant from juvenile to adult criminal proceedings under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge recommended granting the transfer, and the district court adopted this recommendation after conducting a de novo review. The district court weighed the statutory factors, including the defendant’s age, social background, psychological maturity, prior delinquency record, past treatment efforts, and the availability of rehabilitative programs, and found that most factors favored transfer to adult status.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the statutory transfer factors and found no clear error in its factual findings. The court also rejected the defendant’s Eighth Amendment argument that transfer was unconstitutional due to the potential punishments, holding that the challenge was unripe under circuit precedent. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order transferring the defendant to adult criminal proceedings. View "United States v. J.D.V., Jr." on Justia Law

The case concerns a land exchange between the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the J.R. Simplot Company, involving land that was formerly part of the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho. The Shoshone-Bannock Tribes had ceded this land to the United States under an 1898 agreement, which Congress ratified in 1900. The 1900 Act specified that the ceded lands could only be disposed of under certain federal laws: homestead, townsite, stone and timber, and mining laws. In 2020, BLM approved an exchange of some of these lands with Simplot, who sought to expand a waste facility adjacent to the reservation. The Tribes objected, arguing that the exchange violated the restrictions set by the 1900 Act.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho reviewed the Tribes’ challenge and granted summary judgment in their favor. The court found that the BLM’s approval of the exchange violated the Administrative Procedure Act because it did not comply with the 1900 Act’s restrictions. The court also held, in the alternative, that the exchange failed to meet requirements under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) and the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court certified the case for interlocutory appeal to resolve the legal question regarding the interplay between the 1900 Act and FLPMA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the 1900 Act’s list of permissible land disposal methods is exclusive and that the BLM’s exchange under FLPMA was not authorized because FLPMA is not among the listed laws. The court further held that FLPMA does not repeal or supersede the 1900 Act’s restrictions, and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the Tribes under established Indian law canons. The court concluded that BLM’s authorization of the exchange was not in accordance with law. View "SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBES OF THE FORT HALL RESERVATI V. USDOI" on Justia Law

The case concerns the Estate of Jack Halverson, which sought to compel the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), to partition a parcel of land on the Crow Reservation in Montana. Jack Halverson had owned a significant fractional interest in Allotment 1809 and, in 2015, applied for a partition under federal law. After Halverson’s death, his estate and the BIA entered into a settlement agreement that purported to resolve the partition. The BIA executed deeds to effectuate the partition, but the Estate contended that the BIA failed to assign the ownership interests as required by the agreement, resulting in the Estate receiving a smaller share of land than anticipated.After the BIA recorded the deeds, the Estate moved before an Administrative Law Judge to compel the BIA to comply with the settlement agreement, but the motion was denied. The Estate then filed a mandamus action in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, seeking to compel the BIA to partition the land as agreed. The district court granted summary judgment for the BIA, finding that the agency had fully performed its obligations under the settlement agreement. The Estate appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the action was barred by sovereign immunity. The court held that a mandamus suit seeking to enforce contract rights against a federal official is, in effect, a suit against the United States, and such suits are barred unless there is a clear waiver of sovereign immunity. The court found no statute waiving immunity for this type of claim. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "HALVERSON v. BURGUM" on Justia Law

Rural residents of Alaska, including Alaska Natives, have long relied on subsistence fishing in navigable waters such as the Kuskokwim River, which runs through the Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuge. The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) was enacted to protect this way of life by establishing a rural subsistence priority for fishing and hunting on “public lands.” For decades, the federal government and the State of Alaska have disagreed over whether “public lands” under Title VIII of ANILCA includes navigable waters where the United States holds reserved water rights, especially after Alaska’s own subsistence laws were found unconstitutional for not providing a rural preference.After the federal government assumed management of the rural subsistence priority, a series of Ninth Circuit decisions known as the Katie John Trilogy held that “public lands” in Title VIII does include such navigable waters. The United States implemented this interpretation, managing subsistence fishing on the Kuskokwim River within the Refuge. However, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sturgeon v. Frost, which interpreted “public lands” differently in another section of ANILCA, Alaska asserted renewed authority over the river, issuing conflicting fishing orders that did not prioritize rural subsistence users.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska granted summary judgment and a permanent injunction in favor of the United States and intervenors, holding that the Katie John Trilogy remained binding and that Alaska could not interfere with federal management of the rural subsistence priority.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the Katie John Trilogy is not clearly irreconcilable with Sturgeon v. Frost, as the statutory context and purpose of Title VIII support a broader interpretation of “public lands” that includes navigable waters for subsistence purposes. The court also found that subsequent congressional actions ratified this interpretation. The judgment and injunction were affirmed. View "United States v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Members of the Crow Tribe who own trust allotments on the Crow Reservation challenged the loss of their historic water rights following the ratification of the Crow Tribe-Montana Compact and the Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act. The Settlement Act, passed by Congress in 2010, codified a negotiated agreement among the Crow Tribe, the state of Montana, and the United States, which defined tribal water rights and provided substantial federal funding for water infrastructure. In exchange, the Tribe and allottees agreed to waive all other water rights claims. The Act required the Secretary of the Interior to publish a Statement of Findings certifying that certain conditions were met, which would trigger the waiver of prior water rights.After the Secretary published the Statement of Findings in June 2016—following a deadline extension agreed to by the Tribal Chairman and the Secretary—several allottees filed suit nearly six years later. They argued that the extension was invalid because, under the Crow Constitution, only the Tribal General Council or Legislature could authorize such an agreement. They also alleged that the Secretary’s action exceeded statutory authority, breached trust obligations, and violated their Fifth Amendment rights. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the Secretary’s publication of the Statement of Findings constituted final agency action reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, but found the Secretary reasonably relied on the Tribal Chairman’s authority to extend the deadline. The court further held that the Settlement Act created specific trust duties, but the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege any breach. The court also concluded that the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claims for takings, due process, and equal protection failed as a matter of law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Hill v. DOI" on Justia Law

A child, J.B., was removed from her mother’s care in 2015 after reports of drug use by the mother. The Department of Public Health and Human Services initially dismissed its petition in 2018 after the father completed a treatment plan and J.B. was cared for by her paternal grandmother. In 2021, J.B. was again removed, this time from her paternal grandmother’s home due to allegations of sexual abuse by an uncle. Over the next several years, J.B. experienced multiple placements, including with relatives and in therapeutic foster care, while the Department attempted to provide services and reunification efforts. The mother’s engagement with the Department and her appointed counsel was sporadic, and she struggled with substance abuse and unstable living conditions.The Seventeenth Judicial District Court adjudicated J.B. as a youth in need of care and approved a treatment plan for the mother, who failed to comply with its requirements. The Fort Belknap Indian Community, recognizing J.B. as an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), moved to transfer the case to tribal court. The father objected to the transfer, and the District Court denied the motion. The court later terminated both parents’ rights, finding that the Department made active efforts to reunify the family and that continued custody by the mother would likely result in serious harm to J.B. The mother appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, improper denial of the transfer to tribal court, and insufficient evidence for termination.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s decisions. It held that under ICWA, either parent’s objection to transfer to tribal court is an absolute bar, and the father’s written objection was sufficient. The Court found no ineffective assistance of counsel, as the mother’s lack of engagement prevented effective advocacy. Finally, the Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in terminating the mother’s parental rights, as the statutory and ICWA requirements were met by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Matter of J.B., YINC" on Justia Law

A consumer lender, GreatPlains Finance, LLC, owned by the Fort Belknap Indian Community, a federally recognized tribe, was sued by Rashonna Ransom for allegedly violating New Jersey consumer-protection laws. Ransom had taken out two high-interest loans from GreatPlains and claimed the lender broke several laws. GreatPlains argued it was protected by tribal sovereign immunity, as it was created by the tribe to generate revenue and was managed by a tribally owned corporation, Island Mountain Development Group.The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey denied GreatPlains' motion to dismiss, ruling that the lender was not an arm of the tribe and thus not entitled to sovereign immunity. The court based its decision partly on the control exerted by a non-tribal private-equity fund, Newport Funding, which had significant influence over GreatPlains' operations due to a loan agreement. GreatPlains' subsequent motion to reconsider was also denied, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and applied a multi-factor test to determine whether GreatPlains was an arm of the tribe. The court considered factors such as the method of incorporation, the entity's purpose, tribal control, the tribe's intent to confer immunity, and the financial relationship between the tribe and the entity. The court found that while GreatPlains was created under tribal law and intended to benefit the tribe, the financial relationship was crucial. GreatPlains had not shown that a judgment against it would impact the tribe's finances, as it had not returned profits to the tribe. Consequently, the Third Circuit held that GreatPlains was not an arm of the tribe and lacked sovereign immunity, affirming the District Court's decision and remanding for further proceedings. View "Ransom v. GreatPlains Finance, LLC" on Justia Law