Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Mother appealed an order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She argued that the Department of Children and Family Services and the court failed to comply with Code section 224.2 by inquiring whether her child is or might be an Indian child within the meaning of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Mother had “denied Native American ancestry for the family.”The court of appeal affirmed, finding any error harmless. The maternal grandmother is the only person Mother identified as a person who should have been asked about Indian ancestry; she had expressed her desire to adopt the child and to have the child placed with her. Under ICWA, when an Indian child is the subject of foster care or adoptive placement proceedings, “preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with .. a member of the Indian child’s extended family,” 25 U.S.C. 1915(a), (b). Maternal grandmother, Mother’s counsel, and the child.’s counsel, each of whom requested placement with the maternal grandmother, would have had a strong incentive to bring to the court’s attention any facts that suggest that she is an Indian child. Their failure to do so implies that the maternal grandmother is unaware of such facts. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

Maria appealed the termination of her parental rights over her three children, who all have the same father, arguing that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to interview her extended family members about their Indian ancestry. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. 1901, gives Indian tribes concurrent jurisdiction over state court child custody proceedings that involve Indian children living off of a reservation; where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian community. California Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2 lists requirements to effectuate the Act’s policies. The court of appeal affirmed. The record does not support Maria’s argument that readily obtainable information would have shed meaningful light on whether the children are Indian children. There was a prior juvenile court finding that two of Maria’s children are not Indian children, the juvenile court asked Maria, the father, and paternal aunt about Indian ancestry, both parents eschewed Indian ancestry, and Maria was living with extended family members whom she could have asked about potential Indian ancestry. It was unlikely that any further inquiry of family members would have yielded information about Indian ancestry. View "In re Darian R." on Justia Law

Congress established the Osage reservation in Oklahoma Territory in 1872. Years later, “mammoth reserves of oil and gas” were found. Congress severed the subsurface mineral estate, reserved it to the tribe, and placed it into trust with the federal government as trustee. Royalties are distributed to tribal members listed on an approved membership roll (a headright).In previous litigation, the Claims Court found the tribe had standing and found the government liable for breaching its fiduciary duties by failing to collect the full amount of royalties and failing to invest the royalty revenue. Individual headright owners (not the present plaintiffs) attempted to intervene. The Claims Court found that the individuals had no legal interest in the dispute because they were not a party to the trust relationship. The $380 million settlement agreement stated that the tribe, “on behalf of itself and the [h]eadright [h]olders,” waived any claims relating to the tribe’s trust assets or resources that were based on violations occurring before September 30, 2011. In a federal suit, filed by individual headright owners, the Tenth Circuit held that headright owners had a trust relationship with the federal government, which was ordered to provide an accounting.In 2019, based on allegations that the accounting revealed mismanagement of the trust fund, headright owners filed the present suit under the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act, citing breach of statutorily imposed trust obligations. The Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal of the suit. A trust relationship exists between the headright owners and the government and the 1906 Act imposes an obligation on the federal government to distribute funds to headright owners in a timely and proper manner. View "Fletcher v. United States" on Justia Law

The juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3002 petition that alleged the mother (S.V.) had brandished a knife and pushed a female companion in the now-three-year-old child’s presence.A social worker inquired of S.V. about the child’s Indian ancestry; she did not give the social worker any reason to believe the child was or might be an Indian child. In preparing the detention report, a social worker interviewed the child’s maternal great-grandmother and maternal great-grandfather. It is not clear whether the social worker asked any relatives about the child’s Indian ancestry. S.V. filed a form stating that she did not have any Indian ancestry as far as she knew. If that changed, S.V. was to inform the court and the social worker. The juvenile court then inquired whether S.V. knew if alleged the father had Indian ancestry. She indicated that he did not have Indian ancestry. The court found it had no reason to know that the alleged father had Indian ancestry; his whereabouts were unknown.The court of appeal remanded. The first-step inquiry duty under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1903(2), requires the Department to interview, among others, extended family members and others who had an interest in the child. View "In re H.V." on Justia Law

Fisher was charged with conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and two counts of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); 846. The government filed notice that Fisher was subject to an enhanced sentence based on his prior conviction for first-degree burglary under Minnesota law, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). Fisher pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine but objected to the enhanced sentence and requested sentencing credit for the time he served in tribal jail for a tribal court conviction based on the same conduct.The district court overruled Fisher’s objection to the sentence enhancement and denied Fisher’s request to credit his time served in tribal jail, reasoning that it did not have the authority to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum. The district court sentenced Fisher to 180 months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum for a defendant with a “serious violent felony” conviction. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. While Minnesota’s statute is broader than the generic definition of burglary, it is divisible; applying the modified categorical approach, Fisher’s conviction for burglary with assault is a “serious violent felony.” Treating discharged and undischarged sentences differently does not violate the Due Process Clause. View "United States v. Fisher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating Mother's parental rights to her daughter, Carrie, and the trial court's earlier permanency-planning order that eliminated reunification from Carrie's permanent plan, holding that there was no reversible error.On appeal, Mother did not challenge the trial court's conclusions that grounds existed to terminate her parental rights or that termination was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err by denying Mother's motion to continue the termination hearing; (2) did not reversibly err in failing to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act because there was no reason for the court to know that Carrier was an Indian child under 25 C.F.R. 23.107(c); and (3) did not abuse its discretion by eliminating Mother's visitation with Carrie in a permanency-planning order. View "In re C.C.G." on Justia Law

The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians purchased the Sibley Parcel with interest from its Self-Sufficiency Fund and sought to have the land taken into trust by the Department of the Interior with a view to establishing gaming operations. The Tribe claimed the Parcel was acquired for the “enhancement of tribal lands,” a permitted use of Fund interest under the Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act Section 108(c). Interior concluded that the mere acquisition of additional land was not an “enhancement” and declined to take the Parcel into trust because the Tribe failed to demonstrate how the Parcel would improve or enhance tribal lands. The land is in Michigan’s Lower Peninsula far from the Tribe’s existing lands in the Upper Peninsula.The district court granted summary judgment to the Tribe. The D.C. Circuit reversed. Under the plain meaning of the Michigan Act, before assuming a trust obligation, The Department has the authority to verify that the Tribe properly acquired the land with Fund interest, consistent with the limited uses for such interest in Section 108(c). In exercising that authority, The Department correctly determined that “enhancement of tribal lands” does not include an acquisition that merely increases the Tribe’s landholdings. To enhance tribal lands, an acquisition must improve the quality or value of the Tribe’s existing lands. View "Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Haaland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction entered upon his Alford plea to the charges of intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent to injure, willful injury resulting in bodily injury, assault with a dangerous weapon, and driving while barred, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment.In 1948, Congress gave the State criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against "Indians" on the Meskwaki Settlement, and in 2018, Congress took back that jurisdiction. In the instant case, Defendant entered an Alford plea to several charges. After Defendant violated his probation, the Tama County Attorney filed an application for entry of judgment on the counts for which Defendant had previously received deferred judgments. Before the court granted Defendant deferred judgments but before the county attorney sought entry of judgment on those counts Congress repealed the 1948 Act. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the application for entry of judgment for lack of jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Congress's repeal of the state's jurisdiction did not affect criminal cases pending at the time of the repeal. View "State v. Cungtion" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding Defendant guilty of domestic abuse assault and criminal mischief in the fourth degree, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to enter the judgment.The conduct giving rise to the charges against Defendant occurred on the Meskwaki Settlement, and both Defendant and the victim were Indians for purposes of the relevant statutory schemes. In 2018, Congress took back the criminal jurisdiction it gave to the State of Iowa in 1948 over offenses committed by or against "Indians" on the Meskwaki Settlement. On appeal, Defendant argued that Congress's repeal of the 1948 Act divested the district court of jurisdiction to enter judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Congress's repeal of the State's jurisdiction did not affect criminal cases pending at the time of the repeal. View "State v. Bear" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction of an action challenging provisions in the tribal constitution requiring nonresidents to return to the reservation to vote in tribal elections and prohibiting nonresidents from holding tribal office. The court explained that it has previously held that the Voting Rights Act does not apply to Indian tribes because they are not states or political subdivisions subject to the Act. The court concluded that the district court did not err in finding that the Indian Civil Rights Act does not contain a private right of action to seek injunctive or declaratory relief in federal court. In this case, plaintiff failed to allege that he intended to run for public office, and thus he lacked standing to challenge the Tribe's eligibility requirement for holding public office. View "Cross v. Fox" on Justia Law