Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Native American Law
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In the juvenile dependency case involving P.H., Jr., the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Five affirmed the jurisdiction and disposition orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. This case revolved around the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), and whether the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) and the juvenile court were obligated to formally notify certain tribes of the proceedings.The minor, P.H., Jr., lived with his parents, P.H. (Father) and A.R. (Mother), when the Department filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging that the minor was at substantial risk due to physical abuse by the mother, the father's failure to protect the minor, and unsanitary living conditions. The parents filed ICWA-020 Parental Notification of Indian Status forms indicating possible affiliation with federally recognized Indian tribes.The appellate court held that no formal ICWA notice was required in this case because none of the statements by the minor’s parents or other family members provided a reason to know he was an Indian child for purposes of the relevant statutes. The ICWA and related California law define an "Indian child" as a child who is either a member of an Indian tribe or is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. The court found that at most, the statements by the parents and other family members suggested that the minor might have some Indian ancestry, but tribal ancestry alone is not sufficient to trigger the formal notice requirement. The court affirmed the lower court's jurisdiction and disposition orders. View "In re P.H." on Justia Law

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The case involves the State of Nebraska's appeal against a juvenile court's order transferring jurisdiction of a child welfare case involving five Native American children to the Oglala Sioux Tribal Court. The case centered on the interpretation of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act (NICWA), both of which aim to protect the best interests of Indian children and promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the juvenile court's order transferring the cases was conditional and not final, hence not appealable. The court found that the order was dependent on the tribal court's subsequent acceptance or declination of the transfer. If the tribal court declined the transfer, the cases would remain under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The court also noted that under NICWA, the transfer of a case from the juvenile court to a tribal court is subject to the tribal court's declination. Therefore, the court affirmed the Nebraska Court of Appeals' dismissal of the State's appeals due to the lack of a final, appealable order. View "In re Interest of Ricardo T." on Justia Law

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In a case heard by the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, the appellant, a mother (La.B.), challenged the juvenile court's decision to terminate her parental rights. The mother claimed the court failed to adequately inquire into her child's (L.B.'s) potential Native American ancestry as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Despite the mother's indication on a form that she might be a member of a federally recognized tribe of unknown name and location, no extended family members were asked about the child's potential Native American ancestry.The appellate court agreed with the mother's contention, finding the inquiry into the child's ancestry inadequate and thus, an abuse of discretion. The court noted that the inquiry was legally required to include extended family members, regardless of how the child was initially removed from their home. The trial court had failed to adhere to this requirement despite the availability of several family members who could have provided relevant information.The appellate court conditionally reversed the judgement and instructed the juvenile court to order the Social Services Agency to complete the initial ICWA inquiry, including inquiries required under section 224.2, subdivision (b). Depending on the results of the inquiry, the court should proceed in accordance with ICWA and related California law. If no evidence of the child's Native American heritage is found, the juvenile court should immediately reinstate the judgement. View "In re L.B." on Justia Law

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In this case, the Sitka Tribe of Alaska challenged the State of Alaska's management of a commercial fishery, arguing that it harmed a subsistence fishery. The tribe argued that the state violated the subsistence priority statute and the common use and sustained yield clauses in the Alaska Constitution. The tribe also claimed that the state was misinterpreting a regulation controlling the fishery and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the state from managing the fishery according to that interpretation during the upcoming season. The superior court denied the preliminary injunction.The tribe eventually won on its statutory and regulatory claim, but the superior court denied its constitutional claim and its request for attorney’s fees. The tribe appealed to the Supreme Court of Alaska.The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s decisions. It held that the hard look doctrine, requiring agencies to consider all relevant information, already existed and there was no need to create a constitutional requirement not in the plain language of Article VIII, Section 4 of the Alaska Constitution. The court also declined to review the tribe’s motion for a preliminary injunction under the public interest exception, as the issue was moot and did not justify application of the public interest exception. Lastly, the court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award attorney’s fees as the tribe had not shown that the superior court's decision was arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or stemmed from an improper motive. View "Sitka Tribe of Alaska v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska dealt with an appeal against the termination of parental rights of two parents, Elena F. and Ronan F., by the State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services, Office of Children’s Services. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) had removed the two Indian children from their parents' home due to reported domestic violence and later terminated both parents' rights after two years. The parents appealed, arguing that OCS failed to make active efforts to reunify the family.The court found that the OCS made active efforts to reunify Elena with her children even in light of her serious mental illness, substance abuse, and her increasingly violent threats and behavior. As such, the court affirmed the termination of Elena's parental rights.However, the court found that the OCS did not make active efforts to reunify Ronan with his children. The court noted that there was no evidence that two out of three caseworkers assigned to Ronan made any efforts toward his reunification with his children. Therefore, the court reversed the termination of Ronan's parental rights. View "Ronan F. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

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In this case involving the State of Alaska, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS), the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska ruled on an appeal regarding the termination of parental rights of parents Allie P. and Jimmy E. The crux of the case revolved around the application of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), which provides specific protections for Indian children and their tribes in child custody proceedings.Allie P. and Jimmy E. had two children together and Allie had two older children from a previous relationship. All four children were removed from Allie’s custody due to her history of substance abuse. Jimmy E. claimed Alaska Native heritage and argued that his children should be considered Indian children under ICWA.The Supreme Court held that Jimmy did provide a sufficient reason to know that the two youngest children are Indian children and that OCS did not conduct a sufficient inquiry. Thus, the court vacated the termination of Jimmy’s and Allie’s parental rights as to the two youngest children and remanded for further proceedings.However, the court rejected Allie's additional challenges and affirmed the termination of her parental rights with respect to her two older children. The court found that Allie had not remedied the behavior causing her children to be in need of aid, OCS made reasonable efforts to reunite the family, and termination was in the children's best interests. View "Jimmy E. v. State of Alaska, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

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In a case involving the State of Alaska's Office of Children’s Services (OCS), an adult relative, Taryn M., appealed the denial of her request to have custody of an Indian child, Marcy P., who was in the custody of OCS. Marcy P. had a severe congenital disease and required a bone marrow transplant. The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the decision of the lower court, finding that OCS had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that Taryn M. was an unsuitable caretaker for Marcy P. The court established that the burden of proof was on OCS to show that a preferred placement under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) was unsuitable. The evidence presented showed that Taryn M. was unwilling to abide by Marcy’s treatment plans, with instances including not following medical advice for treating fevers and not returning Marcy after a visit as planned. The court concluded that Taryn M.'s actions demonstrated clear and convincing evidence that she was an unsuitable caretaker. View "Taryn M. v. State of Alaska, Department of Family & Community Services" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs sued the Arkansas Division of Corrections (ADC), alleging its policies violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). After a bench trial, the district court dismissed the complaint. It found that their religious beliefs were not sincerely held; that even if they were sincerely held, the policies did not substantially burden those beliefs; and that even if there was a substantial burden, the policies were the least restrictive means to further ADC’s compelling interests. Plaintiffs appealed.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. The court explained that the district court found that ADC lacks the staff and space for separate Jumu’ah services. But Plaintiffs proposed alternatives, including utilizing other available spaces, partitioning the same space, and scheduling two Jumu’ah services in the same space at different times. The district court neither addressed these proposed alternatives to determine whether they were available or would effectively address ADC’s compelling security interests nor addressed whether the prison’s reasons for refusing to offer an accommodation were persuasive in light of the evidence that other prisons are able to do so. Correctly applying the governing law to Plaintiffs’ challenge requires that the court do so. Further, the court wrote that the district court also found that ADC’s religious headdress policy did not substantially burden Plaintiffs’ beliefs because ADC informally allows them to wear kufis in violation of the policy. But even if ADC does not enforce it consistently, the policy expressly prohibits Plaintiffs from wearing their kufis except during religious services. View "Gregory Holt v. Dexter Payne" on Justia Law

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The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to take two parcels of land in Massachusetts into trust for the Mashpee Wampanoag Indian Tribe, holding that the BIA's application of its legal interpretation to the facts was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.Appellants brought this action challenging the Interior's 2021 record of decision reaffirming its 2015 decision to take the land into trust for the Tribe, arguing that the Tribe did not qualify as a "tribe" within the meaning of the Indian Reorganization Act, that the Tribe was not "under Federal jurisdiction," and that the parcel of land was not eligible activities under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the Interior and the Tribe. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Appellants were not entitled to relief on any of their allegations of error. View "Littlefield v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior" on Justia Law

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Defendant-appellant Kenneth Walker appealed his conviction and sentence for assault resulting in serious bodily injury within Indian country. Walker lived "off and on" with his adult niece, Victoria Dirickson. Walker asked Dirickson for a set of house keys. She declined because “[i]t was [her] only day off, and [she] really didn’t feel like getting out and making a copy” of the keys. Walker became “[r]eally aggravated,” and an argument ensued in the living room, which lead to the assault charges at issue in this case. A grand jury indicted Walker on one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury within Indian country. The indictment alleged Walker was a non-Indian and Dirickson was Indian. A jury found Walker guilty as charged. On appeal, Walker: (1) challenged the district court's jurisdiction because it erred in admitting Dirickson's Certificate of Degree of Indian Blood (“CDIB”) and tribal registration cards; (2) the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of a medical expert; (3) the district court abused its discretion in failing to give a unanimity-of-means jury instruction; (4) abused its discretion in failing to consider sentencing disparities arising from a possible sentence in a state case; and (5) Plainly erred in imposing an anger management condition of supervised release due to insufficient notice, and improper delegation of authority to the Probation Office. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Walker's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law