Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Seneca Nation brought a lawsuit seeking relief from New York State, the New York Thruway Authority, and the Thruway Authority’s Executive Director (collectively “Defendants”) for ongoing use of an invalid easement over its tribal land. Defendants appealed the denial of their motion to dismiss. Defendants contend that the Nation is collaterally estopped from bringing this present action based on a 2004 judgment of this court and that this lawsuit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Seneca Nation does not assert property rights over land to which New York State has traditionally held the title and does not seek a declaration that the State’s laws and regulations do not apply to the area in dispute. Therefore, the quiet title exception to Ex parte Young outlined by the Court in Coeur d’Alene Tribe has no application here. Accordingly, the lawsuit falls under the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, neither collateral estoppel nor the Eleventh Amendment bars the Nation from proceeding in this case. View "Seneca Nation v. Hochul" on Justia Law

In a class-action proceeding related to a lending scheme allegedly designed to circumvent state usury laws, Defendant appealed from three district court rulings that (1) reconsidered prior factual findings based on a new finding that Defendant made misrepresentations that substantially impacted the litigation, (2) found that Plaintiffs—Virginia citizens who took out loans (the “Borrowers”)—did not waive their right to participate in a class-action suit against him, and (3) granted class certification. Defendant argued that the district court violated the mandate rule by making factual findings related to the misrepresentations that contradicted the Fourth Circuit’s holding in the prior appeal and then relying on those factual findings when granting class certification. He also contends that the Borrowers entered into enforceable loan agreements with lending entities in which they waived their right to bring class claims against him. In addition, he asserts that common issues do not predominate so as to permit class treatment in this case.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court did not violate the mandate rule and that the Borrowers did not waive the right to pursue the resolution of their dispute against him in a class-action proceeding. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting class certification because common issues predominate. View "Lula Williams v. Matt Martorello" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants' complaint against the Town of Lynnfield, Massachusetts and several of the town's agencies and employees (collectively, Lynnfield) in this dispute over Appellants' spring water business, holding that there was no error or abuse of discretion.Appellants owned and operated the Pocahontas Spring in Lynnfield, Massachusetts, which sat on protected wetlands subject to state and local regulations. When Appellants sought to revive their spring water business and to maintain the Spring for Native Americans as a source of healing water. Appellants brought this complaint alleging that Lynnfield conspired to have neighbors lodge false complaint about Appellants' allegedly unlawful activities at the Spring and Lynnfield would respond to intimidate Appellants and interfere with their business. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that Appellants' failure adequately to brief their two First Amendment claims proved fatal in this case. View "Gattineri v. Town of Lynnfield, Mass." on Justia Law

The Department of the Interior (DOI) provides annual funding for the judicial system of Navajo Nation, an Indian tribe, through a series of self-determination contracts authorized by the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA). After its 2014 annual funding request was “deemed approved,” Navajo Nation filed six separate lawsuits in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to enforce similar funding requests that it had submitted each year from 2015 through 2020. In evaluating the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment to Navajo Nation as to the 2015 and 2016 proposals but granted summary judgment to the DOI as to the rest. Navajo Nation appealed the adverse judgment and contends that both the ISDEAA and its regulations prohibit the DOI from declining its funding requests for 2017 through 2020.   The DC Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the DOI. The court explained that it disagrees with respect to the ISDEAA but agrees with respect to the regulations. The court explained that because there is no “material and substantial change” between the proposed renewal contract—including the proposed 2017 AFA—and the previous contract, the DOI violated 25 C.F.R. Section 900.33 when it considered the section 5321(a)(2) declination criteria and declined to award the funds Navajo Nation requested in 2017. View "Navajo Nation v. DOI" on Justia Law

The Washington State Health Care Authority (“HCA”) and the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community petition for review of a Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) decision denying Washington’s request to amend Apple Health, the Washington State Medicaid plan (the “State Plan”). HCA petitioned CMS to amend the State Plan to include dental health aide therapists (“DHATs”) on the list of licensed providers who can be reimbursed through Medicaid. CMS rejected the Amended State Plan on the basis that it violates the Medicaid free choice of providers statute and regulation guaranteeing all Medicaid beneficiaries equal access to qualified healthcare professionals willing to treat them. Petitioners challenged this denial.   The Ninth Circuit granted the petition of review. The panel rejected CMS’s reasoning on the ground that the underlying Washington statute—Wash. Rev. Code Section 70.350.020—did not violate Section 1396(a)(23) because it merely authorized where and how DHATs can practice and did not in any way restrict Medicaid recipients’ ability to obtain service from DHATs relative to non-Medicaid recipients. CMS’s rejection of the Amended State Plan was “not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. Section 706(2)(A). Accordingly, the panel granted the petition for review and remanded to the agency with instructions to approve the Amended State Plan. View "WASHINGTON STATE HEALTH CARE A, ET AL V. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAI, ET AL" on Justia Law

C.K. (Father) and I.B. (Mother) appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to their infant child, D.B. They argued the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services failed to comply with its duty of initial inquiry into Father’s Indian ancestry under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, and related California law (ICWA), and thus the juvenile court erroneously found that ICWA did not apply. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and found that the error was prejudicial. It therefore conditionally reversed and remanded to allow the Department to fully comply with ICWA. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the determination of the district court that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply to this proceeding but declined Mother's request to order her three minor children's immediate return to her, holding that remand was required due to noncompliance issues.Grandparents filed a petition to establish parenting and custody of three minor children, alleging that a child-parent relationship as defined by Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-211(6), existed between the children and Grandparents and that Parents had engaged in conduct contrary to the parent-child relationship. Parents and Grandparents subsequently signed a stipulated parenting plan designating Grandparents as the sole guardians of the children. Mother later filed a notice that she was withdrawing her consent to the stipulated parenting plan pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 1913(b), part of ICWA, and a motion for immediate return of the children to her custody. The district court denied relief, ruling that ICWA does not apply to internal family disputes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court failed to follow ICWA's procedural requirements and that remand was required for further proceedings. View "In re L.R.J." on Justia Law

The City of Seattle/Seattle City Light1 (“Seattle”) owns and operates the Gorge Dam, which is part of the Skagit River Hydroelectric Project (“Project”). Seattle operates the Project pursuant to a thirty-year license that was issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) in 1995. The Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe (“Tribe”) sued Seattle in Washington state court, alleging that Seattle’s operation of the Gorge Dam without fish passage facilities (“fishways”) violates certain federal and state laws. Seattle removed the case to federal court. The district court denied the Tribe’s motion to remand, finding that it had jurisdiction because the Tribe’s complaint raised substantial federal questions. The district court then granted Seattle’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) and dismissed the complaint.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the SaukSuiattle Indian Tribe’s motion to remand to state court and the district court’s dismissal. affirmed the district court’s order denying the Tribe’s motion to remand the action to state court. The panel held that the City properly removed the action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. Section 1441(a) because the Tribe’s right to relief depended on resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Applying a four-part test, the panel concluded that the Tribe’s complaint necessarily raised federal issues because it expressly invoked federal laws, and it was uncontested that the federal issues were disputed. The panel also affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Tribe’s complaint was subject to section 313(b) of the Federal Power Act. View "SAUK-SUIATTLE INDIAN TRIBE V. CITY OF SEATTLE, ET AL" on Justia Law

N.L., Sr. appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights. A.H. and N.L., Sr. were the biological mother and father of N.L., Jr., born in 2015 and J.L., born in 2018. In August 2020, N.L. and J.L. were removed from their home after law enforcement performed a welfare check. N.L., Sr. argues the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights, the Grand Forks County Human Service Zone (GFCHSZ) lacked standing, and the court erred in finding GFCHSZ met the requirements for termination of parental rights under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-19. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the termination. View "Interest of N.L." on Justia Law

Mother appealed from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her child Adrian L. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 She contends the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not comply with its duty under section 224.2, subdivision (b) to inquire of extended family members, including maternal grandmother, paternal grandmother, and paternal aunt, regarding Adrian’s potential status as an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded additional inquiry would not have yielded information that was likely to bear meaningfully on the question of whether Adrian is an Indian child. The court explained that its review of the record as a whole does not disclose that unquestioned extended family members were likely to have had information that would have borne meaningfully on whether Adrian is an Indian child. Accordingly, any ICWA inquiry error under section 224.2, subdivision (b), was harmless. View "In re Adrian L." on Justia Law