Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Montana Supreme Court
Lundeen v. Lake County
The case revolves around a dispute between Lori Lundeen, a property developer, and Lake County, Montana. Lundeen planned to develop a 60-lot subdivision, Wild Horse RV Resort, on her property in Lake County. She intended to use roads through the Big Arm townsite for access to her development. The Board of Lake County Commissioners granted conditional approval for the development. However, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes contested the County’s ownership, regulatory authority, and right to use the access routes. Lundeen alleges that she relied on Lake County and the Lake County Attorney to research her access issue. After an eight-month moratorium on Lundeen’s development application, the Board conditionally approved an amended road layout for the development. Lundeen claims the Lake County Attorney represented to her that the Tribes’ claim was baseless and that she could proceed with the development.The District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, Lake County, granted Lake County’s motion to dismiss Lundeen's lawsuit for failure to state a claim. The court reasoned that Lundeen was on inquiry notice of the negligent misrepresentation when she became aware the Tribes had blocked off her property. The court also determined the discovery and accrual rules for the statute of limitations were satisfied no later than when the Tribes blocked Lundeen’s access. Based on the applicable three-year statute of limitations, the court found Lundeen’s claims filed were time-barred.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that Lundeen had sufficiently asserted facts that, if accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to her, establish a basis for the claims asserted in her complaint. Therefore, the court concluded that the District Court erred by granting Lake County’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. View "Lundeen v. Lake County" on Justia Law
State v. Crazymule
In this case, the defendant, Malinda Crazymule, was found to have violated her probation. The Sixteenth Judicial District Court, Rosebud County revoked her suspended sentence and ordered a four-year commitment to the Department of Corrections (DOC). The court gave Crazymule 130 days of street time and 21 days of jail time credit but denied credit for jail time served while Crazymule was in Northern Cheyenne Tribal custody. Crazymule appealed this denial.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the lower court's decision. The key issue was whether Crazymule was entitled to credit for the time served during her arrest warrant's issuance while she was in custody for tribal offenses. The Supreme Court found that the District Court erred in its interpretation of the relevant statutes.According to Section 46-18-203(7)(b), MCA, if a suspended or deferred sentence is revoked, the judge must allow credit for time served in a detention center. The Supreme Court emphasized that the language of this statute is not discretionary regarding awarding credit for time served. The court held that the District Court had jurisdiction over Crazymule once the arrest warrant was issued following the filing of the State’s revocation petition with the court, regardless of Crazymule's incarceration for a different offense.The Supreme Court concluded that Crazymule was entitled to credit from the date the revocation warrant was issued and she remained incarcerated in a detention center. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "State v. Crazymule" on Justia Law
Fritzler v. Bighorn
The Supreme Court of the State of Montana was tasked with determining whether the Municipal Court had sufficient evidence to enter a permanent order of protection against the appellant, Alda Bighorn. Bighorn was prohibited from having contact with her grandchild, L.D.F.S, unless supervised, due to allegations made by L.D.F.S's mother, Camille Fritzler. Fritzler alleged that Bighorn had taken L.D.F.S to a family gathering while intoxicated and seeking narcotics, and was planning to enroll L.D.F.S with a Native tribe to gain custody over her. These allegations were not corroborated by any witness testimony or other evidence, but the Municipal Court granted a permanent order of protection against Bighorn. Bighorn appealed this decision, and the District Court affirmed the Municipal Court's ruling.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the lower courts' decisions, ruling that the Municipal Court had abused its discretion by granting the permanent order of protection without any substantial, credible evidence supporting Fritzler's allegations. The Supreme Court noted that hearsay allegations may be sufficient to support issuing a temporary order of protection, but not a permanent one. Furthermore, the court deemed it improper for the lower court to issue a visitation order for a grandparent in a protection order proceeding, stating that grandparent visitation should be established by filing a petition under the relevant statute. The case was remanded to the Municipal Court to vacate and rescind the permanent order of protection against Bighorn. View "Fritzler v. Bighorn" on Justia Law
In re L.R.J.
The Supreme Court reversed the determination of the district court that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply to this proceeding but declined Mother's request to order her three minor children's immediate return to her, holding that remand was required due to noncompliance issues.Grandparents filed a petition to establish parenting and custody of three minor children, alleging that a child-parent relationship as defined by Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-211(6), existed between the children and Grandparents and that Parents had engaged in conduct contrary to the parent-child relationship. Parents and Grandparents subsequently signed a stipulated parenting plan designating Grandparents as the sole guardians of the children. Mother later filed a notice that she was withdrawing her consent to the stipulated parenting plan pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 1913(b), part of ICWA, and a motion for immediate return of the children to her custody. The district court denied relief, ruling that ICWA does not apply to internal family disputes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court failed to follow ICWA's procedural requirements and that remand was required for further proceedings. View "In re L.R.J." on Justia Law
In re Parenting of L.D.C.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the judgment of the standing master amending the parties' parenting plan regarding their minor child, L.D.C., and the related standing master judgment denying Mother's subsequent motion to transfer jurisdiction to the Tribal Court of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Mother and Father, members of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe, entered into a final parenting plan providing for them to co-equally parent L.D.C. The standing master later entered a written judgment amending the parties' parenting plan to place L.D.C. exclusively in Father's custody and care. Mother subsequently filed a state court motion for "transfer" of jurisdiction over the matter to the tribal court and a parallel child custody petition in the tribal court. The standing master denied both motions, and the district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) had jurisdiction to amend the prior parenting plan; and (2) properly amended the prior parenting plan. View "In re Parenting of L.D.C." on Justia Law
Matter of K.L.N.
The Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Mother's parental rights to her child, holding that the district court did not err in terminating Mother's parental rights under state and federal law.In terminating Mother's parental rights to her child the district court made the additional findings and used the heightened evidentiary standards required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in failing to make specific findings under the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act when terminating Mother's parental rights; (2) when it terminated Mother's parental rights under Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-609 and 25 U.S.C. 1912; and (3) in terminating Mother's rights under federal and state law. View "Matter of K.L.N." on Justia Law
In re S.B.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Father's rights to his two children, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Court held (1) the district court erred by proceeding without applying the requirements and standards of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) during the first year of the case, but the violations did not require invalidation of the proceedings; (2) even if the Department of Public Heath and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division (Department) failed to provide proper notice of the proceedings to the Little Shell Tribe as required by ICWA, any error was harmless; (3) the Department provided Father with active efforts to reunify his family; and (4) the district court applied the correct standards when terminating Father's parental rights, and the court's finding that Father was unlikely to change in a reasonable period of time was supported by substantial evidence and not an abuse of discretion. View "In re S.B." on Justia Law
In re K.L.
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to Child, holding that the record did not support that the Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division (Department) engaged in active efforts to provide Father with remedial services and rehabilitative programs to prevent the breakup of Child's family, as required by 25 U.S.C. 1912(d).Child in this case was an Indian child, thus requiring that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) apply to the proceedings. After a termination hearing, the district court concluded the Department had made active efforts as required by ICWA, Father was not able safely to parent Child, and it was in Child's best interest to terminate Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department failed to provide Father with active efforts throughout the custody proceedings as required by ICWA. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law
Lozeau v. Anciaux
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that Appellant failed to prove a set of facts in support of his claim.While detained in jail, Appellant filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus requesting that the district court drop all felony criminal convictions against him on the alleged grounds that the State had no jurisdiction because Appellant was an enrolled member of the Confederated Salish and Kootenani Tribes (CSKT) and committed a crime within the boundaries of the Flathead Indian Reservation. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. On appeal, Appellant argued that the application of Public Law 83-230 (PL-280) by the State was improper and has never been consented to by the CSKT. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's argument that PL-280 was never properly consented to by the CSKT is incorrect; (2) the State properly enacted its enabling legislation under PL-280; and (3) PL-280 and the State's application of PL-280 to the CSKT did not violate the 1855 Hellgate Treaty. View "Lozeau v. Anciaux" on Justia Law
In re S.R.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother’s parental rights to her two minor children for failure to comply with a reunification-oriented treatment plan, holding that the district court’s failure to properly determine whether the children were Indian children before terminating Mother’s parental rights was harmless.On appeal, Mother asserted that the district court abused its discretion by failing properly to confirm or dispel a reason to know that the children were Indian children as defined by the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 25. U.S.C. 1901, et seq. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in light of a subsequently and conclusive tribal determination that neither child was eligible for tribal enrollment, the district court’s abuse of discretion in failing to comply with 25 U.S.C. 1912(a) and 25 C.F.R. 23.107(b) and 23.108 was harmless. View "In re S.R." on Justia Law