Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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While responding to an early-morning 911 call, Officer Blaine Parnell of the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, attempted to arrest Jakota Wolfname on two outstanding tribal warrants. Parnell ordered Wolfname to put his hands behind his back; instead, Wolfname ran away. As the result of his flight from Parnell and the ensuing scuffle, a grand jury indicted Wolfname for “knowingly and forcibly assault[ing], resist[ing], and interfer[ing] with” Parnell while Parnell “was engaged in the performance of his official duties, which resulted in bodily injury to . . . Parnell.” The jury found Wolfname guilty of resisting and interfering with Parnell in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 111(a)(1). It also found that Wolfname made physical contact with Parnell. But the jury wrote, “No,” next to the assault option on the verdict form. And despite testimony from Parnell and his orthopedic surgeon indicating that Parnell suffered damage to a ligament in his thumb during the struggle, the jury also declined to find that Wolfname inflicted bodily injury on Parnell. The district court imposed a 24-month prison sentence. Wolfname appealed. In this case, the parties asked the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to decide whether assault was an element of every conviction under 18 U.S.C. 111(a)(1). The Tenth Circuit found that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury it had to find Wolfname assaulted Parnell. This error was plain error, and warranted reversal. View "United States v. Wolfname" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendant alleging that they sustained injuries as a result of Defendant’s negligence. The accident underlying Plaintiffs’ claims occurred while Defendant was acting within the scope of his employment with the Mohegan Tribal Gaming Authority. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because he was entitled to tribal sovereign immunity on Plaintiffs’ claims. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiffs sought money damages from Defendant personally, not from the Authority. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity extended to Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant because Defendant was an employee of the Mohegan Tribe and was acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. View "Lewis v. Clarke" on Justia Law

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Ute Tribe member Todd Murray died on April 1, 2007, after a police pursuit. Murray’s parents Debra Jones and Arden Post, on behalf of themselves and Murray’s estate, brought a 13-count complaint in the district court alleging various constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983, conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1985, and state tort claims. Claims were brought in varying permutations against nine individual law enforcement officers, their employers, and a private mortuary (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiffs also sought sanctions against Defendants for alleged spoliation of evidence. The district court granted summary judgment to the mortuary on Plaintiffs’ emotional distress claim, and to all remaining Defendants on all federal claims. The court also dismissed as moot Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on the status of Indian lands, and denied Plaintiffs’ motion for spoliation sanctions. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law torts after disposing of the emotional distress claim and the federal claims. Plaintiffs appealed all of these rulings in two appeals. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court, but dismissed an appeal of the taxation of costs because it lacked appellate jurisdiction. View "Jones v. Norton" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a non-Indian, filed a complaint in state district court against Defendants, enrolled members of the Northern Arapaho Tribe, for injuries sustained in a vehicle accident that occurred on a state highway within the boundaries of the Wind River Indian Reservation. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting (1) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) the two-year statute of limitations dictated by the Shoshone and Arapaho Law and Order Code should apply to bar Plaintiff’s action. The district court denied the motion, concluding (1) the court’s exercise of jurisdiction would not infringe on tribal sovereignty, and (2) the court had at a minimum concurrent jurisdiction over the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) had subject matter jurisdiction over this action, and (2) properly concluded that Plaintiff’s action was timely filed under Wyoming’s four-year statute of limitations. View "C'hair v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs filed suit against the United States, Attorney Kandis Martine, and Budget Rent-A-Car after plaintiffs were injured in a car accident caused by Martine. Martine, while driving a rental car to an adoption hearing, drove down the wrong direction on a one-way street and caused the accident. On appeal, the United States challenged the district court's partial summary judgment ruling that, under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346 et seq., and under a self-determination contract entered into between the Department of Interior, BIA, and the Navajo Nation Tribe, Martine was "deemed" an employee of the BIA and afforded the full protection and coverage of the FTCA. The court concluded that the district court's decision concerning subject matter jurisdiction is consistent with the Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. 450 et seq., statutory scheme; the terms of the self-determination contract; and the record evidence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Colbert v. United States" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff and his wife filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), claiming that tribal officers employed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) acted negligently when pursuing a drunk driver and that such negligence resulted in plaintiff and his wife's injuries. Congress extended the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity to claims resulting from the performance of functions authorized by the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, commonly referred to as section 314, 25 U.S.C. 450f. Under the two-part test of section 314, courts must first determine whether the alleged activity is, in fact, encompassed by the relevant federal contract or agreement. The scope of the agreement defines the relevant "employment" for purposes of the scope of employment analysis at step two. Second, courts must decide whether the allegedly tortious action falls within the scope of the tortfeasor's employment under state law. If both these prongs are met, the employee's actions are covered by the FTCA. The court vacated the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court should conduct a new analysis of its subject matter jurisdiction using the two-step framework the court discussed. View "Shirk v. United States" on Justia Law

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Dolgencorp, operator of a Dollar General store on the Choctaw reservation, filed suit seeking to enjoin John Doe and the tribal defendants from adjudicating tort claims against Dolgencorp in the Choctaw tribal court. The underlying tort claims stemmed from Doe's suit alleging that a manager sexually molested him while he was working at the Dollar General store. The court affirmed the district court's denial of Dolgencorp's motion for summary judgment and grant of summary judgment in favor of the tribal defendants because Dolgencorp's consensual relationship with Doe gave rise to tribal court jurisdiction over Doe's claims under Montana v. United States. View "Dolgencorp, Inc., et al. v. MS Band of Choctaw Indians, et al." on Justia Law

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Charles Sheffer, Jennifer Sheffer, and their minor son, J.S., were injured when their tractor trailer collided with a rental vehicle leased to William Garris and driven by David Billups, employees of Carolina Forge Company, L.L.C. Plaintiffs sued Carolina Forge on theories of respondeat superior and negligent entrustment. They also sued the Buffalo Run Casino, the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, and PTE, Inc. for dram-shop liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Carolina Forge, finding as a matter of law Carolina Forge was not liable for its employees' actions under a theory of respondeat superior and did not negligently entrust the rental vehicle to its employees. The trial court also dismissed, sua sponte, the Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc., and the Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma, determining that injunctions issued by the Western District of Oklahoma prohibited suit for any tort claims against a tribe or a tribal entity. Plaintiffs appealed both orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the Peoria Tribe was immune from suit in state court for compact-based tort claims because Oklahoma state courts are not courts of competent jurisdiction as the term is used in the model gaming compact. Furthermore, the Court found that because Congress has not expressly abrogated tribal immunity from private, state court dram-shop claims and because the Peoria Tribe and its entities did not expressly waive their sovereign immunity by applying for and receiving a liquor license from the State, the tribe was immune from dram-shop liability in state court. View "Sheffer v. Buffalo Run Casino" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs sought to hold the city liable for injuries caused by the negligence of a tribal police officer based on the theory that the city had a "non-delegable" duty to provide law enforcement services to the community. Plaintiffs were ordered by the officer to ride on the back of a four-wheeler after he found plaintiffs violating a curfew ordinance. Plaintiffs alleged that they were thrown off the four-wheeler and injured when the officer lost control. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the city because the officer was immune from individual liability for plaintiffs' tort claims, both under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), and the tribe's sovereign immunity. Because the officer was immune, plaintiffs' claims against the city for his negligence failed since those claims were based on the city's vicarious liability for the officer's negligence. View "M.J. v. United States" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Frances Leon Harvey's appeal before the Tenth Circuit stemmed from a Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")lawsuit that he brought against the United States government for complications arising from an injury to his hand. Petitioner claimed that government employees injured him by: (1) misdiagnosing and delaying treatment of his hand fracture; and (2) performing negligent surgery on his hand. He argued that the district court erred in holding the misdiagnosis/delay-in treatment claim to be time-barred and in granting summary judgment on the negligent surgery claim for failure to produce expert evidence. Furthermore, Petitioner argued because Navajo law was the substantive law of this case, the district court failed to follow Navajo law when it dismissed his negligent surgery claim. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly denied Petitioner's motion for default judgment. Although the Court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the misdiagnosis claim was time-barred, the Court concluded that Petitioner's failure to provide expert evidence doomed both his misdiagnosis and surgical malpractice claims. Finally, although the parties disagreed about whether Arizona law or Navajo law applied, the Court did not reach the issue because the outcome would have been the same under both. View "Harvey v. United States" on Justia Law