Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Fredrick Williams appealed the superior court's decision affirming the Ketchikan Gateway Borough's ruling that a house was not exempt from Ketchikan Gateway Borough taxation. In 2002 Williams received a grant to rebuild his house from the Bureau of Indian Affairs Housing Improvement Program. Because Williams has owned the home for ten years, the repayment amount annually decreased by ten percent of the original amount, resulting in no repayment for a transfer occurring 20 years or more after Williams received the grant. Williams executed a deed of trust securing the federal government's right to repayment under the grant. Williams claimed that under the grant and the deed of trust, "[t]he federal government own[ed] . . . the $115,000 it took to build the home," and that Williams was therefore exempt from paying property taxes on it. On appeal, the superior court rejected this argument, upholding the Ketchikan Gateway Borough's view that the deed of trust securing the grant did not divest Williams of the ownership interest in his real property. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court's conclusion and affirmed and adopted its decision. View "Williams v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough" on Justia Law

The State of Michigan entered into a compact with the Bay Mills Indian Community pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(C). The compact authorizes Bay Mills to conduct class III gaming activities (a casino) on Indian lands within the state, but prohibits it from doing so outside that territory. Bay Mills opened a second casino on land it had purchased through a congressionally established land trust. The Tribe claimed it could operate a casino there because the property qualified as Indian land. Michigan sued under section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), which allows a state to enjoin gaming activity conducted in violation of any tribal-state compact. The district court granted the injunction, but the Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit unless Congress provided otherwise; section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) only authorized suits to enjoin gaming activity located “on Indian lands,” while the complaint alleged the casino was outside such territory. The Supreme Court affirmed. As “domestic dependent nations,” Indian tribes exercise “inherent sovereign authority” that is subject to plenary control by Congress; unless Congress acts, the tribes retain their historic sovereign authority. Among the core aspects of that sovereignty is “common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers,” which applies whether a suit is brought by a state or arises from a tribe’s commercial activities off Indian lands. IGRA’s plain terms do not authorize this suit. Section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) partially abrogates tribal immunity with respect to class III gaming located “on Indian lands,” but the premise of Michigan’s suit is that Bay Mills’ casino is unlawful because it is outside Indian lands. Michigan argues that the casino is licensed and operated from within the reservation and that such administrative action constitutes “class III gaming activity.” IGRA’s provisions and history indicate that “class III gaming activity” refers to the gambling that goes on in a casino, not the offsite licensing of such games. View "Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty" on Justia Law

Petitioner requested that the Secretary of the Interior take into trust on its behalf a tract of land known as the Bradley Property, which petitioner intended to use "for gaming purposes." The Secretary took title to the property and respondent subsequently filed suit under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., asserting that the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. 465, did not authorize the Secretary to acquire the property because petitioner was not a federally recognized tribe when the IRA was enacted in 1934. At issue was whether the United States had sovereign immunity from the suit by virtue of the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 86 Stat. 1176, and whether respondent had prudential standing to challenge the Secretary's acquisition. The Court held that the United States had waived its sovereign immunity from respondent's action under the QTA. The Court also held that respondent had prudential standing to challenge the Secretary's acquisition where respondent's interests came within section 465's regulatory ambit. View "Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak" on Justia Law

Respondent filed suit in Federal District Court against federal officials who managed tribal assets held in trust by the Federal Government alleging violations of fiduciary duty and requesting equitable relief. The next day after filing the suit, respondent filed this action against the United States in the Court of Federal Claims ("CFC") alleging almost identical violations and requesting money damages. At issue was whether a common factual basis like the one apparent in respondent's suits sufficed to bar jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1500. The Court held that two suits were for or in respect to the same claim, precluding CFC jurisdiction, if they are based on substantially the same operative facts, regardless of the relief sought in each suit. The Court also held that the substantial overlap in operative facts between respondent's District Court and CFC suits precluded jurisdiction in the CFC where both actions alleged that the United States held the same assets in trust for respondent's benefit and they describe almost identical breaches of fiduciary duties. View "United States v. Tohono O'odham Nation" on Justia Law

The State of Michigan entered into a compact with the Bay Mills Indian Community pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(1)(C). The compact authorizes Bay Mills to conduct class III gaming activities (a casino) on Indian lands within the state, but prohibits it from doing so outside that territory. Bay Mills opened a second casino on land it had purchased through a congressionally established land trust. The Tribe claimed it could operate a casino there because the property qualified as Indian land. Michigan sued under section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), which allows a state to enjoin gaming activity conducted in violation of any tribal-state compact. The district court granted the injunction, but the Sixth Circuit vacated, holding that tribal sovereign immunity barred the suit unless Congress provided otherwise; section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) only authorized suits to enjoin gaming activity located “on Indian lands,” while the complaint alleged the casino was outside such territory. The Supreme Court affirmed. As “domestic dependent nations,” Indian tribes exercise “inherent sovereign authority” that is subject to plenary control by Congress; unless Congress acts, the tribes retain their historic sovereign authority. Among the core aspects of that sovereignty is “common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers,” which applies whether a suit is brought by a state or arises from a tribe’s commercial activities off Indian lands. IGRA’s plain terms do not authorize this suit. Section 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) partially abrogates tribal immunity with respect to class III gaming located “on Indian lands,” but the premise of Michigan’s suit is that Bay Mills’ casino is unlawful because it is outside Indian lands. Michigan argues that the casino is licensed and operated from within the reservation and that such administrative action constitutes “class III gaming activity.” IGRA’s provisions and history indicate that “class III gaming activity” refers to the gambling that goes on in a casino, not the offsite licensing of such games. View "Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case are owners of "chat" restricted by virtue of plaintiffs' membership in the Quapaw Tribe. They alleged that Bingham Sand and Gravel Company, Inc., owner of unrestricted chat, had been removing tailings from one of two piles of co-mingled chat without compensating the restricted owners. Under plaintiffs’ theory of the case, federal law prohibits the sale or removal of any chat from commingled piles without the approval of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”). Despite numerous informal requests that the BIA halt chat removal by Bingham and the Estate of Joseph Mountford (another owner of unrestricted chat), the agency has not done so. Seeking to stop chat removal and obtain an accounting for the chat that has already been removed, plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Interior and several BIA officials. The district court dismissed these claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Although it assumed that plaintiffs could plead a common law accounting claim outside the ambit of the APA, the court nonetheless required exhaustion as a matter of judicial discretion. As to the private defendants, plaintiffs asserted claims for conversion and an accounting. Following dismissal of the federal defendants, the district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction over these claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies; the Court reversed the district court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the conversion and accounting claims. View "Gilmore, et al v. Weatherford, et al" on Justia Law

Several Alaskan native villages (Villages) claimed they possessed non-exclusive aboriginal hunting and fishing rights in areas of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) in the Gulf of Alaska. The Secretary of Commerce promulgated regulations limiting access to the halibut and sablefish fisheries. The Villages claimed that the regulations failed to account for the Villages' non-exclusive aboriginal hunting and fishing rights, without Congress's consent in violation of the federal common law and the Indian Non-Intercourse Act. The district court dismissed their complaint. The Supreme Court remanded to the district court for the purpose of determining what aboriginal rights, if any, the Villages had on the OCS. The district court held that the Villages had no nonexclusive right to hunt and fish in the OCS. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) based on the uncontested factual findings of the district court, the court did not err in concluding that the Villages failed to establish an entitlement to non-exclusive aboriginal rights on the OCS; and (2) because the Villages had not established aboriginal rights on the OCS, the Court had no occasion to consider whether there was a conflict with the federal paramountcy doctrine or whether the Secretary's actions violated the Indian Non-Intercourse Act. View "Native Village of Eyak v. Blank " on Justia Law

Petitioner Tina Marie Somerlott appealed a district court's dismissal of her claims against Cherokee Nation Distributors, Inc and CND, LLC ("CND") for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Petitioner brought federal employment discrimination claims against CND, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. After allowing discovery by both parties, the district court concluded CND was immune from suit under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity and, therefore, dismissed Petitioner's complaint in its entirety. Upon review of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the court's reasoning and affirmed its decision. View "Somerlott v. Cherokee Nation Distributors, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner Frances Leon Harvey's appeal before the Tenth Circuit stemmed from a Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")lawsuit that he brought against the United States government for complications arising from an injury to his hand. Petitioner claimed that government employees injured him by: (1) misdiagnosing and delaying treatment of his hand fracture; and (2) performing negligent surgery on his hand. He argued that the district court erred in holding the misdiagnosis/delay-in treatment claim to be time-barred and in granting summary judgment on the negligent surgery claim for failure to produce expert evidence. Furthermore, Petitioner argued because Navajo law was the substantive law of this case, the district court failed to follow Navajo law when it dismissed his negligent surgery claim. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court properly denied Petitioner's motion for default judgment. Although the Court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the misdiagnosis claim was time-barred, the Court concluded that Petitioner's failure to provide expert evidence doomed both his misdiagnosis and surgical malpractice claims. Finally, although the parties disagreed about whether Arizona law or Navajo law applied, the Court did not reach the issue because the outcome would have been the same under both. View "Harvey v. United States" on Justia Law

The Plaintiffs-Appellants in this case challenged the Federal Highway Administration's selection of a route for the proposed South Lawrence Trafficway project in the city of Lawrence, Kansas. Appellants claimed two aspects of the Highway Administration's decision rendered it arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. Appellants claimed the environmental impact statement supporting the decision violated the National Environmental Policy Act and Department of Transportation noise analysis regulations. Furthermore, Appellants claimed the Highway Administration's analysis under the section of the Department of Transportation Act that protects historic sites, including property associated with Haskell Indian Nations University, improperly concluded there was no "feasible and prudent alternative" to the selected route. Finding "no fatal flaws" in the environmental impact statement or the prudence analysis, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Prairie Band Pottawatomie v. Federal Highway Admin." on Justia Law