Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

The Tribe and CTGW brought suit against the County for imposing property taxes on the Great Wolf Lodge located on the Grand Mound Property, which was tribal land held in trust by the government. At issue was whether state and local governments have the power to tax permanent improvements built on non-reservation land owned by the United States and held in trust for an Indian tribe. The court concluded that Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones made it clear that where the United States owns land covered by 21 U.S.C. 465, and holds it in trust for the use of a tribe, section 465 exempts permanent improvements on that land from state and local taxation. Accordingly, under Mescalero, the County was barred from taxing the Great Wolf Lodge during the time in which the Grand Mound Property was owned by the United States and held in trust under section 465. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the County. View "Chehalis Tribes v. Thurston Cnty." on Justia Law

The Town and the State appealed from the district court's adverse summary judgment ruling in a suit where the Tribe challenged the Town's imposition of the State's personal property tax on the lessors of slot machines used by the Tribe at Foxwoods Casino. The court held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction; the Tribe had standing; neither the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq., nor the Indian Trader Statutes, 25 U.S.C. 261-64, expressly barred the tax; and, under the White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker test, federal law did not implicitly bar the tax because the State and Town interests in the integrity and uniform application of their tax system outweighed the federal and tribal interests reflected in IGRA. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the Tribe and in denying summary judgment for the Town and State. View "Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard" on Justia Law

Christopher C. and Therese C.'s parental rights were terminated as to the couple's four children. The trial court relied primarily on evidence that neither parent had acquired the basic skills necessary to parent their children despite more than a year of training by the Department of Health & Social Services' Office of Children's Services. The Supreme Court after its review concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by sufficient evidence. Therefore the Court affirmed the termination of the parties' parental rights. View "Christopher C. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

A group of Freedmen, former Cherokee slaves and their descendants, sued in district court claiming that the Cherokee Nation had violated the 1866 Treaty that guaranteed the Freedmen all the rights of native Cherokees. To avoid the sovereign immunity bar, the Freedmen sued not only the Cherokee Nation itself but also the relevant executive official, the Principal Chief, in his official capacity. Applying the precedents that permitted suits against government officials in their official capacities, the court concluded that this suit could proceed against the Principal Chief in his official capacity, without the Cherokee Nation itself as a party. The Cherokee Nation and the Principal Chief in his official capacity were one and the same in the Ex Parte Young suit for declaratory and injunctive relief. As a result, the Principal Chief could adequately represent the Cherokee Nation in this suit, meaning that the Cherokee Nation itself was not a required party for purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.View "Vann, et al v. DOI, et al" on Justia Law

The Office of Children's Services (OCS) placed a Native child in a non-Native foster home while working with the other towards reunification. Over two years later, the superior court terminated the parents' parental rights. The child's maternal grandmother and the tribe sought to enforce the Indian Child Welfare Act's (ICWA) placement preferences. The foster parents petitioned for adoption. The superior court found good cause to deviate from the ICWA preference, and that the grandmother was not a suitable placement for the child. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the tribe argued the superior court erred by applying the wrong standard of proof for the good cause determination; that the court's findings were not supported by sufficient evidence; and that the findings were not sufficient to support the good cause determination. The Supreme Court found that the ICWA implicitly mandated that good cause to deviate from ICWA's adoptive placement preferences be proved by clear and convincing evidence. To the extent prior cases held otherwise, they were overruled. Therefore the superior court was vacated here and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Native Village of Tununak v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The dispute before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on interest earned on block grants made to Indian tribes pursuant to the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act. Specifically, Appellant Muscogee (Creek) Nation's Division of Housing challenged both a regulation placing a two-year limit on the investment of grant funds and two notices issued by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development stating that any interest accrued after the expiration of this two-year period must be returned to the Department. The Nation sought declaratory relief invalidating the regulation and notices as well as an injunction to prevent HUD from recouping interest earned on grant funds. The Nation also sought recoupment of the approximately $1.3 million of earned interest it wired to HUD after HUD sent a letter threatening an enforcement action based on the Nation’s investment of grant funds for longer than two years. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that HUD’s sovereign immunity was not waived by the Administrative Procedures Act and, in the alternative, that the Nation had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted because HUD’s interpretation of the statute was permissible. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that HUD was authorized to promulgate a regulation limiting the period for investments, and required to demand remittance of interest earned in violation of the regulation. The Nation was therefore not entitled to recouping the interest it paid to HUD pursuant to HUD's enforcement of its rules. View "Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. HUD, et al" on Justia Law

After the Secretary denied Sandy Lake's request to hold an election so that Sandy Lake's members could vote on a proposed constitution, Sandy Lake filed suit seeking an order directing the Secretary to call an election. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Sandy Lake's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Sandy Lake then filed a second lawsuit without appealing the first lawsuit or exhausting its administrative remedies and subsequently appealed the adverse summary judgment on its claims alleged in the second lawsuit. The court affirmed the district court's original determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that issue preclusion barred the court from reaching the merits of the appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the case, modifying it to be without prejudice. View "Sandy Lake Band v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

The Tribe sought to set aside a decision of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) directing the Tribe to place the names of certain disenrolled individuals back on its membership roll. The BIA issued its decision pursuant to regulations providing for administrative review of adverse tribal enrollment actions where, as the BIA believed in this case, a tribe had authorized such review. The court concluded that the Tribe's governing documents did not grant the authority to the BIA to review appeals from disenrollment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Cahto Tribe v. Dutschke" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed a complaint regarding the government's management of the Central and Southern Florida Project for Flood Control in the Everglades. The gist of the four-count complaint the Tribe filed was that the project diverted excessive flood waters over tribal lands. The district court dismissed three of the complaint's counts for failure to state a claim for relief and the fourth on summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed Count I because the complaint contained nothing to support Count I's allegation that the Corps had an obligation to protect and not interfere with the Tribe's rights; the district court properly dismissed Count II because it contained no allegation of the process the Tribe claimed was due, much less that it was inadequate; the district court properly dismissed Count III because it failed for the same reasons the court found Count I insufficient to state a claim; and the district court properly dismissed Count IV because its allegations were vague and ambiguous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of FL v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant, the Northern Arapaho Tribe, sued various state and county officials in Wyoming, seeking an injunction against the state’s imposition of certain vehicle and excise taxes in an area that Appellant contended was Indian country. Appellant claimed that the state may not tax its members in Indian country, and that the Indian country status of the land was conclusively established by an earlier decision of the Wyoming Supreme Court. The district court dismissed the action with prejudice for failure to join a party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) after determining, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b), that two absent entities (the Eastern Shoshone Tribe and the United States) were necessary parties who could not feasibly be joined, and in whose absence the action could not proceed. The district court also concluded that the Indian country status of the land had not been conclusively determined by the earlier state litigation. Appellant appealed both determinations. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the lower court that the dismissal of the action was proper because the Eastern Shoshone was necessary party that could not feasibly be joined, but vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice. View "Northern Arapaho Tribe v. Harnsberger, et al" on Justia Law