Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

An election dispute arose about which individuals were properly elected or appointed to govern the Thlopthlocco people. The Tribal Town filed suit in the tribal court of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and, accordingly, voluntarily submitted to that court's jurisdiction. The Tribal Town subsequently concluded it did not want to maintain its suit in tribal court and dismissed its claims. But the defendant in that suit had, by that time, filed cross-claims. Arguing that the Tribal Town's sovereign immunity waiver did not cover proceedings on the cross-claims, the Tribal Town attempted to escape Muscogee court jurisdiction, but, in various decisions, several judges and justices of the Muscogee courts held that they may exercise jurisdiction over the Tribal Town without its consent. The Tribal Town then filed a federal action in the Northern District of Oklahoma against those Muscogee judicial officers, seeking to enjoin the Muscogee courts' exercise of jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the federal courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction, defendants were entitled to sovereign immunity, the Tribal Town had failed to join indispensable parties, and the Tribal Town had failed to exhaust its remedies in tribal court. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded, however, that the Tribal Town presented a federal question and that the other claims do not require dismissal. But the Court agreed the Tribal Town should have exhausted its remedies in tribal court while its federal court action was abated. View "Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham, et al" on Justia Law

The County appealed the district court's order preliminarily enjoining it from foreclosing upon certain real property owned by the Cayuga Nation in order to recover uncollected ad valorem property taxes. The court affirmed the district court's injunction where the court declined, as has the Supreme Court, to read a "commercial activity" exception into the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity from suit. In the absence of a waiver of immunity by the tribe, unless Congress has authorized the suit, precedents demand that the court affirm the district court's injunction of the County's foreclosure proceedings against the Cayuga Nation's property. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Seneca County, New York" on Justia Law

The Minto Tribal Court terminated the parental rights of Edward Parks and Bessie Stearman to their daughter S.P. At the termination hearing, the attorney for Parks and Stearman was not permitted to present oral argument to the tribal court. Parks did not file an appeal with the Minto Court of Appeals and instead brought suit against S.P.'s foster parents, the Simmondses, in the state superior court in an attempt to regain custody of S.P. The Simmondses moved to dismiss Parks's state lawsuit on the basis that the tribal court judgment terminating parental rights was entitled to full faith and credit under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that full faith and credit should not be afforded because the tribal court had denied Parks minimum due process by prohibiting his attorney from presenting oral argument on his objections to tribal court jurisdiction based on his status as a non-tribal member. Although the superior court recognized that oral argument is not a per se requirement of minimum due process, the superior court concluded that the denial of oral argument in this case deprived Parks of a meaningful opportunity to be heard because Parks did not receive sufficient notice that his attorney would not be allowed to present oral argument to the tribal court. The Simmondses appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court for further findings. On remand, the superior court reiterated its prior conclusion of a violation of minimum due process and further concluded that the due process error was not harmless because Parks's objections to the Minto Tribal Court's jurisdiction might have had merit. The Simmondses appealed again to the Supreme Court. Because Parks failed to exhaust his remedies in the Minto Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that his state court suit should have been dismissed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded for dismissal of Parks's suit. View "Simmonds v. Parks" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed suit against the United States and others alleging, inter alia, violations of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., and federal common law. The Tribe claimed that the Government breached its fiduciary duties under federal law to protect the land and natural resources subject to the aboriginal title of the Tribe. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the Tribe failed to allege "agency action" sufficient to meet the requirements of the sovereign immunity waiver in section 702, which is necessary to maintain its claims against the federal government and its agencies. View "Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of TX v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

The Attorney General (AG) brought suit against Native Wholesale Supply alleging violations of the Oklahoma Master Settlement Agreement Complementary Act. In 1998, four of the largest tobacco product manufacturers and forty-six states entered into a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) to settle litigation brought by the states to recoup health care expenses resulting from cigarette smoking. In 1999, the Legislature required tobacco product manufacturers who do not join the MSA and whose cigarettes were sold in Oklahoma to make annual payments into escrow accounts to cover health care expenses resulting from cigarette smoking. In August of 2006, the AG removed both Seneca brand cigarettes and their manufacturer, Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., from the AG's directory. In 2007 and 2008, Native Wholesale Supply (NWS) caused Seneca cigarettes to be brought into Oklahoma knowing that the tobacco product manufacturer did not comply with the Escrow Statute or the Complementary Act and that the Seneca cigarette manufacturer and Seneca cigarettes were not on the AG's directory. In May of 2008, Oklahoma Attorney General Drew Edmondson, sought disgorgement and payment to the State of all gross proceeds realized by NWS from the sale of contraband Seneca cigarettes in violation of the Complementary Act. NWS removed the case to federal court asserting complete federal preemption of this state-law suit because NWS "is chartered by the Sac and Fox Nation, is wholly owned by a member of the Seneca Nation, and conducts business on Indian land with Native Americans." The federal court concluded the case was improperly removed and remanded it to the state court. The state district court then granted NWS' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied NWS' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The AG appealed the subject matter jurisdiction dismissal and NWS counter-appealed the personal jurisdiction ruling. The Supreme Court held that the State has personal jurisdiction over NWS based on the Company's purposeful availment of the Oklahoma cigarette marketplace and had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this suit. NWS filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and listed three states in the proceeding as having claims similar to Oklahoma's lodged against it. The three states jointly moved to lift the automatic stay. The bankruptcy court lifted the stay and directed that "information produced by [NWS] during discovery in the bankruptcy case shall be treated by the States as satisfying any request for such information in the State Litigation." The information NWS turned over to Oklahoma included documents showing the cigarette sales and shipping transactions between NWS and Muscogee Creek Nation Tobacco Wholesale and Bowen Wholesale from 2006 to 2010. The state district court case proceeded; and the AG moved for summary judgment. The district court sustained the AG's motion for summary judgment, denied NWS' cross-motion for summary judgment, and entered judgment in favor of Oklahoma. The district court denied NWS' motion for new trial. NWS appealed the summary judgment and denial of a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Oklahoma v. Native Wholesale Supply" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed suit contending that a Florida tax on motor and diesel fuel purchased off tribal lands violated the Indian Commerce Clause, the Indian sovereignty doctrine, and the Equal Protection Clause. The court concluded that Florida has not waived its sovereign immunity from this federal suit. Without a valid abrogation by Congress, Florida was immune from suit regardless of the nature of the relief sought. Further, the Tribe could not circumvent the sovereign immunity of Florida by suing the Director of the Department based on the decision in Ex parte Young where the Department, not the Director, is the real, substantial party in interest in this suit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. View "Seminole Tribe of Florida v. State of FL Dept. of Revenue, et al." on Justia Law

The State entered into an agreement allowing Big Lagoon to operate a casino on a certain parcel of land. On appeal, the State challenged the district court's order requiring the State to negotiate with Big Lagoon under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701-2721. Under Carcieri v. Salazar, the BIA lacked authority to acquire land in trust for tribes that were not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. The court concluded that the only reasonable construction of section 2710(d)(3)(A) is that a tribe's right to request negotiations depends on its having jurisdiction over Indian lands on which it proposes to conduct class III gaming; the State did not waive the "Indian lands" requirement; the land at issue was not "Indian lands" because there was no family or other group on what is now the Big Lagoon in 1934; and, therefore, pursuant to Carcieri, Big Lagoon was not such a tribe. Accordingly, Big Lagoon cannot demand negotiations to conduct gaming on the land and cannot sue to compel negotiations if the State fails to negotiate in good faith. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Big Lagoon Rancheria v. State of California" on Justia Law

Oklahoma petitioned for review of the EPA's final rule establishing a federal implementation plan for the attainment of national air quality standards in "Indian country." The court held that a state has regulatory jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., over all land within its territory and outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation except insofar as an Indian tribe or the EPA has demonstrated a tribe has jurisdiction. In this instance, the EPA was without authority to displace Oklahoma's state implementation plan on non-reservation Indian country where the agency requires a tribe to show it has jurisdiction before regulating Indian country outside a reservation, yet made no demonstration of tribal jurisdiction before itself regulating those areas. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the Rule with respect to non-reservation lands. View "OK Dept. Environmetal Quality v. EPA" on Justia Law

This case concerned a dispute regarding plaintiffs' membership in an Indian tribe. At issue was whether the district court had jurisdiction to enjoin preliminarily the enforcement of a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) order upholding the Band's decision to disenroll descendants of plaintiffs from the San Pasqual Band of Mission Indians and whether such injunctive relief could issue in the Band's absence. The court held that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper, and that the Band was not a required party for the adjudication of the claims underlying the preliminary injunction because they concerned solely the propriety of final agency action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the Band's motions to dismiss the claims on which the injunction rests and its consequent refusal to dissolve the preliminary injunction; remanded to allow the district court to formally clarify its order in compliance with the court's understanding of it; and concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction to review on interlocutory appeal the Band's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' other claims, on which the district court expressly deferred ruling. View "Alto, et al. v. Salazar, et al." on Justia Law

The Tribe bought land from the City of Lansing to build a class III gaming facility, using funds appropriated by Congress for the benefit of certain Michigan tribes. The Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act provides that land acquired with the income on these funds shall be held in trust by the federal government. Michigan obtained an injunction to prevent the Tribe from applying to have land taken into trust by the Secretary of the Interior, on the ground that the submission would violate a compact between the state and the Tribe. That compact requires that a tribe seeking to have land taken into trust for gaming purposes under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2703(4)(B), secure a revenue-sharing agreement with other tribes. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The state did not seek to enjoin a class III gaming activity, but instead a trust submission under MILCSA, so IGRA does not abrogate the Tribe’s sovereign immunity, and the district court lacked jurisdiction. The issue of whether class III gaming on the property at issue will violate IGRA if the Tribe’s MILCSA trust submission is successful is not ripe. View "Michigan v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe" on Justia Law