Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Johnnie Fuson, a registered member of the Navajo Tribe, was forced to relocate from his family’s home following the partition of the Joint Use Area (JUA) under the Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act. Fuson applied for relocation assistance benefits, but his application was denied by the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (ONHIR). On appeal, the Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) also deemed Fuson ineligible for benefits, citing adverse credibility findings and determining that Fuson was not a resident of the Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL) on the relevant date.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona upheld the IHO’s decision, granting summary judgment in favor of ONHIR and denying Fuson’s motion for summary judgment. The district court found that substantial evidence supported the IHO’s adverse credibility findings and that the IHO’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the IHO’s adverse credibility findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The IHO had found every witness not credible due to inconsistencies with other witnesses, creating a circular reasoning that guaranteed adverse credibility findings for all witnesses. The Ninth Circuit also found that the IHO’s finding that Fuson was not a resident of the HPL homesite was arbitrary and capricious. The IHO relied almost exclusively on the Bureau of Indian Affairs enumeration roster without adequately considering contrary testimony about the roster’s reliability.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "FUSON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION" on Justia Law

In 2015, bipartisan legislation repealed the U.S. ban on crude oil exports, leading to expanded efforts to export U.S. crude oil. This case involves an administrative challenge to a construction permit issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for expanding operations at the Moda Ingleside Crude Export Terminal in Texas. The expansion includes constructing new docks and a turning basin, requiring dredging and discharging material into U.S. waters. The Corps conducted an Environmental Assessment (EA) and approved the permit. Plaintiffs, including Native American tribes and an environmental association, sued to invalidate the permit, claiming violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied summary judgment for the plaintiffs and granted summary judgment for the Corps, concluding that the Corps had adequately studied the environmental impacts of the proposed expansion. The court found that plaintiffs had associational standing but had waived certain claims by not raising them in summary judgment briefing. The court also found that plaintiffs forfeited claims related to increased vessel traffic by not raising them during the notice-and-comment period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fifth Circuit held that the Corps did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its environmental impacts analysis, including its assessment of cumulative impacts and climate change. The court found that the Corps's EA was sufficient and that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was not required. The court also agreed that plaintiffs had forfeited arguments related to increased vessel traffic. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Indigenous Peoples v. U.S. Army" on Justia Law

The case involves a project to build a four-story hotel and extend a road in the City of Clearlake. The City approved the project after adopting a mitigated negative declaration (MND) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The Koi Nation of Northern California, a Native American tribe, challenged the approval, alleging the City failed to comply with CEQA, particularly the provisions added by Assembly Bill No. 52, which requires consideration of tribal cultural resources and meaningful consultation with tribes.The trial court denied Koi Nation's petition for writ of mandate, concluding that the City had not violated CEQA’s consultation requirements because there was no written request from Koi Nation to invoke the right to consultation. The court also rejected Koi Nation’s claims regarding the City’s failure to investigate and mitigate the project’s impacts on tribal cultural resources.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that Koi Nation had indeed requested consultation in writing, as required by CEQA. The court determined that the City failed to conduct meaningful consultation, as it did not engage in a process of seeking, discussing, and considering the views of Koi Nation, nor did it seek agreement on mitigation measures. The court concluded that the City’s failure to comply with CEQA’s consultation requirements constituted a prejudicial abuse of discretion, as it omitted material necessary for informed decision-making and public participation.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and judgment, instructing the superior court to issue a writ of mandate setting aside the City’s MND and related project approvals. The court did not address Koi Nation’s other arguments, including the need for an environmental impact report (EIR). View "Koi Nation of Northern California v. City of Clearlake" on Justia Law

Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC (WPC) alleged that its Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the City of Waukegan did not advance its casino proposal for licensing consideration. WPC claimed it experienced intentional discrimination during the application process as a "class of one." The City of Waukegan certified three other applicants but not WPC, which alleged that the process was rigged to benefit another applicant, Lakeside Casino, LLC. WPC pointed to the relationship between the City's mayor and a founding partner of Lakeside, as well as the City's handling of supplemental information from applicants, as evidence of discrimination.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment for the City. The court concluded that WPC, as an arm of a sovereign Native American tribe, could not maintain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Additionally, the court found that WPC's class-of-one equal protection claim failed because WPC was not similarly situated to the other applicants and there were multiple conceivable rational bases for the City's conduct.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that WPC could not carry its heavy burden as a class-of-one plaintiff. The court noted that there were several rational bases for the City's decision, including differences in the casino proposals and the applicants' experience. The court also found that WPC failed to identify a similarly situated comparator who was treated more favorably. The court concluded that the City's conduct throughout the review process, including its handling of supplemental information, had rational justifications. Thus, WPC's class-of-one claim failed under both prongs of the analysis. View "Waukegan Potawatomi Casino, LLC v City of Waukegan" on Justia Law

Curtis Temple, a cattle rancher and member of the Oglala Sioux Indian Tribe (OST), had his grazing permits on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation expire on October 31, 2012. He reapplied for new permits, but another OST member, Donald Buffington, also applied. The OST allocation committee found Temple had over 1,600 cattle, exceeding the 300 animal unit limit, making Buffington the eligible applicant. Temple's permits were awarded to Buffington, and Temple's appeals to the OST executive committee and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) were unsuccessful. Temple continued to graze his cattle on the land allocated to Buffington, leading to multiple trespass notices and eventual impoundment of his cattle by the BIA.Temple filed a lawsuit in the District of South Dakota in August 2015, seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and contesting the permit allocation. The district court denied the TRO and dismissed Temple's permit allocation claims, requiring him to exhaust administrative remedies. Temple's due process claims regarding the impoundment of his cattle proceeded, but the district court found that the written notices of trespass provided to Temple were sufficient and did not violate his due process rights. Temple's motion to continue the trial was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Temple was provided due process through the written notices of trespass and had ample opportunity to contest the trespass determinations. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Temple's permit allocation claims for failure to exhaust tribal remedies, as he did not appeal the tribal court's decision. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Temple's motion to continue the trial. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Curtis Temple v. Roberts" on Justia Law

The Unkechaug Indian Nation and its Chief, Harry B. Wallace, challenged the enforcement of New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) regulations prohibiting the harvesting of American glass eels. They argued that the Andros Order, a 1676 agreement between the Royal Governor of New York and the Nation, allowed them to fish freely and preempted the DEC’s regulations. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the DEC from enforcing these regulations against the Nation’s members in their customary fishing waters.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the Andros Order is not federal law preempting New York’s fishing regulations. The court also found that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against Commissioner Basil Seggos in his official capacity under the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The appellate court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against the DEC but allowed claims against Commissioner Seggos under the Ex parte Young exception. The court also found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to resolve Daubert motions or privilege disputes before ruling on the summary judgment motions. Finally, the court held that the Andros Order is not federal law binding on the United States because it was entered before the Confederal period, on behalf of the British Crown, and has not been ratified by the United States. Therefore, the Andros Order does not preempt New York’s fishing regulations, and the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Unkechaug Indian Nation v. Seggos" on Justia Law

Four Native American tribes operating casinos in Oklahoma filed a federal lawsuit in August 2020 to invalidate certain tribal-gaming compacts entered into by the Governor of Oklahoma and other tribes. These compacts were approved by the U.S. Secretary of the Department of the Interior by operation of law. The tribes argued that the Governor lacked the authority to enter into these compacts, violating Oklahoma law and their rights under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).The Governor, represented by private counsel, defended the compacts' validity under federal law, arguing that any provisions violating state law could be severed. In July 2023, the Oklahoma Attorney General filed a notice to assume control of the state's defense, asserting that the compacts were invalid under state law. The Governor moved to strike the Attorney General's appearance, arguing that he had the authority to retain counsel and that the Attorney General could not override this.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia certified a question to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma regarding whether the Attorney General could assume control of the defense over the Governor's objection. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the Attorney General could not take control of the defense in this case. The court emphasized the Governor's constitutional role as the "Supreme Executive" with the authority to select and direct counsel for the state's interests. The court also noted that the Attorney General could appear in the case but could not override the Governor's choice of counsel. View "CHEROKEE NATION v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR" on Justia Law

Manley Barton, a registered member of the Navajo tribe, applied for relocation benefits from the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (ONHIR) based on his residence at his grandparents' homesite on the Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL). The Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act required individuals residing on land partitioned to the tribe of which they were not a member to relocate. To be eligible for benefits, applicants had to show they were residents of the land partitioned to the other tribe on December 22, 1974, and were heads of household when they moved away. Manley claimed he lived at the HPL homesite until 1986, despite being away for education and employment.ONHIR denied Manley's application, and the Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) upheld the denial, concluding that Manley's residence at the HPL homesite ended in 1984 when his grandparents relocated. The IHO did not consider other evidence of Manley's intent to reside at the HPL homesite, such as his testimony and that of his family members about his continued use of the homesite for ceremonies and chores. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ONHIR, finding the IHO's decision was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's summary judgment. The court held that the IHO improperly applied the "temporarily away" exception, which allows applicants who are away for education or employment to establish residency through intent and manifestations of intent. The IHO's reliance solely on the grandparents' relocation to determine Manley's legal residence was arbitrary and capricious. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two federally recognized Indian tribes, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, over the excavation and development of a burial site known as Hickory Ground in Wetumpka, Alabama. The Muscogee Nation claims that the site is sacred and historically significant, containing graves and ceremonial grounds. The Poarch Band, which purchased the site in 1980 and later had it held in trust by the United States, excavated the site with Auburn University and announced plans to develop a hotel and casino on it. The Muscogee Nation sued to stop the development and restore the site.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama dismissed the Muscogee Nation's complaint, ruling that the Poarch Band and its officials enjoyed sovereign immunity. The court also found that the Poarch officials were immune under an exception to Ex parte Young for claims that are the functional equivalent of a quiet title action and implicate special sovereignty interests. The district court did not analyze the claims individually but dismissed them collectively, leading to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court erred by not analyzing the Poarch officials' sovereign immunity on a claim-by-claim basis. The appellate court emphasized that each claim must be considered separately to determine whether it is the functional equivalent of a quiet title action and whether it implicates special sovereignty interests. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to allow the Muscogee Nation to amend its complaint and to analyze the claims individually. The appellate court also rejected the argument that the Supreme Court had abrogated the Coeur d’Alene exception to Ex parte Young, affirming that it remains a narrow but valid exception. View "Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Rollin" on Justia Law

In 2020, a federal grand jury indicted David DeQuattro, an architect, and Cedric Cromwell, Chairman of the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council and President of the Mashpee Wampanoag Gaming Authority. They were charged with various federal offenses, including bribery and extortion, related to Cromwell allegedly soliciting and DeQuattro allegedly providing checks and other items of value to protect a contract between DeQuattro's firm and the Gaming Authority for building a casino on tribal land.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held a jury trial where DeQuattro was convicted of one count of federal-program bribery, and Cromwell was convicted of two counts of federal-program bribery and multiple counts of Hobbs Act extortion. However, the District Court later entered a judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act-related counts, determining that the Hobbs Act did not clearly abrogate tribal immunity. Both defendants appealed their § 666 convictions, and the government cross-appealed the judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed both the § 666 convictions and the judgment of acquittal. The court found that the evidence did not suffice to show that the RGB contract was "business" of the Tribe, as required under § 666, because the Gaming Authority, which entered the contract, was a separate legal entity from the Tribe and received almost all its funding from a third party. The court also reversed the District Court's judgment of acquittal on the Hobbs Act convictions, holding that tribal officials do not enjoy immunity from federal criminal prosecution and that the evidence was sufficient to show Cromwell's intent to engage in a quid pro quo arrangement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "United States v. Dequattro" on Justia Law