Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

A father appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter, an Indian child within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). He challenged the superior court's findings that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) made active efforts to prevent the breakup of his Indian family, arguing that OCS failed to investigate placement with his extended family members and did not provide him with adequate visitation and remedial services. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that OCS made active efforts, and accordingly affirmed OCS's decision.View "Josh L. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

This case arose from a Child In Need of Aid (CINA) case involving four Indian children who were removed from their parents’ care due to substance abuse and domestic violence. The children were placed with their maternal grandmother, who claimed that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) permanently removed the children and placed them with a non-Native foster family while she was away in Montana caring for her elderly mother. There were substantiated reports of harm relating to the grandmother’s care, and the tribe expressed dissatisfaction with the children’s placement with their grandmother. After removing the children, OCS did not provide the grandmother with notice of scheduled permanency or placement hearings for the children. Over a year after returning from Montana, the grandmother formally requested that the children be placed with her. OCS denied this request and the grandmother appealed, arguing that the children should be placed with her and that the failure to provide her with notice of hearings conducted during the preceding year violated her due process rights. After a full hearing, the superior court denied the request, finding good cause to deviate from the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) placement preferences. The court further concluded that the grandmother was neither entitled to notice of earlier hearings nor prejudiced by a lack of notice. After the superior court proceedings, the children were adopted by the foster family with whom they had bonded. The grandmother appealed the adoption. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because there was not good cause to deviate from the ICWA preferences, the adoption should be set aside and OCS should begin to reunify her with her grandchildren. The grandmother was correct in her argument that she did not receive proper notice of the earlier permanency proceedings. But because any prejudice to the grandmother was cured by the subsequent hearing in which she participated and was able to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and because the superior court did not commit plain error by finding good cause to deviate from ICWA’s placement preferences, the Court affirmed the superior court’s ruling. View "Paula E. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.View "In re J.L. Gordon, Minor" on Justia Law

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue.View "In re C.I. Morris, Minor" on Justia Law

Mother, a non-Indian, gave birth to Child and decided to place Child for adoption. Father was a member of Cherokee Nation. Mother chose a non-Indian family to adopt Child. Adoption Agency filed a pleaded seeking to deviate from the Indian Child Welfare Act's (ICWA) placement preferences. The district court decided to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences based on Mother's preference that Child be placed with a non-Indian family. Intervenor Cherokee Nation challenged the district court's decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, absent a request for anonymity by a biological parent with respect to a child's placement, a parent's placement preference cannot override ICWA's placement factors.View "In re T.S.W." on Justia Law

Upon adjudication of parental neglect, the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) took custody of L.O., a child and an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation, and placed L.O. with a foster family. After L.O.'s natural parents relinquished parental rights, L.O.'s foster family filed a petition for adoption. The Nation filed an objection to the adoption because DCFS failed to abide by the placement preferences contained in the Indian Child Welfare Act and moved the juvenile court to transfer jurisdiction to the Nation. The juvenile court denied the transfer motion. The Nation appealed, and the court of appeals dismissed the case. After the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two procedural questions raised by the Nation, the juvenile court granted the foster family's petition to adopt L.O. Filed with the adoption order was a document titled "Navajo Nation's Consent to Adoption." The Supreme Court declined to address the issues raised on certiorari and dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that the Nation's consent to L.O.'s adoption placement rendered the procedural questions moot.View "Navajo Nation v. State " on Justia Law

After a hearing, the circuit court terminated Mother's parental rights to Child. Mother was Native American and eligible to be enrolled in the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe, but because she was not actually enrolled, an Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) specialist for the Tribe concluded that Child was not eligible for enrollment. Since Child was not enrolled or eligible for enrollment, the court found ICWA inapplicable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err (1) in finding ICWA inapplicable, as Mother failed to show that Child was an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA; and (2) in finding that termination of Mother's parental rights was the least restrictive alternative available.View "In re L.S." on Justia Law

Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to her two children in the district court. The district court ordered that the tribal social services have custody over the children. The tribal court then ordered the adoption of the children. Mother subsequently asked the state district court to set aside her relinquishment under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The district court denied Mother's petition. At issue on appeal was whether, under section 1919 of the ICWA, a tribal-state agreement respecting child custody proceedings may vest a Nevada district court with subject matter jurisdiction to take a relinquishment of parental rights under circumstances where section 1911(a) of the ICWA would otherwise lay exclusive jurisdiction with the tribal court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ICWA, in keeping with the fundamental principles of tribal autonomy, allows for tribal-state agreements for concurrent jurisdiction even when the tribe would have exclusive jurisdiction absent an agreement.View "In re S.M.M.D." on Justia Law

David S. appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter Hannah, who is an Indian child. Hannah was taken into the custody by the Office of Children's Services (OCS) while David was incarcerated. David remained in jail for the first 20 months of Hannah's life. David was released from prison and was on parole for five months, during which time he had regular visits with Hannah. David then became a fugitive for nine months, before being recaptured and reincarcerated. While David was a fugitive, OCS petitioned for termination of his parental rights, and two months after David was returned to prison, the superior court held a termination trial. The superior court found that Hannah was a child in need of aid due to David’s abandonment, incarceration, and substance abuse. The superior court also concluded that OCS had engaged in active efforts to help David's rehabilitation, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act, and that it was in Hannah's best interests for David's parental rights to be terminated. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's ruling because OCS established all requirements necessary for termination.View "David S. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs" on Justia Law

Maternal grandparents petitioned for permanent guardianship of a minor Indian child in the Mille Lacs Band of Ojibwe tribal court. After receiving the guardianship, they sought to have it recognized in a South Dakota circuit court, which had been exercising jurisdiction over the child and his deceased mother since 2007. The circuit court concluded that the tribal court did not have jurisdiction and, consequently, denied the grandparents' motion to recognize the tribal court order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the minor child did not reside on the Mille Lacs Reservation for purposes of exclusive jurisdiction under the Indian Child Welfare Act; and (2) because the tribal court did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the grandparents' guardianship petition, the circuit court did not err in denying the grandparents' petition to recognize the tribal court order. View "Merrill v. Altman" on Justia Law