Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

This case began in July 2008 when the Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) assumed custody of four-month-old "Dawn" from her parents. Dawn was found to be a child in need of aid (CINA). Dawn's parents were Native Alaskans and thus the protections and requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied. Native Village of Tununak (the Tribe) intervened in Dawn's CINA case and submitted a list of potential placement options for Dawn, including Dawn's maternal grandmother, Elise, who lived in the village. Throughout much of the case, the parents and Tribe agreed there was good cause not to place Dawn with an ICWA preferred placement, and Dawn was eventually placed with the Smiths, non-Native foster parents who live in Anchorage. The superior court terminated Dawn's parents' parental rights at a September 2011 trial, making Dawn eligible for adoption. The Tribe asserted that, given the termination of parental rights, there was no longer good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences and objected to Dawn's continued placement in Anchorage. In November the Smiths filed a petition to adopt Dawn. At no point in the case did Elise file an adoption petition in the superior court. The superior court conducted a placement hearing following the Tribe's objection to placement with the Smiths. Following testimony by a number of witnesses, including Elise, the court found that there was continued good cause to deviate from ICWA's adoptive placement preferences and again approved Dawn's placement with the Smiths. The court then granted the Smiths' adoption petition in March 2012. Dawn was almost four years old, and had lived with the Smiths for almost two and a half years. In separate appeals, the Tribe appealed both the superior court's order finding that there was good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences and the adoption order. The Supreme Court then issued an order staying the adoption appeal while it considered the adoptive placement appeal. In 2013, the Court issued a decision in the first appeal that examined Dawn's adoptive placement with the Smiths. The Court reversed the superior court's finding of good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences. Four days after the Alaska Court issued its opinion in the adoptive placement appeal ("Tununak I"), the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl" (Baby Girl). There, the Supreme Court held that ICWA "section 1915(a)'s [placement] preferences are inapplicable in cases where no alternative party has formally sought to adopt the child. This is because there simply is no 'preference' to apply if no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under section 1915(a) has come forward." The Alaska Court concluded that the decision in "Baby Girl" applied directly to the adoptive placement case on remand and to this adoption appeal. "We discern no material factual differences between the Baby Girl case and this case, so we are unable to distinguish the holding in Baby Girl. Because the Supreme Court's holding in Baby Girl is clear and not qualified in any material way, and because it is undisputed that Elise did not 'formally [seek] to adopt' Dawn in the superior court, we conclude that, as in Baby Girl, 'there simply is no 'preference' to apply[,] [as] no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward[,]' and therefore ICWA . . .preferences are inapplicable." The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's order granting the Smiths' petition to adopt Dawn and vacated its remand order in "Tununak I" requiring the superior court to conduct further adoptive placement proceedings. View "Native Village of Tununak v. Alaska, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

J.S. was born in January 2012. Mother and Father were developmentally delayed. Later that year, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services received a referral reflecting Mother and Father were neglecting J.S. Both Mother and Father denied having Indian ancestry. The Department took J.S. into protective custody; J.S. was subsequently placed in foster care with his paternal great-grandparents, who notified the Department that J.S. may have Cherokee ancestry (the great-grandfather provided the Department with documentation that J.S.'s great-great-grandfather was Cherokee). The Cherokee Nation verified J.S.'s eligibility to affiliate with the Nation. The Department then filed a petition alleging Mother and Father failed to protect J.S. Specifically: (1) Mother and Father suffered from mental health issues and cognitive delays; and (2) they engaged in domestic violence.The juvenile court terminated the parents' rights. On appeal of that decision, Father contended the juvenile court erred by finding ICWA was inapplicable in this case. Father also argued errors were made in relation to the ICWA inquiry and notice requirements. Mother joined and expanded upon Father’s ICWA arguments. Mother also requested a different judicial officer preside over the case upon remand. Finding no reversible error, however, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

A 17-month-old Indian child was removed from the custody of her mother, who has a lengthy substance abuse problem and has lost custody of at least six other children, and her father, who has an extensive criminal history and has lost custody of one other child. This case involves the placement preferences set forth in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. The court concluded that the trial court correctly required that the foster parents demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that there was good cause to depart from the ICWA's placement preferences. However, the trial court's application of the good cause exception to the facts before it was legally erroneous and the error was prejudicial to the foster parents. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "In re Alexandria P." on Justia Law

The Minto Tribal Court terminated the parental rights of Edward Parks and Bessie Stearman to their daughter S.P. At the termination hearing, the attorney for Parks and Stearman was not permitted to present oral argument to the tribal court. Parks did not file an appeal with the Minto Court of Appeals and instead brought suit against S.P.'s foster parents, the Simmondses, in the state superior court in an attempt to regain custody of S.P. The Simmondses moved to dismiss Parks's state lawsuit on the basis that the tribal court judgment terminating parental rights was entitled to full faith and credit under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that full faith and credit should not be afforded because the tribal court had denied Parks minimum due process by prohibiting his attorney from presenting oral argument on his objections to tribal court jurisdiction based on his status as a non-tribal member. Although the superior court recognized that oral argument is not a per se requirement of minimum due process, the superior court concluded that the denial of oral argument in this case deprived Parks of a meaningful opportunity to be heard because Parks did not receive sufficient notice that his attorney would not be allowed to present oral argument to the tribal court. The Simmondses appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court for further findings. On remand, the superior court reiterated its prior conclusion of a violation of minimum due process and further concluded that the due process error was not harmless because Parks's objections to the Minto Tribal Court's jurisdiction might have had merit. The Simmondses appealed again to the Supreme Court. Because Parks failed to exhaust his remedies in the Minto Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that his state court suit should have been dismissed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded for dismissal of Parks's suit. View "Simmonds v. Parks" on Justia Law

J.S., born in 1998, was an “Indian child” under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). In 2002, J.S. was adjudicated a youth in need of care, and temporary custody was granted to the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department). In 2012, the Department filed a petition for legal guardianship. Ultimately, the district court granted guardianship over J.S. to J.S.’s foster family. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State’s failure to provide notice to Father and his tribe at the outset of these proceedings did not provide a basis to overturn the district court’s ultimate guardianship order; (2) 25 U.S.C. 1912(d) did not provide a basis to overturn the district court’s award of guardianship to the foster family based on the State’s alleged failure to make “active efforts” to provide services and promote the relationship between Father and J.S.; and (3) contrary to Father’s contention, 25 U.S.C. 1912(e) did not apply to this case and did not serve to invalidate the district court’s award of guardianship. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

B.B. appealed a trial court judgment establishing him as the father of the child, J.Z.T., and ordering him to reimburse the State for past support paid on behalf of the child and to pay future child support. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the state court's exercise of jurisdiction did not infringe on the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe's right of self-government, as claimed by B.B. View "North Dakota v. B.B." on Justia Law

The district court terminated Mother's parental rights to her two daughters (collectively, Children). Mother appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Department of Health and Human Services (Department) undertook sufficient active efforts to reunify Mother and Children as required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA); (2) the Department provided sufficient evidence that reunification of Children with Mother would cause serious physical or emotional damage to Children; (3) the district court correctly determined that Mother had stipulated to the terms of the treatment plan; and (4) all stipulations in ICWA involuntary termination proceedings need not be reduced to writing. View "In re D.A." on Justia Law

Christopher C. and Therese C.'s parental rights were terminated as to the couple's four children. The trial court relied primarily on evidence that neither parent had acquired the basic skills necessary to parent their children despite more than a year of training by the Department of Health & Social Services' Office of Children's Services. The Supreme Court after its review concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by sufficient evidence. Therefore the Court affirmed the termination of the parties' parental rights. View "Christopher C. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

Mother's two Indian children, both minors, were placed in foster care by a separate juvenile court. After the State filed a motion to terminate parental rights, the Omaha Tribe of Nebraska sought to transfer the proceedings to the Omaha Tribal Court pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act. The juvenile court denied the request, finding that the motions were filed at an "advanced stage" of the juvenile proceedings. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no basis for a determination that the motions to transfer these cases to tribal court were filed at an advanced stage of the proceedings to terminate parental rights, and therefore, the court of appeals erred in affirming the separate juvenile court's denial of the motions on this ground. Remanded with directions to sustain the motions to transfer the cases to the Omaha Tribal Court.View "In re Zylena R." on Justia Law

The Office of Children's Services (OCS) placed a Native child in a non-Native foster home while working with the other towards reunification. Over two years later, the superior court terminated the parents' parental rights. The child's maternal grandmother and the tribe sought to enforce the Indian Child Welfare Act's (ICWA) placement preferences. The foster parents petitioned for adoption. The superior court found good cause to deviate from the ICWA preference, and that the grandmother was not a suitable placement for the child. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the tribe argued the superior court erred by applying the wrong standard of proof for the good cause determination; that the court's findings were not supported by sufficient evidence; and that the findings were not sufficient to support the good cause determination. The Supreme Court found that the ICWA implicitly mandated that good cause to deviate from ICWA's adoptive placement preferences be proved by clear and convincing evidence. To the extent prior cases held otherwise, they were overruled. Therefore the superior court was vacated here and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Native Village of Tununak v. Alaska" on Justia Law