Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Two parents disputed the legal custody and visitation rights for their daughter; the mother resided in Alaska and the father resided on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation in Montana. The superior court awarded sole legal custody to the mother because it concluded that the parties could not communicate effectively to co-parent their daughter. The court ordered unsupervised visitation between the father and the daughter in Alaska, but prohibited visitation on the reservation until the daughter turned eight. The father appealed. Although the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it decided legal custody, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court failed to fully justify its decision when creating its restrictive visitation schedule and allocating visitation expenses. Consequently the Supreme Court remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Red Elk v. McBride" on Justia Law

At the start of the dependency proceedings, the juvenile court and Ventura County Human Services Agency believed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901, did not apply to Eskimo families. Father and mother appealed from the order terminating parental rights to their two minor children and selecting adoption as the permanent plan, Welf. & Inst. Code 366.26. The court of appeal reversed. Evidence submitted for the first time on appeal established that the children are Indian children under ICWA. The federal definition of "Indian" includes "Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska." The Noorvik Native Community, a federally-recognized Alaskan Indian tribe confirmed that the minors are tribe members. Before terminating parental rights to an Indian child, the juvenile court must satisfy ICWA requirements, including finding that "active efforts" were made to provide services designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and that parents' continued custody of minors "is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage." Having found ICWA inapplicable, the juvenile court did not consider these requirements before terminating parental rights; NNC was not afforded an opportunity to intervene. View "In re H.G." on Justia Law

The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services filed a petition for emergency protective services for seven-year-old H.T., alleging drug use by Mother and domestic violence between Mother and her boyfriend. The petition stated that H.T. “may be an Indian Child for the purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).” The district court granted the motion for emergency protective services. The district court subsequently held a hearing that adjudicated H.T. a youth in need of care. The Department then filed a petition for permanent legal custody and termination of parental rights. The district court held a termination hearing and adopted and approved the termination petition. Mother appealed, asserting that the district court failed to comply with state and federal statutory requirements for terminating parental rights to an Indian child. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Mother received fundamentally fair procedures prior to the termination of her parental rights; but (2) because the district court applied the wrong statutory standards in its final order, its judgment is vacated. Remanded for entry of a new order on the issue of whether Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. View "In re H.T." on Justia Law

Jane Doe appealed an order terminating her parental rights to her son, TSD. Because TSD was an "Indian child" as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act, the magistrate court was required to make findings in addition to those required by Idaho law. Among other findings, the Department of Health and Welfare (DHW) was required to satisfy the court that it made "active efforts" to "prevent the breakup of the Indian family." On appeal, Doe argued that the magistrate court erred in finding that DHW made such efforts and erred in failing to make that finding by clear and convincing evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court's decision terminating Doe's parental rights. View "In re Termination of Parental Rights of Jane (2014-23) Doe" on Justia Law

S.B.C. was a Naive American child whose biological parents were enrolled members of the Blackfeet Tribe (Tribe). When S.B.C. was approximately four months old he was removed from Mother’s care and placed with Foster Mother. The district court later terminated both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and granted legal custody to Child Services with the right to consent to the adoption of S.B.C. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by denying the Tribe’s motion to transfer jurisdiction to the Blackfeet Tribal Court; (2) did not abuse its discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights; and (3) did not abuse its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights. View "Matter of S.B.C." on Justia Law

Sometime in early 2007, "Connie" approached Holly and William Ebert, a married couple she knew from church, about adopting her child. Connie wanted the Eberts to adopt her child because she thought they would be loving parents and because they shared her religious values. The Eberts agreed to the adoption. "Bruce" and Connie began a relationship in August 2006. At some point, Connie told Bruce that she was pregnant and was considering giving up the child for adoption. Bruce objected to the adoption. After a final attempt to repair their relationship, Bruce and Connie separated permanently in January 2007 and that was when Connie contacted the Eberts about her child. Before the child was born, the Eberts met with Bruce "to discuss a consent to adopt." In late December 2007, Bruce filed a complaint for custody of the child, "Timothy." In July 2008 the Eberts filed an adoption petition and intervened in Bruce's custody case. The superior court ordered paternity testing, and Bruce obtained a positive result. The court appointed counsel for Bruce and consolidated the adoption and custody cases. The superior court ordered an interim custody arrangement after a hearing in December 2008. The court granted physical custody to the Eberts and semiweekly visitation to Bruce. The court also ordered Bruce to pay $50 per month in child support, retroactive to 2007; over the next four months, Bruce paid a total of $200 in support. It was undisputed that Bruce paid no child support before being ordered to do so at a December 2008 hearing. He later testified that he did not realize he had a child support obligation and that the Eberts never applied to the Child Support Services Division for child support. Bruce claimed he was under the impression that the Eberts were wealthy and did not need his financial assistance. In May 2009 the superior court held a trial on the adoption petition and the custody dispute. In post-trial briefing, Bruce argued that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) compelled the court to grant Bruce custody of Timothy and prevented the Eberts from adopting Timothy without Bruce's consent. The Eberts argued that Bruce could not invoke ICWA to prevent the adoption because he was not a "parent" for purposes of the statute until he established paternity in late 2008. They also argued that ICWA section 1912(d)'s "active efforts" provision did not apply in a private adoption, particularly when the parent seeking to invoke ICWA had no meaningful connection to any tribe. And they maintained that, even if ICWA applied, the supervised visitation provided to Bruce was adequate to fulfill the active efforts requirement. Finally, they argued that Bruce's consent to the adoption was not required under state law because Bruce could not show that his failure to communicate with or support Timothy during the child's first year of life was justifiable. Connie, who continued to support the adoption, made arguments similar to the Eberts'. The Eberts and Connie appealed the superior court's denial of the adoption, claiming that Bruce's consent to the adoption was unnecessary. The Supreme Court found that under AS 25.23.050(a)(2)(B), the consent of a noncustodial parent was not required for adoption if that parent unjustifiably fails to support the child. But the superior court did not clearly err by concluding that Bruce had justifiable cause for his failure to support the child. View "Ebert v. Bruce L." on Justia Law

Father had custody of his three minor children that were “Indian children” within the meaning of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act (NICWA). The children were adjudicated as being within Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a) because they lacked proper parental care. The juvenile court determined that it was in the children’s best interests for Father to have only physical custody and awarded legal custody of the children to the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The court of appeals reversed, holding that the juvenile court erred by not addressing at the dispositional hearing whether the State made “active efforts,” as required by ICWA/NICWA, to return the children’s legal custody to Father. The State appealed, arguing that the “active efforts” standard did not apply to the disposition in this case, but rather, the “reasonable efforts” standard applicable in cases involving non-Indian children applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that at any point in an involuntary juvenile proceeding involving Indian children at which a party is required to demonstrate its efforts to reunify or prevent the breakup of the family, the “active efforts” standard of ICWA/NICWA applies. View "In re Interest of Shayla H." on Justia Law

Thirteen-year-old M.S. was placed into emergency protective custody in 2011. After M.S. was adjudicated a youth in need of care, the Department of Public Health and Human Services filed a petition for termination of Father's rights. Because Father was an enrolled member of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe (Tribe), M.S. was eligible for enrollment with the Tribe and, under Indian Child Welfare Act, M.S. was an Indian child. After a hearing in 2013, the district court ordered Father’s parental rights terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the termination proceedings complied with statutory requirements for proceedings involving an Indian child. View "In re M.S." on Justia Law

Mother and Father (“Parents”) were the parents of twin girls. Mother was a member of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation (“Tribe”), Father was not a member of any tribe, and the children were either members of, or eligible to be members of, the Tribe. The Dinwiddie Department of Social Services (DDSS) filed petitions to terminate Parents’ parental rights. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (“J&DR court”) denied the petitions. The DDSS appealed. The Tribe and Parents sought to transfer the case to tribal court. The trial court held that good cause existed not to transfer the proceeding to tribal court and denied the motion to transfer. The court then terminated Parents’ parental rights. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision on the motion to transfer, vacated the award terminating Parents' parental rights, and remanded. In so doing, the court rejected the traditional “best interests of the child” test in favor of a more limited test involving a substantial risk of harm to a child arising from the transfer to a tribal court. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded in light of the standards articulated by the court of appeals in Thompson v. Fairfax County Dep’t of Family Servs. View "Dinwiddie Dep’t of Social Servs. v. Nunnally" on Justia Law

The Mendocino County Health and Human Services Agency filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 on behalf of Minors, ages 3, 7, and 8, alleging that Mother had a substance abuse problem that inhibited her ability to parent her children and that the parents were not providing adequate food or shelter. Deputies found the children in the care of men at a home with drugs and dangerous objects. There was no refrigerator; the toilet would not flush. There was no running water, and there were dead mice in the house. An open power panel posed a significant fire danger. The children had been wearing the same clothes since Mother had left them four nights earlier. Mother appeared to be “extremely high.” She provided a urine sample, saying it would be “dirty.” The Minors were subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901. For several months, Mother did not engage in services, despite repeated efforts to contact her. The juvenile court found that Mother had partially complied with her case plan, that there was no substantial probability Minors would be returned to her custody within 18 months of their removal, that reasonable services had been offered, and that active efforts had been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. The court terminated reunification services and set a hearing under section 366.26 to determine a permanent plan for the children. The appeals court affirmed. View "C.F. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law