Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Jennifer and Adam were the parents of three minor children: a daughter, Andrea, and two younger boys. The children were Indian children as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The State's Office of Children's Services (OCS) took three minor children into emergency custody, then sought a court order granting OCS temporary custody, asserting there was probable cause to find the children in need of aid. A standing master determined that no probable cause existed and recommended that the three children be returned to their mother's custody. The State objected to the master's recommendation, and the superior court reviewed and rejected it, finding that there was probable cause. The mother filed this appeal, asking the Supreme Court to hold that masters have the authority to return children to their homes without judicial review. Before the State filed its brief, the superior court dismissed the underlying case, making this appeal moot. After its review, the Supreme Court applied the "public interest" exception to the mootness doctrine and affirmed the superior court's ruling. View "Jennifer L. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

The dependency petition alleged that mother "K.B." had beat X.B., her youngest son, with a belt causing welts and bruises to his chest, shoulder, arms, and legs, and that she pushed X.B.’s head into a pillow to muffle his screams, causing him to feel as if he were suffocating. The petition alleged that mother had a history of using inappropriate discipline techniques on her sons, such as beating them with belts, humiliating K.B. in public, and forcing K.B. to complete strenuous exercise routines as punishment. The petition also alleged that mother allowed her live-in boyfriend to inappropriately punish K.B. and to smoke marijuana in the children’s presence. K.B. appealed the trial court’s order placing X.B. with his nonoffending and noncustodial biological father, K.D. (father), who lived out of state. She argued that the court erred by failing to find under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (a), that it would be detrimental to X.B.’s emotional well-being to be separated from his maternal family. Mother requested that X.B. be placed with his older sibling in the home of his maternal grandmother. She also argued that the court failed to give proper notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "In re K.B." on Justia Law

Michael C. appeals a juvenile court judgment terminating his parental rights to his minor daughter A.C., and selecting adoption as her permanent plan. Father mainly argued that no sufficient evidence supported the court's underlying findings that: (1) the Agency's adoption assessment report was adequate and up to date on the child's mental and emotional status; and (2) there was no applicable exception to adoption preference. In addition, the Father sought review, by way of designating his appeal to be a writ proceeding, of certain of the juvenile court's earlier orders from the 12-month review and referral hearing, claiming he did not forfeit such claims, even though his previously appointed appellate attorney declined to file such a writ petition after the 12-month orders were made (to that end, Father argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel). Accordingly, Father now asked the Court of Appeal to consider whether the 12-month referral hearing orders were still reviewable because they failed to meet the standards of the Indian Child Welfare Act regarding sufficient evidence: (1) of "ICWA detriment" to return the child to his custody; and (2) whether "active reunification efforts" were made that allowed the juvenile court to rule that his reunification services were adequate and could properly be terminated at the 12-month review and referral hearing. After careful consideration of these arguments in light of the trial court's record, the Court of Appeal determined there was no adequate showing in support of Father's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and further, he has forfeited the substantive arguments he raised about the orders made at the 12-month review hearing. "Even if we were to consider those claims on a writ basis, we would find them meritless." Regarding the judgment that terminated his parental rights and selected adoption as the permanent plan for the child, the Court found no prejudicial error or abuse of discretion occurred, and that the judgment was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the trial court's order terminating her parental rights with regard to her daughter. At issue on appeal is compliance with notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. The court concluded that there is a duty under the IWCA to send updated notices to the relevant tribes when additional information regarding a child's ancestors is obtained after the original ICWA notices were sent. In this case, because the Department failed to send updated notices after it obtained additional information, the court reversed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re I.B." on Justia Law

Mother was an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe. After Jassenia, who was allegedly eligible for enrollment in the tribe, was removed from Mother’s care, the State filed a petition for adjudication pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). At issue before the juvenile court was whether the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied to the adjudication proceeding. The juvenile court determined that ICWA applied to the proceedings. Jassenia’s guardian ad litem appealed, asserting that Mother’s intent to relinquish custody of Jassenia rendered ICWA inapplicable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the juvenile court’s order did not constitute a final, appealable order because the mere determination that ICWA applied, without further action, did not affect a substantial right. View "In re Interest of Jassenia H." on Justia Law

Doe and C.C.’s mother (Mother) are the biological parents of C.C., who was born in 2008. Doe, Mother, and C.C. are all members of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation (Tribes). Doe and Mother were never married, but lived together sporadically during the initial portion of C.C.’s life until Mother ended the relationship in 2010. In July of 2010, Doe shot Mother in front of C.C. Doe pleaded guilty to Attempted First Degree Murder and was sentenced to serve fifteen years, with nine years fixed. He was not eligible for parole until July of 2019. Mother married C.C.’s stepfather on October 15, 2010. Stepfather was also a member of the Tribes. The issue in this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a magistrate court’s judgment terminating John Doe’s parental rights and allowing C.C. to be adopted. Doe argued that the magistrate court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Termination of Parental Rights of John Doe (2014-25)" on Justia Law

Two parents disputed the legal custody and visitation rights for their daughter; the mother resided in Alaska and the father resided on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation in Montana. The superior court awarded sole legal custody to the mother because it concluded that the parties could not communicate effectively to co-parent their daughter. The court ordered unsupervised visitation between the father and the daughter in Alaska, but prohibited visitation on the reservation until the daughter turned eight. The father appealed. Although the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it decided legal custody, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court failed to fully justify its decision when creating its restrictive visitation schedule and allocating visitation expenses. Consequently the Supreme Court remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Red Elk v. McBride" on Justia Law

At the start of the dependency proceedings, the juvenile court and Ventura County Human Services Agency believed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901, did not apply to Eskimo families. Father and mother appealed from the order terminating parental rights to their two minor children and selecting adoption as the permanent plan, Welf. & Inst. Code 366.26. The court of appeal reversed. Evidence submitted for the first time on appeal established that the children are Indian children under ICWA. The federal definition of "Indian" includes "Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska." The Noorvik Native Community, a federally-recognized Alaskan Indian tribe confirmed that the minors are tribe members. Before terminating parental rights to an Indian child, the juvenile court must satisfy ICWA requirements, including finding that "active efforts" were made to provide services designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and that parents' continued custody of minors "is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage." Having found ICWA inapplicable, the juvenile court did not consider these requirements before terminating parental rights; NNC was not afforded an opportunity to intervene. View "In re H.G." on Justia Law

The Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services filed a petition for emergency protective services for seven-year-old H.T., alleging drug use by Mother and domestic violence between Mother and her boyfriend. The petition stated that H.T. “may be an Indian Child for the purposes of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).” The district court granted the motion for emergency protective services. The district court subsequently held a hearing that adjudicated H.T. a youth in need of care. The Department then filed a petition for permanent legal custody and termination of parental rights. The district court held a termination hearing and adopted and approved the termination petition. Mother appealed, asserting that the district court failed to comply with state and federal statutory requirements for terminating parental rights to an Indian child. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Mother received fundamentally fair procedures prior to the termination of her parental rights; but (2) because the district court applied the wrong statutory standards in its final order, its judgment is vacated. Remanded for entry of a new order on the issue of whether Mother’s parental rights should be terminated. View "In re H.T." on Justia Law

Jane Doe appealed an order terminating her parental rights to her son, TSD. Because TSD was an "Indian child" as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act, the magistrate court was required to make findings in addition to those required by Idaho law. Among other findings, the Department of Health and Welfare (DHW) was required to satisfy the court that it made "active efforts" to "prevent the breakup of the Indian family." On appeal, Doe argued that the magistrate court erred in finding that DHW made such efforts and erred in failing to make that finding by clear and convincing evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court's decision terminating Doe's parental rights. View "In re Termination of Parental Rights of Jane (2014-23) Doe" on Justia Law