Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Mother and Father appealed from the jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring their infant daughter a dependent of the juvenile court and removing her from their custody after the juvenile court sustained an amended petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. Mother and Father also contend that the juvenile court failed to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1900 et seq. The court concluded that the juvenile court's jurisdiction finding is supported by substantial evidence where there was ample evidence that Mother was hiding her current drug use. In this case, the court concluded that, due to the juvenile court's failure to comply with the requirements of the ICWA by not giving notice to the Cherokee tribe, the disposition order may only be conditionally affirmed. Accordingly, the court remanded for compliance with the ICWA and related California law. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "LA Cnty. DCFS v. Shahida R." on Justia Law

Father appealed from a judgment entered pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, selecting tribal customary adoption (TCA), as the permanent plan for his children. The court rejected Father's contention that the juvenile court erred in affording the TCA order full faith and credit. The court concluded that the Tribe “did not duly exercise subject matter jurisdiction prior to the initiation of the dependency proceedings under 25 U.S.C. section 1911(a), or by transfer under 25 U.S.C. section 1911(b).” In view of the legislative determination that an Indian child’s best interests normally will be best served by preserving his or her tribal connections, there being no evidence to the contrary, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in selecting the TCA as the permanent plan. The court rejected Father's claim that the juvenile court erred in affording the TCA order full faith and credit because he was not given an adequate opportunity to be heard on the visitation terms of the TCA order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fresno Cnty. Dept. of Social Serv. v. Jimmie S." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant S.H. (mother) was the biological mother of C.G. (born in 2013), the child at issue here, and B.H. (born in 2011), who was C.G.’s half sibling. Both children were removed from mother’s custody, and her parental rights were eventually terminated. On appeal, mother argued that the order terminating her parental rights as to C.G. should have been reversed for failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian and Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). After review of the specific facts entered into the trial court record, the Court of Appeal agreed, reversed and remanded. View "In re B.H." on Justia Law

G.L. appealed a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights. He argued the juvenile court erred by declaring him in default, finding the conditions and causes of the child's deprivation were likely to continue, and determining the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA") did not apply. M.R., the child at issue, was placed in the custody of social services due to concerns that her mother was unfit to care for her. After the child was placed into custody, a social services employee petitioned for termination of parental rights. The petition stated that paternity had not been confirmed, but it noted an individual named V.G. could be the father. It was subsequently established that V.G. was not the father. G.L. then came forward claiming to be the father, but his paternity was never confirmed by biological testing. At a hearing on the petition, M.R.'s mother appeared and stated she desired to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights. In an interim order, the juvenile court noted ICWA might apply because G.L. was a member of the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe. The juvenile court then sent notices of the right to intervene to the tribe. In response, Spirit Lake Tribal Social Services sent a letter stating that, after reviewing the case, the tribal court and the ICWA director "would support the current Termination of Parental Rights in order to establish permanency for [M.R.]." Noting G.L. had refused paternity testing, the tribe indicated it would not intervene unless there was biological proof G.L. was M.R.'s father. At the hearing on termination of parental rights, G.L.'s counsel was present, but G.L. failed to appear. His counsel requested a continuance so G.L. could be present; the court denied the motion. G.L.'s attorney told the court he had recently learned that G.L. was incarcerated in Minnesota. The court then took a recess to allow G.L.'s attorney to contact G.L. to determine whether he could appear by telephone. After the recess, G.L.'s attorney informed the court that he chose not to attempt to contact G.L. "based on all the conversations [he] had previously with [G.L.]." The hearing then proceeded in G.L.'s absence. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court did not err when it terminated G.L.'s parental rights, and it affirmed the order. View "Interest of M.R." on Justia Law

Jennifer and Adam were the parents of three minor children: a daughter, Andrea, and two younger boys. The children were Indian children as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The State's Office of Children's Services (OCS) took three minor children into emergency custody, then sought a court order granting OCS temporary custody, asserting there was probable cause to find the children in need of aid. A standing master determined that no probable cause existed and recommended that the three children be returned to their mother's custody. The State objected to the master's recommendation, and the superior court reviewed and rejected it, finding that there was probable cause. The mother filed this appeal, asking the Supreme Court to hold that masters have the authority to return children to their homes without judicial review. Before the State filed its brief, the superior court dismissed the underlying case, making this appeal moot. After its review, the Supreme Court applied the "public interest" exception to the mootness doctrine and affirmed the superior court's ruling. View "Jennifer L. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

The dependency petition alleged that mother "K.B." had beat X.B., her youngest son, with a belt causing welts and bruises to his chest, shoulder, arms, and legs, and that she pushed X.B.’s head into a pillow to muffle his screams, causing him to feel as if he were suffocating. The petition alleged that mother had a history of using inappropriate discipline techniques on her sons, such as beating them with belts, humiliating K.B. in public, and forcing K.B. to complete strenuous exercise routines as punishment. The petition also alleged that mother allowed her live-in boyfriend to inappropriately punish K.B. and to smoke marijuana in the children’s presence. K.B. appealed the trial court’s order placing X.B. with his nonoffending and noncustodial biological father, K.D. (father), who lived out of state. She argued that the court erred by failing to find under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (a), that it would be detrimental to X.B.’s emotional well-being to be separated from his maternal family. Mother requested that X.B. be placed with his older sibling in the home of his maternal grandmother. She also argued that the court failed to give proper notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "In re K.B." on Justia Law

Michael C. appeals a juvenile court judgment terminating his parental rights to his minor daughter A.C., and selecting adoption as her permanent plan. Father mainly argued that no sufficient evidence supported the court's underlying findings that: (1) the Agency's adoption assessment report was adequate and up to date on the child's mental and emotional status; and (2) there was no applicable exception to adoption preference. In addition, the Father sought review, by way of designating his appeal to be a writ proceeding, of certain of the juvenile court's earlier orders from the 12-month review and referral hearing, claiming he did not forfeit such claims, even though his previously appointed appellate attorney declined to file such a writ petition after the 12-month orders were made (to that end, Father argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel). Accordingly, Father now asked the Court of Appeal to consider whether the 12-month referral hearing orders were still reviewable because they failed to meet the standards of the Indian Child Welfare Act regarding sufficient evidence: (1) of "ICWA detriment" to return the child to his custody; and (2) whether "active reunification efforts" were made that allowed the juvenile court to rule that his reunification services were adequate and could properly be terminated at the 12-month review and referral hearing. After careful consideration of these arguments in light of the trial court's record, the Court of Appeal determined there was no adequate showing in support of Father's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and further, he has forfeited the substantive arguments he raised about the orders made at the 12-month review hearing. "Even if we were to consider those claims on a writ basis, we would find them meritless." Regarding the judgment that terminated his parental rights and selected adoption as the permanent plan for the child, the Court found no prejudicial error or abuse of discretion occurred, and that the judgment was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the trial court's order terminating her parental rights with regard to her daughter. At issue on appeal is compliance with notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. The court concluded that there is a duty under the IWCA to send updated notices to the relevant tribes when additional information regarding a child's ancestors is obtained after the original ICWA notices were sent. In this case, because the Department failed to send updated notices after it obtained additional information, the court reversed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re I.B." on Justia Law

Mother was an enrolled member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe. After Jassenia, who was allegedly eligible for enrollment in the tribe, was removed from Mother’s care, the State filed a petition for adjudication pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247(3)(a). At issue before the juvenile court was whether the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied to the adjudication proceeding. The juvenile court determined that ICWA applied to the proceedings. Jassenia’s guardian ad litem appealed, asserting that Mother’s intent to relinquish custody of Jassenia rendered ICWA inapplicable. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the juvenile court’s order did not constitute a final, appealable order because the mere determination that ICWA applied, without further action, did not affect a substantial right. View "In re Interest of Jassenia H." on Justia Law

Doe and C.C.’s mother (Mother) are the biological parents of C.C., who was born in 2008. Doe, Mother, and C.C. are all members of the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of the Fort Hall Reservation (Tribes). Doe and Mother were never married, but lived together sporadically during the initial portion of C.C.’s life until Mother ended the relationship in 2010. In July of 2010, Doe shot Mother in front of C.C. Doe pleaded guilty to Attempted First Degree Murder and was sentenced to serve fifteen years, with nine years fixed. He was not eligible for parole until July of 2019. Mother married C.C.’s stepfather on October 15, 2010. Stepfather was also a member of the Tribes. The issue in this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a magistrate court’s judgment terminating John Doe’s parental rights and allowing C.C. to be adopted. Doe argued that the magistrate court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Termination of Parental Rights of John Doe (2014-25)" on Justia Law