Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Four children were referred to the Mendocino County Human Services Agency, based on neglect. Their mother, who had a substance abuse problem, disappeared for days and left the children with their maternal uncle, Rafael, who was unable to provide adequately for their needs due to disabilities. The Agency had received seven prior referrals for mother and her children, members of the Cloverdale Rancheria of Pomo Indians. The Agency contacted Cloverdale's Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901, who stated that Cloverdale Rancheria opposed placement with Rafael. Mother was eventually arrested; the children were taken into protective custody. Rafael indicated that he loved the children and had provided care since they were born. Social workers helped him apply for relative placement. No Indian homes were available. Mother initially requested that Rafael be considered for placement. The children, who were found to have multiple developmental, physical, and emotional problems, were ordered into long-term foster care. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Rafael’s claims that he was not given mandatory ICWA notices as an Indian custodian; that active efforts were not provided to prevent the breakup of the Indian family; that the detriment finding was defective; and that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Although the juvenile court failed to promptly investigate his Indian custodian status, any errors were harmless, given that mother revoked the custodianship. View "In re E.R." on Justia Law

Appellant the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes intervened in the adoption proceedings of a minor child (Child). While the adoption itself was not at issue on appeal, disputes that arose during the adoption proceedings were. Respondents Jane and John Doe (Does) initiated adoption proceedings for Child after the rights of Child’s parents were terminated. Because Child might have qualified for protection under the laws protecting an Indian child’s welfare, the Tribes were given notice and intervened in the adoption proceeding. The trial court appointed an independent attorney for the child whose costs were to be split by the Tribes and the Does. Discovery disputes arose during the proceedings, and the trial court issued sanctions against the Tribes. The trial court found the facts before it insufficient to establish that Child was an Indian child, and thus concluded that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not govern the proceeding. Despite this conclusion, the court applied the ICWA’s placement preferences out of concern for Child’s best interests. The Does prevailed in the adoption, and the court granted them attorney fees as the prevailing party. The Tribes contested the discovery rulings, sanctions, failure to find Child an Indian child, and the grant of attorney fees against them, claiming sovereign immunity and a misapplication of the law. The Idaho Supreme Court did not reach the issue of the trial court’s failure to find that Child was an Indian child because it concluded any error was harmless. However, the Court found that trial court’s order compelling discovery was an abuse of discretion. The trial court’s order preventing the Tribes from processing or filing any enrollment for tribal membership on behalf of Child was also an abuse of discretion. Further, the additional order granting attorney fees in the Does’ favor as the prevailing party violated the Tribes’ sovereign immunity. The Court reversed on these latter issues and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "John Doe v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes" on Justia Law

Mother Kimberly L. appealed a trial court's orders terminating her parental rights to Albert A. (A.A.) and Veronica A. (V.A.). Mother argued: (1) the juvenile court’s jurisdictional orders finding the children were dependents within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), were not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating reunification services and setting a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing; (3) the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying mother’s request to continue the permanency hearing to allow her time to file a petition under section 388 requesting additional reunification services; (4) the juvenile court’s orders finding the children were likely to be adopted were not supported by substantial evidence; and (5) the juvenile court erred by concluding legally sufficient notice was provided to relevant Indian tribes pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded mother waived her claim of error regarding the jurisdictional orders by not appealing the dispositions. Mother was absent from the continued jurisdictional hearing and was not entitled to notice of her right to appeal under California Rules of Court, rule 5.590(a). Because the Court concluded the juvenile court did not provide mother with timely and adequate notice of her right to challenge the orders setting a permanency hearing, as mandated by rule 5.590(b), mother did not waive her claim of error respecting the termination of reunification services. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by terminating reunification services or by denying a request to continue the permanency hearing because mother did not comply with her case plan and did not visit with the children. However, the Court agreed with mother that the juvenile court erred by not considering legal impediments to the children being adopted by their paternal grandmother when it found the children were likely to be adopted, and we agree with mother and CFS that the ICWA notice was inadequate. Therefore, the orders terminating parental rights was reversed and the case remanded for the juvenile court to consider legal impediments to the children being adopted, for CFS to provide new ICWA notice, and for the juvenile court to determine whether that notice was sufficient. View "In re Albert A." on Justia Law

Father appealed a jurisdictional finding and dispositional order in the dependency case of his three children, contending, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to find he is a current abuser of marijuana. The court concluded that father’s admitted use of marijuana, his failure to ensure his very young children were adequately supervised, and his absent drug tests all constituted sufficient evidence to support both the jurisdictional finding and the dispositional order. The court concluded, however, that father provided sufficient information of possible Indian heritage to trigger the Indian Child Welfare Act's, 25 U.S.C. 1901-1963, notice provisions. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's finding in that regard and remanded with directions. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "L.A. Cnty. DCFS v. Roland C." on Justia Law

Mother and Father appealed from the jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring their infant daughter a dependent of the juvenile court and removing her from their custody after the juvenile court sustained an amended petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. Mother and Father also contend that the juvenile court failed to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1900 et seq. The court concluded that the juvenile court's jurisdiction finding is supported by substantial evidence where there was ample evidence that Mother was hiding her current drug use. In this case, the court concluded that, due to the juvenile court's failure to comply with the requirements of the ICWA by not giving notice to the Cherokee tribe, the disposition order may only be conditionally affirmed. Accordingly, the court remanded for compliance with the ICWA and related California law. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "LA Cnty. DCFS v. Shahida R." on Justia Law

Father appealed from a judgment entered pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, selecting tribal customary adoption (TCA), as the permanent plan for his children. The court rejected Father's contention that the juvenile court erred in affording the TCA order full faith and credit. The court concluded that the Tribe “did not duly exercise subject matter jurisdiction prior to the initiation of the dependency proceedings under 25 U.S.C. section 1911(a), or by transfer under 25 U.S.C. section 1911(b).” In view of the legislative determination that an Indian child’s best interests normally will be best served by preserving his or her tribal connections, there being no evidence to the contrary, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in selecting the TCA as the permanent plan. The court rejected Father's claim that the juvenile court erred in affording the TCA order full faith and credit because he was not given an adequate opportunity to be heard on the visitation terms of the TCA order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fresno Cnty. Dept. of Social Serv. v. Jimmie S." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant S.H. (mother) was the biological mother of C.G. (born in 2013), the child at issue here, and B.H. (born in 2011), who was C.G.’s half sibling. Both children were removed from mother’s custody, and her parental rights were eventually terminated. On appeal, mother argued that the order terminating her parental rights as to C.G. should have been reversed for failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian and Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). After review of the specific facts entered into the trial court record, the Court of Appeal agreed, reversed and remanded. View "In re B.H." on Justia Law

G.L. appealed a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights. He argued the juvenile court erred by declaring him in default, finding the conditions and causes of the child's deprivation were likely to continue, and determining the Indian Child Welfare Act ("ICWA") did not apply. M.R., the child at issue, was placed in the custody of social services due to concerns that her mother was unfit to care for her. After the child was placed into custody, a social services employee petitioned for termination of parental rights. The petition stated that paternity had not been confirmed, but it noted an individual named V.G. could be the father. It was subsequently established that V.G. was not the father. G.L. then came forward claiming to be the father, but his paternity was never confirmed by biological testing. At a hearing on the petition, M.R.'s mother appeared and stated she desired to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights. In an interim order, the juvenile court noted ICWA might apply because G.L. was a member of the Spirit Lake Sioux Tribe. The juvenile court then sent notices of the right to intervene to the tribe. In response, Spirit Lake Tribal Social Services sent a letter stating that, after reviewing the case, the tribal court and the ICWA director "would support the current Termination of Parental Rights in order to establish permanency for [M.R.]." Noting G.L. had refused paternity testing, the tribe indicated it would not intervene unless there was biological proof G.L. was M.R.'s father. At the hearing on termination of parental rights, G.L.'s counsel was present, but G.L. failed to appear. His counsel requested a continuance so G.L. could be present; the court denied the motion. G.L.'s attorney told the court he had recently learned that G.L. was incarcerated in Minnesota. The court then took a recess to allow G.L.'s attorney to contact G.L. to determine whether he could appear by telephone. After the recess, G.L.'s attorney informed the court that he chose not to attempt to contact G.L. "based on all the conversations [he] had previously with [G.L.]." The hearing then proceeded in G.L.'s absence. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the juvenile court did not err when it terminated G.L.'s parental rights, and it affirmed the order. View "Interest of M.R." on Justia Law

Jennifer and Adam were the parents of three minor children: a daughter, Andrea, and two younger boys. The children were Indian children as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The State's Office of Children's Services (OCS) took three minor children into emergency custody, then sought a court order granting OCS temporary custody, asserting there was probable cause to find the children in need of aid. A standing master determined that no probable cause existed and recommended that the three children be returned to their mother's custody. The State objected to the master's recommendation, and the superior court reviewed and rejected it, finding that there was probable cause. The mother filed this appeal, asking the Supreme Court to hold that masters have the authority to return children to their homes without judicial review. Before the State filed its brief, the superior court dismissed the underlying case, making this appeal moot. After its review, the Supreme Court applied the "public interest" exception to the mootness doctrine and affirmed the superior court's ruling. View "Jennifer L. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

The dependency petition alleged that mother "K.B." had beat X.B., her youngest son, with a belt causing welts and bruises to his chest, shoulder, arms, and legs, and that she pushed X.B.’s head into a pillow to muffle his screams, causing him to feel as if he were suffocating. The petition alleged that mother had a history of using inappropriate discipline techniques on her sons, such as beating them with belts, humiliating K.B. in public, and forcing K.B. to complete strenuous exercise routines as punishment. The petition also alleged that mother allowed her live-in boyfriend to inappropriately punish K.B. and to smoke marijuana in the children’s presence. K.B. appealed the trial court’s order placing X.B. with his nonoffending and noncustodial biological father, K.D. (father), who lived out of state. She argued that the court erred by failing to find under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (a), that it would be detrimental to X.B.’s emotional well-being to be separated from his maternal family. Mother requested that X.B. be placed with his older sibling in the home of his maternal grandmother. She also argued that the court failed to give proper notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "In re K.B." on Justia Law