Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

A Mother appealed a juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her children, Isaiah R. and Summer R., who were four years old and one year old when removed from her custody in 2017. Her only challenge on appeal was that the court found the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) didn’t apply to the children despite a report by both maternal grandparents revealing that their great-grandmother was a member of the Yaqui of Arizona. Mother and father were present at the initial detention hearing and both denied having Indian ancestry; the trial judge found ICWA didn’t apply. Both parents failed to reunify, and the maternal grandparents sought custody. At the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366 permanency planning review hearing, the grandparents completed forms where they indicated the children had Indian ancestry. The Court of Appeal agreed with Mother that the grandparents’ disclosure triggered a duty for the Children and Family Services department to inquire further, and therefore conditionally reversed the order terminating parental rights and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re S.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court terminating Respondents' parental rights to their child, holding that the trial court impermissibly failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act.After a hearing, the trial court entered an order in which it determined that grounds existed to terminate Respondents' parental rights and concluded that termination of Respondents' parental rights was in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to conduct a new hearing on termination of Respondents' parental rights, holding that the trial court did not comply with 25 C.F.R. 23.107(a) and therefore could not determine whether it had reason to know that the child was an Indian child. View "In re M.L.B." on Justia Law

The juvenile court asserted emergency jurisdiction over seven-year-old A.T., whose mentally ill mother had taken him from Washington state to California in violation of Washington family court orders. The court detained A.T., placed him temporarily with his father in Washington, and initiated contact with the Washington family court to address which state had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). In the meantime, the Wiyot Tribe intervened and, with A.T.’s mother asserted Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) required the court to retain jurisdiction in California.The juvenile court determined ICWA was inapplicable and that the Washington family court had continuing exclusive jurisdiction and dismissed the dependency action in favor of the family court proceedings in Washington. The court of appeal affirmed. The juvenile court properly applied the UCCJEA and dismissed the dependency action in favor of family court proceedings in Washington state after finding ICWA inapplicable because the child had been placed with his non-offending parent. ICWA and the related California statutory scheme expressly focus on the removal of Indian children from their homes and parents and placement in foster or adoptive homes. View "In re A.T." on Justia Law

The Alaska Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took custody of three Indian children after reports of substance abuse and domestic violence in their mother’s home. For two years OCS was unable to contact the children’s father, who also struggled with substance abuse issues. Once OCS did contact the father, both he and the mother consented to temporarily place the children with a guardian. OCS then reduced its efforts to reunify the children with their father. Then the children’s mother died. The father was incarcerated for several months; he completed classes and substance abuse treatment. After he was released, he maintained his sobriety and began limited contact with OCS and with his children. Approximately four years after taking custody of the children, OCS moved to terminate the father’s parental rights. After the superior court terminated his rights, the father appealed, arguing OCS failed to make active efforts to reunify him with his children as required by ICWA. To this the Alaska Supreme Court concurred, and reversed the termination of his parental rights. View "C.J. (Father) v. Alaska, DHSS, OCS" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Mother's parental rights to her child, holding that the district court did not err in terminating Mother's parental rights under state and federal law.In terminating Mother's parental rights to her child the district court made the additional findings and used the heightened evidentiary standards required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) in failing to make specific findings under the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act when terminating Mother's parental rights; (2) when it terminated Mother's parental rights under Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-609 and 25 U.S.C. 1912; and (3) in terminating Mother's rights under federal and state law. View "Matter of K.L.N." on Justia Law

Two of L.K.’s three children were Indian children for the purposes of federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and Washington State Indian Child Welfare Act (WICWA). L.K. claimed the State Department of Children, Youth, and Families (Department) removed her children without making "active efforts" to keep the family together as was required under the two laws. The Court of Appeals did not address this issue but, instead, sua sponte found that under the invited error doctrine, L.K. was precluded from raising this issue on appeal, holding that because L.K. repeatedly contended she did not need services, she could not now claim on appeal that the Department did not provide her sufficient services under ICWA and WICWA. It did not reach the issue of whether the Department provided active efforts. The Washington Supreme Court reversed appellate court's holding regarding "invited error." With respect to "active efforts," the Supreme Court found the Department did not engage in the statutorily required active efforts to prevent the breakup of an Indian family. Accordingly, the dispositional order continuing L.R.C.K.-S. and D.B.C.K.-S.’s foster care placement was vacated. The matter was remanded for immediate return of these two children to their mother, unless the trial court finds returning the children put them in “substantial and immediate danger or threat of such danger.” The finding of dependency was unaffected. View "In re Dependency of A.L.K., L.R.C.K.-S., D.B.C.K.-S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this termination of parental rights case to the trial court, holding that while the trial court correctly applied North Carolina law in terminating Mother's parental rights, the case should be remanded for further proceedings intended to ensure compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901-1963.The trial court found that Mother's parental rights were subject to termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-1111(a)(1) and (2) and that termination of Mother's parental rights would be in the child's best interests. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct an inquiry into the issue of whether a guardian ad litem should have been appointed for Mother; (2) the trial court did not err in determining that Mother's parental rights were subject to termination for neglect and that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the child's best interests; and (3) this case should be remanded for further proceedings concerning whether the notice of ICWA were complied with and whether the child was an Indian child for purposes of ICWA. View "In re N.K." on Justia Law

At issue in these two appeals is whether the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services complied with their duties of inquiry and notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and related California law.The Court of Appeal agreed that the Department failed to adequately investigate mother's claim of Indian ancestry and the juvenile court failed to ensure an appropriate inquiry had been conducted before concluding, if it ever actually did, ICWA did not apply to these proceedings. Therefore, the court disagreed with the holding In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 888-889, that amendments enacted by Assembly Bill No. 3176 were intended to limit the Department's robust duty of inquiry. The court conditionally reversed the orders for legal guardianship and remanded the matters to allow the Department and the juvenile court to rectify their errors and to take all other necessary corrective actions. View "In re T.G." on Justia Law

C.V. (Mother) appealed an order issued under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.261 selecting adoption as the permanent plan for her son N.S. and terminating her parental rights. N.S.’s father was a member of the San Pasqual Band of Mission Indians (the Tribe). The Tribe was involved in this case since the juvenile court found that N.S. was an Indian child and that the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) applied. On appeal, Mother contended: (1) the Tribe’s “decree” selecting guardianship as the best permanent plan option for N.S. preempted the statutory preference for adoption under section 366.26; (2) N.S.’s counsel breached his duties under section 317 and provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to discover what Tribal benefits or membership rights were available to N.S. before the termination of parental rights; (3) the court erred in finding that the Indian child exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(vi)(I) and (II) did not apply to preclude termination of parental rights; (4) there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody in Mother’s care would be a substantial risk to N.S.; and (5) the court erred in finding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) does not apply to preclude termination of parental rights. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders, holding that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) does not apply here. Mother contends that the juvenile court and DCFS failed to satisfy the formal notice requirements under the ICWA and related California law.In this case, the initial inquiry conducted by the juvenile court created a "reason to believe" the children possibly are Indian children; DCFS's repeated efforts to gather information concerning the children's maternal ancestry constitutes substantial evidence that DCFS met its duty of further inquiry; but the juvenile court and DCFS's further investigation did not yield results that pushed their reason to believe the children are Indian children, to reason to know the children are Indian children. The court explained that a suggestion of Indian ancestry is not sufficient under ICWA or related California law to trigger the notice requirement. Because DCFS was not required to provide formal notice to the pertinent tribes, the court did not reach Mother's argument that the ICWA notices may have lacked necessary information. View "In re Dominic F." on Justia Law