Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

At dispute in this case was the Crow Water Compact - an agreement among the United States, the Crow Tribe, and the State - which recognizes a Tribal Water Right of the Crow Tribe and its members in a number of sources of water that abut or cross the Crow Indian Reservation in Montana. Here, a group of Crow tribal member Allottees - persons who hold interests in parcels of former Tribal land mostly created by the General Allotment Act - objected to the Compact in the Water Court, claiming that the United States breached its fiduciary duties to the Allottees by failing to protect their water rights in the Compact and failing to adequately represent them in Compact proceedings. The Water Court dismissed the Allottees’ objections. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Water Court (1) applied the proper legal standard of review in dismissing the Allottees’ objections; (2) did not exceed its jurisdiction by dismissing the Allottees’ action rather than staying consideration of the Compact pending resolution of the Allottees’ action in federal district court; and (3) did not err in determining that the Allottees have rights to a share of the Crow Tribal Water Right and that the United States adequately represented the Allottees during the Compact negotiations. View "In re Crow Water Compact" on Justia Law

This case involved numerous claims concerning environmental hazards at three sites on Navajo land in Arizona. El Paso, the successor-in-interest to the corporation that mined uranium at the Mill, filed suit against the United States and others, raising claims under the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. 7901-7942, and the Solid Waste Disposal Act, commonly referred to as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901-6992k. The Tribe intervened and asserted parallel claims under these acts, as well as additional claims against the Government. The court reversed the dismissal "with prejudice" of El Paso's RCRA claims that related to the Dump; remanded with instructions to the district court to enter judgment against El Paso "without prejudice;" vacated the district court's dismissal of El Passo's RCRA claims as to the Highway 160 Site; remanded the case so that these claims could be considered on the merits; and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all other respects. View "El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

Oklahoma petitioned for review of the EPA's final rule establishing a federal implementation plan for the attainment of national air quality standards in "Indian country." The court held that a state has regulatory jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., over all land within its territory and outside the boundaries of an Indian reservation except insofar as an Indian tribe or the EPA has demonstrated a tribe has jurisdiction. In this instance, the EPA was without authority to displace Oklahoma's state implementation plan on non-reservation Indian country where the agency requires a tribe to show it has jurisdiction before regulating Indian country outside a reservation, yet made no demonstration of tribal jurisdiction before itself regulating those areas. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and vacated the Rule with respect to non-reservation lands. View "OK Dept. Environmetal Quality v. EPA" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the validity of an amended rule from the Department of Ecology that reserved water from the Skagit River system for future year-round out-of-stream uses, despite the fact that in times of low stream flows these uses would impair established minimum in-stream flows necessary for fish, wildlife, recreation, navigation, scenic and aesthetic values. The Swinomish Indian Tribal Community (Tribe) sued, challenging the validity of Ecology's amended rule reserving the water. The trial court upheld the amended rule and dismissed the Tribe's petition. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that Ecology erroneously interpreted the statutory exception as broad authority to reallocate water for new beneficial uses when the requirements for appropriating water for these uses otherwise cannot be met. "The exception is very narrow, however, and requires extraordinary circumstances before the minimum flow water right can be impaired." Because the amended rule exceeded Ecology's authority under the statute, the amended rule reserving the water was invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). View "Swinomish Indian Tribal Comm'y v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law

Before 2009, the Alaska Board of Game employed a controversial scoring system in order to distribute permits to subsistence hunters in a popular caribou and moose hunting area between Anchorage and Fairbanks. In 2009, the Board amended its regulations to abolish the scoring system and replace it with two separate subsistence hunts: a community harvest hunt for groups and a separate hunt for individuals. A local tribe was subsequently granted a community harvest permit pursuant to the new rules. An individual resident brought suit challenging the new system, alleging violations of the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act, his due process rights, the Board’s governing statutes, and several provisions of the Alaska Constitution. The tribe intervened on the side of the State and a private organization intervened on the side of the individual. In July 2010, the superior court granted summary judgment and enjoined the community harvest hunt as unconstitutional. The superior court later awarded attorney’s fees to the individual and private organization. The tribe appealed both decisions to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Court concluded that the underlying appeal was moot because the challenged regulation had been substantively changed since 2009. Accordingly, the case was dismissed. View "Nene v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

The Tribe filed a complaint regarding the government's management of the Central and Southern Florida Project for Flood Control in the Everglades. The gist of the four-count complaint the Tribe filed was that the project diverted excessive flood waters over tribal lands. The district court dismissed three of the complaint's counts for failure to state a claim for relief and the fourth on summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court properly dismissed Count I because the complaint contained nothing to support Count I's allegation that the Corps had an obligation to protect and not interfere with the Tribe's rights; the district court properly dismissed Count II because it contained no allegation of the process the Tribe claimed was due, much less that it was inadequate; the district court properly dismissed Count III because it failed for the same reasons the court found Count I insufficient to state a claim; and the district court properly dismissed Count IV because its allegations were vague and ambiguous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of FL v. United States, et al" on Justia Law

On December 14, 2012, the district court issued an alternative writ of mandate directing several irrigation districts to comply with Mont. Code Ann. 85-7-1956 and -1957 before executing a water use agreement with the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Nation and the United States. On February 15, 2013, the district court issued another writ of mandate that rescinded and superseded the alternative writ of mandate. The writ of mandate enjoined the irrigation districts from entering into the proposed agreement. The Supreme Court vacated both the district court's writ of mandate and injunction and the court's alternative writ of mandate, holding that the district court (1) issued an appealable order, making the appeal from the district court's writ of mandate and injunction as well as the issue of whether the statutes apply to the water use agreement properly before the Court; (2) improperly granted the writ of mandate and injunction; and (3) incorrectly compelled the irrigation districts to comply with sections 85-7-1956 and -1957 before they executed the water use agreement. View "W. Mont. Water Users Ass'n, LLC v. Mission Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the adjudication of water rights in the Yakima River Basin. The parties brought various challenges to the conditional final order of the trial court determining their water rights. The Court of appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court for direct appeal. Upon review, the Court reversed the trial court's decision concerning the quantification of irrigable land on the Yakama reservation, and reversed the trial court's determinations regarding the Nation's right to store water. The Court affirmed the trial court's conclusions regarding the rights of nontribal claimants to excess water, but reversed the application of the "future development excuse" under RCW 90.14.140(2)(c) for nonuse of a water right. Finally, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of several individual water rights claims. View "In re Rights to Waters of Yakima River Drainage Basin (Acquavella)" on Justia Law

Six tribal councils, joined by two other associations, filed an action against the State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in the superior court seeking a declaratory judgment that the 2005 Bristol Bay Area Plan (BBAP, the Plan) was unlawful. DNR’s motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) was denied and the superior court held that: (1) the BBAP is a regulation that must be promulgated under the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and (2) Alaska Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) does not bar the Tribes’ claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) did not bar the Tribe's claims and the that BBAP is not a regulation.View "Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources v. Nondalton Tribal Council" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Shinnecock Indian Nation entered began construction of a 61,000-square-foot casino on 80 acres in Southampton, New York. The Tribe did not obtain permits from the state or the town, but began bulldozing trees and brush. The state sued in state court, alleging that the planned casino violates state law, and is outside the scope of the IGRA (a federal act authorizing tribal gaming under certain conditions) because the Tribe is not federally recognized and the site is not “Indian lands” and that construction would violate state environmental laws. The Shinnecock removed the case to federal court on the basis that the complaint pleaded issues of federal law. The State moved to remand the action to state court, arguing that its complaint is based entirely on violations of New York state law, that removal was based on the complaint’s anticipation of defenses, and that the its reference to the IGRA asserts only that the IGRA does not apply. The district court denied remand, conducted a bench trial, and granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the Shinnecock from building a casino without complying with state and local law. The Second Circuit vacated, holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. View "State of New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation" on Justia Law