Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for four counts of sexual abuse of a minor and one count of assault to his girlfriend resulting in serious bodily injury, all occurring in Indian country. Defendant's girlfriend died from her injuries twenty-one months after the assault. The minor is a relative of the girlfriend who was living with the couple. The court concluded that the minor's testimony was sufficient to support the sexual abuse convictions; the district court erred in admitting the hearsay statement of the girlfriend's former husband where the girlfriend had stated that defendant was the person who committed the assault, but the erroneous evidentiary ruling did not affect defendant’s substantial rights where the record as a whole, excluding the testimony, was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for the assault; the evidence amply supported the verdict; and, in regard to defendant's sentence of 293 months in prison, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying an upward departure under USSG 4A1.3 for inadequacy of criminal history category, and USSG 5K2.1 for conduct resulting in death. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Stoney End of Horn" on Justia Law

Jason Merida, the former executive director of construction for the Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma (the Nation), was convicted after a fifteen-day jury trial on six counts of a seven-count indictment. The indictment alleged Merida conspired to receive cash and other remuneration from subcontractors performing work on construction projects for the Nation, embezzled in excess of $500,000 by submitting and approving false subcontractor invoices, and willfully failed to report income on his 2009 and 2010 federal tax returns. Merida testified in his own defense at trial and, on cross-examination, prosecutors impeached his testimony using the transcript of an interview the Nation’s attorneys had conducted with him as part of a separate civil lawsuit, before the initiation of these criminal proceedings. Merida objected to the use of the transcript and moved for mistrial, arguing the transcript was protected by the attorney-client privilege and its use prejudicially damaged his credibility with the jury. The district court denied his motion for a mistrial and the jury convicted Merida on all but one count. Merida timely appealed the trial judge’s denial of his motion for mistrial. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Merida" on Justia Law

Defendant Roger Barnett served as Second Chief of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation in 2013 and 2014. He pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma to embezzling funds from the Tribe by appropriating to his own use money withdrawn from ATM machines. The sole issue on this appeal was whether the district court properly determined the amount of money embezzled for purposes of calculating Defendant’s offense level and the amount he owed the Tribe in restitution. Defendant argued that the court’s reliance on the presentence report (PSR) and Addendum was improper because the government failed to present at sentencing any evidence of the amount of loss. The Tenth Circuit disagreed: the district court could properly rely on the PSR and Addendum because Defendant did not adequately challenge their recitations of the evidence concerning his defalcations. The only issue that he preserved for appeal was whether the recited evidence sufficed to support the court’s determination of the amount of loss, and the Tenth Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient. View "United States v. Barnett" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of one count of assault and two counts of domestic assault by a habitual offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 117. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting testimony of defendant's then girlfriend about the facts underlying his three prior tribal-court convictions for domestic abuse because the testimony was relevant to prove that the convictions had occurred and that she was a spouse or intimate partner; regardless of whether the testimony was relevant to prove that defendant's prior crimes constituted "any assault" under section 117, it was admissible for other purposes; and any prejudicial effect that the testimony might have had on the jury was mitigated by the district court's curative instruction. The court also concluded that, because the right of counsel does not apply in tribal-court proceedings, the use of defendant's prior tribal-court convictions as predicate offenses in a section 117(a) prosecution does not violate the Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Drapeau" on Justia Law

Enacted in response to the high incidence of domestic violence against Native American women, 18 U.S.C. 117(a), applies to any person who “commits a domestic assault within . . . Indian country” and who has at least two prior convictions for domestic violence rendered “in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court proceedings.” The Sixth Amendment guarantees indigent defendants appointed counsel in state or federal proceedings in which a term of imprisonment is imposed, but does not apply in tribal-court proceedings. The Indian Civil Rights Act, (ICRA) which governs tribal-court proceedings, includes a right to appointed counsel only for sentences exceeding one year, 25 U.S.C. 1302(c)(2). Supreme Court precedent holds that convictions obtained in state or federal court in violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot be used in subsequent proceedings “to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense” except for uncounseled misdemeanor convictions for which no prison term was imposed. The Ninth Circuit reversed Bryant’s section 117(a) conviction, finding that the Sixth Amendment precluded use of his prior, uncounseled, tribal-court convictions a predicate offenses. The Supreme Court reversed. Because Bryant’s tribal-court convictions complied with ICRA and were valid when entered, use of those convictions as predicate offenses in a section 117(a) prosecution does not violate the Constitution. Bryant’s sentence for violating section 117(a) punishes his most recent acts of domestic assault, not his prior crimes. He suffered no Sixth Amendment violation in tribal court, so he cannot “suffe[r] anew” from a prior deprivation. ICRA sufficiently ensures the reliability of tribal-court convictions, guaranteeing “due process of law,” providing other procedural safeguards, and allowing a prisoner to challenge the fundamental fairness of proceedings in federal habeas proceedings. View "United States v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Defendant, a non-Indian, appealed his conviction under the federal murder statute, 18 U.S.C. 111, for the murder of the victim on the Tohono O’odham Indian reservation in Arizona. The court concluded that section 1111 was applicable to defendant under the Indian General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1152, which makes federal criminal law applicable in federal enclaves when the defendant is a non-Indian and the victim is an Indian, because the government adduced sufficient evidence to establish that the victim in this case was an Indian. The court held that the evidence introduced at trial, taken in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to establish that defendant acted with premeditation and, therefore, the court affirmed defendant's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. Because the district court erred in defining the term “burglary” in section 1111 by reference to Arizona’s third-degree burglary statute, and this error was not harmless, the court vacated defendant's conviction for felony murder. View "United States v. Reza-Ramos" on Justia Law

Defendants Christopher and Jordan were found guilty of assault with a dangerous weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, both in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2, 113, and 1153. The court concluded that the admission of the certificates of the degree of Indian blood did not violate Christopher’s and Jordan’s Sixth Amendment rights because they were admissible as non-testimonial business records. In this case, the enrollment clerk here did not complete forensic testing on evidence seized during a police investigation, but instead performed the ministerial duty of preparing certificates based on information that was kept in the ordinary course of business. Moreover, in addition to the certificates, the government elicited testimony from the deputy superintendent for trust services that Christopher and Jordan were enrolled in the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the lesser-included-offense instruction; there was no error in the district court’s questioning of the emergency room doctor; and the evidence was sufficient to convict Jordan of assault with a dangerous weapon or assault resulting in serious bodily injuries. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Rainbow" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for domestic assault in Indian country by an habitual offender in violation of 18 U.S.C. 117. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying defendant’s motion in limine and in allowing the government to use his prior simple-assault conviction as a predicate offense under section 117(a); it was reasonable for the jury to credit the victim’s corroborated testimony and find defendant guilty of domestic assault; and defendant's sentence is substantively reasonable where the district court sentenced him at the bottom of the Guidelines range after considering various factors such as his health, history of criminal assault, seriousness of domestic violence, failure to accept responsibility, and his lack of remorse. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Harlan" on Justia Law

Long, a member of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, operated the “OC Store,” a novelty store, on the reservation. The store had few exterior windows. BIA Officer Spargur encountered juveniles, carrying fireworks. One juvenile stated that he just bought them at the OC Store. Spargur went to the Store, was unsure whether it was closed, but concluded the store was open because of lights, music, unlocked doors, and the juveniles’ report that they had “just” purchased fireworks. Spargur entered through two unlocked doors, stopped at a third door, and “knock[ed] and announce[d] police.” Receiving no response, Spargur opened the main door, and, seeing Long’s son, entered the store. Another of Long’s sons acknowledged the juveniles had been in the store. Spargur noticed a small package on one of the concession tables that, based on his experience and training, he “recognized . . . as a package normally holding synthetic marijuana.” Once Long emerged, Spargur reminded him not to sell fireworks after Independence Day, left the store, and prepared an affidavit for a search warrant. A judge, 60 miles away, approved the warrant by telephone. Spargur and others searched the store, seizing 80 grams of synthetic marijuana. Long conditionally pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The Eighth Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss, finding that the officers’ actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Long" on Justia Law

The indictment alleged that "within the Omaha Indian Reservation in Indian Country, [Webster], an Indian male, did knowingly engage in a sexual act with A.C., a child who had not attained the age of 12 years.” The jurisdictional statute, 18 U.S.C. 1152, provides: Except as otherwise expressly provided … the general laws of the United States … shall extend to the Indian country. This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian ... who has been punished by the local law of the tribe. The indictment did not allege A.C. was a non-Indian or that Webster had not faced tribal punishment. At trial, Webster stipulated that he is an Indian and A.C. is a non-Indian. The court excluded references to a tribal complaint filed against Webster, which had been dismissed. Webster was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, 18 U.S.C. 2241(c). The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and upholding the decision not to admit the tribal complaint. Even if the victim’s status is an element of section 1152, the indictment’s failure to allege A.C.’s status did not render it “so defective that by no reasonable construction can it be said to charge the offense.” View "United States v. Webster" on Justia Law