Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1153, which provided for federal jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. The court held that the Tribal Enrollment Certificate was insufficient to establish that defendant was an Indian for the purposes of federal jurisdiction under section 1153 because the government introduced no evidence that defendant's bloodline was derived from a federally recognized tribe. Because the court held that the government introduced insufficient evidence under the first prong of the United States v. Bruce test, the court need not consider whether the Tribal Enrollment Certificate alone was sufficient to carry the government's burden as to the second prong. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's convictions under section 1153 in counts 2 through 9 of the indictment. Defendant's conviction for conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 was unaffected by the court's disposition.View "United States v. Zepeda" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit bribery of an Indian tribal official, and aiding and abetting a bribery involving an agent of an Indian tribal government. Defendant raised evidentiary challenges on appeal. The court held that the district court did not plainly err in determining that evidence relating to uncharged bribery activity was "intrinsic" to the charged conspiracy and therefore admissible notwithstanding the government's failure to give defendant pretrial notice of its intent to use this evidence. Given the substantial evidence of defendant's guilt, and defendant's failure to object and his decision to rehash the same testimony on cross-examination, the court concluded that defendant was not sufficiently prejudiced by the admission of the testimony at issue for the court to exercise its discretion to recognize plain error, if any existed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "United States v. Duane Dale Big Eagle" on Justia Law

Defendant, the Bureau of Indian Affairs Superintendent at the Fort Peck Indian Reservation, was convicted of charges stemming from her involvement in a scheme to obtain money from a tribal credit program. The court reversed defendant's convictions on Counts I and II (conspiracy, theft and conversion of Indian Tribal Organization property) because the alleged object of the conspiracy - the loan modification - was not itself criminal and, therefore, there could be no conspiracy; affirmed defendant's conviction on Count III (bribery) where a rational jury could easily infer a quid pro quo from the facts; reversed defendant's conviction on Count IV (falsification, concealment, or covering up of a material fact) because the government did not show that defendant violated a specific duty to report Credit Program fraud; reversed defendant's conviction on Count V (public acts affecting a personal financial interest) because defendant's financial interest in this matter was insufficient under 18 U.S.C. 208(a); and affirmed defendant's conviction on Count VI (misprision of a felony) where a jury could conclude that payment of the loans at issue made the discovery of the fraud less likely and, therefore, that defendant took an affirmative step to conceal the felony. The court also concluded that there was no Fifth Amendment violation arising out of defendant's convictions on Count V and VI. Finally, the court remanded for resentencing where the district court erred in adjusting the sentence. View "United States v. White Eagle" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Magnan pled guilty to three county of murder in the first degree and one count of shooting with intent to kill. He was sentenced to death for each murder conviction, and to life for the shooting. In his application for habeas relief to the district court, Petitioner argued that his crimes took place in "Indian country," and that as a result, the state trial court lacked jurisdiction over the crimes. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found that a 1970 conveyance of property from the Seminole Nation to the federal Housing Authority extinguished any "Indian Country" designation; even assuming that the Seminole Nation retained some rights to the property in question, those rights were insufficient to deprive the State of criminal jurisdiction. The district court denied the writ application but granted a certificate of appealability. After its review of the case, the Tenth Circuit concluded that conveyance of the surface estate to the land in which the crimes took place were insufficient to extinguish Seminole Nation control over it. Therefore, the land in question was indeed "Indian Country" and therefore the state trial court lacked jurisdiction over the crimes. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case with instructions to grant Petitioner habeas relief. View "Magnan v. Workman, et al" on Justia Law

Tribal authorities of the Tohono O'odham nation charged LKAV, age 17, with murder in May 2009. In November 2011, the United States moved to commit LKAV pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4241 to an adult medical facility for psychiatric treatment. The court held that when the United States charges a juvenile with an act of juvenile delinquency under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), 18 U.S.C. 5031-42, the district court must follow 18 U.S.C. 5037(e) if it committed the juvenile for a study of the juvenile's competency to stand trial. Because the district court in this case instead committed LKAV under 18 U.S.C. 4241(d), the court reversed the judgment. View "United States V. LKAV, Juvenile Male" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his jury conviction and sentence for assault resulting in serious bodily injury on an Indian reservation. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it determined that the Certificate of Indian Blood was a self-authenticating document under Fed. R. Evid. 902(2). Because the error was not harmless, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion in limine, thus it did not deny defendant's right to present a defense. Finally, the district court's application of the sentencing enhancement for serious bodily injury was not clearly erroneous. View "United States v. Alvirez, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant, a member of the Spirit Lake Tribe in North Dakota, was charged with crimes related to her administration of the Tribe's Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program. Defendant was found guilty of embezzlement and willful misapplication. On appeal, defendant challenged her conviction and sentence. The court held that the district court did not err when it instructed the jury that, to find defendant guilty of misapplying tribal property, it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that she used tribal funds or property "knowing that such use [was] unauthorized, or unjustifiable, or wrongful." The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give the proposed good faith instruction but permitting defendant to introduce evidence that supported her claim of good faith and argue its significance to the jury. Finally, the court held that defendant's contention that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a special condition of her probation, that required her to abstain from the use of alcohol and to submit to drug and alcohol screening, was without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Robertson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of being an accessory after the fact, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3, 1151, and 1153(a), by assisting her boyfriend to avoid apprehension knowing that he had committed a murder in Indian country. The court agreed with defendant's contention that the district court erred by instructing the jury that the boyfriend was guilty of an offense against the United States; admitting a minute entry from the boyfriend's criminal case reciting that he had pleaded guilty "to Count 6 of the Superseding Indictment" to prove that he committed the predicate offense; and precluding defendant from presenting evidence that the boyfriend's action, and her knowledge of his action, included facts that could persuade a jury to find that the boyfriend acted in self-defense. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with directions to enter a judgment of acquittal. View "United States v. Head" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Amanda Addison and Melody St. Clair were tried for embezzling or converting funds from Northern Arapahoe Tribe’s Department of Social Services (DSS). On the third day of trial, the trial judge declared a mistrial as to St. Clair only and excluded her from the courtroom for the remainder of the trial. Addison was convicted. She appealed, raising two issues: (1) whether the exclusion of St. Clair violated Addison’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial; and, (2) the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate criminal intent. Because the district court had a substantial reason for excluding St. Clair, no Sixth Amendment violation occurred. The evidence was sufficient to prove her knowing and intentional taking of DSS funds. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Addison" on Justia Law

David S. appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter Hannah, who is an Indian child. Hannah was taken into the custody by the Office of Children's Services (OCS) while David was incarcerated. David remained in jail for the first 20 months of Hannah's life. David was released from prison and was on parole for five months, during which time he had regular visits with Hannah. David then became a fugitive for nine months, before being recaptured and reincarcerated. While David was a fugitive, OCS petitioned for termination of his parental rights, and two months after David was returned to prison, the superior court held a termination trial. The superior court found that Hannah was a child in need of aid due to David’s abandonment, incarceration, and substance abuse. The superior court also concluded that OCS had engaged in active efforts to help David's rehabilitation, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act, and that it was in Hannah's best interests for David's parental rights to be terminated. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's ruling because OCS established all requirements necessary for termination.View "David S. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs" on Justia Law