Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Brown, Reyes, Lyons, and Tibbetts were indicted under the Lacey Act which makes it unlawful to "sell . . . any fish . . . taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of . . . any Indian tribal law." 16 U.S.C. 3372(a)(1). The indictments alleged that they had netted fish for commercial purposes within the boundaries of the Leech Lake Reservation in violation of the Leech Lake Conservation Code, then sold the fish. The four are Chippewa Indians, and they moved to dismiss the indictments on the ground that their prosecution violates fishing rights reserved under the 1837 Treaty between the United States and the Chippewa. The district court granted the motions. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the historic fishing rights of the Chippewa Indians bar the prosecution for taking fish within the Leech Lake Reservation. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2011 the Roy home on the Red Lake Indian Reservation was engulfed in flames and collapsed before fire crews could extinguish the fire. The next morning the bodies of Roy and Beaulieu were retrieved from the rubble. Autopsies indicated that Roy and Beaulieu had been stabbed multiple times before the fire and that their death was caused by exsanguination. A jury convicted defendants, including Martin and Robinson, under 18 U.S.C. 1153, which allows the federal government to prosecute certain "offenses committed within Indian country," including murder or robbery. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of improper ex parte contact by the district court with the jury venire; that the government failed to prove Martin’s Indian status under section 1153 even though he stipulated to that fact; that the court erred by denying Robinson’s motions to sever and allowing the prosecutor to comment on his failure to testify; and that the court erred by declining to give Martin lesser included instruction on theft and by enhancing his sentence by six levels under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(3)(C) for infliction of permanent bodily injury. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

Archambault, a Native American, has many prior convictions for child neglect and substance abuse in the Tribal Court and a history of mental health problems. Archambault's 13-year-old son told a healthcare worker that his mother began forcing him to smoke marijuana when he was six years old and that he had been prescribed Ritalin, but his mother took it from him. His mother would crush the pills and either inhale or inject them. Archambault sold pills that she did not use. Her son stated that he would get in trouble if he took the Ritalin himself. The Bureau of Indian Affairs interviewed Archambault. She admitted using and selling Ritalin and giving her son marijuana. Indicted for distribution of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), she violated the terms of her release by testing positive for alcohol and marijuana and by disorderly conduct. She pled guilty. The court calculated a guideline range of four to 10 months, heard arguments, discussed the section 3553(a) factors, and concluded that Archambault posed a risk to her child, had an extensive tribal criminal history not reflected in her guideline category, and had performed poorly on pretrial release, then sentenced her to 18 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the the sentence. View "United States v. Archambault" on Justia Law

Brooks, a member of the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, is incarcerated for Minnesota convictions of first-degree DWI and assaulting an officer. The Minnesota Department of Corrections (MDOC) requires a chemical-dependency assessment. Brooks was ordered to complete treatment in order to be transferred to a lower-security prison, qualify for work release, and avoid disciplinary sanctions. Brooks began treatment in 2011, but, in 2012, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc; the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. 1996; and the Minnesota Constitution. He claimed that his required chemical-dependency program deprived him of his right to the free exercise of his religion. The district court dismissed some claims and granted summary judgment for the defendants on all others. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, because, based on the complaint, the court and the defendants could not discern what beliefs he has or what faith he professes. View "Brooks v. Roy" on Justia Law

The Ho-Chunk Nation, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, operates casinos in Wisconsin and nets more than $200 million annually from its gambling operations. Cash Systems, one of three businesses involved in this case, engaged in issuing cash to casino customers via automated teller machines and kiosks, check-cashing, and credit- and debit-card advances. Whiteagle, a member of the Nation, held himself out as an insider and offered vendors an entrée into the tribe’s governance and gaming operations. Cash Systems engaged Whiteagle in 2002 as a confidential consultant. Cash Systems served as the Nation’s cash-access services vendor for the next six years, earning more than seven million dollars, while it paid Whiteagle just under two million dollars. Whiteagles’s “in” was his relationship with Pettibone, who had been serving in the Ho-Chunk legislature since 1995. Ultimately, Whiteagle, Pettibone, and another were charged with conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371) to commit bribery in connection with the contracts with the Ho-Chunk Nation and substantive bribery (18 U.S.C. 666). Whiteagle was also charged with tax evasion and witness tampering. Pettibone pleaded guilty to corruptly accepting a car with the intent to be influenced in connection with a contract. Whiteagle admitted that he had solicited money and other things of value for Pettibone from three companies, but denied actually paying bribes to Pettibone and insisted that he and Pettibone had advocated for Whiteagle’s clients based on what they believed to be the genuine merits of those clients. Convicted on all counts, Whiteagle was sentenced, below-guidelines, to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on the bribery charges, the loss calculation, and admission of certain evidence.View "United States v. Whiteagle" on Justia Law

South Dakota Native American inmates filed suit against defendants claiming that a tobacco ban substantially burdened the exercise of their religious beliefs in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a). The court concluded that the record amply showed that the inmates have satisfied their burden. That some Native Americans practicing the Lakota religion would consider red willow bark a sufficient alternative to tobacco did not undermine the decision of the district court. Even assuming that defendants' ban on tobacco furthered compelling government interests in security and order, the ban was not the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. The court concluded that the scope of the district court's remedial orders extended no further than necessary to remedy the violation of inmates' rights under RLUIPA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of injunctive relief in all respects. View "Native American Council, etc., et al. v. Weber, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Philbert Rentz fired a single gunshot that wounded one victim and killed another. He was charged with two separate counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence. Defendant moved to dismiss the second count. The district court granted his motion, holding that the applicable statute under which defendant was charged could not support multiple charges arising from a single use of a firearm. The Government appealed the pre-trial dismissal of the second count. Finding that the trial court erred in dismissing the second count, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Rentz" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of mail fraud and theft by an officer or employee of a gaming establishment on Indian lands. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction. The court concluded that the location of the gaming establishment was not an element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. 1168(b) and that the indictment adequately alleged mail fraud and theft by an officer or employee of a gaming establishment on Indian lands; there was no error in the jury instructions where the instructions correctly defined "intent to defraud;" and there was no error in the admission of prior acts evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Livingston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner Michael Clark's conviction for theft on tribal trust land over which the State had jurisdiction. The Court noted that while the State lacked explicit statutory authorization to issue search warrants on tribal lands, federal law had not preempted the State's ability to do so. Further, the tribe had not used its inherent sovereignty to regulate the procedure by which state law enforcement could execute search warrants on the reservation. Petitioner moved to suppress evidence gathered on tribal land without a tribal warrant. View "Washington v. Clark" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1153, which provided for federal jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. The court held that the Tribal Enrollment Certificate was insufficient to establish that defendant was an Indian for the purposes of federal jurisdiction under section 1153 because the government introduced no evidence that defendant's bloodline was derived from a federally recognized tribe. Because the court held that the government introduced insufficient evidence under the first prong of the United States v. Bruce test, the court need not consider whether the Tribal Enrollment Certificate alone was sufficient to carry the government's burden as to the second prong. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's convictions under section 1153 in counts 2 through 9 of the indictment. Defendant's conviction for conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 was unaffected by the court's disposition.View "United States v. Zepeda" on Justia Law