Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

Brooks, a member of the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, is incarcerated for Minnesota convictions of first-degree DWI and assaulting an officer. The Minnesota Department of Corrections (MDOC) requires a chemical-dependency assessment. Brooks was ordered to complete treatment in order to be transferred to a lower-security prison, qualify for work release, and avoid disciplinary sanctions. Brooks began treatment in 2011, but, in 2012, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc; the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. 1996; and the Minnesota Constitution. He claimed that his required chemical-dependency program deprived him of his right to the free exercise of his religion. The district court dismissed some claims and granted summary judgment for the defendants on all others. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, because, based on the complaint, the court and the defendants could not discern what beliefs he has or what faith he professes. View "Brooks v. Roy" on Justia Law

The Ho-Chunk Nation, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, operates casinos in Wisconsin and nets more than $200 million annually from its gambling operations. Cash Systems, one of three businesses involved in this case, engaged in issuing cash to casino customers via automated teller machines and kiosks, check-cashing, and credit- and debit-card advances. Whiteagle, a member of the Nation, held himself out as an insider and offered vendors an entrée into the tribe’s governance and gaming operations. Cash Systems engaged Whiteagle in 2002 as a confidential consultant. Cash Systems served as the Nation’s cash-access services vendor for the next six years, earning more than seven million dollars, while it paid Whiteagle just under two million dollars. Whiteagles’s “in” was his relationship with Pettibone, who had been serving in the Ho-Chunk legislature since 1995. Ultimately, Whiteagle, Pettibone, and another were charged with conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371) to commit bribery in connection with the contracts with the Ho-Chunk Nation and substantive bribery (18 U.S.C. 666). Whiteagle was also charged with tax evasion and witness tampering. Pettibone pleaded guilty to corruptly accepting a car with the intent to be influenced in connection with a contract. Whiteagle admitted that he had solicited money and other things of value for Pettibone from three companies, but denied actually paying bribes to Pettibone and insisted that he and Pettibone had advocated for Whiteagle’s clients based on what they believed to be the genuine merits of those clients. Convicted on all counts, Whiteagle was sentenced, below-guidelines, to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on the bribery charges, the loss calculation, and admission of certain evidence.View "United States v. Whiteagle" on Justia Law

South Dakota Native American inmates filed suit against defendants claiming that a tobacco ban substantially burdened the exercise of their religious beliefs in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a). The court concluded that the record amply showed that the inmates have satisfied their burden. That some Native Americans practicing the Lakota religion would consider red willow bark a sufficient alternative to tobacco did not undermine the decision of the district court. Even assuming that defendants' ban on tobacco furthered compelling government interests in security and order, the ban was not the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. The court concluded that the scope of the district court's remedial orders extended no further than necessary to remedy the violation of inmates' rights under RLUIPA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of injunctive relief in all respects. View "Native American Council, etc., et al. v. Weber, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Philbert Rentz fired a single gunshot that wounded one victim and killed another. He was charged with two separate counts of using a firearm during a crime of violence. Defendant moved to dismiss the second count. The district court granted his motion, holding that the applicable statute under which defendant was charged could not support multiple charges arising from a single use of a firearm. The Government appealed the pre-trial dismissal of the second count. Finding that the trial court erred in dismissing the second count, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Rentz" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of mail fraud and theft by an officer or employee of a gaming establishment on Indian lands. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction. The court concluded that the location of the gaming establishment was not an element of the offense under 18 U.S.C. 1168(b) and that the indictment adequately alleged mail fraud and theft by an officer or employee of a gaming establishment on Indian lands; there was no error in the jury instructions where the instructions correctly defined "intent to defraud;" and there was no error in the admission of prior acts evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's convictions. View "United States v. Livingston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner Michael Clark's conviction for theft on tribal trust land over which the State had jurisdiction. The Court noted that while the State lacked explicit statutory authorization to issue search warrants on tribal lands, federal law had not preempted the State's ability to do so. Further, the tribe had not used its inherent sovereignty to regulate the procedure by which state law enforcement could execute search warrants on the reservation. Petitioner moved to suppress evidence gathered on tribal land without a tribal warrant. View "Washington v. Clark" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1153, which provided for federal jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. The court held that the Tribal Enrollment Certificate was insufficient to establish that defendant was an Indian for the purposes of federal jurisdiction under section 1153 because the government introduced no evidence that defendant's bloodline was derived from a federally recognized tribe. Because the court held that the government introduced insufficient evidence under the first prong of the United States v. Bruce test, the court need not consider whether the Tribal Enrollment Certificate alone was sufficient to carry the government's burden as to the second prong. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's convictions under section 1153 in counts 2 through 9 of the indictment. Defendant's conviction for conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 was unaffected by the court's disposition.View "United States v. Zepeda" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit bribery of an Indian tribal official, and aiding and abetting a bribery involving an agent of an Indian tribal government. Defendant raised evidentiary challenges on appeal. The court held that the district court did not plainly err in determining that evidence relating to uncharged bribery activity was "intrinsic" to the charged conspiracy and therefore admissible notwithstanding the government's failure to give defendant pretrial notice of its intent to use this evidence. Given the substantial evidence of defendant's guilt, and defendant's failure to object and his decision to rehash the same testimony on cross-examination, the court concluded that defendant was not sufficiently prejudiced by the admission of the testimony at issue for the court to exercise its discretion to recognize plain error, if any existed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.View "United States v. Duane Dale Big Eagle" on Justia Law

Defendant, the Bureau of Indian Affairs Superintendent at the Fort Peck Indian Reservation, was convicted of charges stemming from her involvement in a scheme to obtain money from a tribal credit program. The court reversed defendant's convictions on Counts I and II (conspiracy, theft and conversion of Indian Tribal Organization property) because the alleged object of the conspiracy - the loan modification - was not itself criminal and, therefore, there could be no conspiracy; affirmed defendant's conviction on Count III (bribery) where a rational jury could easily infer a quid pro quo from the facts; reversed defendant's conviction on Count IV (falsification, concealment, or covering up of a material fact) because the government did not show that defendant violated a specific duty to report Credit Program fraud; reversed defendant's conviction on Count V (public acts affecting a personal financial interest) because defendant's financial interest in this matter was insufficient under 18 U.S.C. 208(a); and affirmed defendant's conviction on Count VI (misprision of a felony) where a jury could conclude that payment of the loans at issue made the discovery of the fraud less likely and, therefore, that defendant took an affirmative step to conceal the felony. The court also concluded that there was no Fifth Amendment violation arising out of defendant's convictions on Count V and VI. Finally, the court remanded for resentencing where the district court erred in adjusting the sentence. View "United States v. White Eagle" on Justia Law

Petitioner David Magnan pled guilty to three county of murder in the first degree and one count of shooting with intent to kill. He was sentenced to death for each murder conviction, and to life for the shooting. In his application for habeas relief to the district court, Petitioner argued that his crimes took place in "Indian country," and that as a result, the state trial court lacked jurisdiction over the crimes. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found that a 1970 conveyance of property from the Seminole Nation to the federal Housing Authority extinguished any "Indian Country" designation; even assuming that the Seminole Nation retained some rights to the property in question, those rights were insufficient to deprive the State of criminal jurisdiction. The district court denied the writ application but granted a certificate of appealability. After its review of the case, the Tenth Circuit concluded that conveyance of the surface estate to the land in which the crimes took place were insufficient to extinguish Seminole Nation control over it. Therefore, the land in question was indeed "Indian Country" and therefore the state trial court lacked jurisdiction over the crimes. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case with instructions to grant Petitioner habeas relief. View "Magnan v. Workman, et al" on Justia Law