Justia Native American Law Opinion Summaries

A.W., 10 months old, lived with his mother, Maxwell; his father, White; and half-siblings. A.W. was developing normally. On August 30, Maxwell took a walk with the other children, returning 10 minutes later. White met them at the door and stated that A.W. was choking and that he had found a cigarette filter in A.W.’s mouth. At the hospital, A.W. seized, breathed irregularly, had unequal pupils, and had extensor posturing, which can indicate injury at the deepest part of the brain. A doctor noticed bruising, estimated to be hours old, and believed that A.W. had been “shaken.” At a Fargo medical center, doctors found a brain hemorrhage and concluded that A.W. had shaken baby syndrome. His parents raised concerns about Maxwell’s eight-year old son, J.S., who may have played a role in the death of dogs who were thrown against a tree; knocked out another child’s teeth; threw rocks at children; and had previously injured A.W. A.W. survived and was placed into a therapeutic foster home for medically fragile children. A jury found White guilty of assault resulting in serious bodily injury in Indian country, 18 U.S.C. 113(a)(6), 1151, 1153(a). The court granted White’s motion for acquittal. The Eighth Circuit reversed. The government’s case favored guilt. There was evidence about J.S., but also evidence that a reasonable jury could find to be powerful evidence of White’s guilt and evidence that J.S. did not injure A.W. on August 30. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

In a consolidated appeal, Respondents Steven B. and Ernie Begaye were both enrolled members of the Navajo Nation who were accused of offenses committed on Parcel Three of Fort Wingate (Parcel Three). The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Parcel Three was a "dependent Indian community" and therefore Indian country under 18 U.S.C. 1151(b) (2012) and "Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government," (522 U.S. 520 (1998)). If so, then the district court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Respondents; if not, then the New Mexico Supreme Court had to reverse the district court and permit the State to proceed against Respondents. In review of the controlling case law, the history and the present circumstances of Parcel Three, the Supreme Court concluded that Parcel Teal was not a dependent Indian community, and the district court, therefore, had jurisdiction over Respondents. The district court and the Court of Appeals having concluded otherwise, the Supreme Court reversed. View "New Mexico v. Steven B." on Justia Law

A jury convicted Derrick Jim of aggravated sexual abuse occurring in the Navajo Nation. Jim initially pled guilty to this offense, but later withdrew his plea and went to trial. On appeal, Jim claimed that the trial court erred when it let the Government present evidence of the admissions he made in his plea agreement and during his plea colloquy to the jury, despite Jim waiving his Rule 410 protections as part of the plea agreement underlying his (withdrawn) guilty plea. In its cross-appeal, the Government challenged Jim’s 360-month prison sentence, arguing that the district court erred in calculating Jim’s offense level under the sentencing guidelines. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in enforcing Jim’s Rule 410 waiver by allowing the Government to present to the jury Jim’s prior admissions of guilt. The Court agreed with the Government that the district court erred when it held that, in determining whether a two-offense-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2A3.1(b)(4)(B) for causing the victim serious bodily injury applied in Jim’s case, the court could not consider any injuries directly resulting from the sexual abuse for which Jim was convicted. Thus, the case was remanded for resentencing so the district court could determine, in the first instance, whether that enhancement was warranted in this case and, if so, the impact of that enhancement on Jim’s sentence. View "United States v. Jim" on Justia Law

Based on an incident between Fire Cloud, an Indian, and his friend’s girlfriend, that occurred in his home on Indian land, Fire Cloud was charged with aggravated sexual abuse by force (Count I) and attempted aggravated sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. 2241(a). He requested the district court instruct the jury regarding a lesser-included offense, abusive sexual contact, with respect to Count I, 18 U.S.C. 2244(a)(1). On Count I, the jury found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of abusive sexual contact. On Count II, the jury found him guilty of attempted aggravated sexual abuse. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the verdict and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence demonstrate that a reasonable jury could have found Fire Cloud guilty for both offense. View "United States v. Fire Cloud" on Justia Law

Misquadace pleaded guilty to failure to pay child support, 18 U.S.C. 228(a)(3). He was sentenced to five years’ probation and $54,613.12 in restitution. In 2013, he admitted failing to assign his tribal gaming per capita payment to the South Dakota Department of Social Services in violation of his probation conditions. Misquadace remained on probation and was ordered to pay $200 per month toward his outstanding child-support balance. The condition that he assign his per capita payment was eliminated. Weeks later, a second petition alleged failure to report a change of residence. At his revocation hearing, Misquadace admitted the violation. His probation was revoked. He explained that he had been homeless because of his alcohol addiction but had joined a new church, obtained housing, and was attempting to get his life back in order for the benefit of his children. Misquadace’s violation was a Grade C offense, and his advisory sentencing range was 8 to 14 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed the statutory maximum of 24 months’ imprisonment and 1 year of supervised release, and reduced the amount of restitution owed to $53,716. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the court properly weighed the sentencing factors. View "United States v. Misquadace" on Justia Law

Brown, Reyes, Lyons, and Tibbetts were indicted under the Lacey Act which makes it unlawful to "sell . . . any fish . . . taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of . . . any Indian tribal law." 16 U.S.C. 3372(a)(1). The indictments alleged that they had netted fish for commercial purposes within the boundaries of the Leech Lake Reservation in violation of the Leech Lake Conservation Code, then sold the fish. The four are Chippewa Indians, and they moved to dismiss the indictments on the ground that their prosecution violates fishing rights reserved under the 1837 Treaty between the United States and the Chippewa. The district court granted the motions. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the historic fishing rights of the Chippewa Indians bar the prosecution for taking fish within the Leech Lake Reservation. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 2011 the Roy home on the Red Lake Indian Reservation was engulfed in flames and collapsed before fire crews could extinguish the fire. The next morning the bodies of Roy and Beaulieu were retrieved from the rubble. Autopsies indicated that Roy and Beaulieu had been stabbed multiple times before the fire and that their death was caused by exsanguination. A jury convicted defendants, including Martin and Robinson, under 18 U.S.C. 1153, which allows the federal government to prosecute certain "offenses committed within Indian country," including murder or robbery. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of improper ex parte contact by the district court with the jury venire; that the government failed to prove Martin’s Indian status under section 1153 even though he stipulated to that fact; that the court erred by denying Robinson’s motions to sever and allowing the prosecutor to comment on his failure to testify; and that the court erred by declining to give Martin lesser included instruction on theft and by enhancing his sentence by six levels under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(3)(C) for infliction of permanent bodily injury. View "United States v. Martin" on Justia Law

Archambault, a Native American, has many prior convictions for child neglect and substance abuse in the Tribal Court and a history of mental health problems. Archambault's 13-year-old son told a healthcare worker that his mother began forcing him to smoke marijuana when he was six years old and that he had been prescribed Ritalin, but his mother took it from him. His mother would crush the pills and either inhale or inject them. Archambault sold pills that she did not use. Her son stated that he would get in trouble if he took the Ritalin himself. The Bureau of Indian Affairs interviewed Archambault. She admitted using and selling Ritalin and giving her son marijuana. Indicted for distribution of a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), she violated the terms of her release by testing positive for alcohol and marijuana and by disorderly conduct. She pled guilty. The court calculated a guideline range of four to 10 months, heard arguments, discussed the section 3553(a) factors, and concluded that Archambault posed a risk to her child, had an extensive tribal criminal history not reflected in her guideline category, and had performed poorly on pretrial release, then sentenced her to 18 months imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the the sentence. View "United States v. Archambault" on Justia Law

Brooks, a member of the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, is incarcerated for Minnesota convictions of first-degree DWI and assaulting an officer. The Minnesota Department of Corrections (MDOC) requires a chemical-dependency assessment. Brooks was ordered to complete treatment in order to be transferred to a lower-security prison, qualify for work release, and avoid disciplinary sanctions. Brooks began treatment in 2011, but, in 2012, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983; the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc; the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. 1996; and the Minnesota Constitution. He claimed that his required chemical-dependency program deprived him of his right to the free exercise of his religion. The district court dismissed some claims and granted summary judgment for the defendants on all others. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, because, based on the complaint, the court and the defendants could not discern what beliefs he has or what faith he professes. View "Brooks v. Roy" on Justia Law

The Ho-Chunk Nation, a federally recognized Indian Tribe, operates casinos in Wisconsin and nets more than $200 million annually from its gambling operations. Cash Systems, one of three businesses involved in this case, engaged in issuing cash to casino customers via automated teller machines and kiosks, check-cashing, and credit- and debit-card advances. Whiteagle, a member of the Nation, held himself out as an insider and offered vendors an entrée into the tribe’s governance and gaming operations. Cash Systems engaged Whiteagle in 2002 as a confidential consultant. Cash Systems served as the Nation’s cash-access services vendor for the next six years, earning more than seven million dollars, while it paid Whiteagle just under two million dollars. Whiteagles’s “in” was his relationship with Pettibone, who had been serving in the Ho-Chunk legislature since 1995. Ultimately, Whiteagle, Pettibone, and another were charged with conspiracy (18 U.S.C. 371) to commit bribery in connection with the contracts with the Ho-Chunk Nation and substantive bribery (18 U.S.C. 666). Whiteagle was also charged with tax evasion and witness tampering. Pettibone pleaded guilty to corruptly accepting a car with the intent to be influenced in connection with a contract. Whiteagle admitted that he had solicited money and other things of value for Pettibone from three companies, but denied actually paying bribes to Pettibone and insisted that he and Pettibone had advocated for Whiteagle’s clients based on what they believed to be the genuine merits of those clients. Convicted on all counts, Whiteagle was sentenced, below-guidelines, to 120 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence on the bribery charges, the loss calculation, and admission of certain evidence.View "United States v. Whiteagle" on Justia Law